University of Wollongong

Research Online
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection
2017+

University of Wollongong Thesis Collections

2018

Fatal ferry accidents, their causes, and how to prevent them
Neil Baird
University of Wollongong, neilrosebaird@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1
University of Wollongong
Copyright Warning
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any
copyright material contained on this site.
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised,
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material.
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the
conversion of material into digital or electronic form.
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the University of Wollongong.

Recommended Citation
Baird, Neil, Fatal ferry accidents, their causes, and how to prevent them, Doctor of Philosophy thesis,
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, 2018.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1/498

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

FATAL FERRY ACCIDENTS, THEIR CAUSES, AND
HOW TO PREVENT THEM
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the
degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
From
the

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
by

Neil Baird BA, ASIA, MPRIA, CNI
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts

2018

i

CERTIFICATION

I, Neil William Baird, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Australian National
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security; Faculty of Law, Humanities and
the Arts, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise
referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for
qualifications at any other academic institution.

Neil W. Baird
28 February 2018

ii

FATAL FERRY ACCIDENTS, THEIR CAUSES, AND
HOW TO PREVENT THEM
Table of Contents
Certification

ii

Detailed Table of Contents

iv

Illustrations: Tables, Figures, Graphs, Images and Maps

xiii

Abbreviations, Acronyms and Initials

xvi

Glossary

xxiv

Personae

xxxiii

Abstract

xxxvi

Acknowledgements

xxxviii

1.

Introduction

1

2.

Defining the problem

29

3.

Examples of major fatal ferry accidents

64

4.

Comparisons with other transport modes

107

5.

Economic, geographic, cultural and behavioural factors

130

6.

Technical factors – mechanical and structural

178

7.

Human factors – the roles of analysis, training, education,
psychology and insurance – Developing a safety culture

203

8.

Evacuation, lifesaving and search and rescue deficiencies

240

9.

National and international regulatory and enforcement
deficiencies

258

10.

Some possible solutions. What is to be done?

276

Appendices

308

Literature Review

324

Bibliography

335

iii

Detailed Table of Contents
Illustrations – Figures, Graphs, Images, Maps and Tables
Abbreviations, Acronyms and Initials
Glossary
Personae
Abstract
Acknowledgements

xiii
xvi
xxiv
xxxiii
xxxvi
xxxviii

Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1.0. Introduction
1.2.1. The problem in proportion
1.2.2. Human error the major cause
1.3.1. Inadequate reporting or recording of accidents
1.3.2. The „Internet effect‟
1.3.3. Poor, hot, „wet‟ developing countries are hit hardest
1.4.0. Geographical analysis of accidents
1.5.1. The „Danger Zone‟
1.5.2. Authorities appear unconcerned
1.5.3. Few others appear to care or even notice
1.6.0. Data and reporting deficiencies conceal real toll
1.7.0. Ferry accident rates compared with road, rail and aviation
1.8.0. Geographic, cultural, behavioural and economic factors
1.8.1. The poverty factor
1.8.2. The fatalism factor
1.9.0. Technical factors – mechanical and structural
1.10.0. Search and rescue deficiencies
1.11.0. Human factors – the roles of training, enforcement,
education, psychology and insurance
1.12.1. Regulatory and enforcement deficiencies
1.12.2. The world‟s ten worst offending ferry owners
1.13.0. The aviation model
1.14.0. Some possible solutions – What is to be done?
1.14.1. Solutions must be economical
1.14.2. Developing countries will not take the safety initiative
1.15.0. Much can be done practically and economically

1
2
6
7
8
9
10
11
11
14
15
16
18
18
19
19
20
22
24
26
26
27
27
28
28

Chapter 2 – Defining the problem
2.1.1. Defining the problem
2.1.2. Even a free press is powerless in developing countries
2.1.3. Maritime and general media provide more and better
information than governments
2.1.4. IMO data grossly misrepresents reality
2.1.5. Probably 50% of fatal PV accidents go unrecorded
2.1.6. Available data is disproportionately focused on developed
countries
2.1.7. Internet dramatically improved data availability

29
31
33
33
34
35
36
iv

2.2.1.
2.2.2.
2.3.1.
2.3.2.
2.3.3.
2.3.4.
2.3.5.
2.3.6.
2.4.1.
2.4.2.
2.4.3.
2.4.4.
2.5.1.
2.5.2.
2.5.3.
2.5.4.
2.5.5.
2.5.6.
2.6.0.

Causal analysis of fatal accidents 2000-2015
37
Causal analysis illustrated
39
Geographical analysis revisited
40
National fatality rates have remained largely consistent
41
Statistics are generally significantly understated
42
Known fatal ferry accidents – The worst five countries
43
Data analysis inadequacies
44
Analytical methodology
44
Causes of passenger vessel accidents
45
Human error, undoubtedly, is overwhelmingly and consistently
the major cause of fatal accidents
46
Defining human error
47
Considerable attention accorded to human error
48
Human errors that cause passenger vessel accidents
51
Overloading
51
Unseaworthy vessels
53
Poor lookout
57
General negligence
59
Poor seamanship
62
Human factors are the predominant cause of passenger
vessel accidents
63

Chapter 3 – Examples of major fatal ferry accidents
3.1.0. Examples of major fatal ferry accidents
3.2.0. Heraklion, 231 fatalities, 8 December 1966
3.2.1. Hongxing 240 and Hongxing 245, 432 fatalities, 4 August
1975
3.2.2. Don Juan, 1,000 plus fatalities, 22 April 1980
3.2.3. Tamponas II, 580 fatalities, 24 January 1981
3.2.4. Herald of Free Enterprise, 197 fatalities, 6 March 1987
3.2.5. Dona Paz, 4,386 fatalities, 20 December 1987
3.2.6. Baccha Singh, 438 fatalities, 6 August 1988
3.2.7. Scandinavian Star, 159 fatalities, 7 April 1990
3.2.8. Moby Prince, 143 fatalities, 10 April 1991
3.2.9. Salem Express, 470 plus fatalities, 17 December 1991
3.2.10. Neptune, 1,700 plus fatalities, 17 December 1993
3.2.11. Estonia, 912 fatalities, 28 September 1994
3.2.12. Bukoba, 1,000 plus fatalities, 21 May 1996
3.2.13. Bimas Raya II, 275 plus fatalities, 19 October 1999
3.2.14. Salahuddin II, 370 plus fatalities, 3 May 2002
3.2.15. Le Joola, 1,863 fatalities, 26 September 2002
3.2.16. Nasreen/Nazren/ Nasrin, 400 plus fatalities, 8 July 2003
3.2.17. Al Salam Boccaccio 98, 1,026 fatalities, 3 February 2006
3.2.18. Senopati Nusantara, 560 fatalities, 30 December 2006
3.2.19. Princess of the Stars, 870 fatalities, 21 June 2008
3.2.20. Teratai Prima Dua, 255 fatalities, 11 January 2009
3.2.21. Spice Islander, 2,764 fatalities, 10 September 2011
3.2.22. Rabaul Queen, 252 fatalities, 2 February 2012
3.2.23. Sewol, 304 fatalities, 16 April 2014

64
66
67
68
69
71
73
75
75
77
78
79
80
83
85
86
87
89
91
93
94
97
98
100
102
v

3.2.24. Dongfang Zhi Xing/Oriental Star/Eastern Star, 442 fatalities,
2 June 2015
104
3.3.0. Similarities abound in these case studies
105

Chapter 4 – Comparisons with other transport modes
4.1.0.
4.1.1.
4.1.2.
4.1.3.
4.1.4.
4.1.5.
4.2.1.
4.2.2.
4.3.1.
4.3.2.

Comparisons
107
Comparisons with other modes of transport
107
Inconsistent railway statistics
108
Bus accident data are scarcer and more nebulous
109
Available rail and bus statistics appear erroneous
110
Comparisons restricted to car, oil tanker and aviation sectors 110
Aviation presents a particularly relevant and useful model
112
ICAO accident database is an excellent guide
114
Aviation safety statistics
115
ICAO actively encourages safety intelligence gathering.
IMO, regrettably, does not
115
4.4.1. Comparing 16 years of comprehensive Passenger Airliner and
„known‟ Passenger Vessel Fatality Statistics
117
4.4.2. Continually improving aviation safety performance
118
4.5.1. IMO‟s inadequate ferry safety intelligence data
119
4.5.2. Impressive, well-documented improvements in oil tanker
safety
120
4.6.1. Useful road safety statistics in the developed world
122
4.6.2. Data shows effectiveness of „carrot and stick‟ approach
123
4.6.3. Road deaths per 100,000 population 2013 OECD nations and
Australian states/territories
127
4.6.4. Decline in Road accident Fatalities 1970-2014 Selected OECD
member nations
128
4.7.0. Aviation, oil tanker and road safety successes provide
grounds for optimism
128

Chapter 5 – Behavioural, cultural, economic, educational
and geographic factors
5.1.0.
5.1.1.
5.1.2.
5.1.3.
5.1.4.
5.1.5.
5.1.6.
5.1.7.
5.2.0.

Economic considerations
Poverty, the over-riding factor
The ten worst countries for ferry fatalities
Fatal ferry accidents by country
Ferry fatalities by country
Fewer fatalities arise from each developed country accident
Domestic voyages are much more dangerous
Despite poverty, potential for reform exists
Economic, educational, political and cultural
comparison
5.3.0. Geographic considerations
5.4.0. Cultural and behavioural considerations
5.4.1. Poverty and corruption are closely related

130
130
132
133
134
135
135
136
137
138
139
139

vi

5.4.2. So, too, are poverty and malnutrition and inadequate
education
5.4.3. Effects of religion and its also resulting fatalism
5.4.4. Irrational passenger behaviour
5.4.5. Serially offending shipowners
5.4.6. Human factors far more important than technical ones
5.5.0. Bangladesh
5.5.1. Geography necessitates extensive ferry travel
5.5.2. Scarce official ferry accident data
5.5.3. An improving economy
5.5.4. Violent and dangerous but improving
5.5.5. Export vessels are world class, local craft much less so
5.5.6. Few investigations, few trials, rare punishments
5.5.7. Considerable real potential for improvement
5.6.0. China
5.6.1. Geography facilitates extensive ferry use
5.6.2. Very rapid economic development
5.6.3. Accidents mostly involve domestic ferries
5.6.4. Dilapidated, deplorably crewed vessels
5.6.5. China will likely need to be „shamed‟ into improvement
5.7.0. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo)
5.7.1. Geography, economics and politics necessitate water travel
5.7.2. Corruption “strangles” waterway transport
5.7.3. Water – the economical and convenient transport medium
5.7.4. Many ferry accidents go unreported
5.7.5. Water travel is still the safest and most reliable means
5.8.0. Egypt
5.8.1. Geographic, cultural and economic problems prevail
5.8.2. Modified, elderly Ro-Pax ferries make matters worse
5.8.3. Regulation of inland waterways vessels is non-existent
5.8.4. Crowded waterways – collisions are common
5.9.0. Haiti
5.9.1. Geography and poverty lead to reliance on water transport
5.9.2. Ferries are commonly dangerously unseaworthy
5.9.3. Little real prospect of ferry safety improvement
5.10.0. Indonesia
5.10.1. Archipelagic geography necessitates water travel
5.10.2. A resource rich but poorly managed nation
5.10.3. Many Indonesian ferries are unsafe
5.10.4. IMO has tentatively tried but failed in Indonesia
5.10.5. Potential for assisted improvement is evident
5.11.0. Myanmar (Burma)
5.11.1. Politically repressed, geographically water dependent
5.11.2. Geographically and climatically similar to Bangladesh
5.11.3. Ferry fatality record is likely to be far worse than reported
5.11.4. Myanmar remains a dangerous place for ferry travel
5.12.0. The Philippines
5.12.1. Ferry travel unavoidable in the most archipelagic nation
5.12.2. Ferries remain dangerous despite recent improvements
5.12.3. Fatality record is probably worse than it appears

140
140
141
142
142
144
144
145
145
146
147
148
148
149
149
150
150
151
151
152
152
153
153
154
154
155
156
156
156
157
157
158
158
159
159
160
160
160
162
162
163
164
164
165
165
166
167
167
168
vii

5.12.4. Fast growing tourist and ship building industries will inspire
safety improvements
5.12.5. Government is well aware of the ferry safety problem
5.12.6. Some promising local examples of safety improvements
5.13.0. Senegal
5.13.1. Geographically and culturally vulnerable
5.13.2. Ferry accident data is inadequate
5.13.3. Rich resources, poor people
5.13.4. Ferry accidents mostly kill local people
5.14.0. Tanzania
5.14.1. Geographically and economically vulnerable
5.14.2. Inadequate reporting conceals a bad safety record
5.14.3. New vessel safety compromised by old operational failings
5.14.4. Good reform potential once bad habits are eliminated
5.15.0. The ten most dangerous countries in summary

168
169
170
171
171
172
172
173
174
174
175
176
176
176

Chapter 6 – Technical factors – mechanical and structural
6.1.0. Human factors are almost invariably the cause of
accidents
178
6.1.1. Technical factors have caused fewer than twelve per cent of
fatal ferry accidents and two per cent of fatalities.
178
6.1.2. Most structural or mechanical failures are due to human error,
usually inadequate maintenance
179
6.1.3. Fires, too, are primarily due to human error
179
6.1.4. Almost all vessels are at least adequately designed and built 180
6.2.1. Conventional, monohull Ro-Pax ferries are statistically
a very significant problem
181
6.2.2. Fatal conceptual flaw of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries
makes them particularly vulnerable in an accident
182
6.2.3. Southward migration of elderly monohull Ro-Pax ships is a
serious danger
183
6.2.4. Thirty-two per cent of ferry fatalities have involved Ro-Pax
ships
185
6.2.5. Conventional Ro-Pax ferry fatality summary 2000-2015
185
6.2.6. Dangers of „grandfathering‟
187
6.2.7. Fast ferries, particularly multihulls, are very safe ferries 188
6.2.8. Fast ferry fatality summary
190
6.3.1. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are inherently
dangerous
192
6.3.2. Multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries have proved to be significantly
safer
193
6.3.3. Multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries are far less vulnerable to human
error
195
6.3.4. Even conceptually unsafe vessels require human error to kill 196
6.4.1. The HSC Code – An unforseen benefit
197
6.4.2. Little likelihood of technical factors causing accidents 198
6.5.1. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are the major problem
technically. They should be banned
199
viii

6.5.2. Simple, standardised smaller ferry designs would help
6.5.3. Human factors almost always the cause

202
202

Chapter 7 – Human factors – The roles of data collection,
analysis, training, education, psychology and insurance –
Developing a safety culture
7.1.1. Human error – the main overriding cause of almost all
fatal ferry accidents
7.1.2. Behavioural improvement is achievable
7.1.3. Accidents don‟t just happen
7.2.0. The six most dangerous human factors
7.2.1. Unseaworthy vessels
7.2.2. Poor lookout
7.2.3. Overloaded vessels
7.2.4. Negligence
7.2.5. Poor seamanship
7.2.6. Suicides/Accidents
7.2.7. The hierarchy of accident causes
7.3.1. Analysis of human factors or errors and their effects – the
human element
7.4.1. Wider analyses of human factor roles in fatalities
7.5.1. IMO‟s Human Element Vision
7.5.2. Classification societies, too, have researched human error
7.5.3. Governments, generally, are well aware of the human error
problem
7.5.4. Industry and professional associations are similarly active
7.6.1. How, then, is a “safety culture” to be developed
7.6.2. The aviation industry, as usual, shows us the way
7.6.3. Aviation vs. Maritime – A strange dichotomy
7.6.4. Adapting proven error solutions to the maritime industry
7.7.1. Better training would eliminate many problems
7.7.2. Who will pay for such training?
7.8.0. Insurers to demand reforms
7.9.0. Proven human error solutions are well known

203
205
206
208
209
210
210
211
211
211
212
212
215
218
219
222
224
226
229
230
232
233
235
236
238

Chapter 8 – Evacuation, lifesaving and search and rescue
Deficiencies
8.1.0. Evacuation, lifesaving and SAR deficiencies
8.2.1. Evacuation difficulties are the primary problem here
8.2.2. Some vessel types are much harder to evacuate
8.2.3. Evacuation problems have been studied extensively
8.2.4. Meaningless mathematically based evacuation analysis
8.2.5. The importance of effective safety briefings
8.2.6. Exits and life saving equipment must be accessible, obvious
and easily used
8.3.1. Little effective safety equipment reaches developing
countries

240
241
241
242
243
243
245
246
ix

8.3.2. Much IMO “approved” safety equipment is heavy, difficult,
expensive, impractical and even dangerous
8.3.3. Conventional lifeboats are an expensive, complex, heavy
and largely inadequate solution
8.3.4. Evacuation and lifesaving equipment should be simpler,
lighter, cheaper and easier to use
8.3.5. Currently mandated safety equipment is often inappropriate
to poor tropical countries
8.3.6. Alternative, more economical safety equipment is available
8.4.1. Search and Rescue failures remain a serious problem
8.4.2. Excellent models exist for effective SAR organisation
8.4.3. IMO‟s SAR Convention has proved to be effective where
implemented. EPIRB‟s, also, are very effective when fitted
8.4.4. Real efforts being made to promote better SAR services
8.5.0. Evacuation, lifesaving and SAR deficiencies remain
although practical and economical solutions are
available

247
247
248
249
250
252
254
255
255
256

Chapter 9 – National and international regulatory and
enforcement deficiencies
9.1.0.
9.1.1.
9.1.2.
9.1.3.
9.1.4.
9.1.5.
9.2.1.
9.2.2.
9.2.3.
9.2.4.
9.2.5.
9.2.6.
9.2.7.
9.2.8.
9.2.9.
9.3.0.
9.4.0.

A global problem
Too much regulation – Too much bureaucracy…
IMO is well aware of the domestic ferry safety problem
IMO, generally, fails to „follow-up‟
IMO is the most important weak link in the regulatory chain
Oil tanker reforms show what IMO is capable of
The Philippines – Major enforcement weaknesses
China, too, is well intentioned but slow acting
Indonesia – Plentiful regulations, regulators and
investigators
Bangladesh has similar problems to Indonesia
Tanzania. Chaotic but having realistic reform potential
Myanmar is probably worse than it looks
Egypt, despite its many problems, has reform potential
DR Congo, Haiti and Senegal will be difficult to reform
The twenty worst countries for ferry fatalities and their
potential for reform
Enforcement deficiencies are the core problem
Effective regulatory and enforcement reform is
possible…

258
258
259
260
261
262
262
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
272
274

Chapter 10 – Some possible solutions – What is to be done?
10.1.0. Human error is the fundamental problem and IMO is currently
an inadequate solution
276
10.1.1. Reducing human errors must be the primary focus
280
10.1.2. Simplify, improve and, above all, enforce existing
regulations
281
x

10.2.0. Reform of IMO would be the preferred solution
282
10.2.1. IMO appears remote, disengaged and disinterested in
developing country domestic ferry fatalities
282
10.2.2. IMO must develop the „will‟ to effectively support and assist
developing countries to improve their domestic maritime safety
standards by working „with‟ them
284
10.2.3. IMO HQ should move to centre of real maritime world
285
10.2.4. Passengers have a right to expect domestic voyages to be
equally as safe as international ones and airline flights
285
10.2.5. Reform IMO with ICAO as a model
285
10.2.6. Revise IMO‟s SOLAS Code to be more economical using
the HSC Code as a model
286
10.3.1. Ban new construction of conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries
287
10.3.2. Sales of elderly, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries
to developing countries should be banned immediately 288
10.4.1. Focus reform effort on most dangerous countries
289
10.4.2. National authority reform
289
10.5.1. Introduce a standard format accident inquiry model
290
10.5.2. Improve database of accidents and enquiry reports
291
10.5.3. A culture of learning from minor accidents and „near misses‟
should be widely promoted
292
10.6.0. Improve vessel design, construction and equipment
292
10.6.1. Design, construction and equipment of vessels should be
economically and climatically appropriate
292
10.6.2. Promote standardised safe ferry types and designs
294
10.6.3. Mandate fitting of simple, inexpensive lifesaving equipment 295
10.6.4. Recognise that inadequate maintenance is a vastly bigger
problem than bad design or construction deficiencies
296
10.7.0. Introduce improved universal ticketing systems
297
10.8.0. Utilise human factors specialists
297
10.9.0. Encourage classification societies to assist on a pro bono
basis
298
10.10.0. Encourage passenger behavioural reform
299
10.10.1. Consumer education of ferry passengers should be
promoted
299
10.10.2. Aviation-like seating rules should apply to smaller and fast
ferries
300
10.10.3. NO SMOKING rules should be rigorously enforced
300
10.11.0. Encourage owner, officer and crew behavioural
reform
301
10.11.1. Basic officer and crew training, education and behaviour
must be improved
301
10.11.2. Delinquent owners, masters and officers should be
severely punished
302
10.11.3. The problem of fatalism must be rectified
302
10.11.4. Withhold insurance from proven bad owners
303
10.12.0. Improve evacuation, search, rescue and recovery
303
10.13.0. Raise public consciousness of the ferry safety problem
304
10.13.1. Global approach required
304
xi

10.13.2. Implement a global „vetting‟ system for passenger vessels 305
10.14.0. Promote swimming lessons globally
305
10.15.0. Conclusion
306

Appendices

308

Literature Review

324

Bibliography

335

xii

Illustrations
List of figures, graphs, images, maps and tables.
Figures
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
4.1.
4.2.
7.1.

Author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel accidents 6
The „Internet Effect‟
8
Geographical analysis of accidents and fatalities
10
Fatal accidents reported worldwide
36
Author assessed causes of fatal PVA 2000 to 2015
39
Author assessed causes of fatal PVA 1966 to 2015
40
Geographical analysis of PVA and fatalities 2000 to 2015
40
Geographical analysis of PVA and fatalities 1966 to 2015
41
Airliner accidents per 1 million flights 1977-2016
118
Reduction in numbers of marine oil spills from tankers
1970-2010
121
The hierarchy of human errors
209

Graphs

4.1.
4.2.

Road deaths per 100,000 population – OECD nations
Steady reduction in road accident fatalities per million
inhabitants

Images
1.1.
1.2.

1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
2.7.
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
3.5.
3.6.

The sinking of the „unsinkable‟ Titanic
Coffins of some of the 4,386 victims of the Dona Paz
collision
The developing country problem: massive overloading
The wreckage of the large motor banca Kim Nirvana
Search and rescue efforts vary enormously
Where corruption prevails, safety is not a major
consideration
The sinking of the Princess of the Stars in 2008
Typical examples of gross overloading of top-heavy ferries
Overloaded ferries are nothing new
A Filipino motor banca
The Al Salam Boccaccio 98 was a dangerously modified
ferry
Modern, well-designed and constructed ferries in the
Philippines
“Only” two died following an engine room fire on Nordlys
S.S. Heraklion as S.S. Leicestershire under prior ownership
Don Juan
The Indonesian Government owned ferry Tamponas II on
fire
The Herald of Free Enterprise aground and capsized
The collision, fire and sinking of the Dona Paz was the worst
The Scandinavian Star was struck by a dedicated arsonist

127
128
1
4
15
20
22
25
32
51
52
55
56
60
61
66
68
69
71
73
75
xiii

3.7.
3.8.
3.9.
3.10.
3.11.
3.12.
3.13.
3.14.
3.15.
3.16.
3.17.
3.18.
3.19.
3.20.
3.21.
3.22.
3.23.
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
5.1.
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
6.6.
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.

The Italian Ro-Pax ferry Moby Prince after the collision and
fire
77
Salem Express submerged in deeper water having slid off the
reef
78
The Estonia photographed shortly before her sinking
80
Bukoba capsized just before sinking off the Tanzanian shore 83
Bimas Raya II in Merauke in 1996.
85
The wreckage of Salahuddin II being salvaged after her
sinking
86
Le Joola before her sinking, one of the worst ever ferry
disasters
87
Le Joola capsized but still afloat with people still alive inside 88
The reason there are so many fatalities in Bangladeshi
accidents
89
Al Salam Boccaccio 98, an Italian built, Egyptian owned
Ro-Pax
91
The inter-island conventional Ro-Pax ferry Senopati
Nusantara
93
Princess of the Stars at the Manila ferry terminal
94
Teratai Prima Dua alongside
97
Spice Islander was in appalling condition before her fatal
voyage
98
Rabaul Queen
100
Sewol showing the modifications that contributed to its
instability
102
Dongfang Zhi Xing capsized in the Yangtze River
104
The obvious risks of overloaded Indian trains
108
The problem with buses. A typical grossly overloaded Indian
bus
109
Aviation accidents, while rare, result in large numbers of
fatalities
114
Western Marine Shipyard has built a number of fine vessels 147
The demise of the formerly WSF owned Skagit
189
General arrangement drawing of the Estonia
192
General arrangement drawing of an Incat 98 metre high
speed catamaran
195
A 20 metre Filipino motor banca held together with string
199
General arrangement of the 2017 Damen 5510 Ro-Pax ferry 201
The Damen 5510 shows a properly designed monohull
Ro-Pax
202
Liferaft Systems Australia (LSA) marine evacuation
systems (MES)
249
An inexpensive lightweight HDPE Carley float
251
The 20 person Karly Float is simple, light and effective
252

10.1. One of Fast Cat Ferries‟ 20+ modern Ro-Pax Philippine
ferries
10.2. Pool noodles would provide cheap, easy to use buoyancy
aids

293
296

xiv

Maps
1.1.
5.1.
5.2.

The „Danger Zone‟
11
The world‟s worst ten countries for ferry fatalities
132
Bangladesh showing that a river delta overlays much of the
country
144
5.3. China has a lengthy coastline, many islands, rivers and
canals
149
5.4. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
152
5.5. Egypt with its lengthy Red and Mediterranean sea coasts
155
5.6. Haiti comprises about one third of the island of Hispaniola
157
5.7. Indonesia comprises an archipelago of 17,000 islands
159
5.8. Myanmar, formerly known as Burma is on the Bay of Bengal 163
5.9. The Philippines, like Indonesia, is an archipelago
166
5.10. Senegal is almost bisected by The Gambia
171
5.11. Tanzania is surrounded by large lakes and the Indian Ocean 174

Tables
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
2.1.
4.1.
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
6.1.

6.2.

The Numberwatch table of fatality numbers
The poverty factor. Ten worst countries for road accidents
The worst offending companies by total deaths
The worst offending companies by total fatal accidents
Data from the five most dangerous countries compared
A comparison of fatal aircraft and ferry accidents
Known Fatal Ferry Accidents by country from 1966-2015
Known Total Ferry Fatalities by country 1966-2015
An economic, educational, political and cultural comparison
Conventional Monohull Ro-Pax Ferry Fatality Summary
2000-2015
Summary of fast ferry fatalities by vessel type and region

17
18
26
26
43
117
133
134
137
185
190

xv

Abbreviations, Acronyms and Initials
ABS. American Bureau of Shipping. United States‟ classification society.
ACOPS. Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea.
ACRO. Aircraft Crashes Records Office.
ADB. Asian Development Bank.
AIIB. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
AIS. Automatic Identification System.
AMSA. Australian Maritime Safety Authority.
ARPA. Automatic Radar Plotting Aids.
ASR. Air Sea Rescue.
ATSB. Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
AusAID. Australian Agency for International Development.
AUSMEPA. Australian Marine Environment Protection Association.
BASI. (Australian) Bureau of Air Safety Investigation.
BIMCO. Baltic and International Maritime Council. Global trade association of
ship owners.
BOMI. Board of Marine Inquiry.
BMPVA. Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel database.
BV. Bureau Veritas. French classification society.
BWM. International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships‟
Ballast water and Sediments. (of IMO).
CCG. Canadian Coast Guard.
CCS. China Classification Society.
CEFOR. Central Union of Marine Insurers.
CIC. Casualty Investigation Code (of IMO).
ClassNK. Short version of NKK Japanese classification society.
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CMI. Comite Maritime International.
CNG. Compressed Natural Gas.
COLREGS. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (of
IMO).
COI. Commission of Inquiry.
COSPASS/SARSAT. Satellite facilitated marine search and rescue system.
CSR. Corporate Social responsibility.
DBP. Development Bank of the Philippines.
DMA. Danish Maritime Authority.
DNV. Det Norske Veritas. Norwegian classification society.
DNV-GL. Det Norske Veritas – Germanischer Lloyd. Classification society.
DSMP. Domestic Shipping Modernisation Program (of the Philippines).
DWT. Dead Weight Tons. A measure of a ships carrying capacity including
cargo, fuel, stores, crew and passengers.
EASA. European Aviation Safety Agency.
EBRD. European Bank for reconstruction and Development.
ECDIS. Electronic Chart Display and Information System.
ECS. Electronic chart system.
EEDI. Energy Efficient design Index.
EEZ. Exclusive Economic Zone.
EMSA. European Maritime Safety Agency.
EP. European Parliament.
EPIRB. Emergency Position Indicating Rescue Beacon.
EUROCONTROL. Integrates and harmonises air traffic management across
all European countries.
EUROREP. European Vessel reporting System.
FAO. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.
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FOC. Flag of Convenience.
FRP. Fibre reinforced plastic. A construction material a.k.a. fibreglass.
FSF. Flight Safety Foundation.
GDP. Gross Domestic Product.
GISIS. Global Integrated Shipping Information System (of IMO).
GL. Germanischer Lloyd. German classification society. Now part of DNV.
GMDSS. Global Maritime Distress and Safety System.
GPS. Global Positioning System.
GRP. Glass reinforced plastic. A construction material, aka fibreglass.
GRT. Gross registered ton/tons. A volumetric measure of a ships capacity.
Commonly used to describe the sizes of passenger vessels.
GT. Gross ton/tons, as above.
HCG. Hellenic Coast Guard.
HDPE. High density polyethylene. A rugged plastic construction material.
HELMEPA. Hellenic Marine Environment Protection Association.
HE. Human error.
HF. High frequency radio.
Hp. (hp) Horsepower.
HSC. High Speed Craft Code (of IMO).
IACS. International Association of Classification Societies.
IATA. International Air Transport Association.
IBIA. International Bunker Industry Association.
ICAO. International Civil Aviation Organisation. The aviation counterpart of
IMO. Based in Montreal.
ICC. International Chamber of Commerce.
ICG. Indian Coast Guard.
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ICS. International Chamber of Shipping.
IFO. Intermediate Fuel Oil.
IGF. International Code of safety for Ships using Gases or other Lowflashpoint Fuels (of IMO).
IGO. Intergovernmental Organisation.
ILO. International Labour Organisation (of the United Nations).
ILU. Institute of London Underwriters.
IMDG. International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (of IMO).
IMF. International Monetary Fund.
IMO. International Maritime Organisation.
IMRF. International Maritime Rescue Federation.
INMARSAT. International Maritime Satellite Telecommunications
Organisation.
INTERFERRY. International association of ferry owners and operators
(Disclosure: The author is a member of INTERFERRY).
INTERMEPA. International Marine Environment Protection Association.
IRS. Indian Register of Shipping.
IRTAD. International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group of the OECD.
ISF. International Shipping Federation.
ISM. International Safety Management Code (of IMO).
ISU. International Salvage Union.
ITF. International Transport Forum.
ITF. International Transport Workers Federation.
IUMI. International Union of Marine Insurers.
JAIC. Joint Accident Investigation Commission of the Estonian, Finnish and
Swedish governments investigating the Estonia accident.
JAMRI. Japanese Maritime Research Institute.
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JBIC. Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
JCG. Japan Coast Guard.
JICA. Japan International Cooperation Agency.
KRS. Korean Register of Shipping, a classification society.
Kw. Kilowatt.
kWh. Kilowatt hours.
LL. Load Line.
LMIS. Lloyd‟s Maritime Information Services.
LNG. Liquified Natural Gas.
LR. Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping. London based classification society.
LRETRU. Lloyd‟s Register Educational Trust Research Unit.
LRF. Lloyd‟s Register Foundation.
LRS. Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping (as above).
MAIB. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (of the UK).
MARINA. Marine Industry Authority (of the Philippines).
MARPOL. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.
(IMO).
MAYDAY. Distress signal transmitted by radio.
MBOI. Marine Board of Inquiry.
MCA. Marine and Coastguard Authority (of the UK).
MDO. Marine Diesel Oil.
MEPC. Marine Environment Protection Committee (of IMO).
MES. Marine Evacuation Systems incorporating evacuation chutes and
integrated liferafts.
MIT. Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.
MOB. Man (woman or person) over board.
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MoS. Motorway of the Sea.
MRCC POM. Marine Rescue Coordination Centre in Port Moresby.
MRO. Marine Rescue Operations (library) of the IMRF.
MSAS. Member State Audit Scheme (of IMO).
MSC. Maritime Safety Committee (of IMO).
NF. Nippon Foundation.
NGO. Non Governmental Organisation.
NI. Nautical Institute (Disclosure: The author is a member of The Nautical
Institute).
NKK. Nippon Kaiji Kyoka. Japanese classification society.
NLR-ATSI. NLR Air Transport Safety Institute.
nm. Nautical mile.
NMO. Norwegian Maritime Directorate.
NMSA. National Marine Safety Authority of Papua New Guinea.
NTSB. National Transportation Safety Board (of the USA).
NTSC. National Transportation Safety Committee of Indonesia.
OECD. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OECF. Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (of Japan).
OH&S. Occupational health and safety.
OSV. Offshore service vessel.
PAG-ASA, Philippine Atmospheric and Geophysical Sciences Association.
PAL. Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage by Sea (PAL) (of IMO).
PAMI. Philippine Association of Maritime Institutions.
PAN PAN PAN. Distress signal (less urgent) transmitted by radio.
P & I. Clubs. Protection and Indemnity clubs (Insurance).
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PCG. Philippine Coast Guard.
PDP. Philippine Development Plan.
PIISA. Philippine Inter-Island Shipowners Association.
PM. Particulate matter.
PNG. Papua New Guinea.
PSO. Public Service Obligation.
PV. Passenger vessel, or vessels.
RAN. Royal Australian Navy.
RBG. Rescue Boat Guidelines (of the IMRF).
RCC Australia. Rescue Coordination Centre in Canberra.
RINA. Royal Institution of Naval Architects (UK).
RInA. Italian Register of Shipping (Classification society).
RN. Royal Navy.
RNLI. Royal National Lifeboat Institution of the United Kingdom and Ireland.
RNZN. Royal New Zealand Navy.
Ro-Pax. Roll on, roll off passenger and vehicle ferry.
Ro-Ro. Roll on, roll off vehicle ferry.
RPN. Republic of the Philippines Navy.
RSN. Republic of Singapore Navy.
SAR. Search and Rescue Convention of IMO. And, simply, search and
rescue.
SCCG. South Korean Coast Guard.
SDR. Special Drawing Rights.
SMS. Safety Management System.
SNAME. Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (USA).
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SOLAS. Safety of Life at Sea Convention (of IMO).
SOS. Distress signal (traditional) transmitted by radio.
SRS. Ship Reporting System
STCW. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (of IMO).
SWATH. Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull. A type of catamaran with semisubmerging hulls.
TSS. Traffic Separation Scheme.
UN or UNO. United Nations or United Nations Organisation.
UNCLOS. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
USCG. United States Coast Guard.
USN. United States Navy.
USOAP. Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program (of ICAO).
VDR. (or VDA). Voyage Data Recorder or “Black Box”.
VHF. Very high frequency radio.
VSL. Value of a statistical life.
VTS. Vessel Tracking System (or Service).
WBW. Work Boat World magazine.
WFSA. Worldwide Ferry Safety Association.
WHO. World Health Organisation (of the United Nations).
WMRC. World Maritime Recue Congress (of the IMRF).
WMU. World Maritime University (Subsidiary of IMO).
WOC. World Ocean Council. An international maritime industry association.
WSC. World Shipping Council.
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Glossary
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). A classification society.
Accident. An unintended event involving fatality, injury, vessel loss or serious
damage, environmental damage or external property damage.
Airworthy. An aircraft is deemed to be airworthy if it is capable of safely flying
over its intended route at the intended time.
Allision. An unintended, usually violent collision with a fixed object such as a
bridge, wharf or quay.
Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea (PAL). The IMO‟s PAL Convention “establishes a regime of liability for
damage suffered by passengers carried on a seagoing vessel. It declares a
carrier liable for damage or loss suffered by a passenger if the incident
causing the damage occurred in the course of the carriage and was due to the
fault or neglect of the carrier”. Entry into force 23 April 2014. (Source IMO).
Ausmarine. Formerly known as Professional Fisherman. Australia‟s maritime
trade magazine. {Owned by the author‟s family company.}
Austal Ships. A leading Australian builder of large aluminium ships. One of the
two main pioneers of high speed RO-Pax vessels.
Banka, bangka, banca. Traditional Filipino craft used for fishing, cargo and
passenger carrying. Can be sail, paddle or engine powered. Essentially
comprising a slim, canoe-like main or central hull stabilised by two outrigger
floats usually attached very flimsily. That makes them particularly vulnerable
to capsize in the event of an outrigger float breaking off the vessel. Similar
craft also operate in Indonesia.
Barge. Traditionally a non-powered vessel used for carrying cargo of various
kinds, sometimes people, and propelled using an associated tug.
Beam. The extreme lateral width of a vessel.
Boat. Generally a small vessel, often undecked.
Bow door. A large door through which vehicles are driven and which is
located at the extreme front of the vessel.
Bridge. (Of a ship or boat). The control or command position from which the
vessel is navigated or driven.
Bridge team management. The organisation of the officers and ratings
working on the bridge or wheelhouse of a vessel.
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Bulkheads. Walls or panels dividing a vessel laterally into compartments.
They structurally support the hull sides of the vessel and, if watertight, can
subdivide the vessel‟s hull into watertight compartments.
Bulker. A ship designed to carry cargoes such as minerals, grain or
woodchips in bulk utilising large watertight compartments.
Bureau Veritas. A classification society.
Carley float. A lifesaving device resembling a small, double-sided boat.
Designed to support a number of survivors.
Captain. The person in command or control of a vessel and responsible for its
safe navigation.
Casino ship/boat/vessel. Any vessel either berthed or underway, the primary
purpose of which is to facilitate gambling.
Catamaran. A vessel having two separate hulls joined by a rigid bridge-deck.
The two separate hulls normally comprise several watertight compartments.
Those factors make catamarans more stable and less likely to sink than single
hulled craft. They, and trimarans, have the best safety record of all ferries.
Having two fine hulls normally means that catamarans incur less water
resistance than conventional vessels and, thus, require less power.
Classification society. A mutual organisation charged with ensuring the safety
and seaworthiness of vessels.
Collision. An unintended, usually violent, connection with another vessel.
Compartments, watertight. Are compartments in a vessel‟s hull separated
from the adjoining compartment by a water-tight bulkhead. They enhance the
buoyancy of the vessel especially in the event of an accident.
Consequence. The outcome of an accident.
Contact. Striking any fixed or floating object other than those involving a
collision, allusion or grounding.
Container ship. A ship designed and constructed to carry standard steel
shipping containers of either 6x2.5x2.5 m or 12x2.5x2.5 m external
dimensions.
COSPAS- SARSAT. The joint American/Russian satellite radio distress
monitoring system that forms the basis for the use of EPIRBs.
Crew. Persons employed to work on a vessel at the direction of its captain.
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Crew Supply Boat (Vessel). A fast offshore service vessel used to carry
personnel and light supplies to and from offshore oil and gas installations and
vessels.
Critical wash. Vessel wake that causes damage to other vessels or
shorelines.
Cronyism. Organisation of business among a group of friends or aquaintances
who have undue influence over a government.
Crony capitalism. An economic system based on cronyism (see above).
Cruise ship/liner/vessel. A live-aboard passenger vessel that voyages on
irregular routes.
Developed country. Any country with a gross domestic product per capita
measure that places it in the top quartile of nations. A euphemism for “rich”
country.
Developing country. Any other nation. A euphemism for “poor” country.
DNV- GL. A Norwegian/German classification society.
Domestic shipping. Any shipping activity undertaken within the maritime
boundaries of the home country of the vessel concerned.
Explosion. An accident or incident where an explosion is the initiating event.
Fast ferry. Any ferry having a service or operating speed of 25 knots or more.
Fast catamaran ferry. A twin-hulled ferry with a service speed exceeding 25
knots.
Fast hydrofoil ferry. A fast ferry, usually single-hulled, that uses the speed of
the vessel acting on hydrofoils to lift its hull clear of the water‟s surface.
Fast jetfoil ferry. Similar to a hydrofoil but with waterjet propulsion operating
through the hydrofoils.
Fast monohull ferry. A single-hulled ferry with a service speed exceeding 25
knots.
Fatalism. A belief that whatever happens in one‟s life is pre-ordained so that it
is pointless to try to change or improve it.
Fatigue. Tiredness arising from lack of sleep or overwork or a combination of
the two.
Ferry. A vessel carrying paying passengers on a regular service on a defined
route.
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Fire. Accidents where fire is the initiating event.
Flags of convenience. Are flown by vessels registered in a particular flag state
for reasons of reduced taxation, lower crewing costs or less stringent safety or
seaworthiness standards.
Flag state. The country where a vessel is officially registered. Its home
country.
Float. A buoyant device normally used in the sense of life saving.
Flotsam. Rubbish floating on the sea.
Frequency. Number of times an action occurs.
Gangway. A plank or ramp used to provide access to a vessel in harbour.
Grandfathered. An allowance in regulation or rule-making for pre-existing
conditions prior to the rule or regulation being implemented.
Grounding. When a vessel strikes the bottom of a waterway or an underwater
object such as a rock or coral.
Hazard. Any kind of object such as a reef or rock or man made structure that
presents a danger to a vessel. Can also be a weather hazard such as a
storm.
High speed ferry. Any ferry having a service or operating speed exceeding 25
knots.
Hull. The main, outer shell of a vessel below its sheerline.
Human error. Can be defined as wrongful decisions, mistakes, blunders,
carelessness, miscalculations or negligence made by or on the part of human
beings.
Human factors. Any action, usually malign or dangerous, that can be
attributed to human action or negligence.
Hydrofoil. Any fast craft with a main hull that lifts clear of the water by means
of its forward speed creating lift using hydrofoils.
Hypothermia. A dangerous human condition caused by excessively low body
temperature.
Incat Tasmania/Australia. An Australian builder of large, fast, aluminium RoPax ships. One of the pioneers in the development of such vessels.
Incident. An unplanned activity.
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INTERFERRY. International association of ferry owners, operators and their
suppliers. {Disclosure: The author is a member of INTERFERRY}.
International shipping. Shipping activity that involves voyages between two or
more sovereign states.
Jetfoil. See Fast Jetfoil Ferry, above.
Jetty. A man-made structure extending from the shore into the sea to facilitate
access to vessels.
Life boat. A small boat used to provide a means of escape from and survival
in the event of a larger vessel sinking.
Life float. A simple buoyant raft-like device with the same purpose as a life
boat.
Life jacket. A personal, wearable floatation device.
Life preserver. Similar to a life jacket.
Life raft. A compact floatation device, usually inflatable, that provides refuge
for survivors in the event of a ship or boat sinking.
Lloyd‟s Register. Classification society.
Long-tail boat. Small, about 12 metres LOA, engine powered, fast, narrow
boats used as ferries and tourist boats in Thailand
Look out. “A person or party employed or stationed to look out; or
reconnoitring boat or vessel”. 2. “The action or an act of looking out”. Source:
The New Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, 1993.
Master. The person in command or control of a vessel who is aboard the
vessel and directing its navigation and operations.
Mayday. A distress signal broadcast by radio or telephone indicating that the
sender is in serious and immediate danger.
Motor bangca or banca. An engine powered bangca. Common in the
Philippines.
Nautical Institute (The). The Nautical Institute, a British based international
organisation of master mariners which promotes safety at sea and greater
professionalism among its members. {Disclosure: The author is a member of
The Nautical Institute.}
Near miss. An incident such as a collision, allusion or grounding that is
narrowly avoided.
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Negligence. Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. It has been defined in the New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 1993, as: “Lack of attention to what ought to be done; failure to
take proper or necessary care of a thing or person; lack of necessary or
reasonable care in doing something; carelessness”.
Officers. The trained, experienced and educated executives charged with the
safe and economical operation of a vessel.
Open registry. A legal device designed to attract shipowners to register their
ships on a normally more expensive or rigorous national ship registry.
Outboard motor. An easily removable marine engine that is attached on a
smaller vessel, usually at the stern.
Over load/Overloaded/ Overloading. “Load with too great a burden or cargo,
put an excessive load on”. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993.
Pan Pan Pan. A distress message transmitted by radio when a situation is
threatening but not yet catastrophic. Assistance is required but not necessarily
immediately.
Passenger. A person who has paid to undertake a voyage on a ship or boat.
Passenger vessel. A vessel having the primary purpose of carrying
passengers.
Pilot. A highly qualified mariner with considerable local knowledge who
advises vessel masters on their transits through navigationally complex areas,
usually in to or out of ports.
Pool noodle. A cheap, simple, pipe shaped device made from foam plastic
that is used to provide buoyancy to recreational swimmers in pools and at
beaches.
Poor country. Any sovereign nation having a Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
per capita of less than USD 3,000 per annum at 2015 prices.
Port side. To the left side of a vessel, looking forward.
Port State Control. The regulation and control of ships by the government of
the country in which they are currently located.
Port State Inspections. The enforcement of the above.
Quay. A man-made structure designed to preserve a shoreline and to provide
convenient access to vessels berthed alongside it.
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Ratings. Junior ship‟s personnel whose activities are directed by the vessel‟s
officers.
Rich country. A nation with a Gross Domestic Product per capita exceeding
USD 40,000 as at 2017.
Risk. The possibility of an accident or disaster occurring.
Roadworthiness. The ability of a road vehicle, truck, bus or car, to safely
reach its destination.
Ro-Pax ferry. A ferry designed, constructed and equipped to carry passengers
and road vehicles. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries have proved to be
especially vulnerable to accidents caused by human error.
Ro-Pax/Train ferry. A ferry designed, constructed and equipped to carry
passengers, road vehicles and railway trains. They have similar vulnerabilities
to conventional Ro-Pax ferries.
Ro-Ro vessel. A cargo vessel designed, constructed and equipped to carry
road vehicles, usually trucks.
Satcom. Satellite communications. Such as by INMARSAT, Irridium and
Thuraya.
Seafarers. Seagoing personnel generally.
Seamanship. “…the art or practice of managing a ship or boat at sea; the skill
of a good seaman”. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993.
Seaman. A skilled seafarer.
Seaworthiness. A ship is seaworthy if it is fit to put to sea and able to survive
the prevailing or expected sea conditions when fully loaded. It should be fully
and competently manned, properly navigated and carrying appropriate stores
and fuel for the intended voyage.
Sheer line. The curve of a vessel‟s deck between the top of the bow and the
top of the stern. Can also be described as the curvature of the deck in a
longitudinal direction.
Ship. A vessel, usually fully enclosed or decked, used primarily for commerce
or war.
Ship management. The management of vessels with the objectives of
profitability, safety, environmental soundness and longevity.
Situational awareness. The self-knowledge of precisely where a person or,
particularly the vessel he is operating, is located related to other vessels, the
shore, the sea bottom or other hazards.
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SKYbrary. Library and database of aviation safety data and statistics. A joint
venture of ICAO and EUROCONTROL.
Snag. A log, branch or other piece of wood floating or submerged in water.
Special Drawing Rights. (SDR). SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable
currencies. Their value is based on a basket of five major currencies. That
value is calculated daily and posted on the IMF website. On 26 May 2017
SDR 1 = USD 1.38.
Starboard side. On or to the right hand side of a vessel, looking forward.
Stockholm Rules. Stockholm Agreement into European Ferry Stability
Regulation.
Super critical wash. A vessel‟s wake or wash that can cause significant
danger or damage to other vessels or the shoreline if the vessel is operated
negligently.
Superstructure. The part of a vessel that is constructed above its sheer line.
Tanker. A ship designed, constructed and fitted-out for the carrying of liquid
cargoes.
Tourist boat. A usually small ferry used to carry tourists to view or experience
local marine attractions.
Trimaran. A triple hulled vessel.
Tug. A powerful, usually small, vessel used for towing or pushing other
vessels.
Unseaworthy. A vessel that is unfit to go to sea because of deficiencies in
design, construction, maintenance, equipment or crew competencies.
Vessel. A ship or boat capable of navigation while carrying a cargo or
passengers or both.
Voyage planning. Utilising a navigational plan to ensure the safety and
predictability of a voyage.
Wake. The area of disturbed water behind a vessel caused by the vessel‟s
progress through the water.
Wash. Similar to wake above.
Waterjet. A pump-like device used to propel a vessel by forcing water astern
under very high pressure.
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Watertight compartments. Sections of a vessel‟s hull separated by watertight
bulkheads.
Wharf. Similar to a jetty in being a man-made structure providing access to
vessels. Usually constructed parallel to the shore.
Work Boat World. International maritime trade magazine specialising in noncargo commercial and government vessels. {Disclosure: WBW is owned by
the author‟s family company.
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ABSTRACT
Almost 2,000 deaths are known to occur annually as a result of passenger vessel
accidents. Practically all of them (91%) involve ferries. Because of reporting
deficiencies it is estimated that the actual total toll could well be at least 50 per cent
higher. While even that number is relatively insignificant compared with the numbers
of deaths caused by cigarette smoking, road accidents, Hepatitis, Malaria,
Tuberculosis, illegal drug use, American guns and similar preventable causes of
death, it still involves considerable personal tragedy and substantial economic cost.
The accidents occur more frequently and their impacts are significantly more severe
than, for example, aviation and railway accidents.
Importantly, some 76% of those known accidents and 95% of their resulting deaths
occur in the poor, tropical regions of the world. Indeed, 80% of them have occurred
in just ten developing countries. Some 93% of them occur on usually unavoidable
domestic voyages. Their victims are thus the least able to prevent or avoid them.
Moreover, by the author‟s estimate, about 88% of the accidents and 98% of the
deaths are directly attributable to human error. This is mainly in the form of
unseaworthy vessels, poor lookout, overloading, general negligence and poor
seamanship. These factors are exacerbated by evacuation, lifesaving equipment and
search and rescue deficiencies. Put simply, the causes are overwhelmingly
behavioural and cultural rather than structural or mechanical.
This multi-disciplinary study is based on an analysis of a database of passenger
vessel accidents that the author has compiled since 1985 and which, in total, covers
all known passenger vessel accidents that have occurred in the world since 1800. In
attempting to make objective and valid assessments of the causes of the accidents,
the period covered has been reduced to the final 50 of those 215 years. The study
has then been further focused on ferries and tourist boats. Some 681 fatal ferry
accidents, resulting in nearly 60,000 deaths, have occurred over that half century
involving such vessels.
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Thanks to the introduction of the Internet a much greater availability and accuracy of
data has enabled an even more intense focus to be made on the most recent sixteen
years since 1 January 2000. This means, particularly, that the vessels concerned are
comparatively modern and are more likely to be operating under current national and
international rules and regulations. It also means that many more accidents that
occur in remote parts of the world are being reported.
The analysis is wide-ranging and comprehensive even if somewhat subjective in
attributing accident causes. In any case, no more objective method has been found
or can be envisaged. The statistics derived from the database show conclusively that
as the great majority of deaths are the result of human error, they should be
preventable.
Those figures are compared with those arising globally from commercial aircraft
accidents, oil tanker shipping accidents and from road accidents occurring in
developed countries. Those modes of transport have far superior accident reduction
records than does the ferry sector, particularly over the past three decades. Their
accidents, too, have been incomparably better recorded than have ferry accidents.
They provide valuable ideas as to how the latter sector could improve significantly.
The careful historical statistical analysis involved has exposed some previously
unforseen facts. For example, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, especially older
vessels, are disproportionately dangerous. Their sale to developing countries should
be banned. Conversely, however, fast catamaran ferries are disproportionately safe.
Their adoption and use should, therefore, be encouraged.
Taking a holistic approach, the study has involved elements of history, politics,
economics, psychology, sociology, law, naval architecture, ergonomics and
geography. The summary and conclusion describes and recommends a number of
improvements to ferry design, construction, outfitting, and, most particularly,
regulation, enforcement and operation.
It strongly urges major reforms to the International Maritime Organisation, using the
International Civil Aviation Organisation as a model. The objectives of those reforms
are to assist and encourage developing nations in reducing their incidence of
domestic ferry accidents. If widely implemented, those reforms and improvements,
most of which should not be prohibitively costly, should lead to significant reductions
in the number of passenger vessel accidents and the death toll arising from them.
1 February 2018
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The best-built, equipped and „safest‟ ship is doomed if its
commander and officers fail to exercise good seamanship
and common sense.
1.1.0. Introduction.
In 1901 Captain J.C. Voss sailed a primitive eleven metre dugout canoe most
of the way around the world from Vancouver in Canada.1 Eleven years later
the world‟s acclaimed safest, fastest and most luxurious ship, the „unsinkable‟
Titanic, collided with an iceberg off Newfoundland and sank with massive loss
of life.2

Image 1.1. The sinking of the „unsinkable‟ Titanic significantly raised the
wealthy world‟s awareness of maritime safety and led to some important
improvements (Willy Stower painting ex Wikipedia).
These two events highlight the dichotomy with respect to maritime safety that
has seemingly always existed. That is between behavioural and cultural
approaches and structural, mechanical and regulatory ones. Put simply, good
1

Voss, J. C. The Venturesome Voyages of Captain Voss (Century Hutchinson, first
published 1913, Third ed, 1989)
2
Gardiner, R. The Great Titanic Conspiracy (Ian Allan Publishing, 2010)
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seamanship and common sense can ensure the safe navigation of almost
anything that can float. Conversely, the best-built, equipped and „safest‟ ship
is doomed if its commander and officers fail to exercise good seamanship and
common sense.
Fortunately, good or, at least, adequate seamanship and seaworthiness are
the norm. Of the 2.2 billion ferry passenger voyages estimated by industry
body INTERFERRY to be made annually (probably more like 5 billion), only
about 36 voyages are known to have resulted in disaster. 3 The record for the
cruise and tourist vessel sectors is even better. Indeed, cruise ships, cargo
liners and casino ships have been involved in only eight per cent of the fatal
accidents and were responsible for only 1.2 per cent of the fatalities described
in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database.4 Arguably, a
significant proportion of those fatalities could be attributed to suicides. It is
nearly impossible, in most cases, to determine whether a „person overboard‟
is an accident or a suicide. It should be noted, though, that sea travel is the
third safest mode of public transport after aviation and rail. It is far safer than
travel by road.

1.2.1. The problem in proportion.
About 2,000 „known‟, and possibly as many as 3,000,5 deaths have occurred
annually from 2000 to 2015 as a result of passenger vessel accidents. 6 That
figure comprises the deaths known to have occurred from January 2000 to
December 2015 when, thanks largely to the widespread adoption of the
Internet, the average number of known fatalities recorded in the BMPVA
database nearly doubled from the average of the previous 34 years.7
The author estimates, by very careful and conservative extrapolation, that the
actual figures for both accidents and fatalities must be at least 50 per cent
higher than the „known‟ figures. As described in chapters 2 and 5, and in item
1.3.1, accidents were significantly under-reported in many of the countries
discussed. It is believed that is still the case in some such as DR Congo,
Myanmar, Brazil, Peru and the Philippines.8 It must be emphasised that
reports from remote places in developing countries, while much more prolific
than in pre-Internet days, are still believed to be far from comprehensive.

3

The international association of ferry owners, operators and suppliers. Even that figure is
probably little more than a guess. The real number is probably considerably higher, most
likely at least double. In an internal memo, the Chairman of the Interferry Domestic Ferry
Safety Committee noted in December 2017 that the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration
presented a ferry ridership figure of 1.8 billion in China alone. Unfortunately, little accurate
global data is available. www.interferry.com.
4
Appendix, A. Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database, 1966-2015, Baird
Publications, Melbourne, 2015.
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Author estimate. See comments on Gabon, Congo and Nigeria on next page and on the
Philippines in 1.3.1. and 1.3.2
6
Appendix A, Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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Described in 1.3.1.
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For example, no reports of ferry fatalities have been found for Gabon and
Congo. They adjoin DR Congo and have very similar geographic, cultural and
economic conditions and ferry activities but smaller populations. It seems very
unlikely that no fatalities have been occurred there. Similarly, a recent paper
analysing boat and ferry fatalities on inland waterways in Nigeria, without
providing details, lists numerous fatal accidents that have not been recorded
elsewhere. That list comprises accidents that occurred between 2004 and
2009.9 The BMPVA database lists three fatal accidents resulting in 323
fatalities over that period. That compares with 308 fatal accidents with an
unknown but obviously much larger number of victims listed in the Nze paper.
There is no evidence to indicate that a sudden and dramatic increase in the
number of accidents has occurred since 1 January 2000. The most likely
reason is a dramatic, Internet facilitated, reporting improvement.
While even 3,000 fatalities is relatively insignificant compared with the
numbers of deaths caused by cigarette smoking, road accidents, Hepatitis,
Malaria, Tuberculosis, illegal drug use, American guns and similar preventable
causes of death, it still involves considerable personal tragedy and substantial
financial cost. The accidents occur more frequently by every measure than do,
for example, aviation and internally caused railway accidents described in
Chapter 4.
Unfortunately, though, the accidents that do occur mostly do so in the poorest,
most ferry dependent parts of the world. In fact, in the half century to the end
of 2015, eighty per cent of fatalities arising from passenger vessel accidents
occurred in just ten poor or comparatively poor developing countries.10
Indeed, 90 per cent of ferry fatalities occurred in just 20 countries from 1966 to
2015 and from 2000 to 2015 that percentage rose to 91 per cent of all global
fatalities.11 Those fatalities almost invariably (93%) occur on domestic
voyages.12 Fifteen of those countries were included in both periods.13 The
dangers to passengers there are both very real and very preventable. They,
and their potential solutions, are explored in detail here and especially in
Chapters 5 and 10.
It should be noted that fewer than ten per cent of fatal passenger vessel
accidents involved cruise ships, casino vessels or cargo liners. They resulted
in 688 or 1.2 per cent of fatalities over the half century described and
analysed.14 Almost all cruise ships, casino ships and cargo liners have been
engaged in international voyages when involved in accidents. They tend to
carry wealthier passengers. That ensures that cruise ship accidents are
accorded much more publicity than ferry accidents. Since 1988 there has only
9

Nze, I.C. Analysis of the Fatality Rates of Boat and Ferry Accident(sic) on Inland Waterways
in Nigeria, IOSR-JBM, Lagos, 2013.
10
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, DR Congo, India, China, Tanzania, Haiti,
Egypt, Greece, Senegal, Peru, Brazil, Myanmar, and USA.
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Appendix A, Ibid.
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been one cruise ship accident resulting in the deaths of more than nine
people, the 2012 grounding and capsize of the Costa Concordia which led to
32 deaths.15 The great majority of cruise ship fatalities have been individual
person overboard incidents.16 There is very little the cruise lines can
realistically do to prevent those.

Image 1.2. Coffins of some of the 4,386 victims of the Dona Paz collision, fire
and sinking off Mindoro Island in the Philippines in December 1987. It was the
world‟s worst passenger vessel disaster in peacetime (Wikipedia).
It should be noted here, however, that this work most emphatically does not
look at the problem of maritime fatalities affecting refugees or illegal
immigrants. There is no realistic solution to the dangers posed by the vessels
they voyage on except by totally preventing their operation. Tragically, going
to sea on „people smuggling‟ boats operated by criminal gangs is akin to
playing Russian roulette. If refugee and illegal immigrant fatalities were to be
included in this study, the death toll would be considerably higher.
This thesis, which has drawn extensively on its author‟s study of more than
two centuries of maritime accidents, has focused most intensely on and more
closely examined and analysed all known fatal passenger vessel accidents
that have occurred globally in the fifty years from 1966 to 2015.17 This
obviously subjective but very careful analysis of the causes of those accidents
led to the author‟s assessment that 88 per cent of the fatal accidents and 98
per cent of the resulting fatalities were the result of some kind of human error.
Human error can be defined as wrongful decisions, mistakes, blunders,
carelessness, miscalculations or negligence. This is higher, but not
significantly so, than the estimate of 88 per cent of fatalities derived by a
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similar but less extensive study published in 2014.18 That study, by the
Worldwide Ferry Safety Association covered only ferries and not all passenger
vessels and was for a shorter period..
The data in the BMPVA database has largely been compiled from
contemporary newspaper, trade magazine and, more recently, Web news
reports. They have been cross-referenced and verified wherever possible
from other sources including IMO and national government reports, books,
directories, academic papers and other databases. The latter include the IMO
Global Integrated Shipping Information Service (GISIS) database19 and that of
the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association.20 The Lloyd‟s Casualty Reports,21
IHS Fairplay22 and International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI)23 casualty
databases have also been consulted although they tend to focus on larger
vessels and are somewhat “North Atlantic centric” in focus.
This project, therefore, has become a very wide-ranging one that has involved
a comprehensive study across a number of disciplines including: psychology,
sociology, economics, law, ergonomics, education, naval architecture, political
science, geography, history, demographics and meteorology. It is truly multidisciplinary.

18

Golden, A. 'Ferry Fatalities: Statistics and Causation of Major Accidents 2000-2012' (Paper
presented at the Worldwide Ferry Safety 2015 Conference, New York City, 2014)
19
Accessible through the IMO website, www.imo.org.
20
Refer to www.ferrysafety.org.
21
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From www.iumi.com/statistics/.
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1.2.2. Human error the major cause.
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Figure 1.1 Author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel accidents 19662015. By accidents on the left and by fatalities on the right. (BMPVA
database).
The most common cause of fatal maritime accidents is vessels that are
unseaworthy due to poor design or construction and inadequate maintenance.
That, along with collisions, groundings, allisions, overloading, negligence and
poor seamanship comprise the great majority of factors that can clearly be
attributed to human error. From the frequently scant facts available from the
news sources cited in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident
database, the author has carefully assessed the cause of each accident.24
Obviously, however, there can be no argument about the underlying cause in
cases involving collisions, allisions, groundings and overloading. The often
related factors of negligence, inadequate seaworthiness and poor
seamanship are more subjective and perhaps nebulous assessments but they
have been based on a careful review of the only known facts available to the
author.
This, as described in 1.2.1, has involved compiling as much information as
possible from numerous diverse sources. That have been further verified and
cross-referenced using government reports, focussed histories, books,
academic studies and other marine casualty databases.25 More recently,
24
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since about 2000, considerably more information has become accessible via
the Internet. In many cases this data is still considered to be inadequate but it
is all that is publicly or, even, privately available.

1.3.1. Inadequate reporting or recording of accidents.
Sparse reporting of fatal accidents, particularly prior to the widespread
adoption of the Internet around the year 2000, means that the statistics
analysed are not globally comprehensive because reports from poorer, more
accident prone, regions or countries were even rarer in the earlier period. For
example, the BMPVA database26 records five accidents resulting in 303
fatalities in China in 1999 whereas Fairplay News online quotes China‟s
communications minister mentioning 249 „sinkings‟ and 769 deaths in the
same year.27 Similar comments have been made by officials of the Philippines
Navy about fatal ferry accidents in that country. 28 They have apparently been
significantly under reported as have, similarly, fatal ferry accidents on inland
waterways in Nigeria.29
By contrast, fatal accidents aboard cruise and casino ships tend to be widely
reported and have been throughout the study period. Those ships are large
and conspicuous and tend to be engaged in international voyages. More
importantly, they tend, obviously, to be populated with passengers from richer
countries. Thus the „Clapham Omnibus‟ hierarchy of relative news importance
prevails.
Tellingly, the BMPVA database records only 176 accidents in the 34 years
from 1966 until the end of 1999 whereas it shows 570 occurring over the next
sixteen years.30 Obviously and logically that cannot possibly be an accurate
reflection of reality, hence the estimate of at least 3,000 fatalities per annum.
The author, however, has been unable to find a more extensive or
comprehensive accident database anywhere.
Certainly, the International Maritime Organisation‟s GISIS database is wholly
inadequate.31 GISIS lists accidents and fatalities that occurred in western
developed countries quite comprehensively although it tends to focus most on
those that were most extensively covered by the news media. Beyond the
OECD member countries, however, its coverage declines significantly.
Similarly, other databases are limited by vessel size. Lloyd‟s List Casualty
Reports ignore anything under 100gt and IUMI under 500gt.32
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They and Fairplay also tend to record only very major accidents in developing
countries. Their exclusion of smaller vessels inevitably ignores a large
proportion of the accidents described in this work. For example, they record
the Dona Paz and Princess of the Stars accidents in the Philippines but not
those involving the Kim Nirvana or the Catalyn D.33 The absence of reliable
confirmatory data is a major factor in the difficulty of defining the real extent of
the problem and has been commented on elsewhere.34
Indeed, as recently as 27 November 2017, at the opening of IMO‟s 30 th
Assembly Session in London, the Secretary-General, Mr Kitack Lim, admitted
that: “For IMO, we need to have more detailed and deeper analysis of
statistics and data so that we can really understand underlying trends and
causal factors behind shipping casualties…”.35 That comment reflects very
badly on the strange and completely unrealistic manner whereby IMO
compiles the data for its GISIS database.

1.3.2. The „Internet Effect‟.
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Figure 1.2. Fatal accidents reported annually worldwide. Note the dramatic
increase from around the year 2000. The Internet Effect. (BMPVA database).
The realities of inadequate reporting of accidents are starkly highlighted by the
dramatic increase in the number of fatalities recorded each year since 1
January 2000 in the BMPVA database. For the first 34 years of the study the
average known annual global death toll was 818 whereas for the next sixteen
years it was 1,975. The advent and widespread adoption of the Internet has
led to much more extensive and comprehensive reporting of maritime
accidents. Further, as noted in IHS-Fairplay in December 2015, the
33

Appendix A, Ibid
See, for example, Shettar, G. EU maritime casualty rise „due to improved reporting‟, IHSFairplay, London, 1 December 2015.
35
th
From a speech delivered by the Secretary-General of IMO at the opening of its 30
Assembly, London, 27 November 2017. www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/.
34

8

establishment of the European Marine Casualty Information Platform in 2011
has brought about a more than doubling of reported accidents per annum on
that continent in the four years from 2011-2014.36 The author, however,
believes very strongly that because of continuing under-reporting, the real
annual global death toll would be more than 3,000 on average and that it
would have been so for the full 50 years examined .
For example, there are only three accidents recorded in the BMPVA database
for Myanmar/Burma from 1966 until 2006.37 They resulted in 667 fatalities (an
average of 17 fatalities per annum) and all three vessels involved were
nameless. Since the once „pariah‟38 state started to open to the outside world
in 2007, twelve accidents affecting named vessels and causing 584 fatalities
have been recorded (an average of 65 fatalities per annum). 39 The earlier
data, obviously, is wholly inadequate. Extrapolating from the 2007-2015
statistics, a case can be made for more likely figures of at least 75 accidents
and 3,250 fatalities in Myanmar/Burma over the period 1966-2015.
Whatever the true number, however, the information that is available about
the known accidents is sufficient to enable sensible decisions to be made as
to causality, underlying trends and practical preventative measures.

1.3.3. Poor, hot, „wet‟ developing countries are hit hardest.
Further, the figures for the first 34 years show a much higher proportion of
fatalities occurring in so-called „developed‟ countries than in the next sixteen
years. Overall, though, and as illustrated clearly in Figure 1.3 below, 76 per
cent of accidents and 95 per cent of fatalities over the complete fifty-year
study have occurred in poor, hot and mostly wet, archipelagic, riverine and
Lakeland „developing‟ countries.
Because the numbers of accidents and fatalities occurring in developed
countries have marginally declined over the last two decades, it could be
assumed that the rate has increased in poorer countries over the same
period. That seems to be a reasonable assumption even allowing for the
Internet effect on reporting. As described in Chapter 2, the total numbers of
„known‟ fatal ferry accidents globally are clearly not declining and are in fact
significantly increasing as people in developing countries seem to be travelling
more frequently and because they are better reported.

36
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1.4.0. Geographical analysis of accidents.
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Figure 1.3 Geographical analysis of accidents and fatalities. By accidents on
the left and fatalities on the right. 1966-2015 inclusive. Note the absence of
Myanmar/Burma from this data. (BMPVA database).
So, the much higher incidence of fatal accidents in developing countries is at
the crux of the problem that will be addressed here. While ferry accidents will
continue to occur in developed countries, at least some constructive attempts
are being made to reduce their incidence and effects. Voyages in the
developed world are still not totally free from danger, especially if conventional
monohull Roll On-Roll Off (Ro-Ro) or Ro-Pax ferries with wide-opening bow
doors and full-length, low vehicle decks cannot be avoided, as is explained in
detail in chapters 2 and 6. However, the risks in the developed world are, in
reality, now very low thanks partially to better on board responses and
superior search and rescue (SAR) services.

10

1.5.1. The „Danger Zone‟.

Map 1.1. The „Danger Zone‟. The poor, hot equatorial belt where the majority
of fatal passenger vessel accidents occur.
In developing countries, however, reductions in their ferry accident death tolls
are especially difficult to achieve. Obviously, less developed countries suffer
also from very high road and rail accident death tolls. A similar lack of success
is evident with respect to reducing those. This lack of remedial results is a
product of cultural and behavioural problems that can largely be blamed
ultimately on poverty. This can also be attributed to all the poverty driven
reasons of overloading, negligence, lack of maintenance, poor training,
fatalism, corruption, panic, absence of life-saving equipment and inability to
swim.40 It is obvious that most developing countries will require considerable
assistance from the wealthier world before they achieve significant reductions
in their numbers of ferry fatalities.

1.5.2. Authorities appear unconcerned.
While national and local governments in developing countries must be well
aware of the problem of such preventable accidents, they do little or nothing
about them. That phenomenon is described in detail in the national case
studies in Chapter 5 and in the consideration of national and international
regulatory and enforcement deficiencies in Chapter 9. Of the ten worst
countries for passenger vessel accidents only the Philippines pays any
serious attention to them and its responses are far too little and much too late.
At the INTERFERRY conference in Cebu in 1999 the author spoke at length
with the then Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines (Later
President), Hon. Gloria Macapagal Arroya who was well aware of her
country‟s high incidence of ferry disasters.41 She claimed the government was
“working on it” by trying to reduce the corruption of the Marine Industry
Authority (MARINA) and the Philippines Coast Guard and by implementing
more transparent and effective Marine Boards of Inquiry.
Now, nearly eighteen years later and after six years with Ms Arroya powerfully
in charge as President, there has been a small, albeit welcome, improvement.
In 2015, for example, there were four known fatal ferry accidents in the
Philippines. A total of 154 people perished in them.42 2015 was a
40
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Hon. Gloria Macapagal Arroya. Discussion with author, Cebu, October 1999. INTERFERRY
is the international trade association of ferry owners.
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comparatively good year. However, more recently, there has been impressive
improvement. In 2016 there were three known fatal accidents producing 24
fatalities. In 2017 there was only one known fatal ferry accidents in the
Philippines with 11 fatalities resulting.43
The same lack of concern is evident internationally. On a number of occasions
in the late 1990s and early 2000s the author met with the Hon William O‟Neil,
then Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organisation in
London.44 Questioned on what IMO could do to bolster the obviously
inadequate efforts of many national governments with respect to passenger
vessel safety, his response was to the effect that: “We are not able to interfere
in the internal affairs of sovereign member nations”. When pressed on the fact
that the IMO‟s sister organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) was doing just that with respect to purely internal airline companies,
the response was, ”they operate under a different charter from us”.
Subsequent enquiries made indirectly of Secretary-General O‟Neil‟s
immediate successor, Rear Admiral Efthimios Mitropolous, and various of his
senior colleagues elicited much the same answer. Further, when asked
whether IMO‟s charter could be changed to something more like ICAO‟s, Mr
O‟Neil‟s response was, “our member countries wouldn‟t wear that”.
Realistically, until very recently, IMO has only shown interest in international,
as opposed to domestic, passenger vessel activities.45 Even now, IMO seems
to recoil from accepting any responsibility for or involvement with domestic
ferry activities.
There is no doubt that the IMO mandate is restrictive. It describes itself thus:IMO is the global standard setting authority for the safety, security and
environmental performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create
a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective,
universally adopted and universally implemented. Further, it describes, …its
role is to create a level playing-field so that ship operators cannot address
their financial issues by simply cutting corners and compromising on safety,
security and environmental performance.46 The key word here is
„international‟, it most definitely does not mean “domestic”.
In a 2008 Secretary-General‟s Report on the Contribution of IMO on maritime
safety and security, IMO defines its Mandate as follows:Since 1959, the International Maritime Organization(“IMO”). As the sole
United Nation‟s (sic) specialized agency exclusively devoted to maritime
affairs, has been providing a forum for co-operation among Governments in
the field of government regulations and practices relating to all kinds of
43
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shipping engaged in international trade, facilitating the adoption of
comprehensive multilateral treaties for a wide range of technical measures
and, in particular, the adoption of the highest practicable standards, designed
to enhance safety, security and efficiency in shipping engaged in international
trade”.47 Again, the key word here is „international‟, as opposed to „domestic‟.
The same document, in claiming the “wide acceptance and legitimacy of
IMO‟s mandate”, states that there are 167 sovereign member states of IMO
and that between 138 and 158 have adopted various of its conventions. While
IMO has undoubtedly achieved that wide acceptance and legitimacy of its
mandate among all, or at least the great majority, of developed nations, it has
clearly failed to do so in any of the developing nations discussed here.
Further, in practice in many developing countries, „adoption‟ of conventions
does not mean that they will be implemented, much less enforced.
In fairness to Mr O‟Neil, he did publicly urge domestic ferry safety reforms on
a number of occasions. He publicly offered IMO‟s assistance to national
governments but none are known to have taken up his offers except in the
most limited fashion.48 His hands were tied, in effect, by the fact that in
practice IMO is a secretariat. Its member states control it. Its system requires
that in order for new rules to be considered, any states proposing such
changes must demonstrate a compelling need for them.
Regrettably, his successors have been less forthcoming and, apart from a
handful of small conferences and seminars, attended by carefully chosen
delegates, in developing countries, nothing notable seems to have been
achieved except for the laudable, but severely limited by its small number of
participating countries, Manila Statement of 2015.49 Regrettably, its effects
have been negligible to date.
This attitude contrasts sharply with the sentiments expressed on the
establishment of IMO in 1948 as the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organisation (IMCO)50. IMO is self-described as: “…the United
Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships”.51 On the same web
page, IMO describes itself further as: “…the global standard setting authority
for the safety, security and environmental performance of international
shipping. Its main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping
industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted and universally
implemented”.52 The word „international‟, as opposed to „domestic‟ keeps
creeping in as a very effective „escape clause‟.
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It also contrasts strongly with IMO‟s civil aviation counterpart, the International
Civil Aviation Organization‟s (ICAO) “core mandate” which, “…was to help
States achieve the highest possible degree of uniformity in civil aviation
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization”. 53
In even stronger contrast: “ICAO works with the Convention‟s 191 Member
States and industry groups to reach consensus on international civil aviation
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) and policies in support of a
safe, efficient, secure, economically sustainable and environmentally
responsible civil aviation sector. These SARPS and policies are used by
ICAO Member States to ensure that their local civil aviation operations and
regulations conform to global norms, which in turn permits more than 100,000
daily flights in aviation‟s global network to operate safely and reliably in every
region in the world”. Note the use of the very important word „local‟.54 It very
effectively and unfortunately differentiates ICAO from IMO.
Reinforcing that: “ICAO also coordinates assistance and capacity building for
States in support of numerous aviation development objectives; produces
global plans to coordinate multilateral strategic progress for safety and air
navigation; monitors and reports on numerous air transport performance
metrics; and audits State‟s civil aviation oversight capabilities in the areas of
safety and security”.55
In practice, ICAO takes an inspirational leadership role in an endeavour to
improve aviation safety globally. IMO avoids that and appears largely to do as
its member states direct.

1.5.3. Few others appear to care or even notice.
There lies a large part of the problem. No one in a position to do anything
about the problem cares enough to do so. It has much to do with the clichéd
and probably apocryphal but true joke about the hierarchy of news, viz: An
article was allegedly published prominently on page 1 of The Times of London
headed “Three killed in Clapham omnibus tragedy”. In the same issue on the
bottom of page 8 there was a small article headed “Earthquake in Chile,
36,000 dead”. It may be apocryphal but that is the attitudinal reality.
This arrogant and ignorant, North Atlantic centric attitude is exemplified in the
prestigious Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History which, published in 2007,
lists only the Titanic, Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star and
Estonia in its item on Ship Disasters involving passenger ships. It fails to
mention any of the far worse accidents that occurred elsewhere until that
time.56 Remarkably, but perhaps not surprisingly, the Dona Paz tragedy, that
53
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resulted in far more fatalities than in all four of those accidents combined, is
not mentioned at all in any of the four 700 page volumes of the
Encyclopedia.57

Image 1.3. The developing country problem: massive overloading of
unseaworthy, incompetently crewed ferries (Wikipedia).
Of course, when North American, Australasian, Japanese or European
tourists die in passenger vessel accidents in developing countries, we quickly
learn about it from their hometown newspapers and, increasingly commonly,
on news websites. At least such reports alert us to the fact of the accident.
In fairness, it must be pointed out that in conjunction with INTERFERRY and
the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association, and at their initiative, the International
Maritime Organisation has made some tentative approaches aimed at safety
improvements to local vessel owners and regulators in the Philippines,
Bangladesh and Indonesia since 2006.58 Sadly, apart from in the Philippines,
little seems to have come of that well-intentioned initiative. Perhaps it raised
awareness minutely in some of the world‟s richer countries. No measurable
change has been noted in the other two target countries. There has simply
been a re-arrangement of their fatality rankings.59

1.6.0. Data and reporting deficiencies conceal real toll.
While the data in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database is
not comprehensive, it is the best available and is estimated to be at least 66
per cent accurate in terms of numbers of accidents and their resulting
fatalities. It has been compiled for longer than all but the Lloyd‟s List Casualty
57
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Reports and the Lloyd‟s register of Shipping (LRS) Casualty Review and also
covers smaller vessels that are not included in the Lloyd‟s List statistics. It has
been cross-referenced against all the other known databases revealed in
literature and Google searches. The numbers, though, are conservative and
probably underestimate the real totals by about 50 per cent. It is estimated,
therefore, that probably at least 3,000 people die in passenger vessel
accidents annually compared with the 2,000 per annum listed for the past
sixteen years in the BMPVA database.
Even after acknowledging the deficiencies in available data, the world still has
a serious problem in that as many as 3,000 innocent, mostly fare paying,
public transport passengers are dying at sea or in inland waters each year.
They are dying miserable deaths in accidents that are mostly preventable.
The majority of victims appear to be women, children and the elderly, the
reports listed in Appendix A tell us. They are less likely to be able to swim and
usually not strong enough to beat men to whatever floating debris may be
available to save them.
Further, the accidents usually also result in many injuries and considerable
property damage even if only to the vessels involved. Obviously, this, too,
affects poor people more than their richer counterparts. Environmental
damage, while slight, is also a factor.

1.7.0. Ferry accident rates compared with road, rail and
aviation
It is estimated that nearly 1.3 million people die each year in road accidents
world-wide.60 That is more per day than ferry deaths per year. Again, the vast
majority – around 90 per cent – of them occur in low to middle-income
countries. Indeed, as could be expected, the worst affected countries are the
same as those similarly affected by ferry accidents.61 The causes similarly
arise from poverty and are mainly overloaded, unroadworthy vehicles driven
by incompetent, negligent and/or fatigued drivers.
As well as having the best safety record of all modes of public transport, the
aviation industry has the best reporting and most accurate data. It is also
significantly more safety-conscious than the other modes and its international
regulator, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), more
determined than its United Nations counterpart IMO to have a positive
influence at the local level. According to the Aviation Safety Network, a
division of the Flight Safety Foundation, which appears to have the most
comprehensive statistics, there have been an average of 32 fatal accidents
involving scheduled commercial aircraft carrying 14+ passengers each year
since 2000. The average death toll per annum over the same period has been
713.62 That is less than a quarter that of ferries.
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Railway accidents are more problematic. A significant proportion of them
involve suicides. Many others are the result of road vehicle driver stupidity
manifested in driving over railway tracks in the face of oncoming trains.
Discounting those to look at derailments, train-to train collisions and similar,
train only events, the numbers of accidents and their resulting deaths fall
significantly.
As with passenger vessels, though, accurate data is difficult to find. It is also
very difficult to obtain direct comparisons. Every data compiler approaches
their project differently. One comparison that covers the three main streams is
Numberwatch.63 It compares fatalities per kilometre travelled, per journey and
per hours travelled.
Probably the most accurate list of fatal railway accidents is provided by
www.list25.com.64 It is supported by figures compiled by the BBC which show
that railway passenger accident fatalities at an average of about 300 per
annum from 1966 to 2015 inclusive are negligible compared with ferries at
about ten times as many.65 That figure is confirmed by www.infoplease.com.66
While not highly accurate, the statistics comparing the accident and fatality
rates of road, rail, air and water transportation of passengers are accurate
enough to show their relationships starkly. As will be shown in more detail in
Chapter 3, passenger vessel travel is very much safer than road travel, other
than, arguably, by bus, but significantly less safe than rail or air travel. Bus
travel, perhaps surprisingly, according to Numberwatch, is the safest means.
The author, however, finds that difficult to believe and refutes it in Chapter 3.
km
Air 0.05
Bus 0.4
Rail 0.6
Van 1.2
Water 2.6
Car 3.1
Pedal cycle 44.6

journeys
Bus 4.3
Rail 20
Van 20
Car 40
Foot 40
Water 90
Air 117

hours
Bus 11.1
Rail 30
Air 30.8
Water 50
Van 60
Car 130
Foot 220

Table 1.1. The Numberwatch table showing the numbers of fatalities per
billion kilometres, journeys and hours of travel. The bus and rail figures
appear unlikely (Numberwatch.com).
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1.8.0. Geographic, cultural, behavioural and economic factors.
1.8.1. The poverty factor.
Geographic, cultural, behavioural and economic factors, the author has
concluded, are the predominant reasons why human error dominates the
causes of passenger vessel accidents. An economic factor, poverty, is
common to all the regions and countries where the most frequent and most
deadly accidents occur. Poverty appears to be the most important factor. As
will be shown in detail in Chapter 5, the poverty factor can be seen to apply
just as significantly in road, rail and aviation accidents as in passenger
vessels.
Road fatalities
Road Fatalities per
per 100,000
100,000 motor
inhabitants
vehicles
Libya
73.4
128.2
Thailand
36.2
74.6
Malawi
35
1,310.4
Liberia
33.7
133.4
DRC
33.2
6,405.4
Tanzania
32.9
1,073.7
CAR
32.4
4,336.5
Rwanda
32.1
3,521.1
Iran
32.1
92.7
Mozambique
31.6
1,507
Country

Table 1.2. The poverty factor. The world‟s ten worst countries for road
accidents on an annual basis. Of the countries listed, only Iran and Thailand
could be described as middle income (Source: World Health Organisation –
Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015).
Poverty can be causally linked to cultural and behavioural factors in terms of
education, training, awareness and care as well as purchasing, maintenance
and operational disciplines. A significant factor in that causal link is poverty
induced malnutrition. It, unsurprisingly, has been found to lead to cognitive
weaknesses that cause low levels of situational awareness, slow reactions
and illogical responses to problems.67 While not the only cause of such
deficiencies, it is undoubtedly a significant contributor to them. Poverty,
obviously, is also directly linked to the poor seaworthiness of vessels and their
lack of even the most basic life-saving equipment. Safe new vessels and
equipment are comparatively expensive.
Even in terms of the health of vessel crews, poverty is a factor. An ill or
fatigued crewman is unlikely to be an alert or careful crewman. Further, the
sanctity of human life is inevitably accorded a much lower priority in poorer
67
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countries than in richer ones. Having travelled extensively by sea and river in
poorer countries, the author has noted the disdain with which crews have
treated fellow human beings who were obviously in trouble. Rather than
helping fellow mariners in trouble, which is almost an instinctive reaction in the
wealthier world, the attitude often appears to be: “He‟s got into that trouble
himself so he should get out of it himself. I don‟t want to be involved”. 68

1.8.2. The fatalism factor.
An attitude of resigned neglect or fatalism seems to be common in the
countries where accidents are more frequent.69 If some form of reward is not
on offer, many seem to believe that assistance is not worth the effort or risk.
Perhaps that, as well as poverty, is the reason for an almost complete
absence of organised, search and rescue facilities or services from poorer
jurisdictions. Poverty does, thanks to its resultant malnutrition, seem to be a
major contributing factor to cognitive weakness, fatalism and a negligent state
of mind in much the same way as drug and alcohol addiction are in the
wealthier world.70
Poverty also contributes to another factor in that employees who question the
status quo are usually penalised with the result that few do so. Such
employees fear losing their jobs in areas of high unemployment.
As well as by poverty, behavioural factors are strongly influenced by culture
and religion as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 5. These can be
particularly important after the event of an accident when a strong belief in
karma or similar can make it difficult to encourage rescue and recovery
efforts.
There is much, though, that can be done, even in the absence of a poverty
reduction, economically and practically to modify and improve the human
behaviour that leads to the vast majority of passenger vessel accidents.

1.9.0 Technical factors – mechanical and structural.
A careful review of the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database
shows that mechanical and structural failures represent only a minute
proportion of the reasons for passenger vessel accidents.71 Almost without
exception such failures can be fairly attributed to the human error factors of
poor seaworthiness or neglect. Engine breakdowns, fires and structural
failures rarely occur without some form of human assistance or influence
either positive or negative, mainly incompetence, neglect or, even, sabotage.
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For example, structural failures involving vessels of even the most primitive
kind are extremely rare. There are, however, certain types of vessels that are
prone to suffer from them with alarming frequency. Most notable of those are
the motor bancas that are commonly used as ferries in the Philippines.

Image 1.4. The wreckage of the large motor banca Kim Nirvana which
capsized in the comparative calm of Ormoc harbour in 2015 when an
outrigger broke off while turning. There were 113 fatalities (Wikipedia).
When poorly maintained and or negligently operated, these simple vessels,
that are effectively canoes stabilised by two outrigger floats, tend to shed an
outrigger and, in the ensuing panic, capsize. Such accidents can be fatal,
especially when the vessel is comparatively large as in the July 2015 case of
the Kim Nirvana which capsized when an outrigger broke off close to shore in
Ormoc harbour on Leyte Island.72 The result of that capsize was 113 fatalities.
Other vessel types that have suffered structural failures are conventional
monohull Ro-Pax ferries that have shed bow door visors as in the case of the
Estonia.73 However, as is discussed below, such failures can usually be
attributed to poor seamanship in sailing too fast for the conditions or operating
with vehicle deck doors open.74
It is indeed encouraging that non-human caused structural and mechanical
failures are so rare. There is probably little practical that can be done about
reducing them as is explained in Chapter 6.

1.10.0. Search and rescue deficiencies.
This is a very important factor in passenger fatalities. Even in the wealthier
world, such deficiencies have been major causes of death. If survivors can be
found and recovered quickly, their chances of long-term survival are obviously
considerably higher. Drowning, shark attack, thirst, starvation or hypothermia
are all less likely to kill if survivor recovery operations are quick and efficient.
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Despite the considerable attention paid to this subject and the government
and charity money directed at it in wealthier countries, there are still significant
capacity deficiencies in most parts of the world. IMO has developed a Search
and Rescue Code (SAR) that guides the maritime world in such matters. 75
While undoubtedly well-intentioned, and widely-adopted in principle, in reality
it suffers from the inability or unwillingness of IMO to interfere in the internal
affairs of its sovereign member states to encourage its implementation.76
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association (WFSA) has sponsored and coordinated considerable research on this problem in conjunction with the
International Maritime Rescue Federation. A paper it presented at the IMRF‟s
World Maritime Rescue Congress in Bremerhaven, Germany in 2015
highlighted some of the search and rescue deficiencies that fail ferry accident
survivors, particularly in poorer countries.77
Chapter 8 examines these deficiencies in considerable detail and that
examination leads on to a number of simple and economical solutions that are
proposed in Chapter 10. The important fact that arises from the study of SAR
deficiencies is that there are numerous effective solutions that are currently
being worked on by dedicated people in a number of parts of the world.
There are many examples of SAR failures but one of the more notable was
the multi-national mess that followed the sinking of the Estonian Ro-Pax ferry
Estonia in September 1994.78 This accident occurred in the Baltic Sea in an
area where the Estonian, Finnish and Swedish jurisdictions overlapped.
Essentially, the various rescue services used different radio channels and
were largely unable to communicate. Worse, some of the rescue helicopters
were overloaded with press photographers and, so, unable to retrieve
survivors from the very cold sea.79
Even where supposedly high quality, well-equipped rescue services are
available as in South Korea with the Sewol and Belgium, with the Herald of
Free Enterprise, they were remarkably ineffectual in the face of a real
disaster. The Belgians and British, though, were much more effective than the
Koreans.
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Image 1.5. Search and rescue efforts vary enormously in availability and
quality. The Bangladeshi approach has not been notably successful. It is
usually poorly organised and too little, too late (news.cn).
Of course, as could be expected, in the poorer parts of the world SAR
services are practically non-existent. Survivors have to rely on the awareness,
observation and benevolence of the crews of any passing vessels. Better than
nothing but hardly dependable.

1.11.0. Human factors – the roles of training, enforcement,
education, psychology and insurance
As this thesis strongly emphasises, human error in its many manifestations
has been the primary cause of 88 per cent of passenger vessel accidents and
of 98 per cent of the deaths arising from them. Poverty, and its often resultant
malnutrition, is generally likely to be the ultimate reason for many such
errors.80
Human error in the maritime industry has been the subject of considerable
study, particularly over the last half century. Indeed, human error is probably
the most closely studied, inquired into and commented upon phenomenon in
all forms of maritime operations. Some very important and informative books
have delved into the subject. One of the most illuminating is Human Factors in
the Maritime Domain.81
Much has been done in the wealthy world to encourage improvements in
human behaviour but there is still a long way to go even there. In developing
countries, regrettably, maritime human performance remains a very serious
problem indeed. The Philippines, notably, has 140 maritime training and
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educational institutions, more than any other country, but, until very recently,
still suffered from one of the worst rates of fatal marine accidents.82
While the outlook is discouraging, it is not beyond hope. The aviation industry
offers a very encouraging model. It has seen dramatic safety improvements in
rich and poor countries alike over the last three decades. These have been
described very well against a maritime background in an excellent handbook
published by The Nautical Institute.83
The London based, Nautical Institute is an international association of master
mariners that works diligently to improve the professionalism of mariners
globally. It is an organisation that provides hope for this thesis. Because of it,
worthwhile improvements in mariner performance and behaviour can, are
being, and will be made. It has made significant and very valuable
contributions to mariner education, training and even psychology. It clearly
illustrates what can be achieved when serious, professional industry
participants work together to achieve positive behavioural change.
Most developed countries have made major advances in Occupational Health
and Safety (OH&S) regulation, enforcement, training and encouragement. It
has become an accepted component of employment activity in many such
countries and has contributed substantially to significant reductions in
employment related death and injury rates.
Insurance is another important motivator of human behaviour. It can have
either positive or negative effects. It can insist that insured vessels are
seaworthy and their crews competent. That, after all, is what the classification
societies that arose from the marine insurance business are meant to ensure.
On the other hand, awareness that a vessel is well insured can lead to
negligence because of the moral hazard „safety-net‟ that insurance provides.
In Chapter 7 the role of marine insurance is reviewed in detail. The author
believes that the insurance industry could do more to positively modify
mariner behaviour, particularly with respect to domestic ferry operations in
developing countries.
So also could the role of classification societies be extended into developing
countries, perhaps even as a philanthropic activity. Classification societies
promote themselves as experts on vessel and operational safety. They are
mostly structured as not-for-profit businesses that, in reality, make very useful
surpluses, read profits. Some pro bono contributions to the maritime industries
and relevant government bodies in poorer countries would seem to be a
useful gesture of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) from them.
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1.12.1. Regulatory and enforcement deficiencies.
These, the author contends, are the most important ultimate reasons for the
high frequency of fatal ferry accidents in developing countries. Where there is
inadequate enforcement of such local regulations as do exist, combined with
an almost total disdain for international regulations, it is almost guaranteed
that passengers will suffer.84
Corruption, inevitably, is a close relative of poverty. When bureaucrats, police
and coastguard personnel who are responsible for ensuring ferry safety, are
poorly remunerated, they will inevitably seek other sources of income.
Unfortunately, that can be easy to come by from corrupt ship owners who
want to reduce their maintenance, safety equipment and crewing expenses.
That kind of corruption is obviously endemic in the poorer tropical countries
where a disproportionately large number of the world‟s passenger vessel
fatalities occur.85 Its corrosive effects are probably matched by the callous
lack of concern shown by the national and international regulators mentioned
above. In an ideal world, unseaworthy vessels and incompetent crews would
be prevented from operating by professional and ethical authorities.
The author has personally observed some of the worst examples of such
corruption in jurisdictions such as Tanzania. There, the ferry route between
Dar-es-Salam and Zanzibar is both busy and highly dangerous despite the
usually relatively benign prevailing weather. The death toll from ferry
accidents on that route is horrifying. Over the past twenty years it has been
more than 5,000.86 Even on some of the modern and seaworthy vessels
operating there, severe fatal accidents have occurred due to appalling
seamanship.
The near-new and very seaworthy and safe catamaran fast ferry Kilimanjaro
II, for example, was driven into a wave at speed on 5 January 2014. At least
25 passengers were swept off the foredeck, where they should not have been
riding, and lost.87 No serious effort seems to have been made to recover them
even though the ferry remained completely seaworthy. In the thirty months
prior to that accident 3,270 passengers perished when the old and
unseaworthy ferries Skagit and Spice Islander capsized and sank.88 The
existence and enforcement of safety standards were certainly not evident
there. Rather, the behaviour of local, passenger-carrying mariners showed an
almost total absence of safety-consciousness or good seamanship.
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Image 1.6. Where corruption prevails, passenger safety or survival is not a
major consideration. The Spice Islander capsized and sank near Zanzibar on
10 September 2011 with the loss of 2,976 lives. Apart from being old and
grossly overloaded, it was in very poor condition and badly „hogged‟ as this
image shows. It should never have been permitted to go to sea (Wikipedia).
The Philippines is another jurisdiction where, while facts are generally known,
thanks to a comparatively free press, the official details of ferry accidents are
often difficult to obtain. One difficult to comprehend and accept fact that is
very well known is that over an eighteen year period one family of ship
owners, under its various guises, lost about 6,000 of its passengers.89 Most of
them died in the biggest peacetime maritime disaster in history, the 1987
sinking of the Dona Paz that killed about 4,386 people.90 In any jurisdiction
where the Rule of Law really applied, that would not be allowed to happen.
Indeed, callous, unscrupulous owners have much to answer for. Many of the
human error factors that lie behind almost all of the fatal accidents are
ultimately the result of the greed and negligence of such people. While the Go
family‟s Sulpicio Lines, of Dona Paz infamy stands out, there have been a
number of other serially offending owners such as Rabaul Shipping,
Townsend Thoresen/P&O Ferries, Negros Navigation, Aboitiz Shipping, Al
Salam Maritime Transport, Sydney Ferries, the Indonesian Government,
Minoan Flying Dolphins, and many more as shown below. They should more
rigorously be brought to account.91
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1.12.2. The World‟s ten worst offending ferry owners.
Owner
Sulpicio Lines
Makame Hasnuu
Senegal Government
Lucky Magloire
Negros Navigation
Al Salam Maritime Transport
Tanzania Railways Corp
Estline Marine Co
Pelayaran Nasional Indon
Prima Vista

Deaths
5,925
2,976
1,863
1,800
1,056
1,032
933
912
580
568

% of total
9.86%
4.95%
3.10%
3.00%
1.76%
1.72%
1.55%
1.52%
0.97%
0.95%

Country
Philippines
Tanzania
Senegal
Haiti
Philippines
Egypt
Tanzania
Estonia
Indonesia
Indonesia

Table 1.3. The worst offending companies by total deaths. Notably, three of
the ten are government owned (BMPVA database).
Owner
Carnival Cruise Lines
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line
Sulpicio Lines
BC Ferries
Norwegian Cruise Lines
WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz
Carlos A Gothong Lines
Minoan Flying Dolphins
San Nicholas Shipping Line
Stena Line

Incidents
23
11
10
5
5
5
4
4
4
4

% of total
3.0%
1.5%
1.3%
0.7%
0.7%
0.7%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%

Deaths
77
14
5,925
7
12
423
370
112
121
6

% of total
0.13%
0.02%
9.86%
0.01%
0.02%
0.70%
0.62%
0.19%
0.20%
0.01%

Country
USA
USA
Philippines
Canada
USA
Philippines
Philippines
Greece
Philippines
Sweden

Table 1.4. The worst offending companies by total fatal accidents. Note that
Carnival, Norwegian Cruise and RCCL are very large cruise lines. Apart from
the notable exception of the Carnival owned Costa Concordia with 32
fatalities, most of their fatalities have occurred in very small numbers. About
50% are suspected of being suicides. Of course, nothing is known of serial
offending owners in countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh, DR Congo and
Senegal as vessel owners‟ names rarely appear in accident reports (BMPVA
database).
The reality, though, is that in many developing countries repeat offenders are
barely even censured let alone punished and prevented from operating. This
can only happen when there is an almost complete absence of enforcement of
whatever regulations exist there. Corruption is a major problem in many parts
of the world and will be one of the most difficult problems to overcome.92

1.13.0. The aviation model.
Fortuitously, there is an excellent model that the maritime industry can easily
access to guide a significant improvement in its safety consciousness and
performance. First, unlike its sister organisation, IMO, the ICAO is not
reluctant to involve itself in the internal affairs of sovereign member nations. It
92
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endeavours to encourage, educate, lead and enforce a global approach to
safety as a discipline. As is explained in Chapter 4, ICAO has, through
persuasion, co-operation, encouragement and enforcement, made remarkable
progress, particularly over the last three decades. Apart from an obvious and
disappointing absence of will, perhaps accentuated by local corruption at
worst or negligent complacency at best, there is no reason why IMO could not
emulate the leadership role of its aviation counterpart.
Obviously, the performances of national governments vary enormously in the
rigour of their approaches to maritime safety. In many very obvious cases
their approaches are much less rigorous than those they apply to their local
aviation industries. IMO should and could encourage them to improve even if
only on that basis.
Similarly, aviation insurers seem to take a much more rigorous approach to
their customers than do their maritime counterparts.
The aviation industry and its regulators have spent substantial amounts of
time and sums of money on researching ways to make flying safer. It has
been an excellent investment and provides the maritime industry with a
practical and encouraging guide or benchmark as to how to similarly improve.

1.14.0. Some possible solutions – What is to be done?
1.14.1. Solutions must be economical.
Given that the large majority of ferry accidents and the deaths arising from
them occur in developing countries, it must be accepted that any solutions
must be very economical. Developing country national governments are
rarely willing or able to apply rich country levels of expenditure to poor country
ferry safety problems.
Implementing and enforcing regulations and raising safety awareness need
not be expensive activities. They seem likely, though, to be the most effective
solutions. Richer countries‟ OH&S, road safety and public health campaigns
have been very effective even with comparatively little expenditure. So has
the reform of the oil tanker sector. As the great majority of passenger vessel
fatalities are ultimately caused by human error (as will be shown below) any
improvements to be made will mostly involve behavioural modification rather
than technical improvements. That will be significantly less expensive.
First, and most important, the IMO must be pushed by its richer country
members into emulating the approach of its ICAO cousin even if only to
protect their own tourist citizens from developing country ferry accidents. It
should also be encouraged to emulate its own successful efforts in
encouraging the reduction of oil spills from tankers. It is imperative that IMO
makes more than just token efforts to persuade member governments to
adopt rich and middle income country standards and regulations and enforce
them rigorously. An analysis of the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel
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database shows conclusively that those regulations are effective provided that
they are properly enforced. There is more than adequate existing national and
international maritime regulation. The problem is that it is too often
inadequately enforced.

1.14.2. Developing countries will not take the safety initiative.
Very little or no improvement will be achieved if the world relies on developing
country governments, with the notable exception of the Philippines, to take the
initiative in this regard. They must be encouraged to regulate vigorously in
favour of maritime safety and to enforce those regulations very rigorously.
Severe punishments must be imposed on transgressors so as to encourage
the others.

1.15.0. Much can be done, practically and economically, to
improve ferry safety.
As is explained in detail in Chapter 10, there is much that can be done,
especially in developing countries, to improve the safety of passenger
vessels; the competence and behaviour of their operators; and, the
effectiveness of SAR responses. Significant technical, behavioural and
psychological improvement is economically and politically achievable.
Developed countries have largely achieved them as have other industries and
maritime sectors. All that is required is the global will to bring such vitally
needed improvements about. It is hoped that this thesis will help draw global
attention to that requirement. Ferry passenger fatalities are preventable.

28

Chapter 2
Defining the problem
Data and reporting inadequacies make accurate definition
of the dimensions of the problem very difficult
2.1.1. Defining the problem.
While anecdotal evidence general and electronic media reports abound as to
the extent of the problem of fatal ferry accidents, it is difficult to obtain recent,
detailed and accurate information from primary sources about most of the
accidents that have occurred in the developing world. It is impossible also, for
example, to learn how many ferry voyages are undertaken; how many
passengers travel on each; the specifications of the vessels concerned; and,
what is the duration or length of voyage. We can, therefore, only deal in
absolutes. Comparative analyses are impossible because of the absence of
such data. There is no statistical denominator.
Developed nations in northern Europe, North America, Australasia and Japan
have much more useful statistics available. They also have a free press,
functioning legal systems and a process of government inquiries into the
reasons for and outcomes of serious passenger vessel accidents. Those
inquiry findings are usually publicly available. Those countries, however,
particularly more recently, are not where the real problems of ferry fatalities
lie.
Such official inquiries are often superficial or unfocused and their published
results sometimes late and misleading but, at least, they are usually open to
the public and the evidence presented to them is recorded permanently and
reported on. They can provide a useful, even if biased, basis for the analysis
of the events that they enquire into. As Joseph Conrad described them in Lord
Jim in 1900, “However, an official inquiry could not be any other thing. Its
object was not the fundamental why, but the superficial how, of this affair”.93
The „how‟ is usually easily determined but the „why‟, which is far more
important, is far more difficult. So difficult, indeed, that many inquiries do not
even try to delve into it. However, so as to try to learn from the accident
experience, the „why‟ is imperative in order to avoid it happening again in
similar future circumstances.
Very importantly, though, a comparatively free press in developed countries
can normally be relied upon to expose criminal behaviour or attempts by
vessel operators and authorities to conceal facts.
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It should be noted, however, that even a free press may be muzzled to some
extent by the aggressive use of defamation laws. The author has personal
experience of this, most particularly after publishing warnings of safety
shortcomings in North Sea ferries shortly before the Herald of Free Enterprise
capsized in 1987.94 Needless to say, that threatened defamation litigation
ceased immediately following the capsize of that vessel. He also published
comments on the Rabaul Queen sinking that inspired a threatening letter from
the vessel‟s owner.95
Two of the most informative and effective inquiry reports examined were those
concerning the Marchioness96 and Estonia97 accidents both of which occurred
in “developed” jurisdictions. Both revealed enormous amounts of detail and
could only be described as extremely thorough. However, while the
Marchioness inquiry was very thorough, it suffered from being conducted
eleven years after the accident occurred in 1989. Its recommendations,
though, would appear to have had some positive effect as no similarly tragic
accident has happened in the United Kingdom since.
The Estonia Commission reported less than three years after the accident.98
However, the author believes that its very comprehensive and detailed report
was marred by focusing too intently on technical detail at the expense of
human factors. That focus did, though, lead to worthwhile improvements in the
design, construction, equipping and operation of Ro-Pax ferries in northern
Europe and Scandinavia at least. That has undoubtedly been generally
beneficial. The Estonia report was also marred by a bias toward placing blame
on participants from beyond Estonia, Finland and Sweden, the three countries
behind the commission. To its credit, though, the fact of it closely following the
very timely and much more searchingly effective Herald of Free Enterprise
inquiry report undoubtedly increased its impact.99
The very comprehensive and plainly transparent Rabaul Queen inquiry report
showed very impressively that developing countries can conduct such
inquiries effectively.100 However, such exemplary reports have been
disappointingly rare.
Further fatal Ro-Pax ferry accidents have, of course, occurred but not in
Northern Europe where the new Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star
and Estonia accident inspired „Stockholm Rules‟ were implemented quickly
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and rigorously from 1996.101 They have proved to be very effective in that
region but less so in the Mediterranean and much less so in Asia and Africa
as is described at length in Chapter 6.

2.1.2. Even a free press is too frequently powerless in
developing countries.
Unfortunately, developing countries normally lack functional or transparent
legal systems and tend to suffer from “cronyism” whereby friends or relatives
of the rulers, who tend to own the vessels involved, are protected from
government investigations into any misbehaviour or negligence on their
part.102 These problems are widespread and generally afflict most of the
countries where larger numbers of passenger vessel accidents occur.
Of those, only Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Thailand can be said to
enjoy the benefit of a largely free press to at least expose criminality or coverup. However, even they do not have fully functioning systems of marine
boards of inquiry as developed countries know them. Their court systems,
similarly, could hardly be described as fair and objective in the western
developed country sense.
That has led to Sulpicio Lines in the Philippines remaining unpunished until
2008 despite losing in excess of 6,000 of its paying passengers in four
separate „accidents‟ including the obscene Dona Paz sinking when 4,375
people lost their lives.103 Finally, following the sinking of the Princess of the
Stars in 2008, Sulpicio Lines‟ operations were suspended by the Maritime
Industry Authority of the Government of the Philippines (MARINA). However,
phoenix like, the company simply changed its name to Philippine Span Asia
Carrier Corporation and re-commenced operations.104 Effectively, it was given
no more than a „slap on the wrist‟ by the Philippine Government. It is, then,
still operating although without further known fatal accidents since then. Its
punishment has in reality been little more than an inconvenience.
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Image 2.1. The sinking of the Sulpicio Lines owned Princess of the Stars in
2008 with the loss of more than 800 lives resulted in little more than a “slap on
the wrist” from the Philippines Government. It was the last of a series of
accidents over 18 years that led to the deaths of more than 6,000 people
before the company changed its name to something less notorious
(Wikipedia).
To further illustrate the extent of the arrogance engendered by the „cronyism‟
that is rampant in the Philippines, Sulpicio Lines petitioned the Manila
Regional Trial Court with a claim that the Board of Marine Inquiry had no right
to investigate the sinking of the Princess of the Stars which caused about 860
fatalities. That aggressive approach failed, however, and Sulpicio‟s petition
was rejected.105 Things, as noted below, are very slowly improving in that
respect in that country.
Cronyism was discussed at length in a feature article in The Economist in
2016.106 It showed the malign influence enjoyed by the declared billionaire
friends of rulers in a number of countries. Obviously, with their dearth of
known billionaires, all African countries and Bangladesh were excluded from
the Economist‟s survey but The Philippines, unsurprisingly, was in third place
following Russia and Malaysia. Indonesia, India, China and Thailand were all
included on The Economist‟s list of the twelve worst countries for crony
capitalism.
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2.1.3. Maritime and general media provide more and better
information than do developing country governments.
Much of the information about developing country ferry accidents that does
exist has been revealed and recorded by the general and maritime media
rather than by government authorities. Thus the Baird Maritime Passenger
Vessel Accident database predominantly comprises reports sourced from
newspapers, journals, books, directories, other databases, and from online
news services.107 Most recently, in 2015, there have been brief and poor
quality films of the fatal accidents involving the Pura Vida Princess in Costa
Rica and the Marina Baru in Indonesia presented on YouTube.108 There are a
further two YouTube videos presented in Appendix F that very graphically
illustrate the reality of ferry accidents in Bangladesh. An interesting and useful
development. In the „Western‟ developed world reports of marine boards of
enquiry can normally be accessed with respect to all accidents involving
significant loss of life. Regrettably, this has been practically impossible
elsewhere.
Globally, Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping (LR), a classification society, publishes
the most useful and comprehensive reports on casualties or accidents.
However, its Casualty Review only lists losses of ships larger than 100 grt.109
That excludes many of the vessels in the developing world that are the subject
of this thesis. The other useful global source is the Institute of London
Underwriters (ILU). It publishes an Annual Report listing ship and aircraft
accidents although it unfortunately excludes ships smaller than 500 grt except
for war casualties.110 The IMO‟s Global Integrated Shipping Information
System (GISIS) is claimed to list the world‟s shipping casualties and incidents
and to record the findings of the resulting MBOIs.111 So far, regrettably, it does
so partially and very inadequately and is practically devoid of developing
country ferry accident data. It is disappointingly revealing to compare its
content with that of the BMPVA database.

2.1.4. IMO data grossly misrepresents reality.
Even more revealing was the 2012 published International Shipping Facts and
Figures – Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment
from the IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre.112 It showed how North Atlantic
centric IMO is in that it cites a number of UK and USA based publications but
not one from the Asia-Pacific, African or South American regions. Worse, it is
simply and grossly wrong in its figure of lives lost in maritime accidents. While
considerably more accurate than its cited source, IHS-Fairplay, it understates
the true figures by more than 50 per cent.

107

Appendix A, Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident Database 1966-2015.
Google. YouTube. 2015 and view Appendix F.
109
Casualty Review, Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping, London, Ongoing.
110
Annual Report, Institute of London Underwriters, London, Ongoing.
111
Global Integrated Shipping Information System, IMO London, Ongoing.
112
International Shipping Facts and Figures, IMO, London, 6 March 2012.
108

33

The figure published by IMO for the five year period 2006-2010 inclusive is
5,938 fatalities. The author‟s BMPVA database shows 9,283 „known‟ fatalities
for the same period. That, of course should be increased by about 50 per cent
to reflect the estimated unreported fatalities. 113 IMO‟s subsequent estimated
ratios of lives lost to numbers of seafarers and passengers are, therefore,
ludicrously low.114 In any event, IMO would have no idea of the numbers of
seafarers or passengers involved. Applied globally, IMO‟s statistics grossly
misrepresent reality.
Promisingly, however, as noted in Chapter 1(1.3.1), in his speech delivered at
the opening of the IMO‟s 30th Assembly in November 2017, IMO SecretaryGeneral Kitack Lim made a plea for more comprehensive and better data and
statistics about marine casualties.115 That offers some hope that IMO is
becoming aware of its information deficiencies. However, while the author
offered his extensive data to IMO without charge, apart from an initial positive
response, no attempt has been made by IMO to avail itself of his offer.
Considerable detailed analysis of the available accident statistics has been
carried out by the International Union of Maritime Insurance (IUMI) which has
been compiling data since 1993. The protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs
generally have been compiling similar data but, again, on the wider subject of
all vessels, particularly larger ones.
Maritime lawyer Philippe Boisson, on behalf of the French classification
society Bureau Veritas (BV), has made a wide study of the safety of all kinds
of vessels, not just passenger vessels.116 He has noted similar difficulties in
sourcing information about accidents in developing countries. He states: “LRS
takes account only of passengers and seamen who have died or are missing
in a total loss, not the huge numbers of accidents in the perilous seas of the
Third World. The ILU surveys only loss of life caused by accidents to ships of
more than 500 grt, whereas certain national sources reveal that most deaths
and injuries occur on board small craft…”117
Further, Boisson commented: “Of course, it is also possible to turn to the
reports issued by flag administrations after an accident at sea, but the
information they contain usually remains inconsistent and unequal in value
from one state to another”.118 The experience of the author is that little if
anything has changed since M. Boisson‟s book was published in 1999.

2.1.5. Probably 50% of fatal PV accidents go unrecorded.
These realities mean that significant numbers of fatal passenger vessel
accidents must never have been reported on or recorded at all. Figure 2.1,
113
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below, makes that fact particularly obvious.119 However, and very importantly,
the widespread adoption of the Internet around the turn of the Millennium has
seen a very dramatic increase in the numbers of fatal accidents recorded. It is
particularly significant that practically all of this increase has been in the
developing world. This data has been of considerable value in the
development of this thesis.
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association (WFSA) has urged the adoption of
mandatory reporting of ferry accidents. It “…found that only a small fraction of
the world‟s ferry accidents were voluntarily reported to the IMO‟s Global
Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS)120, and hypothesise that
mandatory reporting would improve the frequency and quality of nations‟
accident investigations, which could help prevent future accidents”.121 Indeed,
as to GISIS, the author randomly sampled 20 accidents from the BMPVA
database from 2001 to 2012, the cause of some 5,480 fatalities and could find
only 12 of them listed on GISIS despite some of them having been very
extensively publicised. Of those listed, most were described very
inadequately.
On querying this deficiency, the author was advised that IMO Member States
“…are regularly reminded and requested to make sure they put good and
comprehensive information up there but it does sometime seem that is not
always high on their priorities (sic)”.122 This is remarkable given the timely,
accurate and comprehensive data that is available from the IMO‟s sister
organisation ICAO describing aviation accidents.123

2.1.6. Available data is disproportionately focused on
developed countries.
Consequently, the data recorded in the BMPVA database prior to 2000 is
disproportionately focused on accidents that occurred in developed
countries.124 It is similarly disproportionately focused on cruise ships because
their clientele tend to be well off and, therefore, of more interest to the general
media.
While it makes little or no difference to the overriding trends in the causes of
such accidents, it significantly distorts the records of the particular states in
which they occurred. So, because the data gathered over the period 20002015, is far more comprehensive, it has been used here for more detailed
analysis.

119

For example, for Myanmar/Burma there is very little information available for the period
1962 -2007 because the country was effectively closed to the outside world for most of that
period.
120
IMO, GISIS, Ibid.
121
Worldwide Ferry Safety Association. Annual Report, New York, 2015.
122
Email from Mr Lee Adamson, Head Public Information Services, Legal and External
relations Division, IMO, to the author. 10 June 2016.
123
See, for example, the ICAO Safety Report 2016 Edition, ICAO, Montreal, 2016.
124
Appendix A, Ibid.

35

The Internet, also, helps to provide us with multiple sources of news that
effectively confirm or, at least, further validate the data that has to be utilised
in the absence of any other information. There is thus usually sufficient data
available to corroborate the descriptions of almost all of the accidents listed.
Unfortunately, however, there is insufficient data available to enable a
statistical denominator to be created in terms of, for example, fatalities per
voyage, or fatalities per passenger mile, or per numbers of vessels in service.
Such figures simply do not exist.
In other words, while much of the data that is available is not strictly empirical,
it is sufficient to work with for the purpose of this thesis. Put simply, there can
be very little doubt as to who is at fault or why in the event of a collision,
allision or grounding or when a vessel proceeds to sea against a very
definitely predicted typhoon.

2.1.7. Internet dramatically improved data availability.
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Figure 2.1. Fatal accidents reported worldwide. Note the dramatic and
sustained increase around the year 2000. This coincides with the advent of
widespread use of the Internet (BMPVA database). 125
Despite the approximately four-fold increase in the numbers of fatal accidents
per annum reported in the years since 2000, it cannot be assumed that the
statistics in the BMPVA database are in any way all-encompassing. The
author believes that due to under-reporting, the real figures for the number of
accidents and the resulting death toll could be as much 50 per cent higher
than shown.
Indeed, Philippe Boisson, commenting on the death toll arising from all
maritime accidents wrote: “This shortage of internationally comparable data
suggests that official figures could be multiplied by at least ten”.126
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Given that as the likely situation for the period since the year 2000, it is
equally likely, because of much worse under-reporting, that the true figures
could be at least seven or eight times those recorded in the database for the
prior 34 years from 1966 to 1999. It is distinctly possible that the reality could
be even worse than that speculated figure as vessels and their equipment
and, even, governance in some jurisdictions, have improved somewhat over
the same period. For example, note the relative reductions in numbers of both
accidents and fatalities in The Philippines shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 below.
It may be speculated that this improvement is at least partially due to
increased publicity about ferry accident fatalities leading to a demand from
passengers/customers for better vessels and behaviour from ferry owners in
that country. It may also be due, in part, to the improved reporting of accidents
in other poorly performing countries
As will be seen below and in Chapter 10, such a demand for improved vessels
has been created and new competitors are entering the industry in the
Philippines with significantly better and safer vessels.
It is acknowledged, therefore, that the following analysis is somewhat
restricted by the information that is available. The author is unaware, however,
of any more comprehensive source of information and has had to work with
what is available. It is unlikely, therefore, that the trends presented are
inaccurate in any way other than an under-reading caused by this paucity of
information. In other words, the extent of the problem will generally be worse
than shown here. It is very unlikely that the causes of accidents will be any
different.

2.2.1. Causal analysis of fatal accidents 2000-2015.
Given the much greater availability of reports of accidents and the data arising
from them since 1 January 2000, it became obvious that, apart from the
timeliness of the information, its greater quantity provided a much better
sample for both causal and geographic analyses. Compared with the data
presented in Chapter 1, which covers the full fifty years of the database, those
covering its most recent sixteen years provide information that is undoubtedly
more comprehensive and accurate globally.127
That more recent and more voluminous information, however, largely confirms
the trends indicated by the full fifty-year statistics. The major author assessed
causes are generally similar in both the fifty-year and sixteen year samples
despite the massive change in sample numbers. Probably unsurprisingly, the
same also applies generally to the geographical analysis of accidents. Apart,
notably, from the significant relative improvement of the Philippines. An
improvement which, incidentally, proves that change for the better is
achievable given the right approaches. Of course, the increase in the volume
of reporting from Bangladesh, Myanmar and some African countries will be a
major factor in this change.
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It is possible, too, that the relative performance of the Philippines may not
have been as bad as the BMPVA database statistics indicate. This is a result
of the relatively greater under-reporting of accidents, pre-Internet, in other
countries, most notably Myanmar, that do not benefit from the relatively free
and virile press that is a major attribute of the Philippines. While it is
impossible to empirically confirm that anomaly, it should be carefully borne in
mind by anyone analysing relative safety performances between countries,
particularly in the period prior to 31 December 1999.
Of course, while there has been a distinct improvement, relative to other
countries, in the performance of the Philippines, in absolute numbers of
fatalities, the Philippines averaged 149 per annum from 1966 to 1999 but 166
per annum for the 16 years thereafter. This may simply indicate that the
Internet factor may have been relatively less important in the Philippines than
in other countries such as Tanzania, Myanmar and DR Congo, for example.
That appears likely to be the reality.
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2.2.2. Causal analysis illustrated.
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Figure 2.2. Author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel accidents 20002015. By accidents, left and fatalities, right. They have changed from the full
fifty-year survey (below) but not dramatically so except for the marked
improvement in accidents attributable to poor lookout (BMPVA database). 128
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Figure 2.3. By comparison, author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel
accidents 1966-2015. By accidents, left and fatalities, right (BMPVA
database).129

2.3.1. Geographical analysis revisited.
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Figure 2.4. Geographical analysis of passenger vessel accidents and fatalities
2000-2015. By accidents, left and fatalities, right (BMPVA database). 130
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Figure 2.5. By comparison, geographical analysis of passenger vessel
accidents and fatalities 1966-2015. By accidents, left and by fatalities, right
(BMPVA database). 131 Note that, because of an absence of data, Myanmar is
not included in either of these comparisons.

2.3.2. National fatality rates have remained largely consistent.
Notably, the ten most dangerous nations for ferry travel measured both by
numbers of accidents and numbers of fatalities remained the same over both
the fifty and sixteen year periods studied although their rankings did change
somewhat. They are: The Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tanzania, DR
Congo, China, India, the United States and Haiti. With the exception of the
United States and the possible or partial exception of China, all are classed as
developing countries. Of the ten, only India, the United States, Indonesia and
The Philippines enjoy the benefit of a mostly free press. None, except perhaps
the United States, could be described as having an independent, objective
and usually corruption-free bureaucracy. This, as noted above, can be an
impediment to the timely, accurate and detailed reporting of accidents of any
kind.
Generally, developing countries tend to be dangerous countries. This applies
to all forms of transport, except, generally, aviation, and to many other
aspects of daily life. However, even the United States is home to a significant
underclass of comparatively poor people, much more so than most other
developed countries. Perhaps that is the reason why it is the only so-called
130
131
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„developed‟ country to appear in these statistics. It should be noted, also, that
the USA has a far worse record of road accident fatalities than most other
developed nations.132 There would appear to be a definite cultural/behavioural
connection there.
An interesting and encouraging improvement that emerged over the final
sixteen years of the survey is that the Philippines improved from worst place
for fatalities with 18.2 per cent to fifth place with 8.4 per cent.133 However,
more comprehensive accident reporting in other developing countries is
probably the main reason for the improvement in the relative position of the
Philippines. The reported number of ferry fatalities per annum there actually
increased from 2000 to 2015.
The statistics from the BMPVA database illustrate that relative improvement
well.134 Over the same period, by contrast, Tanzania saw many more and
worse accidents. It is suspected, though, that this may have largely been
because of more complete recording of accidents in that country since 1999.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh experienced no noticeable improvement with an
average of four fatal accidents per annum with an average of 379 fatalities
arising from each.
Tanzania has commenced to introduce larger vessels on a number of its
coastal ferry routes, particularly from Dar-es-Salam to Zanzibar. Two of them,
Spice Islander and Skagit, sank with massive loss of life in 2011 and 2012
respectively. It seems that larger or even newer vessels do not always
guarantee greater passenger safety.
Even brand new ferries have not engendered any notable improvement in
safety consciousness in Tanzania. The tragic „nose-dive‟ in 2014 of the 2010
built Kiliminjaro II provided a clear illustration of that.135

2.3.3. Statistics are generally significantly understated.
It must again be emphasised that the figures listed above are almost certainly
significantly underestimated, Indeed, in April 1988, Feliciana G. Salonga, then
president of the Philippines Shipyard and Engineering Corporation, estimated
that 40,000 people died in Philippine waters each year.136 The Philippine
Government disputed that and suggested the real figure was more like 20,000
to 30,000 per annum!137
There are, obviously, numerous small accidents that are not regarded as
newsworthy.138 And, if a senior officer of the Philippine Coast Guard conceded
132

Refer to Figure 4.2.
Appendix A, Ibid.
134
Ibid
135
See Appendix A.
136
Refer to 1.3.1. Feliciana G. Salonga.
137
Subsequent comment to the author from Commo Gueltiero dela Cruz, PCG retd. See
Personnae.
138
Hooke, N, Maritime Casualties 1963 – 1996, Second edition, LLP, London, 1997, P.174.
133

42

that such large numbers were correct, it can be assumed that the totality is
considerably worse than the available statistics concerning the Philippines
and a number of similar countries suggest.
It seems very reasonable to assume that the same realities apply in most of
the other developing countries examined here and thus that the overall
accident and fatality statistics presented here significantly underestimate the
actual figures.

2.3.4. Known fatal ferry accidents.
The Worst Five Countries: 1 January 2000-31 December 2015
YEAR

BANGLADESH
Accd

INDONESIA

TANZANIA

D.R.CONGO

PHILIPPINES

2000
2001

4
1

Fatal
560
100

Accd
3
3

Fatal
611
41

Accd
0
0

Fatal
0
0

Accd
0
1

Fatal
0
143

Accd
7
3

Fatal
384
36

2002
2003

3
8

537
1,284

4
3

128
91

2
1

160
33

0
1

0
282

5
5

94
149

2004
2005

6
7

441
950

1
3

273
226

0
2

0
49

3
3

452
250

2
2

191
8

2006
2007

8
3

224
238

9
3

1,246
188

1
0

28
0

3
1

250
39

4
5

94
112

2008
2009

3
4

212
310

1
6

9
390

1
3

37
56

1
1

13
110

5
4

1,001
164

2010
2011

4
4

138
173

2
8

33
186

0
1

0
2,976

4
3

493
300

0
3

0
6

2012
2013

2
2

320
69

3
3

105
37

1
1

293
33

0
0

0
0

3
2

33
250

2014
2015
Total
Average
P/Annum

2
4
65

370
203
6,129

3
4
59

33
220
3,817

1
0
14

25
0
3,690

3
2
26

569
107
3,008

1
3
54

8
154
2,684

4

383

4

239

1

231

2

188

3

168

Average
fatalities per
accident

94

65

264

116

50

Table 2.1. A comparison of fatal accident and fatality data from the five most
dangerous countries (That represent about 61% of the known total) for ferry
accident fatalities - 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2015. The Philippines
improved from worst to fifth worst country in terms of fatalities per annum in
that period (BMPVA database).139 Note that Myanmar should be on this list.
Data deficiencies have necessitated its exclusion.
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2.3.5. Data analysis inadequacies
This is why considerable caution must be exercised when analysing and
interpreting the data compiled in the BMPVA database. While it is undoubtedly
the best available, it is, equally undoubtedly, incomplete. Further, this data,
while it is largely based on newspaper and online news service reports, has,
as far as undeveloped nations are concerned, no official status such as might
enhance the veracity of reports of Marine Boards of Inquiry and similar
investigations in developed countries.
Given these constraints, though, there is sufficient consistency of information
to enable usefully accurate conclusions to be drawn. It seems very unlikely
that, even if full and detailed reports were available on all accidents, the
trends on which this thesis is based would be any different. They are
overwhelmingly consistent worldwide and over both the sixteen year and fifty
year time spans. There is also a remarkably close correlation between the
author-assessed causes of the accidents and their geographical locations.

2.3.6. Analytical methodology.
Similarly, the fact that the causes attributed to all the accidents recorded in the
database are „author-assessed‟ inarguably implies subjectivity. This is not
disputed but the assessments have been made consistently and, while the
author in no way claims to be in a position similar to that of the chairman of an
MBOI, it is impossible to argue that a collision, overloading or grounding, for
example, could have any cause other than human error. Judgements as to
seaworthiness are more nebulous but, if a vessel disintegrates or catches fire
while in service, there is very little doubt as to that reality.
In an endeavour to present as much detailed information as possible about
each known accident, the data has been presented across 22 fields. They are:
Day, Month, Year, Region, Country, Detailed Location, Type of Incident,
Number of Deaths, Vessel Name, Flag State, Vessel Type, Hull Construction
Material, Tonnage (GRT), Length (Metres), Year Built, Ship Builder, Ship
Owner, Claimed Cause, Author Assessed Cause, Inquiry Adjudication,
Explanatory Notes, and Information Sources. Obviously, in many cases, not
all fields could be completed because of information scarcity.
This process became something of a „jig-saw puzzle‟ in that information often
had to be extracted from a number of sources and, in many cases, interpreted
to facilitate its useful presentation. Indeed, information continues to be
discovered even many years after the event concerned. A significant
variability exists, therefore, as to the accuracy of the data presented. The
processes applied to the data gathering were consistent, however, and the
author firmly believes that no more extensive or accurate data exists. The
absence of significant inconsistencies in the data collected and analysed
confirms that, taken across the whole database, the figures used to determine
the reasons for the problem and its extent are as accurate as possible.
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2.4.1. Causes of passenger vessel accidents.
While the data available was frequently sparse and somewhat nebulous, the
investigatory process eventually uncovered sufficient information for the
author to assess, admittedly subjectively, the most likely cause of almost
every accident. In addition, an even greater number of non-fatal accidents
were also examined and the causal trends were precisely consistent with the
fatal accidents. The substantial quantity of data collated provides good
grounds to believe that the trends that it reveals are accurate. Any resulting
inaccuracies are considered, therefore, to be immaterial. The BMPVA
database has been seen by many people with an interest in the subject of
ferry safety. Not one has pointed out any inaccuracies.
Across the total of 750 accidents examined and assessed, practically all had
been the subject of some kind of media or government report.140 While the
reported details varied significantly in both quantity and quality, in almost
every case enough information was available to enable the author to sensibly
and objectively assess the likely cause.
Again, the consistency of the trends revealed tends to confirm the overall
accuracy of the data. In the case of almost every accident examined and
assessed, the facts were clear and the cause obvious. The accidents that
were the subject of really nebulous reports have been classed in the „All
Others‟ category. They amounted to fewer than eight per cent of the accidents
listed.
Indeed, the statistics for author-assessed causes as to total numbers of
accidents and fatalities over both the full fifty-year period surveyed and the
most recent sixteen years are practically identical. Over both periods the
figure for numbers of accidents assessed to be caused by human error is
identical at 88 per cent. The percentages of fatalities believed to have arisen
from human error caused accidents were 99 per cent in the period 2000-2015
and 98 per cent for the fifty years from 1966 to 2015.141 It must be noted,
though, as shown below, that the detailed reasons for those human errors
have changed somewhat.
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2.4.2. Human error, undoubtedly, is overwhelmingly and
consistently the major cause of fatal accidents.
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association has analysed, ”… 147 ferry accidents
worldwide to determine what proportion of accidents are caused by human
error(HE)”.142 In summary, it determined that 61 per cent of accidents and 75
per cent of fatalities were caused by human error using a „conservative‟
approach. However, taking a „liberal‟ approach, it attributed 85 per cent of
accidents and 92 per cent of fatalities to human error. Although gained from a
considerably smaller sample (147 cf. 570) over a similar period (14 cf.15
years), the results are similar to those estimated by the author who takes a
more rigorous approach to seaworthiness in particular than does the WFSA.
A more recent study Statistical analysis of ship accidents and review of safety
level, by Eleftheria, E. et al, looked at accidents involving all ship types above
100gt from 2000 to 2012. It concluded that: “…an overwhelming part of
marine accidents (more than abt. 80%) is attributable to human factors…”.143
As the author has commented elsewhere:
Their causes are primarily unseaworthy vessels, poor lookout, overloading
and downright negligence, none of which can be blamed on anything but
human error.
Structural and mechanical failures, of which there are remarkably few, cannot
be blamed for collisions, allisions, groundings and capsizes due to
overloading. They can all be put down to human error. So, in other words, the
main problems are predominantly behavioural and cultural rather than
mechanical or structural. Our naval architects, ship builders and engine
manufacturers do a pretty good job.144
Numerous other commentators have come to similar conclusions with respect
to the importance of human error or human factors in maritime, particularly
passenger vessel, accidents. Indeed, some have even gone so far as to
suggest that it is the only cause of accidents. In a sense, perhaps an extreme
one, it could be argued that such a proposition is reasonable. However, most
commentators allow for the possibility that there can be some other causal
factors.
A very useful, comprehensive and extensively researched government
document that examines the human element in shipping was published in
2010 by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency. It concurs with the author‟s
assertion that practically 100 per cent of maritime accidents are directly or
indirectly attributable to human element issues. It, “…explains the
142
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fundamental aspects of human behaviour and the complex interactions of
human element issues in the maritime industry”. More specifically, “It shows
how the human element needs to be managed simultaneously at all levels in
the industry, on board ship, within companies and amongst regulators, and it
provides effective, pragmatic guidance on how these issues can be
addressed”.145

2.4.3. Defining human error.
Human error has been well defined by Michelle Grech and colleagues as: “An
inappropriate or undesirable human decision or behaviour that leads to
undesirable outcomes or has significant potential for such an outcome.
Accumulation of errors may result in accidents”.146 IMO defines human error
as: “… a departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an
individual or group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or
undesirable results”.147
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) describes the related concept of
„human factors‟ as “the study and analysis of the design of the equipment, the
interaction of the equipment and the human operator, and most importantly
the procedures the crew and management follow”.148
Over the fifty year period examined in this thesis considerable work, analysis,
study, evaluation and promotion has been directed at the specific problem of
human error and, more generally, at human factors, human behaviour and
safety. A considerable part of that effort has been set against a background of
transportation activity of which, of course, maritime transport is a major
component. That effort has resulted generally in impressive and important
improvements in terms of reductions in the numbers of accidents and of their
resulting fatalities.
Eleftheria et al highlight the “remarkable example” of “the improvement of
safety of tanker operations after year 1990…”.149 Given IMO‟s key role in
those reforms, they offer an excellent example or model of what could be
achieved if IMO were to cooperate similarly with the ferry sector.
While its performance has improved, the maritime industry, apart from the oil
tanker and cruise ship sectors, has generally not enjoyed the same dramatic
rate of improvement that has benefitted the aviation and road transport
sectors, especially in the developed world, over that same period. The
passenger vessel sub-sector has, unfortunately, been similarly slow to
improve as the wider maritime sector.
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The London based Nautical Institute (NI)150 has published an excellent
handbook on this subject.151 It describes how: “A system of examinations for
aviation pilots in human performance and limitation has produced great
advances in safety for that sector”. It shows how those developments can be
adapted to the maritime sector to effect similar improvements in human
factors. As is described in chapters 1, 4 and 7, there is much to be gained by
the maritime industry from emulating aviation industry practices.

2.4.4. Considerable attention accorded to human error.
Given their importance as contributing factors in maritime accidents,
considerable attention has been accorded to human error, human factors and
human behaviour by organisations such as the Nautical Institute, the
classification societies, numerous national authorities and IMO. Numerous
seminars and conferences on the subject have been presented and resulting
reports published as can be seen in the Bibliography herewith. These events
have not been wasted and considerable progress made, particularly in the
field of cognitive psychology. This is discussed in Chapter 7.
Undoubtedly the single most effective initiative on the part of IMO since the
imposition of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)152 a century ago
was its adoption of the International Safety Management Code (ISM)
in1993.153 This followed soon after the Herald of Free Enterprise and
Scandinavian Star accidents and its implementation was hastened by the
Estonia sinking in 1994. Notably, all three of these accidents occurred in
European waters and their significant loss of life over a six-year period
inspired rapid reform in northern Europe at least.154
Paragraph 1.2.2 of the ISM Code lists three main objectives for safety
management. They are: to “…provide for safe practices in ship operation and
a safe working environment; establish safeguards against all identified risks;
and continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and
aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies both to safety and
environmental protection”.155
Importantly, the ISM Code covers all passenger vessels with no lower gross
tonnage or age limits although non-SOLAS vessels may be exempted from
mandatory compliance.156 As explained in Chapter 8, however, its
enforcement in poorer countries has been patchy, to say the least, with the
result that safety improvements have been less impressive than in the
150
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developed world. Poverty and its accompanying corruption make
improvement much more difficult there.
The author has commented further on this factor elsewhere:
So, the blame for all this death and destruction can pretty much be sheeted
home to owners, crews and regulators. They are failing dismally and mostly,
but not entirely, in the poorer parts of the world. Never forget, though, the
Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star, Estonia, Express Samina,
Staten Island Ferry, Sewol, and Costa Concordia, for example. You can still
be killed in a passenger vessel accident in the western „developed‟ world but
your chances of survival are much better there.157
Examining the major causes of passenger vessel fatalities, that is:
overloading; inadequate seaworthiness; poor lookout; negligence; and, poor
seamanship, such as sailing into hazardous weather, we find that those
various forms of human error comprise 98 per cent of the causes of such
fatalities over the full fifty years examined. If we look at numbers of fatal
accidents, rather than fatalities, they are almost exactly 88 per cent human
error induced for the same period. Despite having more comprehensive and,
presumably, accurate reporting, since 2000, we have not noticed a decline in
the percentage of fatal accidents caused by human error. That is not
encouraging. However, in terms of fatalities, the percentage of known deaths
attributable to human error has become slightly worse since 2000. That is
thought provoking.
An interesting comment on the problem comes from a non-mariner source.
The following was published in the 2015 edition of Lonely Planet –
Philippines, a travel guide, under the heading „Ferry Safety‟:
For the most part ferries are an easy, enjoyable way to hop between islands
in the Philippines, but ferry accidents are not unknown. Bad weather, lax
regulations and maintenance, equipment breakdowns, overcrowding and a
general culture of fatalism are to blame.158
A „culture of fatalism‟ or the „karma‟ factor is an interesting concept that seems
worth investigating and will be in Chapter 5. Suffice to say that it is probably
endemic in most if not all the cultures that prevail where the majority of the
world‟s fatal ferry accidents occur. It may well be a significant contributor to
some of the human error factors that seem to be behind so many of the
accidents examined here.
There are those, though, who believe that a high percentage of human error
causes is a good thing because it means that technical causes are fewer and
that human errors can be eliminated. This view is, perhaps, not so perverse
as it may seem at first glance. In fact it has been well argued by Captain Ed
Verbeek, an Amsterdam marine pilot, in the Nautical Institute‟s magazine
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Seaways. He commented, “… I am shocked that after thousands of years of
designing, building and equipping ships, the technology is still so frail that one
out of five (Vandeek‟s figure) accidents has technical causes”.159
Most would dispute his view but there is a certain odd logic to it. Others,
again, believe that all accidents are the result of human error or human
factors. Self-evidently, if you investigate far enough back, almost every
technical, mechanical or structural cause must be the result of human error in
design, manufacturing or maintenance if not just in operations.
This, obviously, is the key to the whole problem of maritime accidents whether
they involve cargo ships, naval vessels, cruise ships or ferries. Practically
every accident is ultimately caused by human error of some kind. That, at
least, gives reformers something to work with. Fortunately, human behaviour
can be modified and improved to a considerable extent. The aviation industry,
the oil tanker sector in shipping, and the developed world‟s road traffic
authorities, in particular, have shown that there are many ways in which such
human errors can be significantly reduced, if not eliminated entirely. That is
the premise on which this thesis has very largely been based.
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2.5.1. Human errors that cause passenger vessel accidents.
These are listed and described in order of importance below:

2.5.2. Overloading.

Image 2.2. Typical examples of gross overloading of top-heavy ferries in
Dhaka, Bangladesh. This is the norm in all the developing countries where
most ferry accident fatalities occur (www.nigerianmonitor.com).
Overloading of ferries and the associated falsification or total absence of
passenger manifests is undoubtedly the most deliberate or wilful type of
human error that leads to passenger vessel accidents. Overloading has been
and remains the major cause of the fatalities that arise from passenger vessel
accidents. Such accidents normally happen in the form of capsizing or sinking
or both. Overloading is widely practiced in developing countries and it is
probably only good luck and generally benign sea or river conditions that
prevent many more accidents occurring with their resulting fatalities. It is the
factor that consistently leads to the greatest number of fatalities per accident.
The incidence of overloading caused accidents has remained almost constant
over the full fifty years of the survey but, in the final sixteen years, the
percentage of fatalities arising from overloading caused accidents has
increased from the long-term figure of 34 per cent to 39 per cent. This is
significant and can probably be attributed to more widespread ferry travel
accompanying recently improving economic conditions in some developing
countries. It is particularly disappointing given that all the efforts of IMO,
inspired and goaded by INTERFERRY and the WFSA are not bearing even a
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small amount of fruit.160 It is to be hoped, though, that IMO will not be so
disappointed as to desist from its efforts. Better focused and directed, they will
be able to make a difference.
Reductions in or elimination of the overloading problem will only come about
with improvements in the training and education of crews and the introduction
of practical regulations and their rigorous enforcement. Those regulations will
be required to control the behaviour of owners and masters as well as local
authorities as they are often corruptly complicit in such overloading. Better
designed vessels such as those advocated by Stuart Ballantyne that “run out
of deck space before they run out of buoyancy or stability” will also lead to
significant reductions in fatalities when they are eventually brought into
service.161
Some incidents of overloading noted in the BMPVA database could not be
blamed on owners or masters.162 At least two were the result of passengers
forcing masters to put to sea against their better judgement by threats or by
simply untying the vessel‟s mooring lines. Nevertheless, the majority of such
incidents are due to greedy owners who also, on occasion, have forced
reluctant masters to put to sea. In many of those cases the owners have been
assisted by corrupt officials. They, at the least, have turned a „blind eye‟ to the
overloading.

Image 2.3. Overloaded ferries are nothing new. This 1649 painting of a Dutch
river ferry by Salomon van Ruysdael (1600-1670) illustrates the problem well
(Rijksmuseum).
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Melbourne broadcaster Jon Faine and his son Jack, in their book From Here
to There – A Father and Son Road Trip from Melbourne to London, described
an Indonesian ferry voyage from Kupang on West Timor to Larantuka on
Flores that took place in 2009 under the chapter heading „Scary Ferry‟.163
Commencing with their description of the need for bribery to even board the
ferry, the poor condition of the ship and its gross overloading of people, cargo,
vehicles and animals, the whole experience is dystopian. No-smoking signs
are blatantly ignored and rubbish is continually thrown over the side. It is,
indeed, a scary ferry but it is the well-described reality of ferry travel in much
of the developing world.

2.5.3. Unseaworthy vessels.
As assessed by the author from a very careful examination of the information
contained in the BMPVA database over the full, fifty-year, period of this study,
unseaworthy vessels have been the second most important factor in that they
have been blamed for 36 per cent of fatal accidents and 31 per cent of
fatalities. That factor also worsened in the final sixteen-year period when the
percentages increased to 40 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. 164
While the information in the database is often limited, it is difficult to argue that
capsizes can have causes other than overloading, collisions, groundings,
allisions or inadequate seaworthiness. All can only be due to human error.
Unseaworthy vessels are usually made that way by negligence and, for the
purposes of this thesis, are described separately because they remain a
specific form of negligence. Almost without exception, unseaworthy vessels
are older vessels that have not been properly maintained or have been badly
modified to increase their carrying capacity.
The exceptions, which are usually newer vessels, have invariably been poorly
– read negligently – designed or constructed. Such vessels, also almost
invariably, have been insufficiently carefully surveyed or examined by the
appropriate government authority or a classification society if they have been
surveyed at all. Further, even younger vessels can be poorly maintained.
Again, this factor is closely related to negligence and frequently involves
corruption of maritime authority or classification society surveyors.165
Vessels can become unseaworthy as a result of structural, mechanical or
equipment deficiencies often caused by corrosion or rust. Structural and
mechanical deficiencies are normally the result of inadequate maintenance or
of poorly designed and often illegal modifications. They are usually in the form
of adding extra decks that adversely affect stability as can be seen in Image
2.5.166
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Others are inherently unseaworthy thanks to poor conception and detailed
design and inadequate construction. The Filipino motor bancas, or bangcas,
are examples of this problem. They have been involved in numerous fatal
accidents. Bancas are essentially built around a narrow, canoe-bodied central
hull that is inherently unstable without the flimsy wooden or bamboo
outriggers that are, often poorly, attached for the purpose of making the
vessels stable. These structures are often insufficiently strong when
constructed, often held together by string or fishing line, and then are poorly
maintained. This can be made worse by the, sometimes careless, operation of
such vessels. So, unseaworthy vessels can be, and frequently are, made
even more dangerous by poor seamanship.
Fortunately, motor bancas, as seen in Image 2.4, rarely exceed 30 metres in
length so, while they are too frequently involved in fatal accidents, the number
of fatalities arising is generally fewer than 100 in each case. They could easily
and quite inexpensively be more substantially constructed so as to make them
safer but, as with all such dangers in the Philippines, culture, tradition and
poverty are the ultimate sources of such problems. There is nothing inherently
wrong with the design concept, just their flimsy construction, inadequate
maintenance, insufficient outrigger float buoyancy and careless operation.
They could, relatively easily and inexpensively, be made significantly safer.
A major cause of accidents in many developing countries is that a high
proportion of ferries, particularly in more remote areas, were never designed
to carry large numbers of people. Often they are not much more than dinghies
or canoes intended for purely inshore work carrying very small loads. They
are unseaworthy by reason of being too small and completely unfit for
purpose and are made much more so by gross overloading.
It should be noted, too, that even large, comparatively modern vessels can be
inherently unseaworthy. As described at length in Chapter 6, conventional
monohull Ro-Pax ferries, with their large vehicle access doors and their open,
low vehicle decks, have a disproportionately poor accident record (See, for
example, Image 2.5.). Some 30 per cent of the fatalities listed in the Baird
Maritime Passenger Vessel accident database occurred in such vessels
(Thirty-two per cent in the 2000-2015 period).167
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is entirely possible that an inherently
unseaworthy vessel could be safely sailed around the world by a competent
seaman.168 The problem in many developing countries is that unseaworthy
vessels are often combined with less than competent, or even careful,
captains. Indeed, as mentioned elsewhere, even some very modern, properly
designed and constructed and well-equipped vessels have come to grief
because of operator errors. Costa Concordia, Kilimanjaro II and Sliepner are
good examples of those.169
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Image 2.4. A Filipino motor banca. Note the flimsy structure, mostly utilising
string or monofilament fishing line, attaching the “outriggers” to the central
“canoe” hull which combines with the almost complete absence of buoyancy
in the outrigger floats to make the vessel dangerous in all but the most benign
conditions (Wikipedia).
In Bangladesh the ferries tend to be larger and more substantial than in Africa
or Southeast Asia but they are often poorly modified to increase their
passenger capacity by adding decks at the expense of reducing their stability.
This problem has not been confined to Bangladesh, it is simply more
common there. Indeed, the author recalls travelling on Greek ferries in the
Aegean Sea in the mid-1970s when he always slept and stayed on deck. This
was due to his fear that the stability of those ships had been compromised by
the addition of extra decks with very inadequate, if any, compensation in the
form of sponsons added at the ship‟s waterline. Few, if any, such ships
continue to operate in the northern Mediterranean. If not yet scrapped, they
are likely to be operating in Africa.
This flow of elderly vessels of declining seaworthiness from northern and
richer countries to poorer southern ones has been a significant contributing
factor in some of the major and most deadly accidents in Greece, parts of
Africa, the Philippines and Indonesia. The Dona Paz, Le Joola, Spice Islander,
Skagit, Princess of the Stars, Al Salam Boccaccio 98, Superferry 14, Filipino
Princess, Princess of the Orient, Dashun, Senopati Nusantara, Express
Samina, Teretai Prima, and St Thomas of Aquinas are examples of mostly
conventional monohull Ro-Pax vessels listed in the BMPVA database that
served safely for years in their countries of origin but, thanks to age, neglect,
dangerous modifications and, often, poor seamanship, were involved in
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deadly accidents in their new homes and roles.170 That phenomenon has
been further commented on in chapters 3 and 6 in particular.

Image 2.5. The Al Salam Boccaccio 98 was a typical example of a
dangerously modified former European, in this case Italian, ferry with
additional, stability robbing decks added, theoretically counterbalanced by
sponsons added at the waterline. Its wide-opening, low vehicle access doors
and unobstructed, full length, low vehicle deck made it particularly vulnerable.
It was involved in a deadly accident resulting in 1,022 fatalities in February
2006 in the Red Sea (Wikipedia).
There was and, to some degree still is, a clear movement of elderly ferries
from north to south. When ferries become obsolete, worn out or redundant in
northern Europe or North America they tend to be sold to poorer countries in
the Mediterranean and then on to Africa. In the case of elderly Japanese
ferries, they tend to be sold to the Philippines and then on to Indonesia. With
every transaction they seem to become more decrepit and more dangerously
modified so as to pack in yet more passengers. Many of the vessels involved
in fatal accidents in the Philippines, Korea and Indonesia had been „retired‟
from Japan some years previously. The same applies to former Baltic ferries
that are „handed down‟ through Greece, Italy, Spain and, later, Africa and Iran.
Seaworthiness deficiencies, then, have many parents. Poor design and
construction, inadequate maintenance and stability robbing modifications are
170
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some of the more obvious ones. They are all due to human factors, mostly
negligence and greed.

2.5.4. Poor lookout.
Poor lookout is the third most important cause of accidents across the whole
fifty years of the survey at 22 per cent and has led to an equal percentage of
fatalities. However, in the most recent sixteen-year period this reduced to 20
per cent of accidents and only nine per cent of fatalities (See Figures 2.2. and
2.3.) This is the most encouraging area of recent improvement and would tend
to indicate an increase in crew training and educational standards. It is too big
a discrepancy to be attributable to increases in information availability.
Collisions, allisions and groundings are all and can only be the result of the
common human errors of failing to maintain a good lookout or, much more
rarely, the removal of a navigation aid. They cannot be blamed on any other
technical or behavioural cause. They have been a major cause of maritime
accidents throughout history but the effects of such events have worsened as
vessel speeds have increased, particularly over the past half-century.
While it is pleasing to note the recent declines in both the numbers of poor
lookout caused accidents and, particularly, their resultant fatalities, an
alarming new trend has been drawn to the author‟s attention. That is the
mesmerising effect of modern electronic navigation instruments on, mostly
younger, officers. A number of senior ship‟s masters and coast guard officers
have complained to the author and in the maritime media of the unwillingness
of junior navigating officers to „look out the bridge window‟.171 It seems that too
many of them prefer to focus on radar and GPS plotter screens rather than to
use their own eyes to achieve situational awareness. This trait has led to the
increasingly widely accepted and ironically described phenomenon of „radar
assisted collisions‟ or „GPS assisted groundings‟.172
Renowned master mariner and maritime journalist Michael Grey has written
on the subject including recently under the heading: “The eyes have it”. There
he commented on a neatly printed sign he saw in a ship‟s bridge. It read:
“Don‟t forget to look out the window”. As he added, “Generation Y officers still
need to use their eyes”.173
It has also led to groundings such as the January 2013 incident involving the
American mine hunter USS Guardian on a coral reef in Visayas region of the
Philippines. That has been blamed on an over reliance on insufficiently
accurate electronic charts.174 Two subsequent fatal collisions between
American destroyers and merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean and South
171
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China Sea and a grounding off Japan in 2017 have been attributed to poor
lookout and inadequate bridge management.175
The aviation industry has noted this phenomenon of „automation overreliance‟
and is working vigorously to overcome it. Indeed, in January 2016, the United
States Department of Transportation issued a recommendation suggesting
that, “…enhanced Federal Aviation Authority oversight was needed by way of
guidance to train and evaluate pilots and to develop standards to determine
whether pilots received sufficient opportunities to maintain and demonstrate
their manual flying skills”.176
The problem of maintaining an adequate lookout can be the result of many
behavioural deficiencies commencing with poor training and running through
poor bridge discipline; fatigue; the health problems of poor eyesight and
weakness due to influenza, malnutrition and similar ailments; and, the
electronic distractions mentioned above.177 All such deficiencies can be
reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by better management, training, discipline
and leadership. The significant reduction in the percentage of fatalities due to
poor lookout over the final fifteen years illustrates the benefits of such
improvements quite convincingly.
Grech, Squire and others, as we shall see in Chapter 8, have analysed the
problem of the fatigue that leads to poor watchkeeping and considerable work
has been done by the United States Coast Guard and IMO, among others, to
ameliorate it. The Nautical Institute has continued to organise conferences
and publish on the human element and its relationships to maritime accidents.
Its influence is both beneficial and effective. Typical of the NI‟s efforts was a
two-day conference held in New Delhi in 2008. It focused on the subjects of
“Human Element and People” and “Human Element and Resources” under
the general heading of “Modern Watchkeeping and the Human Element”.178
That kind of event does contribute to the general raising of awareness of the
problem. It was helpful that it was held in Asia and, so, was closer to the
epicentre of the problem.
The reduction in fatalities attributable to poor lookout, encouraging as it may
be, still shows that while better crew training is certainly effective, it has only
reduced the importance of poor lookout as a cause of fatalities from second
most important to fourth. There is a long way to go but it is clear that
improvement is possible as will be explained in Chapter 7.
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2.5.5. General negligence.
This factor has remained almost constant in rankings of importance as a
cause of accidents over the fifty-year period surveyed but has declined
somewhat as a cause of fatalities.179 It would seem there has been a slight
improvement in the provision of lifesaving and fire-fighting equipment and of
its maintenance since the start of the third millennium.
Certainly, the author has noted a tightening of regulations and their
enforcement in, for example, Thailand and the Philippines. In both, it has
recently been made compulsory, in the case of smaller boats, not only for
lifejackets to be on board but worn by all passengers.180
In the Philippines, too, it has been noted on the more modern and faster
ferries, at least, that aviation-like safety briefings are given and that clean new
lifejackets are stowed in appropriate, well-signed and obvious places.
Inflatable liferafts, that appear to be properly maintained are also accessibly
fitted. This is an important and encouraging development. In contrast, the
author observed two vessels recently in the United Kingdom where the
inflatable liferafts were stowed so as to require a crane to launch them. How
those vessels passed MCA survey is a mystery.181
It is interesting, in this context, to compare the noticeable improvement over
the past fifteen years in the Philippines with the continuing death toll in
Bangladesh. Indonesia and Tanzania where few or no such improvements
seem to have been made.182 (See Figures 2.4. and 2.5.). Similarly, no notable
improvement has been seen in the cruise ship sector where fires, suicides
and viral epidemics continue to occur at much the same rates as previously.
They are all, ultimately, the result of negligence.
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Image 2.6. Modern, well-designed and constructed ferries that have been built
and equipped to international standards, such as this FastCat Ro-Pax are
contributing to a significant improvement in the ferry safety record of the
Philippines. They are not, however, immune from grounding due to poor
lookout as happened in December 2016 (Archipelago Ferries). 183
It is particularly disappointing that this clearly behavioural and culturally
caused problem of general negligence has not even been reduced in so many
developing countries. At least Thailand and the Philippines have shown what
even modest reform can achieve.
Large cruise ships or „liners‟ are involved in fewer fatal accidents than ferries,
if only because there are fewer of them. Those fatal accidents, too, have
resulted in remarkably few deaths.184 However, they do suffer from a
disproportionately high number of fires. These originate in engine rooms,
galleys and sometimes passenger cabins. From 1984 to 2007 the BPVA
database records 16 instances of fatal fires on cruise ships that resulted in
108 deaths.185 Over the whole period surveyed there were many more nonfatal fires on cruise ships.
The majority of the fires have been attributed to maintenance deficiencies.
This problem also manifests itself in the frequent viral epidemics that afflict
cruise ships. They are invariably due to inadequate hygiene, in reality yet
another maintenance problem which leads to unsafe or unseaworthy ships.
Obviously, given their very size, large crews of culturally disparate people and
large numbers of inexperienced, often elderly and poorly briefed passengers,
cruise ships are very vulnerable to human errors. Their potential for creating a
183
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new passenger vessel fatality „record‟ is disconcerting. Some such vessels
can have as many as 7,000 people on board at one time. That is a frightening
scenario.
Another serious problem common to cruise ships lies with the number of
apparent suicides of both passengers and crew members that occur on or
from them. The psychological reasons for this bear examination given that in
the case of passengers, at least, they are on holiday and assumed to be
enjoying themselves on board. That, obviously, has nothing to do with
seaworthiness, or probably even negligence, but it is a statistical oddity that
would seem to reflect on the overall management of such ships.

Image 2.7. “Only” two died following an engine room fire on the Norwegian,
Hurtigruten Line owned cruise ferry Nordlys off the Norwegian coast. That
generally well-regarded line has suffered many „accidents‟. Almost all of them
have been blamed on human error (Wikipedia).
All aspects of vessel management, operation, equipment and maintenance
are negatively affected by general negligence. Obviously, negligence is a
cultural and behavioural problem that starts at the top with government
regulation and company management and „trickles‟ down through all levels of
a ship owning company. It is probably the least costly problem to eliminate but
it does require substantial attitudinal modification.
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2.5.6. Poor seamanship.
Closely related to general negligence and poor lookout, poor seamanship is a
separate causal category of its own. It has been author assessed as a cause
of around four per cent of fatalities over both periods studied.186
Seamanship has been defined as, “The art or skill of handling a vessel. Skill in
using deck equipment, boat handling and the care and use of line and
wire”.187 Clearly, this art or skill was absent in the cases so assessed.
Inferior or inadequate boat handling capabilities and the ignorant or untrained
use of deck or lifesaving equipment has been the cause of a significant
number of fatalities. It is usually the result of either or both of insufficient
training or experience or inadequate procedural disciplines. In other words, of
poor management.
The large majority of accidents assessed as being due to poor seamanship
were the result of ships being sailed into clearly and publicly predicted
dangerously bad weather, usually typhoons. A number of these were Sulpicio
Lines ferries that capsized and or sank in typhoons.
By a remarkable coincidence, every ten years, in 1988, 1998 and 2008,
Sulpicio Lines sent vessels to sea in the face of predicted major typhoons.
That resulted, in each case, in the capsize and sinking of their ships with the
loss of 1,583 lives in total. That, of course, is in addition to the even more
notorious collision, fire and sinking of the Dona Paz that was attributed to poor
lookout. That “accident” resulted in 4,386 fatalities. The total death toll at
Sulpicio Lines exceeds 6,000 people.188
Sulpicio Lines, sadly, has been far from the only offender in that regard as can
be seen in the BMPVA database.189 There have been numerous other
examples of vessels putting to sea in the face of predicted dangerous
weather.
Even modern, sound and well-maintained vessels are not immune from poor
seamanship. The recent example of the high speed nose-dive of the Dar-esSalam to Zanzibar ferry Kiliminjaro II off Tanzania in 2014 resulted in the
deaths of 25 passengers who were washed off the foredeck where they
should not have been in the first place. Not only was the ferry driven far too
fast for the conditions, the subsequent „recovery‟ operation of the passengers
washed overboard was completely botched.190
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More recently, a brand new Fastcat of Archipelago Ferries grounded near
Cebu, in the Philippines, on its maiden voyage.191 Showing that even the most
fastidious companies are not immune from the problem of poor lookout!
Thankfully, their vessel was sufficiently safe as to have caused neither injuries
nor fatalities.
Other examples of poor seamanship are spread through the BMPVA
database. Some involved sailing too fast for the conditions. Another saw a
„whale watch‟ boat getting too close to a whale that bumped and capsized it.
Others were when crews failed to respond to distress calls or failed to sound
alarms on their own vessels. Still others involved attempts to berth vessels in
dangerously strong winds and pilotage errors such as taking „short cuts‟.
All can only be blamed on foolishness or stupidity that is the result of making
ill-considered decisions that fly in the face of common sense. Common sense,
after all, is really what good seamanship is all about.

2.6.0. Human factors are the predominant cause of passenger
vessel accidents.
Despite the paucity of comprehensive, accurate, proven and objectively tested
information, it has become very obvious that human factors, more specifically
human errors of the various kinds described, are the cause of more than 88
per cent of passenger vessel accidents and at least 98 per cent of their
resulting fatalities. The positive information arising from that fact is that
structural, mechanical and other causes are comparatively insignificant. Also,
while suicide and the extremely rare „freak‟ accidents are probably impossible
to reduce significantly, structural and mechanical causes are declining from an
already low base and could, with minimal effort and expense, be reduced yet
further.
It should be noted, however, that all the major, and most minor, cruise line
companies appear from their records to be well managed from a safety
perspective. It is clear from the statistics contained in the BMPVA database
that the greatest risks to passengers remain with ferries operating on
domestic routes in the twenty countries having the worst records for
passenger safety.
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Chapter 3
Examples of major fatal ferry accidents
It is remarkable how many common causal factors and
types of human errors continue to re-present themselves.
Even more remarkable is the fact that so many serially
offending ship owners remain unpunished and in
business.
3.1.0. Examples of major fatal ferry accidents.
To better illustrate and clarify how and why many of the fatal ferry accidents
described briefly in the BMPVA database actually occurred, the following
twenty-five more detailed case studies have been prepared to describe major
accidents where enough useful facts are known to be able to provide the
necessary information to do so.192 The selection of cases is otherwise
arbitrary except for an attempt to present a geographic and historic range as
well as a range, as far as possible, of vessel, location and accident types.
Some of the accidents are well known but most, less so. They range in
severity from 143 to 4,386 fatalities and cover 18 national jurisdictions and the
full period from 1966 to 2015. Regrettably, none describe any of the multitude
of smaller accidents in smaller vessels in countries such as Myanmar,
Bangladesh and DR Congo which, combined, comprise the greater part of the
global fatality toll. Where the death toll is comparatively small, accidents will
usually receive very little, if any, media coverage or local government interest
in the form of a Marine Board of Inquiry (MBOI) or similar.
As noted in chapters 1 and 2, The BMPVA database shows us that those
accidents occur frequently but mostly in relatively remote places where few
reports are made or records kept. It is usually difficult in such cases to obtain
many details of the vessel concerned. Normally, the best that can be
expected is a newspaper or newsagency report of the accident and an
estimated number of fatalities arising along with a very brief description of the
circumstances such as whether it involved a collision, grounding, fire or
capsize. As can be seen from the BMPVA database, this varies according to
the size of the vessel and the country of occurrence. For example, in the
Philippines, Indonesia, Tanzania, Egypt and even Haiti, the name and
specifications of the vessel are usually known. In Bangladesh, Myanmar and
DR Congo they usually are not. This offers a very stark contrast to the very
comprehensive reporting of accidents that occur in developed countries. 193
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The author estimates that the grounding and subsequent capsize of the
Carnival Cruise Lines vessel Costa Concordia off Italy received more
developed country media coverage than all the fatal accidents in the
Philippines combined. That despite the Costa Concordia accident resulting in
33 deaths compared with many thousands in the Philippines including more
than 4,300 in one incident. The difference between „developed‟ Europe and
„developing‟ Asia.
Twenty-five cases, or 3.3 per cent, of a total of 750, have been drawn from
the BMPVA database.194 In each case, a number of contemporary media
reports and, where available, MBOI proceedings have been distilled and
summarised. Of the 25 cases studied, interestingly, 15, or 60 per cent,
involved conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries.195 Most of those were
substantial vessels. Seven of those, or 28 per cent, occurred in OECD
nations. Clearly, accidents have continued to occur, even in reputedly safe
developed countries, especially where Ro-Pax ferries are involved. However,
there have been distinctly fewer in developed countries since 1994 when the
Estonia sinking provided an awakening.
In fact, from 1966 to 2015, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries have been
involved in 16.4 per cent of fatal accidents that have resulted in 31.5 per cent
of total known fatalities. From 2000 to 2015 they were the vehicles for 32 per
cent of fatalities. That, clearly, is because they tend to be larger vessels but it
also reinforces the argument that the conventional Ro-Pax concept is
fundamentally unsafe.196 This is due to low, wide opening vehicle access
doors, usually at both ends of the vessel, combined with a long, wide, largely
unobstructed vehicle deck located close to the vessel‟s waterline. If significant
quantities of water get on to the deck because of a sharp turn or a vehicle
door malfunction, the vessel is particularly susceptible to capsize thanks to
the „free surface effect‟ of that water sweeping across the deck.
In developing countries they have often been poorly modified to increase their
carrying capacity. They are particularly vulnerable to fires on their vehicle
decks as described below. Even without dangerous modifications, they
require very competent, alert and disciplined crews to ensure their safe
operation. Such crews are not always available in developing countries.
As can be seen from a perusal of the database, while the cases described
here are worse than average in terms of death toll, they are very typical in
circumstances. 197 They have simply been reported in more detail. That has
facilitated the creation of these case studies. It should be noted, though, that
none of the case studies describes fatal accidents involving multihull fast
ferries. They have simply not been involved in any significant accidents.198
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It is remarkable how many common causal factors continue to re- present
themselves. It is even more remarkable how many types of human errors
keep repeating themselves. Most remarkable of all is the fact that so many
serially offending owners remain unpunished and continue in the ferry
business.199 The accidents are listed in ascending date order commencing
with December 1966. They are most definitely not comprehensive, merely,
illustrative. The case studies have been compiled and summarised from
numerous sources that are mostly cited in groups in the text.
It must also be emphasised that the „known‟ accidents recorded in the
BMPVA database unfortunately omit probably hundreds of additional
accidents that have not been accorded any media coverage. Those accidents
would, of course, add many thousands to the total of fatalities

3.2.0. Heraklion, 231 fatalities, 8 December 1966.

Image 3.1. S.S. Heraklion as S.S. Leicestershire under prior ownership and
before conversion to a Ro-Pax (Wikipedia).
Causing an estimated total of about 231 fatalities, the actual number is
unknown because there were allegedly far more passengers aboard than the
219 who held tickets, the single screw steam ship Heraklion was an accident
waiting to happen. Although built by the reputable Fairfields Shipbuilding &
Engineering Company of Glasgow, she was 17 years old and inadequately
maintained following a poor conversion to Ro-Pax by its second owner the
Greek company Aegean Steam Navigation Typaldos (ASNT).200
The 8,922 grt, 152 m LOA steel passenger/cargo ship had been owned by
ASNT for two years during which she had been cheaply and poorly converted
to a Ro-Pax ferry by the simple expedient of cutting holes in its side to enable
vehicle access to its holds directly from the quay.
After loading delays, she put to sea from the southern island of Crete heading
for the Athenian port of Pireaus in a Force 9 gale. Some hours later she
capsized and sank in the Aegean Sea off the islet of Falkonera in “enormous
seas”. Survivors reported that a poorly secured truck, that had caused the
loading delay, came adrift and smashed open the newly cut and badly sealed
vehicle loading door in the side of the ship. This allowed the sea to pour in
causing the ship to capsize in fewer than twenty minutes.
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The Hellenic Coast Guard was slow to respond and, due to radio frequency
inadequacies, was unable to communicate with a number of British and
American warships that were exercising in the area and which could have
assisted. While chaotic, the rescue operation still managed to save about 50
people.
The subsequent MBOI listed clear cases of poor seamanship and
management as well as negligence. Obviously, the ship should have been
seeking shelter rather than putting to sea in such a gale. The inquiry
discovered that the owner did not mandate abandon ship drills and that the
ship‟s distress call was delayed.201
The inquiry inspired rule changes in Greece such that ships were prevented
from departing in Force 9 or greater wind strengths and the HCG‟s
procedures were reformed. ASNT‟s fleet was inspected and 12 of its 15
vessels were found to be unseaworthy and required to be scrapped.
The owner, Haralambos Typaldos, and his general manager were imprisoned
for manslaughter. Significantly, a near sister ship to the Heraklion, the
Wahine, which had been converted to a Ro-Pax-Train ferry, grounded and
sank near Wellington, New Zealand, 16 months later with the loss of 51
lives.202 Yet another case of bad seamanship and an unseaworthy ship made
worse by a poor modification and the gross negligence of the owner. All
human factors.

3.2.1. Hongxing 240 and Hongxing 245, 432 fatalities, 4 August
1975.

The Hongxing 240 and Hongxing 245 both belonged to the same Chinese
Government owned ferry line that carried passengers between Hong Kong
and Guangzhou via the Pearl, Zhuyiang and Xi rivers. They were substantial
triple deck steel ferries of unknown size and travelled overnight.
The two ferries collided and sank during a „heavy storm‟ on the night of 4
August 1975 on the Zhuyiang River between Guangzhou and Zaoqi. A
reported 432 of the approximately 800 people on board the two ferries were
lost.203 Another clear case of poor lookout and, probably, inadequate
seaworthiness and search and rescue facilities.
Due to the strict media controls and news management prevailing at the time
under the People‟s Republic of China Government, no other information is
available nor has any MBOI report ever been released.

201

Described in Economic Outlook magazine, Athens, October 2000.
Appendix A, Ibid.
203
Ibid.
202

67

3.2.2. Don Juan, 1,000 plus fatalities, 22 April 1980.

Image 3.2. Don Juan (Wikipedia).
The Ro-Pax ferry Don Juan, was built in Japan in 1971 by Niigata
Engineering, a reputable and prolific shipyard. She was a fast and, by
contemporary Philippine standards, luxurious ship of 2,311 grt and 96 m LOA.
In Tablas Strait, north of Mindoro Island en route from Manila to Bacolod City,
Negros Island, on a clear, calm, moonlit night Don Juan collided with the small
tanker MT Tacloban City. They were in one of the Philippines‟ busiest sea
routes. The masters of both vessels blamed each other for the collision. The
tanker had right-of-way but, in reality, to conform with COLREGS, both
vessels should have stopped to avoid colliding. These „blame games‟ are
seemingly standard procedure in the Philippines with the objective of
confusing the already cursory PCG Marine Boards of Inquiry.204
The ferry sank in about fifteen minutes during which time a distress signal was
transmitted and some lifejackets handed out while Carley floats, but no
lifeboats, were launched. The tanker stood by and reportedly rescued many
survivors as did another nearby tanker, the Laoag City that was owned by the
same company as the Tacloban City.
While it is estimated that there were more than 1,000 fatalities, the exact
number is unknown. The owners of Don Juan, Negros Navigation Co, claimed
there were 890 passengers and 110 crew aboard, a total of 1,000 people, but
896 were rescued and 121 bodies recovered, a total of 1,017. They admitted,
however, that many latecomers and small children “may” have been omitted
from the passenger manifest. Later reports from relatives of the missing tend
to support the local media‟s estimate of more than 1,000 fatalities.
Significantly, the Don Juan sank less than 40 nautical miles from the site of
the later collision and sinking of the Sulpicio Lines owned ship Dona Paz from
which there were 4,386 fatalities in similar circumstances involving a collision
with a small tanker. The masters of both ships „stood on‟ in that they
maintained their course and speed despite the possibility of a collision. They
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showed a complete disregard for the International Collision Regulations
(COLREGS). 205
Negros Navigation Co has since merged and changed its name to 2GO
Travel. On 16 August 2013 another vessel of that new company‟s fleet, St
Thomas Aquinas, collided with a cargo ship and sank in Cebu Strait off the
port of Cebu with the loss of 205 lives.206
In both cases, as seems to be becoming a common theme, the vessel was
overloaded, seamanship was bad, lookout poor, COLREGS ignored, and
passenger manifests, safety equipment and rescue responses all inadequate.
It seems amazing that after 33 years such lessons continue to be ignored.

3.2.3. Tamponas II, 580 fatalities, 24 January 1981.

Image 3.3. The Indonesian Government owned ferry Tamponas II on fire
shortly before sinking. Rescue vessels could have safely approached much
closer than they did (www.lautanindonesia.com).
The official death toll in this accident was 431 but contemporary local media
reports, based on interviews with families of missing passengers, indicate
about 580 fatalities. Fire broke out on the Indonesian conventional monohull
Ro-Pax ferry Tamponas II at night and in heavy rain while the ship was off the
southern coast of Kalimantan (Borneo) en route from Jakarta to Ujung
Pandang on Sulawesi Island in Indonesia.
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Tamponas II was only ten years old, having been built in 1971 by the
reputable Japanese shipyard Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as a conventional
steel Ro-Pax ferry for a Japanese owner. A substantial vessel of 6,139 grt,
she was 129 metres long. She was purchased in 1980 by Peleyaran Nasional
Indonesia, an Indonesian Government owned company, for USD 8.5 million
and was then believed to have been in good, seaworthy condition.
The ship‟s manifest claimed it was carrying a crew of 82, 1,054 ticketed
passengers, 190 cars, 390 motor-cycles and cargo including mail. The
subsequent MBOI accepted there were 1,184 people on board but it seems
probable that there were in excess of 1,300. Many passengers were reported
to have boarded without tickets. That happens, apparently, even on military
aircraft in Indonesia.207 In any event, the ship was considered to have been
badly overloaded. Interestingly 70 of the ship‟s crew of 82 survived the sinking
but the master apparently went down with his ship.
The officially accepted cause of the accident was that a discarded cigarette
butt ignited spilt fuel on the vehicle deck. That conflagration quickly spread
through the vehicles carried there causing numerous explosions and a major
fire that eventually sank the ship.208
The rescue operations were not well co-ordinated or effectively carried out.
Numerous other vessels were in the vicinity but would not move in close
enough to the flaming and exploding, but still floating, ship to pick up the
mainly non-swimming victims. Many passengers reportedly panicked and
jumped into the sea despite being non-swimmers and not wearing life jackets.
Despite the heavy monsoonal storms in the area, a number of survivors were
rescued up to five days later.209
Obviously, fire safety regulations were not taken seriously in 1981 and, nearly
thirty years later, in 2009, Jon Faine noted, as mentioned in Chapter 2, that
they were still being ignored on Indonesian ferries.210 Equally obviously, the
ship carried insufficient life-jackets or other life-saving devices such as life
rafts, Carley floats or life boats. Furthermore, secondary as well as primary
fire-prevention and control systems were inadequate.
Effectively Tamponas II was a victim of a combination of most of the causes
of maritime accidents including, negligence, overloading, an unseaworthy
vessel, insufficient life saving and fire-fighting equipment and poor
seamanship as well as a chaotic and inadequate rescue effort.
Tellingly, the ship presented as yet another example of a conventional
monohull Ro-Pax ferry „sold south‟ from a developed country to a developing
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one where maintenance, business and crewing standards were inadequate to
maintain and operate it safely. Further, it was government owned and suffered
from the wholly inadequate enforcement of the regulations of that same
government.

3.2.4. Herald of Free Enterprise, 197 fatalities, 6 March 1987.

Image 3.4. The Herald of Free Enterprise, aground and capsized with bow
doors still open, one nautical mile outside Zeebrugge Harbour
(www.bbc.news.com).
While the death toll was comparatively modest at 193, all British citizens, the
fact that Herald of Free Enterprise was sailing between Zeebrugge in Belgium
and Dover in England and was owned by the well known and then still British
P&O Group meant that its sinking made headlines globally.
A seven year old ship, the Herald was built by the reputable German shipyard
Schichau Unterweser as a 7,951 grt conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry of
132 m LOA. So was the also Townsend Thoresen owned European Gateway
which capsized in similar circumstances off Felixstowe five years earlier with
the loss of six lives. Herald was owned by Townsend Thoresen Ferry Co
which had been taken over by the P&O Group three weeks before the
accident. She was fully compliant with the, now obviously inadequate,
international and European standards for Ro-Pax ships that applied at the
time.
The ferry departed Zeebrugge on a cold, calm day with 500 passengers, 80
crew members, 84 cars and 42 trucks aboard. The bow doors remained open
and, as the ship turned into the open North Sea, water flooded through the
door onto the unobstructed vehicle deck. The „free surface‟ effect of that
capsized the ship in about 60 seconds. Fortunately, she capsized in shallow
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water and so did not completely sink. This undoubtedly prevented even more
fatalities. Her lifeboats, notably, could not be launched.
The rescue response was faster and more effective than usual with a
combination of small craft and helicopters from Belgium, The Netherlands and
Britain all contributing to a remarkably small death toll in the circumstances.
The surviving crew of the ship were praised for their efforts in assisting
passenger survival.
Townsend Thoresen (P&O Ferries), however, was held responsible for the
accident by the subsequent MBOI.211 Indeed, had the subsequently
implemented British law on Corporate Manslaughter been in force at the time,
the company‟s directors would, it seems, have been charged accordingly.
Many operational safety deficiencies, some of which the company and its
competitors had been warned against in a series of articles published shortly
before the accident in Work Boat World,212 were criticised in the inquiry.213
The inquiry findings, combined with those involving the earlier European
Gateway and later Scandinavian Star and Estonia accidents, led to worthwhile
improvements in operational, construction and design safety in Ro-Pax ferries
especially in Northern Europe. The United Kingdom Corporate Manslaughter
law was implemented soon after.
Inspired or driven by the sinkings of the Herald of Free Enterprise,
Scandinavian Star and Estonia, among other conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries, a number of north European nations co-operated to introduce the socalled “Stockholm Rules” to improve the safety of Ro-Pax ferries in the Baltic
and North seas and in the English Channel.214 Those rules eventually proved
to be effective but, notably, only in Northern Europe. The Mediterranean Sea
and beyond were specifically excluded.
However, the Herald capsize itself was yet another testament to poor
seamanship, an unseaworthy ship, cronyism and owner negligence and
arrogance. Notably, the expressed fears of a number of the company‟s senior
sea-going officers were ignored by its management. All are human errors.
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3.2.5. Dona Paz, 4,386 fatalities, 20 December 1987.

Image 3.5. The collision, fire and sinking of the Dona Paz made it the world‟s
worst peacetime maritime tragedy (www.maritimedanmark.dk).
The world‟s worst ever peacetime maritime tragedy, the collision, fire and
sinking of the Philippines cargo ferry Dona Paz, resulted in 4,386 fatalities.
The 24 year old ship, previously known as Don Sulpicio, had already been
gutted by fire, re-conditioned, re-named and returned to service. That fire,
which occurred when the ship was carrying 1,100 passengers, happened in
June 1979. It was allegedly caused by a lit cigarette butt thrown into a cargo
hold. All passengers and crew were rescued on that occasion.
Originally built by Onomichi Zosen of Japan, Dona Paz was 2,324 grt and 93
m LOA and certified to carry 1,518 passengers. She was owned by Sulpicio
Lines of Cebu which, in turn, was owned by the notorious Go family. 215 They
have a uniquely appalling record in that over a period of 21 years from 1987
their ships have been involved in at least eight fatal accidents that have
resulted in more than 6,000 fatalities in total. The company‟s ships
experienced numerous accidents prior to 1987 including another involving a
previous Dona Paz which capsized and sank in 1977 killing at least 30
people.216
At 10 pm on the moonless night of 20 December 1987 Dona Paz was en
route from Tacloban City on Leyte Island to Manila via Catbalogan on Samar
Island. In Tablas Strait, the busiest sea route in the Philippines, off Dumali
Point on eastern Mindoro Island, she collided with the small (629 grt) parcel
tanker Vector, which was loaded with 8,800 barrels of „petroleum products‟.
There was a violent explosion and fireballs passed between the two ships and
then ignited the spilt fuel covering the surface of the sea surrounding both.
Both ships were consumed by the fire and eventually sank in 530 metres of
water. The Dona Paz at midnight and the Vector two hours later. Of the
estimated 4,412 people aboard both ships, only 26 were rescued and most of
them were badly burnt.
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The nearby ship Don Claudia saw the flames and approached to assist and
stood by at a distance because of the flames. Her master transmitted a
distress signal – the Dona Paz did not as, apparently, it had no operating
radio. The response from the PCG and MARINA was reportedly, “Later”. As it
happened, later, meant eight hours later as that was how long it took the
authorities to respond. By then there was not a sign of the disaster. U.S. Navy
helicopters flying over the scene next morning could see nothing.
It is alleged that the final death toll may have been as high as 5,000. No one
really knows but the best estimate of the subsequent MBOI was 4,386. At
least 1,000 of those were young children. The passenger manifest indicated
1,493 victims but it was regarded as meaningless. MARINA stated that 1,586
passengers were manifested and 2,755 were un-manifested plus 58 crew, a
total of 4,399 on a ship limited to 1,518 passengers.
The inevitable „blame game‟ followed the accident and into the MBOI. The two
vessel owning companies blamed each other. Surviving crewmen from the
Vector claimed that the Dona Paz had rammed it. A surviving passenger said
that the Dona Paz captain was watching videos in his cabin while the two
mates were dinking beer. A young, inexperienced rating or cadet was
allegedly on watch. Caltex, the charterer of the Vector was not finally cleared
of blame until 2000. Meanwhile, the Vector‟s owner was ordered to “indemnify
the families”.
The inquiry blamed Vector but also blamed Sulpicio for many deficiencies
involving bad management, overloading, inadequate and locked life saving
equipment and more. Both vessels were clearly in breach of COLREGS. A
number of senior and junior PCG officials were deemed to have been
complicit in the gross overloading and were dismissed or „re-assigned‟.
The total cost to Sulpicio‟s insurers was less than USD 10 million. The ship
was „in class‟ and had passed survey so the classification society and
surveyors could also be accused of complicity in the disaster. Some years
later Philippine ship survey standards were reviewed by insurers, as were the
nation‟s maritime safety standards.217
Little, however, seems to have been learned from this sad tale of human
error, collusion, corruption, poor lookout, bad seamanship, poor
seaworthiness, bad management, and inadequate rescue efforts. Nine
months later another Sulpicio Lines vessel, the Dona Marilyn sailed into the
path of Typhoon Ruby and capsized and sank with the loss of at least 418
people.
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3.2.6. Baccha Singh, 438 fatalities, 6 August 1988.
Almost no details are known about this the world‟s thirtieth worst passenger
vessel disaster in the twentieth century. It seems that the Baccha Singh was a
wooden ferry operating upstream on India‟s famed and „sacred‟ Ganges
River. The vessel hit a sandbar and capsized near Manihari Ghat near Bihar.
There were 438 fatalities. The river may have been dirty but it could not have
been deep. An orderly evacuation would have saved many more.218
This was yet another case of poor seamanship, poor lookout and an
unseaworthy vessel. All made worse by inadequate life saving equipment and
a poor rescue response. Indeed, all the usual elements of human error.

3.2.7. Scandinavian Star, 159 fatalities, 7 April 1990.

Image 3.6. The Scandinavian Star was a substantial, nineteen year old,
conventional Ro-Pax vessel running on a busy route between two highly
developed countries, Denmark and Norway. She was struck by a very
dedicated arsonist who succeeded in practically destroying the ship‟s
accommodation along with 160 of its complement on his second attempt
(Wikipedia).
The 10,513 grt conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry was built in 1971 by
Dubigeon-Normandie SA in Nantes, France. The ship had three previous
owners and names before being chartered to the Da-No Line at the time of
the disaster. It had suffered a serious engine room fire in March 1988.
While en route from Frederikshaven to Oslo, in the Skagerrak, 30 nautical
miles from the mouth of the Oslo Fjord, the arsonist‟s second attempt was
successful and, despite the assistance of several passing ships, the vessel
218
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was extensively damaged and at least 159 passengers and crew perished.
The exact number is unknown as the passenger manifests and crew lists
were destroyed in the fire.
Despite being operated in two of the world‟s most safety-conscious
jurisdictions, the vessel‟s safety equipment and procedures were found
wanting. There were major language and communication difficulties that led to
panic. The ship‟s sprinkler system was ineffective and most lifeboats could not
be launched even though seas were calm at the time. Apparently, no one
knew how to launch them. Nor had there been any fire drills. The bulkheads
and walls were covered with an inflammable plastic that gave off poisonous
gases when burning. The ship continued to burn for four days. The ship‟s
owner and his wife were among the dead.
The two subsequent inquiries, when combined with those following the Herald
of Free Enterprise (3.6.) and Estonia (3.13) disasters, among others, led to
the implementation of the Stockholm Rules on passenger vessel safety in
1996.219 Since then there have been no further major ferry accidents in
Northern Europe/Scandinavia.220
While, as a conventional Ro-Pax ferry, the Scandinavian Star was particularly
vulnerable to mishap, the ship‟s owner and officers were obviously unusually
negligent as were its flag state, classification society and the two port states
concerned. 221 The ship was poorly equipped and its crew inadequately
trained and led. The Danish and Norwegian maritime authorities must bear
some of the responsibility as should the classification society Lloyd‟s Register.
Notably, the ship had been issued with a passenger safety certificate by its
flag state, the Bahamas, and had passed inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard
only four months prior to the accident.222
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3.2.8. Moby Prince, 143 fatalities, 10 April 1991.

Image 3.7. The Italian Ro-Pax ferry Moby Prince after the collision and fire
(www.humansatsea.com).
En route from the Port of Leghorn, on the west coast of mainland Italy to
Olbia, on the east coast of Sardinia, the Moby Prince had not even departed
the Livorno Roads, three miles outside the port, when it collided with the
anchored 186,506 dwt, 286 metre tanker Agip Abruzzo. Formerly the Koningin
Juliana, the 23 year old, Cammell Laird built Moby Prince was a 6,187 grt,
131 metre LOA, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry.
Sailing at 18 or 19 knots and without radar, despite thick patches of fog, the
ferry drove into the starboard bow of the tanker and breached one of its crude
oil cargo compartments. Oil poured into the sea and ignited all around the
ferry so that it quickly caught fire. All 36 crew members on the tanker were
rescued unhurt by harbour launches but only one of the 144 people aboard
the ferry survived the conflagration. That passenger described the situation on
board, which he endured for two hours, as chaotic.
It took seven days for the fire on the tanker to be controlled. By that time the
ferry was completely and irreparably gutted, having had its fire extinguished
within 24 hours. Thick oil fouled the nearby Tuscan beaches that were closed
for some time. Both ships were declared to be constructive total losses
although 90 per cent of tanker‟s cargo was salvaged.
An Italian Ministerial Commission declared in January 1993 that the
Navigazione Arcipeligo Maddalenino owned ferry was principally at fault due
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to its excessive speed and failure to use radar. Fog was also cited as a cause
as was the failure of the tanker to display correct lighting in fog. Some
negligence among duty officers in the Port of Leghorn was referred to.223
Again, quite clearly, the main factors were human errors involving bad
seamanship, poor lookout and inadequate safety procedures and equipment.

3.2.9. Salem Express, 470 plus fatalities, 17 December 1991.

Image 3.8. Salem Express submerged in deeper water having slid off the reef
and sunk in the Red Sea outside Safaga Harbour (www.holidaycheck.pl).
The Haj pilgrimage ferry Salem Express was returning across the Red Sea
from Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to Safaga and then Suez in Egypt with 644,
mainly Egyptian, people on board when she struck a coral reef, was holed,
then slid off and sank in deeper water.
The 25 year old, 4,771 grt and 115 metres LOA conventional monohull RoPax ferry was less than six nautical miles from Safaga Harbour when it
grounded in stormy weather. There were 470 fatalities according to official
Egyptian Government figures. It is alleged, though, that the correct figure may
be considerably higher. Insurance claims amounted to less than USD 20
million.224
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From photographs the ship appeared to be in good condition under the
Egyptian owners, Samatour Shipping Co, however, under previous
ownership, the vessel allegedly appeared very dilapidated.
No further details are known of the circumstances of the sinking although,
obviously, the ferry was significantly off course due to a navigational error
and, probably, a poor lookout. Equally obviously, safety equipment and life
boats/rafts were inadequate as were the evacuation and rescue efforts.225

3.2.10. Neptune, 1,700 plus fatalities, 17 December 1993.
Sadly and ironically, the 39 year old Haitian wooden, 256 grt, 45 metre LOA,
triple-deck, motor cargo ferry Neptune was owned by a company called
“Lucky Magloire”!
Licensed to carry only 250 passengers plus 10 crew members, she was
alleged to have been carrying more than 2,000 people when she capsized
and sank in a „sudden squall‟ off the west coast of Haiti, near Miragoane,
during an overnight voyage from the port of Jeremie and the capital, Port au
Prince. It was neither the first nor the last fatal ferry accident off Haiti, merely
the deadliest. It is estimated that more than 1,700 people died and that there
were 285 survivors. There are no official figures.
Allegedly „officially‟ there were only 820 ticketed passengers aboard a ferry
licensed to carry 250. There were no passenger manifests or crew lists. The
ferry sailed on a regular 150 nautical mile voyage that normally took about 12
hours.
The captain, who swam safely ashore, blamed passengers for the capsize.
He said they rushed to one side of the ship to shelter from torrential rain. That
destabilised the ship and caused it to capsize and, eventually, sink. As well as
passengers, the ferry carried livestock and bagged charcoal. Fortunately so
because the dead animals and bags of charcoal were buoyant and provided
refuge for most of the survivors.
There were no life jackets, life boats or life rafts, nor was there a radio.
Allegedly, the crew failed completely to assist with the evacuation. Indeed, it
took 36 hours for authorities in Port au Prince, only 60 nautical miles from the
accident, to respond and despatch two naval launches to assist. It was the
sixth significant fatal ferry accident to occur in Haiti in five years. There have
been numerous similar events since including one involving the La Fierte
Gonavienne that capsized and sank in 1997 killing about 300 passengers. 226
Yet another example of poverty induced human error involving a grossly
overloaded, unseaworthy ferry with no life saving or communications
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equipment. The vessel, obviously, was manned and owned by negligent
incompetents.

3.2.11. Estonia, 912 fatalities, 28 September 1994

Image 3.9. The Estonia photographed shortly before her sinking and clearly
showing the controversial bow door and visor (www.estoniaferrydisaster.net).
The largest, in terms of number of fatalities, and one of the most controversial
passenger vessel catastrophes involving developed countries since World
War II, the causes and targets for blame as to the capsize and sinking of the
Estonia are ongoing. Numerous books, magazine articles, conference papers,
additional regulations and academic papers in learned journals have been
inspired by it. Ironically, by motivating responses, it has probably contributed
more to improvements in ferry safety than any other accident.
Although there were considerably fewer fatalities than in any number of
accidents in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, this ferry, sailing as it was
between north European and Scandinavian cities was far more newsworthy.
The Clapham omnibus syndrome, mentioned in Chapter 1,227 seems to
prevail. As does its mention in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History.228
Its importance must, then, be kept in proportion.
During the night of 28 September 1994, the 21,794 grt, 157 metre LOA
conventional monohull Ro-Pax/Cargo ferry Estonia capsized and sank in the
Baltic Sea off Turku, Finland, during a voyage from Tallin, Estonia, to
Stockholm, Sweden. A total of 1,049 crew members and ticketed passengers
were aboard the ship that was licensed to carry 2,000. Only 137 survived the
227
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sinking, so 912 died. Only 93 bodies were recovered and it is assumed,
therefore, given that there are few, if any, predators in the Baltic Sea, that 819
were entombed in the ship. However, those figures remain somewhat moot.
Although only fourteen years old and apparently in good condition, the ferry
which was built by the reputable German ship builder, Jos. L. Meyer of
Papenburg, had three previous but also reputable owners. At the time of the
accident the ship had been owned for two years by the Estonian company
Estline Marine Co. It was fully compliant with all the then prevailing port and
flag state regulations and standards related to Ro-Pax ferries.
The night was dark, stormy and cold. Seas were estimated at nine metres and
the water temperature was eight degrees Celsius. On such a night you would
think and expect that mariners would be cautious. Not so on the Estonia. It
proceeded at its standard operating speed into the big seas and gale of wind.
The Estonian, Finnish and Swedish governments established a Joint Accident
Investigation Commission (JAIC) to examine the circumstances of the sinking.
Its preliminary findings were very controversial when released three years
later.229 This was particularly because they seemed to unfairly apportion much
of the blame to the builder/designer. Others, most particularly this author,
believe the owner and, especially, the master should have been accorded
much more responsibility for the tragedy.230
While there is no doubt that the ferry‟s bow door failed, it can well be argued
that the vessel was being pushed much too hard in the conditions. The
master, it seems, took little or no notice of reports from inspectors prior to
departure that there were leaks around the bow door. Nor did he slow down
when his own engineers reported bigger leaks an hour after departure.
Further, his distress signal transmission was tardy and he failed to warn
passengers of the impending abandonment. Few were able to reach or board
the lifeboats or don the plentiful life jackets. Some of the lifeboats floated free
but many of them capsized, others sank with the ship. The ship was equipped
with EPIRBs but apparently no one on board thought to activate them.
Further, the rescue response by the authorities of the three countries
concerned was slow and inadequate. Radio communications among vessels
and helicopters was poor to non-existent and some of the helicopters were so
laden with press photographers that they could not rescue anyone.
The findings of the JAIC certainly appeared strongly prejudiced against the
German shipbuilder and the French classification society (Bureau Veritas) and
in favour of the deceased master and local inspection and rescue authorities.
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Many experts, other than the carefully chosen expert witnesses who testified
before the inquiry, still hold very strong opposing views. 231
This author is firmly of the view that there were many other causal factors
than just the allegedly badly designed and constructed bow door and visor.
They, incidentally, fully complied with the prevailing regulations when built,
passed survey and numerous subsequent inspections. The whole
conventional monohull Ro-Pax concept could equally be blamed.
Despite its many failings, the JAIC did make some useful and thoughtful
recommendations as to the future design, construction and operation of RoPax ferries. It certainly led to the rapid implementation of IMO‟s ISM Code and
to the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement into European Ferry
Stability Regulation.232
The sinking, its circumstances and its aftermath remain controversial. A
Google search reveals numerous further reports and commentaries as well as
books published on the subject. Even IMO has published a twenty-page
bibliography of material published on the subject.233 Something of a contrast
with the coverage it accorded to far more deadly accidents that have occurred
in developing countries.
The insurance cost of the Estonia disaster was USD 135 million. The accident
was a stark illustration of human error involving a chain of design,
construction, regulatory, management, seamanship, seaworthiness, search
and rescue and investigatory factors. It was hardly a good example of the
maritime superiority of the developed world.
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3.2.12. Bukoba, 1,000 plus fatalities, 21 May 1996.

Image 3.10. Bukoba capsized just before sinking off the Tanzanian shore of
Lake Victoria. Some passengers, trapped inside, were still alive and tapping
on the hull at that stage (www.dailynews.co.tz).
Bukoba was an 800 grt steel cargo ferry of 60 metres LOA and a maximum
passenger capacity of 430. Prefabricated by Belgian Shipbuilders Fulton in
Belgium and re-constructed beside Lake Victoria in1979 she was, at 17 years,
not very old by African lake ship standards.
Owned by the Tanzanian Government‟s Tanzanian Railways Corporation
(TRC Marine Division), the ferry was on a regular overnight voyage of 110
nautical miles from Bukoba to Mwanza along the Tanzanian shore of Lake
Victoria, the world‟s second largest freshwater lake. Departing Bukoba at 10
pm, in smooth conditions, the vessel called at an intermediate port where
many more passengers rushed aboard. There was no ticketing or control and
the clearly overloaded vessel was very obviously listing as it left the port.
Some time afterwards it reportedly hit a rock and capsized some 30 nautical
miles from Mwanza.
No distress call was transmitted and, by the time any rescue vessels arrived,
the ship was nearly submerged. An attempt at rescue/salvage was botched
and, when a hole was cut in the still floating hull to evacuate passengers who
were still alive and tapping on the hull at the time, the remaining buoyancy
was lost and the ship sank completely.
The official death toll was 894 but local media reports indicate it was at least
1,000. That was more than double the ferry‟s licensed capacity. The manifest
showed 433 first and second-class passengers but there was no manifest for
third class. Only first and second-class passengers were issued with
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lifejackets and there appears to have been no other life saving equipment
aboard.
The master and nine TRC Marine Division officials were arrested and charged
with murder but soon released. The Tanzanian Government appointed a
Commission of Inquiry but there is no public record of its findings apart from a
press release blaming gross overloading.
Contemporary local press reports indicate that all Lake Victoria ferries at the
time were in deplorable condition, badly manned, inadequately equipped and
with little or no loading controls. Their owners and crews ignored regulations
and maintenance was hopelessly inadequate. Inspections were non-existent
as were crew qualifications and rescue services. Bureaucrats were allegedly
ignorant, corrupt and incompetent.234
Judging from recent events on the Tanzanian coast, little has changed in the
intervening twenty years. (See reports on the Spice Islander, Skagit,
Kilimanjaro II et al in the BMPVA database and below). 235
There have been numerous fatal accidents involving ferries on the large
central African lakes including Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Albert
and Lake Nyasa. Ugandan, Tanzanian, Rwandan, Kenyan and DR Congolese
vessels have been involved. The causes are invariably similar and all involve
most of the usual forms of human error with overloading, unseaworthy
vessels, poor seamanship and general negligence being the main culprits. 236
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The details have been well reported in Hooke, N. Op Cit, p.106; Herald-Sun, Melbourne,
24 May 1996; The Times, London, 22 May 1996; www.nytimes.com/1996/06/02; and,
www.bukoba.weebly.com/mv_bukoba_disaster/.
235
Appendix A, Ibid.
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For details see Appendix A, Ibid.
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3.2.13. Bimas Raya II, 275 plus fatalities, 19 October 1999.

Image 3.11. Bimas Raya (left) in Merauke in 1996. Apparently she was even
more dilapidated when she sank in 1999 (www.rosencranz-shipphotos.de).
The tiny steel coastal cargo ferry Bimas Raya II, which appeared to be a
converted fishing boat, caught fire, capsized and sank off the south coast of
Indonesia‟s Irian Jaya province near the town of Merauke, just west of the
Papua New Guinea border. It is in a low-lying, swampy, crocodile and malarial
mosquito infested region.
Owned by Merauke based Bimas Raya Lines PT, the 196 grt, 1991 built
vessel was constructed in Indonesia by Bina Bahtera to Biro Klasifikasi class.
When pictured in 1996 and only five years old, the vessel already appeared
dilapidated and poorly maintained.
Details, as usual, are sparse but it appears that the ship, which, had a
licensed carrying capacity of 125 passengers, was grossly overloaded with in
excess of 300 people on board. It suffered an engine room fire that spread
and caused the vessel to capsize and sink. There were only 26 survivors so
there were somewhere between 275 and 361 fatalities. No one really knows
how many.
Apparently, no distress signal was transmitted and a search only commenced
when the vessel became overdue. One of the owner‟s other ships along with
a workboat from the Port of Merauke and some local fishing boats conducted
237
a search with little success.
Obviously, the fire fighting equipment was inadequate as were the
communications and lifesaving equipment. The ship was overloaded by at
least 200 per cent. As in so many cases, the causes of the Bimas Raya II
sinking were an unseaworthy vessel, incompetent crew, poor seamanship,
gross overloading and managerial neglect. All human errors.
Unsurprisingly, Bimas Raya Lines was still operating as at the end of 2017. It
appears to have suffered no penalty or restrictions as a result of this appalling
accident.
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Details derived from www.fairplay.co.uk/ 22 October 1999; The Times, London, 21
October 1999, p.18; www.iol.co.za/news/world; www.wrecksite.eu;
www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/10/21/; and, www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details.
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3.2.14. Salahuddin II, 370 plus fatalities, 3 May 2002.

Image 3.12. The wreckage of Salahuddin II being salvaged a few days after
her sinking. Large numbers of bodies were found trapped inside (Tribune
India).
Salahuddin II was a typical triple decked, steel hulled Bangladeshi river ferry
of indeterminate provenance and ownership. It was about 60 metres LOA and
of unknown age. Large numbers of similar vessels operate from the Dhaka
Launch Terminal serving the riverine areas of southern central Bangladesh.
The ferry collided with another vessel, capsized and sank in a „sudden storm‟
at the mouth of the wide and often „turbulent‟ Meghna River, near Shalna,
about 85 nautical miles south-east of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. The
accident occurred just before midnight on 3 May 2002, not an unusual time for
such a disaster.
Newspaper and Internet reports indicate that there were in excess of 500
passengers on board and only 100 survived the accident. There were, of
course, no passenger manifests. The estimated fatalities range from 370 to at
least 450. The vessel was clearly badly overloaded as is the norm in
Bangladesh. Also, as normal, there was little or no safety equipment and the
crew unskilled, un-trained and, probably, malnourished and fatalistic.
Shortly after the accident the Bangladeshi Government promised to set up
two inquiries into both that particular accident and the wider problem of
Bangladeshi ferry safety. The Salahuddin II accident was blamed on
„technical inadequacy‟ and the Government ordered a tightening of safety
standards.238
Inevitably, there were at least two further fatal ferry accidents in Bangladesh
in 2002. They lifted the death toll there for that year beyond 537. From then
238

Reports derived from www.fairplay.com. 4 May 2002; Lloyd‟s List Casualty Reports, 4 May
2002; www.reuters.com/article/idUSDHA11372/; www.news.bbc.co.uk, 4 May 2002; and, The
Washington Post, 7 May 2002.
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until the end of 2015 there have been a further 56 accidents and 4,868
fatalities.239

3.2.15. Le Joola, 1,863 fatalities, 26 September 2002.

Image 3.13. Le Joola shortly before her sinking, one of the worst ferry
disasters in history. Her overloading exploits were notorious. This image
shows why (www.grijalvo.com).
The 2,087 grt and 80 metres LOA conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry Le
Joola was designed, built and licensed to carry 536 passengers, 44 crew
members and 35 cars. On the night of 26 September 2002 when the ferry
capsized and, ultimately, sank, the ferry was carrying at least 2,000 people, of
whom, 1,034 were ticketed. Of those, at least 1,863 died including many who
were trapped in the hull and still alive when it sank about fifteen hours after
the capsize. Some 551 bodies were eventually recovered.
Until September 2011, when it was surpassed by the Tanzanian monohull RoPax ship Spice Islander, this was Africa‟s worst peacetime shipping disaster
and the world‟s second worst.240
Apparently well built in Germany in 1990 by Schiffswerft Germersheim, the
ship was reportedly well-equipped with safety gear but was allegedly very
poorly maintained. It had just returned to service after a year of major repairs
including the replacement of the port engine. The ship was owned by the
Senegalese Government, through its Ministere de l‟Equipement, and operated
by the Armed Forces of Senegal. It plied a regular route from the capital
Dakar in the northern sector of the country to Casamance in the south but,
allegedly, made unscheduled and irregular stops to serve unmanifested
passengers as a matter of course.
239
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Appendix A, Ibid.
Ibid.
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On 26 September 2002 Le Joola sailed from Zuiginchor, the regional capital
of southern Senegal, bound for Dakar, the capital of the West African nation.
Departing around 9 pm, the ship transmitted a radio signal saying it was
sailing in calm seas at 10 pm. Reports vary but it was claimed by the owning
department that the ship sailed into a storm about 11 pm. The subsequent
inquiry disputed that claim but, in any case, the ship capsized about 11.05
pm. It was then well out to sea off the mouth of the Gambia River which flows
through the nation of The Gambia which effectively bisects Senegal. It
actually sank inside the Exclusive Economic Zone of The Gambia.
Le Joola was badly overloaded as was normal practice. It is believed that too
many of the excess passengers were on the upper deck trying to escape the
heat and their movement capsized the vessel. Apparently, many of them
survived the sinking only to drown while awaiting rescue.
While small fishing boats arrived a few hours after the capsize and rescued a
few people, government vessels did not arrive until many hours after the
capsize. The ship remained capsized but still afloat until 3 pm on 27
September 2002. Tapping was heard from inside the ship until then.

Image 3.14. Le Joola capsized but still afloat and with people still alive inside
the hull. AFP (www.bbc.com).
The Senegalese Government commissioned a Marine Board of Inquiry as did
France because there were French citizens on board. The President of
Senegal dismissed the Prime Minister and most of her cabinet shortly after
the event for miss-handling the rescue. Some other officials were also
dismissed. However, despite accusations of negligence, poor maintenance,
sailing beyond the ship‟s limits, and gross overloading during the 12 month
inquiry, no one was prosecuted and there was no trial.241
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Combining and summarising a selection of reports from www.iht.com, 28 September 2002;
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-197117929/; www.allafrica.com/RIN/06/11/02,19/09/08/;
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Again, a grossly overloaded, poorly maintained ship being operated in a badly
unseamanlike manner capsized and sank taking almost 2,000 people with it.
Although the sinking technically occurred in international waters, on an
international voyage, actually within the EEZ of a second country (The
Gambia), the IMO was disinclined to act or, indeed, even to comment. 242

3.2.16. Nasreen/Nazren/Nasrin, 400 plus fatalities, 8 July 2003.

Image 3.15. The main reason there are so many fatalities associated with
Bangladeshi ferry accidents is the gross overloading that is normal there.
Here the families of passengers await confirmation of their fate.
(www.devastatingdisasters.com).
Claimed to be the worst of a large number of Bangladeshi ferry disasters, the
capsize and sinking of the Nasreen/Nazren/Nasrin was a typical example of
the accidents that happen so frequently in that now rapidly developing but still
poor country.
The Nasreen, a typical Bangladeshi triple decked steel passenger ferry,
operated from the Dhaka Launch Station on voyages along the Meghna River
to Lalmohan and Barisal, about 90 nautical miles south, south-east of Dhaka.
At the common disaster hour of around 11pm, the ferry reportedly nose dived,
capsized and sank in what has been variously reported as „turbulent waters‟,
a „whirlpool‟, and a „confluence of monsoon swollen rivers‟. The sinking
occurred on the Meghna River near Chandphur close to where the
Salahuddin II sank 14 months previously.
Licensed to carry 300 passengers, Nasreen was allegedly carrying well over
600 at the time of her sinking. It is claimed that 200 swam to safety or were
rescued by fishing boats so that 400 plus were missing. The figures do not
www.shipwreckology.com/2012/09/26/; www.tradewinds.no/22Sept2008/; www.tht.com; and,
www.fairplay.com.AP(05/11/02).
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www.imo.org The IMO GISIS database was searched but no mention of Le Joola found.
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compute but between 400 and 600 are believed to have died. The vessel
sank only 600 metres from the Chandphur launch terminal. It capsized quickly
and passengers inside the ferry had no means of escape.
Allegedly illegally carrying 35 tonnes of cargo, the ferry had no life saving
equipment and an untrained, unqualified crew and master. The master and
owner both died in the accident or, perhaps, went missing subsequently.
The subsequent MBOI blamed overcrowding or incompetence. Two marine
surveyors were deemed responsible for failing to properly check the vessel.
They were fined less than USD 200 each.243
Once more, a dangerously unseaworthy ship, manned by incompetents and
allowed to be grossly overloaded by a negligent owner and complicit
authorities, sank with massive loss of life. For a very stark illustration of the
realities of these problems readers are referred to Appendix F where two
YouTube videos of recent Bangladeshi ferry accidents may be seen. The
complete failure of lookout; response to an impending collision; and, attempts
to rescue survivors of the capsized vessel, despite the availability of life
buoys, is distressing but illuminating.
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Summary derived from reports in www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/09/;
www.china.org.cn/english/international/69403/;
www.news.bbs.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3066885.stm/; www.dawn.com/news/112444/;
www.ipsnews.net/2003/07/; and, www.en.prothorn-ato.com/bangladesh/news/52034/.
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3.2.17. Al Salam Boccaccio 98, 1,026 fatalities, 3 February 2006.

Image 3.16. Al Salam Boccaccio 98, an Italian built, Egyptian owned,
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry looking decidedly unstable and
unseaworthy with her four obviously additional decks and vehicle access door
cut in the starboard side forward. The sponsons added at the waterline were a
feeble attempt to improve the ship‟s stability (www.shipspotting.com).
Originally built in 1970 for Italy‟s Tirrenia Lines by Italcantieri‟s Monfalcone
shipyard which, several bankruptcies and government „bail outs‟ later, is
known as Fincantieri, the 131 metre LOA, conventional Ro-Pax ferry Al Salam
Boccaccio 98 was later considerably enlarged from 6,450 grt to 11,779 grt.
This was mainly by the expedient of adding four accommodation decks and
waterline sponsons to then stabilise the ship.
The ship was allegedly sold from Italy to Egypt because it failed to meet the
Stockholm Rule requirements introduced following the sinking of the Herald of
Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star and Estonia.244 It was legally prevented
from operating in European waters – quite correctly as things turned out.
Owned by Egypt‟s Al Salam Transport, Al Salam Boccaccio 98 (ASB98)
operated as a Ro-Pax ferry carrying vehicles and passengers, mainly Haj
pilgrims and Egyptian workers between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. She was one
of a number of vessels engaged in that trade.
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Refer to 2.1.1, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, and 6.2.1.
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The ship was not the first of the Red Sea ferries to sink. In December 1991
the Salem Express (See 3.11.) grounded and sank with 470 fatalities. Only
four months prior to the ASB98 sinking, another vessel owned by Al Salam
Transport sank following a collision in the Red Sea. There were two fatalities.
Also, in June 2002 another Al Salam Transport owned Ro-Pax ferry Al Salam
90 caught fire soon after departing Dhuba. A crewman died.245
ASB98 was en route across the Red Sea from Dhuba, Saudi Arabia, to
Safada in Egypt with about 1,410 people, mostly returning Haj pilgrims and
Egyptian workers, as well as 220 vehicles on board. Contact was lost and it is
believed there was a fire about 60 nautical miles and four hours from Dhuba
at 10 pm. It is believed the ship sank at 11.33 pm. No distress signal was
transmitted but an EPIRB was activated at 11.58 pm. Conditions were windy around 24 knots wind speed – but the sea was slight.
There was more than adequate life saving equipment with ten lifeboats and
90 life rafts capable of supporting more than 3,000 survivors. Five of the
lifeboats and an unknown number of liferafts were launched. It is believed that
about 1,026 people perished but the numbers are still being debated. Even
the number of survivors is not definite.
Equally debateable is what actually happened and why. Both the Egyptian
(Port state) and Panamanian (Flag state) authorities held inquiries. The
Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) was recovered and provided further
contradictory information. The ship was not fully laden and the fire burnt for
four hours. It started on the vehicle deck and has been blamed by some,
because of water used to extinguish the fire, for having caused the already
top-heavy ship to capsize. Some blamed blocked scuppers and some alleged
sabotage.
The Egyptian MBOI blamed a „wicked conspiracy‟ and imprisoned the owner
Mandouh Ismail for seven years. Two of his employees were sentenced to
three years in prison. Ismail was accused of ordering the captain to proceed
despite his doubts being expressed per radio.246
The indisputable facts are that the ship was unseaworthy in the first place,
having been banned from Southern European waters some years before.
Even to a casual observer, the ship appeared dangerously top heavy (the
author observed it in Genoa before the accident). Seamanship was obviously
poor without even a distress signal being transmitted even though the fire had
been burning for more than four hours before the ship sank. The only signal
sent was via a float free EPIRB which transmitted after the ship sank. Despite
the recovery of the VDR, we are unlikely to ever learn the whole story.
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All recorded in Appendix A, Ibid.
Described comprehensively in www.fairplaydailynews.com;
www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/02/; www.heiweico.tripod.com/as98.htm/;
www.redseawreckproject.com; and International Maritime Organization, Information Resource
on the Al Salam Boccaccio 98, London, 2010, www.imo.org.
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3.2.18. Senopati Nusantara, 560 fatalities, 30 December 2006.

Image 3.17. The inter-island conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry Senopati
Nusantara was 31 years old when it sank in a “violent storm” in the Java Sea
(Wikipedia).
The bluff bowed, landing barge like, conventional Ro-Pax ferry Senopati
Nusantara capsized and sank in a storm while en route from Kumai in
Kalimantan (Borneo) to Tanjung Emas in Semarang, East Java. Fatalities are
difficult to ascertain as reports vary from 46 to 600. Local newspaper reports
indicate the likely figure is between 400 and 600, most probably around 560.
Similarly, the age of the vessel is in some doubt with estimates ranging from
16 to 37 years. The 77 metre LOA, 2,718 grt, steel vessel was built in Japan
and owned by local company Prima Vista PT. It operated scheduled voyages
on the Kumai to Tanjung Emas route and had been doing so for some years
until sinking in a „violent storm‟ 25 nautical miles off Mandalika Island in the
Java Sea.
Licensed to carry 850 passengers, it is estimated there were between 628
and 800 on board as well as 29 buses and trucks and the usual mass of
motor-cycles. There were 219 known survivors, some of whom were found
250 nautical miles and seven days from the wreck.
Immediately following the accident, the Indonesian Minister of Transport
claimed the vessel was seaworthy, carried sufficient lifesaving equipment and
was “not old”. There was a wide-ranging aerial search as well as efforts by
local fishing boats and six ships of the Indonesian Navy.
Survivors, however, reported bad seamanship, chaos and fights for
lifejackets. Following the subsequent MBOI, the master was convicted of
navigating improperly and “careless manouvering” as well as ignoring the
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weather. Found guilty in the Semarang Court, he was imprisoned for two
years and four months. The court praised the owner for promptly
compensating the victims.247
With great respect to the court, it would appear that its verdicts were neither
fair nor objective. The owner would seem to be just as culpable as the master.
The ship was obviously neither seaworthy nor properly equipped with
accessible life saving equipment. The master, equally obviously, did sail into a
storm but it is very likely he was ordered to do so by the owner.

3.2.19. Princess of the Stars, 870 fatalities, 21 June 2008.

Image 3.18. Princess of the Stars at the Manila ferry terminal
(www.wakanatsu.com).
The Sulpicio Lines owned conventional monohull Ro-Pax “cruise” ferry
Princess of the Stars, ignoring frequent, adamant and obvious warnings,
sailed into the face of Typhoon Fengshen (Frank). Midway through her
voyage from Manila to Cebu City she lost power, grounded, capsized and
sank off San Fernando Island in Roblon Province near Mindoro Island in the
Visayas in the central Philippines. She had sailed directly into the eye of the
typhoon. An estimated 870 passengers and crew died as a result.
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Information compiled from www.lloydsregisterfairplay.com; www.abc.net.au/news/; BBC
News, 4 & 8 January 2007; The Indian Express, 31 December 2006; and ANTARA, 1 January
2007 and 31 December 2006.
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The death toll, added to those from several previous accidents, amounted to
more than 6,000 „known‟ fatalities arising from accidents involving ships
owned by Cebu based Sulpicio Lines over a period of twenty years.
Undoubtedly a world record for one company!248
The steel Ro-Pax ferry was the largest in the Sulpicio fleet and in the
Philippines. It was 23,842 grt and 193 metres LOA. Built by the highly
regarded Ishikawajima-Harima shipbuilding company of Aloi in Japan in 1984,
it was purchased by Sulpicio in 2001 and converted from a pure cargo vessel
to a Ro-Pax ferry. Its regular route was Manila to Cebu City and return.
As usual with developing world ferry disasters the ship capacity and final
fatality figures are nebulous and often deliberately obscured. In this case,
passenger capacity has been variously described as 1,992 and 2,876 with up
to an incredible 978 crew! The crew list and passenger manifest are just as
vague. The owners claimed there were 862 people on board but there were
almost certainly many more. The official death toll was 862. However, there
were 56 survivors, 67 bodies were found and 747 listed as missing, a total of
870. The first in a long list of arithmetic discrepancies.
The Philippines MBOI found that passengers were ordered to don life jackets
at 11.30 am. The abandon ship order was given at 11.45, a distress signal
transmitted at noon and contact lost at 12.30 pm. Some passengers managed
to get into liferafts but survivors accused the crew of being more interested in
saving themselves. The sinking ship capsized at 6 pm.
Interestingly, another Sulpicio Lines ship put to sea through Manila Bay
shortly before the Princess of the Stars departed. Noting the conditions, the
master turned around before leaving the entrance to the bay. He was roundly
and loudly abused by many of his passengers for doing so, especially as the
Princess passed them. However, upon berthing back in Manila and learning of
the fate of the Princess, he was suddenly regarded as a hero.249
The Philippines Navy tried but gave up rescue attempts in the face of
„enormous waves‟. The first rescue ship arrived more than 24 hours after
contact was lost. MARINA “grounded” all Sulpicio Lines‟ vessels and the
government established “Task Force Princess Stars” to handle the accident.
Even the normally supine President Gloria Macapagal Arroya roundly
criticised Sulpicio.
In turn, Sulpicio blamed the Philippines Coast Guard and Bureau of
Meteorology for the inadequacy of their warnings even though most other
ships in the Philippines, including a number of Sulpicio vessels, had cancelled
voyages or taken shelter because of the impending typhoon.250 Sulpicio
offered bereaved families compensation of about USD 4,500 each.
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See 1.12.2.
Described in Appendix C in a letter to the author from Commodore Gualterio Dela Cruz,
PCG (Retd).
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See Appendix C, Ibid.
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The Philippines MBOI reported promptly on August 25. It found Sulpicio Lines
and its deceased captain jointly liable and recommended that Sulpicio‟s
licence be suspended. It blamed human error, particularly by the captain.
Sulpicio was found to be negligent. Sulpicio blamed an „Act of God‟ and again
blamed the weather forecasters, accusing them of negligence.
The company appealed and threatened that because it carried more than 40
per cent of the country‟s internal cargo, it would cause major national
economic damage if its operating licence were to be suspended. Sulpicio‟s
owners, the Go family are very powerful both economically and politically in
Cebu, the country‟s second city.
Seven years later, the Manila trial court awarded USD 6.6 million (About USD
7,000 each) to be paid by Sulpicio in compensation to the victims‟ families. At
least it was more than the original Sulpicio offer. In January 2015 MARINA
revoked the Certificate of Convenience of Philippine Span Asia Corp, formerly
known as Sulpicio Lines, for its failure to comply with the ISM Code.251
While Sulpicio Lines is without any doubt the world‟s worst behaved
shipowner, its repeated deadly performances simply illustrate most of the
usual human errors comprising negligence, poor seamanship, an
unseaworthy ship and general incompetence. They also illustrate the power of
such companies in developing countries and the inability of regulators to
withstand such power. Sulpicio Lines continues to operate as Philippine Span
Asia Corp!252 Remarkably, perhaps, it does not present a web site.
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Case study compiled from reports by Williams,D.L. Op Cit, p. 200; Safety at Sea, London,
19 June 2009; Reuters, 22 June 2008; www.rappler.com/more-ph/issues/disasters/;
www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?58695/; ABS-CBN, 22 June 2008; and, www.tradewinds.no 22
June 2008.
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3.2.20. Teratai Prima Dua, 255 fatalities, 11 January 2009.

Image 3.19. Teratai Prima Dua alongside (www.shipspotting.com).
Owned by PT Nur Budi, the 1999 built steel conventional monohull Ro-Pax
cargo ferry Teratai Prima Dua was a typical example of a locally and rather
roughly built inter-island vessel in the intra-Indonesian fleet. She was of 700
grt and plied a regular scheduled route across Makassar Strait from Pare
Pare on the south-west corner of Sulawesi Island to the major town of
Samarinda on Kalimantan (Borneo).
At 4 am on the morning of 11 January 2009 the ferry was reportedly hit by two
large waves which caused it to heel about 30 degrees. Then a wave hit from
another direction and that capsized and soon sank the vessel. It is believed
that 255 of the passengers and crew perished as a result.
The passenger manifest that, like most such documents in Indonesia, was
probably inaccurate, listed 250 passengers. The crew list stated 17. There
were probably more since there were 42 survivors and the subsequent MBOI
recorded 255 fatalities. As usual, the figures do not compute.
The small number of survivors confirms their evidence before the MBOI that
“high waves flipped the ferry” quickly. The Indonesian Navy and Coast Guard
conducted a search the following day but it was still rough and the search was
not successful.
The master was accused of ignoring the weather warnings, of overloading his
vessel and of having inadequate lifesaving equipment available. He was
convicted and imprisoned for nine years. There was no news of any penalty
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being applied to the owner who appears to have been equally culpable in
every respect.253
The usual human errors were evident.

3.2.21. Spice Islander, 2,764 fatalities, 10 September 2011.

Image 3.20. Spice Islander was, as this picture shows, in appalling condition
before she set out on her fatal voyage. It was badly „hogged‟ showing that its
back was broken, among other deficiencies. It should never have sailed at all,
let alone carried large numbers of passengers (www.shipsnostalgia.com).
Thanks, largely, to the Internet, more news about Tanzania‟s dreadful ferry
safety record has begun to be published since 2000. This has seen the East
African country decline from being barely noticed to third worst country in the
world for ferry fatalities in the ten years from 2005 to 2015.
To date, its worst accident involved the Spice Islander an ancient, steel
landing barge style monohull Ro-Pax ferry of 60 metres LOA and 836 grt.
Already forty years old when she arrived in Tanzania from Greece in 2007,
the badly battered ferry capsized and sank around 1.00 am on September
2011. Depending on which report is the most accurate, there were between
1,573 and 2,976 fatalities as a result. Most reports tend to favour the latter
figure.
On a short voyage from Stone Town on Unguja, the main island of the
Zanzibar group, to the northern island of Temba, the grossly overloaded
vessel lost power, capsized and sank. There was very little lifesaving
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Compiled from reports in BBC News, !6 January 2009; Bangkok Post, 13 January 2009;
International Herald tribune, 13 January 2009; CBC News, 12 January 2009; and, BBC News,
11 January 2009.
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equipment and the crew were of virtually no assistance to the panicking
passengers.
The ship was in disgraceful condition. It was battered, rusty and, worst of all,
badly hogged in that effectively its back was broken. It appeared that little or
no maintenance had been done on the vessel for many years. It in fact broke
down off Somalia on its delivery voyage due to contaminated fuel. It should
never have been allowed to go to sea. It was, however, probably a very
profitable ship for its owner, Makame Hasnuu. It would have cost practically
nothing to buy and very little, if anything, had been spent on maintenance.
Apparently licensed to carry 645 passengers and 45 crew, which seems
excessive anyway, the ferry was believed to be carrying 3,586 people when it
sank. It was so overloaded that a number of passengers were concerned
enough to disembark in Stone Town to avoid the onward voyage to Pemba.
The Tanzanian Government convened a MBOI shortly after the sinking. There
was, of course, much contradictory evidence presented. The numbers of
passengers and fatalities were disputed but the Government confirmed in
October 2011 that the vessel had been carrying 3,586 of whom 2,764 were
unaccounted for. Some 620 people had been rescued and 203 bodies
recovered. The survivors were rescued by other ferries.
The MBOI adjudication was one of negligence and murder. The ferry had
been badly overloaded. The master, owner and ten of the crew were charged
with murder.254 It is not known whether they were ever convicted or punished.
Clearly, whatever penalties were imposed failed to act as a deterrent to other
local operators. Only eight months later, the much newer, American sourced
Skagit capsized and sank between Dar es Salam and Stone Town causing
293 fatalities. Interestingly, the travel advisory website
www.tripadvisor.com.au did not mention the safety record of Tanzanian ferries
in its advice on the reliability of ferries on the Dar es Salam to Zanzibar route
as of July 2016. That is grossly irresponsible.
Yet another case of a grossly overloaded, unseaworthy, badly maintained
ferry managed by a negligent owner and crewed and commanded by
incompetents sinking with massive loss of life. Human error indeed.
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Contemporary reports compiled from Lloyd‟s List, 24 January 2012; www.bbcnews.com;
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 September 2011; www.theguardian.com/comment-isfree/2011/sep/13/; www.geocoaching.com/geocache/GC58F7P/; and,
www.tripadvisor.com.au.
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3.2.22. Rabaul Queen, 252 fatalities, 2 February 2012.

Image 3.21. Rabaul Queen (Wikipedia).
The small, 259 grt, 30 year old cargo ferry Rabaul Queen sailed into a
forecast strong gale in Papua New Guinea‟s Bismark Sea on 1 February
2012. She capsized and sank causing the deaths of as many as 300
passengers and crew.
The 47 metre LOA ship was launched in Japan in 1982 by Kawamoto
Shipbuilding. It was designed and built to operate in the benign conditions of
Japan‟s northern Inland Sea. It was purchased in 1998 by Captain Peter
Sharp‟s Rabaul Shipping to operate in the considerably more boisterous
waters of the Bismarck Sea around northern PNG.
The vessel‟s normal route was from Kimbe, the capital of West New Britain
province, to Lae, on the north side of the mainland of PNG, a 280 nautical
mile voyage. For voyages of such duration the vessel was licensed to carry
295 passengers and 16 crewmembers. Technically, it was in survey.
On the afternoon of 1 February 2012 the ferry proceeded to sea in spite of
gale warnings predicting winds up to 48 knots from the north-west and very
rough seas. As the gale built, passengers began to get wet and started to
move to one side for shelter. This caused the ship to heel, acquiring a list of
about five degrees to port. About 6.15 am on 2 February the ship was hit by
some very large waves and capsized so quickly no distress signal could be
transmitted. A float free EPIRB, however, was activated as the ship sank
about 6.30 am. The first rescue ship MOL Summer arrived around 9.40 am
and recovered 116 survivors. Other vessels later recovered 130 more.
From this accident we have the benefit of undoubtedly the best, simplest and
clearest report of a BMOI yet seen by the author, the Commission of Inquiry
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into the sinking of Rabaul Queen.255 It is a credit to the PNG Government, its
Marine Advisor, Captain Nurur Rahman, and its Commissioner, Judge
Warwick Andrew.
The COI found numerous deficiencies in the ship, its owner, its crew and their
operations. Essentially, it was grossly overloaded, unseaworthy, badly
maintained, unstable, unsafe and manned by poorly trained incompetents.
The ship was unfit to go to sea in the forecast and actual conditions. It did not
carry enough lifejackets and the crew were untrained in the use of what safety
equipment was fitted. The master was negligent in many respects and the
owner, Captain Peter Sharp, even more so. The COI found that between 142
and 161 people perished in the sinking. Local media claim many more
fatalities.
The COI found that Captain Sharp had behaved negligently for many years.
As far back as 1993 he had sent a ferry Kris to sea when it was obviously
unsafe. That vessel sank with the loss of five lives. It found him arrogant and
that he had no regard for the safety of passengers. Another of his vessels
Kimbe Queen had run aground on coral reefs twice including once only days
after the Rabaul Queen disaster.
The COI also found the National Maritime Safety Authority (NMSA) to have
been incompetent and ineffective and in need of drastic reform. It deemed the
search and rescue operation to have been competently conducted by the
Maritime rescue Coordination Centre in Port Moresby (MRCC POM) in
cooperation with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority‟s (AMSA) Rescue
Coordination Centre in Canberra (RCC Australia).
Arising from the COI‟s report, a number of charges, mostly of manslaughter,
were laid against Sharp, the vessel‟s master and mate and another employee
of Rabaul Shipping. Also, a maritime safety officer has been charged with
negligence. The manslaughter charges were dismissed on 31 July 2017 but
charges of sending or taking an unseaworthy vessel to sea were yet to be
heard as at 6 December 2017.256/257
The COI into the sinking of the Rabaul Queen inspired a devastating report
which highlights many of the similar deficiencies that afflict so many of the
vessels, owners and operators that have been described in this chapter. All
the usual ingredients of negligence, incompetence, an unseaworthy vessel,
absence of seamanship, lack of maintenance, overloading, corruption and
panic were there.
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Case study compiled from reports in Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the sinking
of the Rabaul Queen, Port Moresby, www.coi.gov.pg/rabaul-queen/;
www.pngexposed.wordpress.com/tag/rabaul-queen/; www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-02/;
and, www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-13/.
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Appendix D. Letter from Captain Peter Sharp, managing director of Rabaul Shipping to the
editor of Work Boat World magazine, Baird Publications, Melbourne, 3 February 2015.
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Tlozek, E. Rabaul Queen trial: Court dismisses manslaughter charges against Australian
ferry owner, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-31/.
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3.2.23. Sewol, 304 fatalities, 16 April 2014

Image 3.22. Sewol showing the additional accommodation decks at the stern
that contributed to its instability (www.abc.net.au).
Although it resulted in „only‟ 304 fatalities, the capsize and sinking of the
South Korean conventional monohull Ro-Pax cargo ferry Sewol has probably
received more international media coverage than any other Asian passenger
vessel accident. This is likely due to the fact that most of the victims were
teenaged school students as well as the political machinations and legal
drama that followed the accident and that South Korea is generally regarded
as a „developed‟ country.
The Sewol was yet another „accident waiting to happen‟. All the ingredients
were there: corrupt, negligent officials; a corrupting, negligent owner;
incompetent and cowardly officers and crew; insensitive politicians; an
unseaworthy ship; subsequent suicides; overloading; inadequate lifesaving
equipment; and, a slow and not particularly competent rescue effort. It
provided the South Korean Government, the Korean Register of Shipping and
the South Korean Coast Guard with a very nasty awakening.
Built in 1994 in Japan by Hayashikane Shipbuilding and Engineering, the
6,825 grt vessel was 146 metres long. The owner, Chonghaejujin Marine
Company, in turn owned by Yoo Byung-eun, purchased it in 2012 and
immediately added additional superstructure, thus reducing the ship‟s stability.
It operated on three round trips weekly from Incheon, the port of Seoul, to Jeju
on Korea‟s south coast. The ship was reported to have been dilapidated when
purchased. It was classed by and in survey to the Korean Register of
Shipping and passed a South Korean Coast Guard inspection in early 2014.
On 16 April the ship was outward bound from Incheon when it heeled over
and sank during a sharp turn 0.9 of a nautical mile off Douggeochado near the
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south-west corner of South Korea. The ship was carrying 476 people, mostly
teenage high school students, 124 cars, 56 trucks and 1,157 tonnes of cargo.
Nearly twice its legal limit.
The subsequent MBOI, conducted by the South Korean Board of Audit and
Inspection was sensational in its findings and devastating in its
recommendations. It found the KRS license was based on falsified
documents. It revealed the ship‟s previous master had resigned following
threats of dismissal after informing the owner his ship was unstable and
unsafe.
The helmsman was inexperienced and, while the master was off the bridge,
made the fatal sharp turn. The master ordered passengers to remain in their
cabins as the ship sank. The master was one of the first to abandon ship. The
ship‟s modifications were illegal. There was a “questionable relationship”
between the operator and regulator. The owner had been issued with
warnings as to the seaworthiness of his ship. The rescue operation was slow
and inadequate. Many passengers were still alive when trapped inside as the
ship sank. The master fled after abandoning ship. Finally, two divers were
killed during the rescue effort.
Following the inquiry, the 69 year old master was imprisoned for 36 years for
negligence; the chief engineer for 30 years; a corrupt SKCG official for four
years; and, the president of the owning company for seven years for homicide
by wilful negligence. The owner‟s body was found later after committing
suicide. The vice-principal of the school who had organised the trip for his
students also, tragically, suicided.258
Again, all the usual ingredients were involved: greed, corruption, negligence,
incompetence, illegal and dangerous modifications, overloading, an
unseaworthy ship and appalling seamanship. It must be highlighted that this
„accident‟ occurred in a so-called developed country in 2014. The political
„cover-up‟ that followed simply made the whole disgraceful incident even
harder to accept by the families of the passengers who perished.259
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Compiled from reports in The Economist, London, 26 April 2014;
www.cnn.com/04/26/2014/; www.bbc.com; and, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/16/.
259
The callous response of President Park Geun-hye was cited in the ultimately successful
impeachement trial which led to her dismissal and subsequent imprisonment on 10 March
2017. See Murray, L, South Korean president impeached, Australian Financial Review,
Fairfax Media, Sydney, 11-12 March, 2017.
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3.2.24. Dongfang Zhi Xing/Oriental Star/Eastern Star, 442

fatalities, 2 June 2015.

Image 3.23. Dongfang Zhi Xing capsized in the Yangtze River. Passengers
were still alive and trapped in the hull when this image was taken
(www.wunderground.com).
Forty years on from the similarly storm caused collision and sinking of the
Hongxing 240 & 245, China experienced another river cruise ferry disaster
resulting in a similar number of fatalities. The 1975 accident occurred near
Guangzhou on a tributary of the Pearl River and resulted in about 432
fatalities. The Chinese government was better able to suppress the news in
those days. Despite its best efforts, much has been revealed about the
Oriental Star capsize and sinking that saw ten more people killed than in the
previous event.
The Dong Fang Zhi Xing or Eastern or Oriental Star was one of a number of
four deck steel cruise ferries that take tourists along the Yangtze River from
Nanjing to Chongqing via the Threes Gorges. At 3,900 grt and 77 metres LOA
and with accommodation for about 450 tourists, she was typical of the breed.
Built in 1994 by the Chongqing Chandong Shipbuilding Corp, she was owned
by the Oriental Shipping Co and operated by Xihe Travel.
On the night of 2 June 2015, while most of its elderly Chinese passengers
were asleep, the ship capsized and sank near Jianii in Hubei province. There
were 442 fatalities and only 12 survivors including the master and chief
engineer. The authorities were not notified of the capsize until two and a half
hours later by survivors who had swum ashore.
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It is notable that the ship was lengthened by 11 metres in 1997. In 2013 the
Nanjing Maritime Bureau found that six of ten Yangtze cruise ships had safety
problems among which was a significant difficulty in recruiting trained crews.
At the subsequent inquiry, the master and engineer claimed the ship had
been hit by a tornado. That was proved to be untrue although it was found
there had been a severe thunderstorm with strong downbursts. Ships had
earlier been warned of severe weather.
The rescue effort was unimpressive and it was noted that many passengers
were tapping on the hull when salvage commenced. However, they were all
dead by the time the ship was righted.
On 30 December 2015 the Chinese Government released the report arising
from its inquiry. It found that the owner and local authorities had “flaws in their
daily management” and suggested that 43 people be punished.260
Yet another poorly enlarged, unseaworthy ship crewed by incompetents and
managed and regulated negligently caused the deaths of more than 400
innocent passengers.

3.3.0. Similarities abound in these case studies.
These case studies are replete with similar stories. The reasons for the
accidents are remarkably similar and were each caused by some form of
human error. It is significant that fifteen (60%) occurred at night. That,
undoubtedly, increased the likelihood of greater fatalities as it made
evacuation and rescue more difficult.
They confirm that practically all the accidents have essentially human error
causes and that little seems to have been learnt over the past fifty years with
the notable exception of in Northern Europe. The same causes continue to
reappear. They also illustrate that, while more fatal accidents (76%) occur in
developing countries, they still do happen in developed ones (24%) albeit with
less catastrophic results in terms of numbers of fatalities per accident.
While human errors are the major cause of fatal passenger vessel accidents,
there is no doubt that certain types of vessels suffer from vulnerabilities that
exacerbate the problem and make accidents more likely to be fatal.
Obviously, conventional Ro-Pax ferries, motor bancas and modified vessels
that are so made less stable can worsen the effects of human error.261 Sixty
per cent of the 25 vessels in the cases studied here were conventional
monohull Ro-Pax ferries.262
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Well described in The Age, 4 June 2015; The Australian, 3 June 2015;
www.shipwrecklog.com/log/2015/06/03/; and, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/.
261
No motor bancas are included among these case studies because they are too small to
have carried sufficient passengers to have caused more than 150 fatalities in one accident.
262
All percentages derived from a statistical analysis of Appendix A, Ibid.
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There is much that can be learnt from such accidents. The problem lies in
applying that knowledge to the task of reforming the behaviour of the people
employed in the ferry industry to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the risks
involved in their operations. Reform can be achieved, however, even in
developing countries, as the aviation industry and oil tanker sector have
shown.
Despite an increased international focus on training and education and ever
more stringent safety requirements, fatal accidents continue to occur. Unlike
the airline and oil tanker industries, there has been no significant reduction in
the overall annual numbers of ferry fatalities since 2000. Indeed, although the
data is nebulous, nothing seems to have changed – except in Northern
Europe – over the past half century.
Astonishingly, a number of repeat offenders (24%) among owners have been
revealed in this chapter. The major causal factors, despite much
encouragement by governments, the maritime media and IMO, continue to
be: negligence (100%), overloading (72%), poor lookout (24%), badly
modified vessels (24%), unseaworthy vessels (76%), incompetent crews
100%), regulatory corruption, collusion between owners and survey officials
and classification societies, poor seamanship (unknown percentages but
common), insufficient lifesaving and fire-fighting equipment (72%), inadequate
maintenance (unknown percentage but probably most), and late and
inadequate rescue responses (56%); of the cases studied here.263
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All statistics derived and analysed from Appendix A, Ibid.
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Chapter 4
Comparisons with other transport modes
Improvements in aviation, oil tanker and road accident and
fatality numbers provide a basis for optimism
4.1.0. Comparisons
4.1.1. Comparisons with other modes of transport.
To determine how ferry travel compares with other modes in terms of
accidents and fatalities it is necessary to examine the risks associated with
those other modes. This has the important additional benefit of providing
valuable lessons as to how other modes, particularly road vehicles, oil tankers
and aviation, have been able to very significantly reduce their incidence of
both accidents and their accompanying fatalities. In the case of car travel that
has mostly been in developed countries but with aviation it has been almost
world wide as have oil tankers. Fortunately, all have been well documented
and recorded.
Other modes, again, including both rail and bus were reviewed but rejected
for the purposes of this study. Rail travel is obviously quite different from
water, road and air, if only because trains, running on rails, cannot divert from
the very precise direction laid out for them. Practically all railway accidents are
the result of external causes rather than errors on the part of the actual train
operator or driver.
Rail fatality statistics incorporate large numbers of suicides and the
carelessness of significant numbers of car, bus and truck drivers and
pedestrians who misjudge their ability to cross tracks in front of oncoming
trains.264 As these are not usually defined separately in most available
statistics it makes it nearly impossible to calculate which fatalities have been
the direct result of rail travel in the sense of passenger and crew deaths.
Errors on the part of train drivers and their controllers and overloaded trains
have undoubtedly caused fatalities but they have been rare and, so, are not
comparable with aviation, car, oil tanker and ferry accidents.
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For a detailed study of this phenomenon, in the Australian context, refer to Rail accident
costs in Australia, Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Canberra, 2002.The
conclusions contained in that document undoubtedly have international relevance.
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4.1.2. Inconsistent railway statistics.
In addition the statistics available from developing countries are inconsistent,
vague and uninformative in the extreme. For example, India has large
numbers of fatal railway accidents but obtaining anything more than sketchy
press reports about them is practically impossible. The likely fatality reality is
considered by the author to be very much higher than the official statistics that
are published. Even in developed countries such as the United States, where
there are comparatively large numbers of fatal railway accidents, it is very
difficult to distinguish between victims who were actually on a train and those
who were run over by one.

Image 4.1. Despite the obvious risks associated with this kind of overloading
seen in India, train travel, for ticketed train passengers at least, is
comparatively safe (www.therewillbeasia.com).
Nevertheless, the vast majority of rail accident fatalities involve pedestrians
being run down by trains, often as suicides, or road vehicles colliding with
trains due entirely to driver incompetence or panic.265 Very occasionally a
major accident occurs but they are very rare and usually result in fewer than
100 fatalities. They are simply not comparable in either their frequency or their
fatality severity with ferry accidents.266 The worst ever train accident occurred
in India, killing nearly 800 people in 1981.267
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Rail accident costs in Australia, Ibid.
A spectacular example was of a train derailment near Lucknow in India in November 2016
killing an estimated 146 passengers. See Scores die after train runs off the tracks in India,
The Australian (AP), Sydney, 21 November 2016, P. 9.
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Ibid.
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4.1.3. Bus accident data are scarcer and more nebulous.
Bus travel is even more difficult to evaluate. Many bus accidents in developing
countries are accorded no publicity and are not even recorded by the
appropriate authorities.268 The same, generally, applies to travel by car or
motorcycle. Many buses operate illegally in developing countries in a kind of
grey market similar to many ferry operations in the same kinds of countries.
Even if an accident results in more than 100 fatalities, as some do, it is not
considered newsworthy. However, as with car accidents, the incidence of bus
accidents and fatalities has been falling significantly in developed countries for
the past forty years. This is almost certainly due to stricter controls on
overloading, road-worthiness, drink driving and the wearing of seatbelts.

Image 4.2. The problem with buses. A typical grossly overloaded bus in a
developing country, in this case, India. The statistics on fatal accidents
involving such vehicles are very hard to come by (Wikipedia).
The author has seen the aftermath of several bus accidents in India,
Bangladesh, Egypt and Indonesia. When a heavily overloaded bus, with
passengers on the roof and hanging on to the sides and rear, rolls over an
embankment, the number of fatalities can be very high. As they occur so
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The author has observed the aftermath of bus accidents in India, Bangladesh, Egypt and
Indonesia that must have resulted in many tens of fatalities each. They were not recorded in
the local media.
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frequently, the response from the general public, the local media and local
authorities is unlikely to be much more than a shrug of the shoulders. 269
The death rate arising from bus accidents is also considered likely to be
significantly higher than from ferry accidents but official global statistics as
collated by Numberwatch, in Figure 1.4. in Chapter 1, do not show that. 270
Those statistics tend not to distinguish between buses, trucks and cars.

4.1.4. Available rail and bus statistics appear erroneous.
Indeed, that table shows that rail and bus travel are considerably safer than
travel by ferry or even by aircraft. In the case of bus travel that seems most
unlikely and, from his own observation, the author strongly refutes those
figures.
There are, self-evidently, many more buses than ferries in the world and they
suffer from many of the same problems. They are: unroadworthy vehicles;
poor lookout; overloading; general negligence; poor accident recovery
responses; and, poor driving skills. These accord precisely with the main
causes of ferry fatalities. While it is impossible to accurately estimate the
numbers of either passenger vessels or buses operating globally, the author
estimates from personal observation that there would be at least three times
as many buses as ferries. Therefore the Numberwatch figures seem very
unlikely to be accurate.
Bus travel in the developing world is not for the faint hearted. It is a Hobbesian
activity in which life is likely to be “… nasty, brutish and short”.271

4.1.5. Comparisons restricted to car, oil tanker and aviation
sectors.
So, for the purposes of this study, comparisons and benchmarking have been
restricted to the car, oil tanker and aviation sectors where the statistics appear
to be far more accurate and useful. They also, especially in the developed
world, show the distinctly improving trends of the past forty years. The tried
and proven techniques that led to those improving trends appear to mostly be
quite readily and economically adapted to the ferry industry. For the purposes
of this work, then, the statistics covering road travel will generally be restricted
to car travel in the developed world. They remain useful, however, because
they illustrate how various behavioural and technological improvements have
contributed to a marked decline in road fatalities in most developed countries.
For aviation the very useful and complete statistics provided by the
International Civil Aviation Organisation, Boeing Corporation and
269

Personal observation by the author. In Bangladesh there were numerous examples.
During a two hour drive through the countryside outside Dhaka in late 1978 at least six
wrecked buses were observed.
270
Numberwatch, Op cit.
271
Hobbes, T. Leviathan, J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1973.
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www.aviation-safety.net have been extensively referred to.272 The ICAO has
shown conclusively that a global approach where “no country is left behind”
can be very effective.273 A process of encouragement, assistance, benchmarking, propaganda and, when necessary, enforcement by banning, has led
to significant world-wide improvements in civil aviation safety.
ICAO, however, is not afraid to „name and shame‟ individual countries or even
airlines when it believes their safety procedures are unsatisfactory. For
example, Thailand was “red-flagged” in 2015 and took ICAO‟s criticisms very
seriously. The Thai Government took strong, effective and immediate action
to rectify the problems pointed out by ICAO. It would presumably do likewise if
IMO were to publicly shame it about its unsafe ferries and tourist boats.
Other, more permanent, defaulters have been Angola, Botswana, DR Congo,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malawi,
Nepal, Sierra Leone and Uruguay. They have all required extensive ongoing
attention from ICAO.274 Notably, three of them also have very poor ferry safety
records. Aviation is still far from perfect, particularly in much of Africa and the
former Soviet Union, but it has shown very significant improvement over the
past three decades. It is now the safest transport mode by a considerable
margin.
IMO, impressively, worked very effectively in conjunction with INTERTANKO,
the oil tanker industry equivalent of INTERFERRY, to dramatically reduce the
number and consequences of oil tanker accidents.275 That development was
largely inspired by the marine pollution that followed the groundings of the
Torrey Canyon in 1967 and the Exxon Valdez in 1989. It is notable that IMO
appeared to be more interested in the problems of oil pollution that followed
tanker accidents than in their human consequences or, indeed, in the fatalities
arising from ferry accidents. However, the co-operation between IMO and
INTERTANKO showed the potential for significant safety improvement that
could be achieved with similar co-operation between ferry owners and IMO
with the ferry industry.
An interesting commentary on the paucity of useful statistics on the safety of
various modes of travel and the difficulty in comparing the safety or risks
inherent in each mode was published on the blog www.artchester.net by
Arthur Chester.276 Mr Chester asserts that:
Data on travel fatalities are noteworthy for their lack of completeness. He says
that, In the U.S. and other industrialized countries, aircraft accidents are
272

Aviation Safety Network presents some very clear and up-to-date data on its website.
www.aviation-safety.net.
273
International Civil Aviation Authority, in www.icao.int/about-icao, Montreal, 2015. It
provides excellent, detailed, timely and very extensive data.
274
Cripps, K. Thailand „red-flagged‟ for aviation safety concerns, CNN, Atlanta, 19 June 2015.
www.edition.cnn.com/2015/06/19/travel/thailand
275
Refer to Introduction, Legal affairs, IMO, London, 2017,
www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Pages/Default.aspx/.
276
Chester, A. Travel Fatalities by Car, Air & Ship, in www.artchester.net, USA, 6 September
2015.
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thoroughly investigated and documented, and motor vehicle accidents are
almost as well reported. However, many countries are inconsistent about
collecting and reporting their data. Foreign air travel fatalities in particular are
often under-reported. A similar situation holds for cruise ships, with the
additional complication that almost all cruise ships are registered in countries
that rely primarily on voluntary reporting by the cruise lines.277
This was discussed at length in Chapter 2, but, allowing for those statistical
deficiencies, there is sufficient information available about global aviation, oil
tanker and developed country car accidents to enable worthwhile
comparisons to be made with the risks associated with ferry travel. Despite Mr
Chester‟s comments, the author has found that cruise ship accidents are
comparatively well recorded. They do, after all, mainly affect developed
country passengers. The less accurate, and more limited, information about
fatal ferry accidents that is available is far more useful than no information. It
does facilitate the illustration of quite clear trends that enable lessons to be
drawn from successful improvement initiatives that have been made in those
other modes and which are adaptable to ferry travel.

4.2.1. Aviation presents a particularly relevant and useful
model.
The aviation industry, particularly, presents a useful, and undoubtedly the best
documented, model for improvement of ferry industry safety. Apart from
organic internal industry improvement, there has been considerable
internationally driven improvement thanks to the encouragement of ICAO. Its
contribution, influence and performance have put those of IMO to shame.
Many national authorities, working in conjunction with ICAO, particularly in
Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and the UAE have also made significant contributions to
improvements in aviation safety both domestically and to poorer neighbouring
countries in their wider regions.278 ICAO clearly appears to deliberately play
an assisting, cooperative and supportive leadership role with its member
nations. That role seems to have generally eluded IMO despite their largely
similar mandates and mission statements.
Indeed, ICAO states in its mission statement, as published on its website, that
its mission is: “To serve as the global forum of States for international civil
aviation. ICAO develops policies and standards, undertakes compliance
audits, performs studies and analyses, provides assistance and builds
aviation capacity through many other activities and the cooperation of its
Member States and stakeholders” (note the final seven words in bold).279

277

In other words, they are registered in tax havens and under “flags of convenience” such as
Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands and Marshall Islands, among others.
278
For details of the worst ten aviation accidents, refer to www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/traveltruths/the-deadliest-aviation-plane-crashes-disasters-in-history/.
279
Refer to www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/vision-and-mission/.
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IMO, however, surrounds its mission statement with more legalistic „escape‟
words. It states that its mission: “…is to promote safe, secure, environmentally
sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will be
accomplished by adopting the highest practicable standards of maritime
safety and security, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of
pollution from ships, as well as through consideration of the related legal
matters and effective implementation of IMO‟s instruments with a view to their
universal and uniform application”.280
Both organisations are mandated to improve safety on an international basis.
Neither body, as international subsidiary organisations of the United Nations,
has a mandate to interfere with domestic matters. However, while ICAO
seems to interpret its mission as it being required to work globally „with‟ its
member nations to assist and support them to improve safety on both
international and domestic flights, IMO interprets its mandated role quite
differently and more literally. IMO, in its rigid adherence to its „noninterference in domestic matters‟ policy, evinces no apparent interest in
adopting the same kind of leadership role that ICAO carries out so effectively.
It largely restricts its mission to international voyages although even those
tend be ignored by IMO if, for example, they occur in Africa as in the case of
Le Joola.281 The difference between the two bodies, then, is clearly one of
interpretation and approach.
Annual numbers of passenger aircraft accidents, too, are rather more
comparable with ferry accidents although the latter tend to have much greater
numbers of fatalities per accident, as can be seen in Table 4.1, below. The
world‟s worst ever aviation accident, for example, involved a collision between
two Boeing 747 aircraft at Tenerife airport on 27 March 1977.282 That resulted
in 583 fatalities. Indeed, even the combined total of fatalities from the world‟s
ten worst aviation accidents at 3,561 is far fewer than the 4,386 deaths arising
from the one ferry collision involving the Dona Paz in the Philippines Sibuyan
Sea in 1987.283
Most importantly, annual fatal airliner accidents have reduced from 100 in
1949 to 18 in 2015 in a steady progression.284 In 2017 there were no fatal jet
airliner accidents.285 This has been achieved against the background of a
dramatic increase in the number of flights over the same period.286
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Refer to www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryofIMO/Pages/Default/.
Refer to 3.17.
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www.planecrashinfo.com and www.edition.cnn.com/2014/03/08/travel.
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See 3.8. for case study.
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See Fatal Airliner Accidents Per Year 1946 -2016 at www.aviationsafety.net/graphics/infographics/
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See www.airlineratings.com.
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4.2.2. ICAO accident database is an excellent guide.
The author has been unable to find any comprehensive list of accidents and
fatalities kept by IMO, even though its GISIS (Global Integrated Shipping
Information System) database is claimed to perform that function, that is
comparable with that of Aviation Safety Net.287 Nor has he been able to find a
„naming and shaming‟ list comparable with that published by ICAO. It is
incomprehensible that IMO has not even been able to achieve either of those
despite its spurious, negligent and unimpressive claim to be, “…unable to
interfere in the internal affairs of our sovereign Member States”.288
Those Member State governments and IMO should start to emulate ICAO and
its member states and learn how to effectively “Regulate, educate, encourage
and enforce” better behaviour. Establishing a comprehensive database
recording accidents would provide a useful foundation for such action.

Image 4.3. Aviation accidents, while very rare, tend to result in large numbers
of fatalities because, obviously, of the speeds at which they usually occur.
They also attract considerable publicity. This was the crash of an Air Asia
Boeing 777 at San Francisco airport. It actually resulted in very few fatalities
and was attributed to pilot error (www.incolors.club.com).
IMO did promulgate its Casualty Investigation Code (Code of International
Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a
Marine Casualty or Marine Incident) on 1 January 2010.289 This became
mandatory from 1 January 2016.290 However, to date, more than seven years
later, the author has been unable to find any evidence of the CIC Code being
followed except in western developed countries where it was happening
anyway. The only known exception is the excellent Rabaul Queen inquiry
conducted for the Government of Papua New Guinea which is described in
Chapter 3.

287

Examine and compare GISIS at www.imo.org.
Hon. William O‟Neil, Various discussions with the author. London, 1998-2002.
289
IMO, Casualty Investigation Code, London, 2010.
290
Detailed in IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS), www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/.
288

114

Regrettably, IMO has failed to publish an annual report for its Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) since 1996.291 This compares with ICAO which published
its 2016 ICAO Safety Report during 2016. It incorporates data current to the
end of 2015.292

4.3.1. Aviation safety statistics.
Aviation accidents by their comparative rarity and spectacular nature tend to
attract considerable public interest and, inevitably therefore, media coverage.
Hence, apart, perhaps, from in the Soviet Union and China of more than two
decades ago, the vast majority of aviation accidents have been recorded and
generally well reported. ICAO has published extensive and detailed statistics
on the subject and maintains a useful database of accidents with details of
their causes and lessons to be learnt from them.293
ICAO divides the world into six regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America
and the Caribbean, North America and, Oceania. It presents accident
statistics in the fields of: Traffic, Number of accidents, Rate or number of
accidents per million departures and, number of fatal accidents. Interestingly,
in ICAO‟s 2011 edition of its State of Global Aviation Safety report, Asia was
the region with the lowest rate of accidents per million departures.294 Africa
was more than five times as bad.
ICAO also, usefully, compares accidents with traffic distribution and, here,
Africa also performs worst. As always with regional comparisons, there are
peculiarities that should be noted and allowed for. For example, Oceania
includes New Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya. Of those
New Zealand and Australia have excellent safety records which are distorted
by the appalling records of PNG and Indonesian Irian Jaya.295

4.3.2. ICAO actively encourages safety intelligence gathering.
IMO, regrettably, does not.
ICAO has been encouragingly proactive in promoting and initiating safety
intelligence and in 2010 “…initiated a risk-assessment approach to enhance
aviation safety based on safety intelligence”.296 It explains that it “…
accomplishes its objectives in this regard through identification and analysis of
heterogeneous data sources, such as:
*Accident statistics.
*USOAP Audit results.
*Economic indicators.
*Traffic volume and traffic growth.
291
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*Traffic distribution factors, including the proportion of flights flown by a
State‟s Air Operator‟s Certificate (AOC) holders vs foreign operators”.
Very importantly, and in strong contrast with IMO‟s lack of initiative, it says:
“This Safety Intelligence enables the Organization to cultivate a holistic
understanding of safety issues and opportunities to assist Member States and
regional and sub-regional organizations”.
Further, ICAO has established and maintains the Integrated Safety Trend
Analysis and Reporting System (iSTARS) which is described as “… a web
based utility which combines different safety-related datasets and allows for
effective and integrated safety analysis”. It also, in partnership with
EUROCONTROL, maintains SKYbrary, an electronic repository of safety
information which is made available to users world-wide and includes
information sourced from across the wider aviation industry. It even
incorporates information on operational issues and individual aircraft
airworthiness.297
Obviously, intelligence is imperative. It would be difficult, if not impossible to
make substantial safety improvements if you don‟t know the extent of the
problem and where, how and why it occurs. ICAO has and makes generally
available to the interested public vast amounts of information on the subject of
aviation safety. It conducts and encourages and assists other authorities to
conduct thorough and searching inquiries into aviation accidents as a very
important component of its accident prevention effort.
There are a number of other sources of aviation accident statistics such as
the Flight Safety Foundation,298 the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA),299 the NLR Air Transport Safety Institute,300 AirSafe.com,
Planecrashinfo.com, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)301 and
the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI).302 All operate in
developed countries or in regions of developed countries.
Their roles are similar but subsidiary to that of ICAO and they contribute
statistics to ICAO‟s global accumulations. They are interesting to examine in
the context of this study because they all work slightly differently and take
slightly different approaches to reach similar objectives.
Thus, the statistical reports of all the organisations have been studied in
addition to the voluminous and very informative material published by ICAO.
They make for very interesting and illuminating comparisons with the scarce
statistics available about passenger vessel accidents.
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4.4.1. Comparing 16 years of comprehensive Passenger
Airliner and „known‟ Passenger Vessel Fatality Statistics.

YEAR

Passenger Airliners
Accidents

Fatalities

Passenger Vessels
Accidents

Fatalities

2000

43

1,148

40

1,805

2001
2002

35
43

801
1,112

24
38

729
3,303

2003
2004

33
34

703
453

46
23

2,509
1,831

2005
2006

40
33

1,074
905

42
49

2,376
3,445

2007
2008

31
33

773
588

51
36

1,305
1,869

2009
2010

31
32

760
943

41
34

1,605
1,059

2011
2012

36
23

524
475

34
27

4,059
1,669

2013
2014

29
20

265
691

20
20

615
1,729

2015
Total
Average P/Annum

14
510

186
11,401

30
555

1,492
31,400

32

713

35

1,963

Average fatalities per
accident

22

56

Table 4.1. A comparison of fatal accidents involving passenger aircraft and
passenger vessels from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2015. The aviation
figures were obtained from the Flight Safety Foundation303 and the passenger
vessels from the BMPVA database.304 The author contends that the real
passenger vessel fatality numbers are about 50% higher than shown here.
Very importantly, the aviation accident and fatality statistics show a significant
downtrend over the past sixteen years by both measures. This, generally,
continues the improving trend that has been evident over more than three
decades. The current risk of dying in a commercial jet airliner accident in
almost all parts of the world is now so small as to be practically non-existent.
In theory, because ships travel at about four per cent of the speed of aircraft
and operate in two dimensions, rather than three, ferry and tourist boat travel
should be even less risky. The fact that it is not so reflects very badly on IMO,
the national and regional governments involved as well as the owners and
operators of the vessels concerned.

303
304

Flight Safety Foundation, Ibid.
Appendix A, Ibid.

117

The comparison above is obviously somewhat general but it has been made
in a very deliberate effort to compare „apples with apples‟ as far as possible.
All involved fare paying passengers and extraneous factors such as
hijackings, terrorism and people smuggling activities have been excluded. As
with so many of the statistics associated with fatal ferry accidents, it is
emphasised that the figures, while incomplete, are most likely to be very
conservative. In reality, the ferry fatalities are estimated to be as much as 50
per cent higher than shown here (See Chapter 2). Given the source of the
aviation accident figures and some cross-checking against other databases
mentioned above, it is believed that the aviation figures are distinctly more
accurate.
Aviation fatalities are in continuous downtrend but ferries, while varying from
year to year, have remained near constant when averaged over the whole
sixteen-year period since the widespread adoption of the Internet from about
1 January 2000.305 Of course, because of significant data deficiencies, it is
impossible to know accurately the trends in ferry fatalities.

Figure 4.1. Airliner accidents per 1 million flights 1977-2016 (Aviation Safety
Network).

4.4.2. Continually improving aviation safety performance.
Nevertheless, for all its deficiencies, the comparison quite clearly illustrates
important trends both in the outright comparison between passenger aircraft
and passenger vessel safety and in the continuing improvement in the safety
performance of the commercial aviation industry. Obviously and
fundamentally, thus far in the Third Millennium, it is considerably more
dangerous to travel by ferry than by commercial passenger aircraft.
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This reality raises an interesting conundrum. If it is so much more dangerous
to travel by ferry than by airliner, why has so much more research effort and
statistical and behavioural analysis been directed at airliner accidents rather
than at their ferry counterparts? Could it simply be because wealthier people
tend to travel by air and poorer ones by sea? Could it be because, unlike
aircraft manufacturers, many, but not all, ship and boat builders take very little
interest in their products after they have been delivered to their first owners
and even less when they have passed to second and third owners? Is it
because many, but again, not all, ship and boat builders tend to construct
„one-off‟ vessels and have little or no brand or reputation to protect? Or, is it
simply because, outside the more developed countries, no one really cares?
Whatever the answer, all the research effort and money directed at the study
of aviation safety provides the researcher into maritime safety with much in
the way of both ideas and “benchmarking” opportunities. It offers almost
endless ideas as to how passenger vessel safety could be improved as well
as almost innumerable proven examples as to how to do so. The large
numbers of both small and major safety improvements made by the aviation
industry and its global, regional and national regulators provide many of the
keys to making passenger vessel travel very much safer.
Despite what Mr Chester wrote above, the information gathering and analysis
undertaken globally by the aviation industry is incomparably better and more
useful in efforts to improve safety than that of any other transport sector. That
intelligence gathering effort is enhanced by the competition that exists
between the various government and commercial organisations that are
involved with it. Above all, the record of ICAO highlights what could be
achieved by IMO if it were to follow ICAO‟s example. An abundance of data
makes achieving reforms much more likely than where such data is scarce.
Even if IMO possesses similar information related to maritime safety, which is
very doubtful, it certainly fails to make it widely available. ICAO is proactive
and positive in its intelligence gathering and dissemination. Unfortunately,
IMO is not. This is one of a number of related reasons why the safety record
of aviation has improved significantly since 1980 while that of ferries,
generally, has not.

4.5.1. IMO‟s inadequate ferry safety intelligence data.
The author has examined IMO‟s GISIS database and found it lacking in useful
information. He has corresponded with Mr Lee Adamson, Head – Public
Information Services of IMO, to question that information deficiency and to
offer assistance in providing more. Mr Adamson‟s response was: “…the
problem with that idea is that it is the Member states‟ own database; we just
host it for them, We don‟t have any authority from them to add data from any
other source”.306
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Again, we return to the problem of IMO being unwilling, uninterested in or
unable to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign member states. Are
those states trying to conceal something? This also tends to confirm the fact
that the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database is the most
comprehensive and accurate available. 307
In its Secretary-General‟s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2008,
IMO defined its mandate thus, under the heading, Maritime Safety and
Security – Functions and current Activities of IMO:
MANDATE OF IMO
Since 1959, the International Maritime Organization(“IMO”), as the sole United
Nation‟s specialized agency exclusively devoted to maritime affairs, has been
providing a forum for co-operation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulations and practices relating to all kinds of shipping
engaged in international trade, facilitating the adoption of comprehensive
multilateral treaties for a wide range of technical measures and, in particular,
the adoption of the highest practicable standards, designed to enhance
safety, security and efficiency in shipping engaged in international trade.308
That very lengthy sentence encapsulates the problematic nature of IMO‟s
involvement with ferry safety. The key words are “engaged in international
trade”. The problem is that practically all (at least 93%) fatal ferry accidents
have occurred on domestic rather than international voyages. 309 Of the 681
fatal ferry accidents recorded in the BMPVA database, only 47 or fewer than
seven per cent occurred on international voyages.310
So, while IMO may well have, as it claims, 167 sovereign states as members,
it is doing very little to inform itself of the extent of the domestic ferry fatality
problem in developing countries. Nor is it doing anything constructive to
reduce or eliminate that problem. Its reluctance to collect or even evince
interest in the statistical data describing the extent and causes of developing
country domestic ferry accidents is symptomatic of a very regrettable malaise.
That, combined with a similar reluctance on the part of the national
governments of the most dangerous countries for ferry travel represents a
very significant component of the total problem.

4.5.2. Impressive, well-documented improvements in oil
tanker safety.
Distinctly contrasting with IMO‟s apparent lack of interest in domestic ferry
safety problems has been its serious, constructive and continuing efforts
aimed at improving the safety of oil tankers. Those efforts have largely been
307
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made in conjunction and co-operation with INTERTANKO, the international
tanker owners association as well as flag and port states. Given the heading
of its background paper on Maritime safety/Oil Tankers, Tanker safety –
preventing accidental pollution, it could well be asked if IMO‟s focus is more
on oil pollution prevention than on ferry fatality prevention, on pollution rather
than people?311
The measures described in that document are thorough, detailed and have
been very widely and effectively implemented in co-operation with industry,
flag and port states. They have led to a remarkable reduction in both tanker
accidents and their resulting pollution since the early 1980s.312 Despite the
numbers of oil tankers more than doubling from 1970 until 2007, the number
of oil spills annually reduced from 120 at their peak in 1974 to fewer than ten
in 2007, a 93% reduction.313

Figure 4.2. Reduction in numbers of marine oil spills from tankers compared
with the number of tankers in service (from www.worldoceanreview.com/
ITOPF/Fernresearch).
This was achieved through a concerted campaign of awareness, education,
training, vessel design and construction improvement, procedural
improvement, regulation and rigorous enforcement and punishment. It was
obviously very effective and provides another proven template for the kinds of
measures that would significantly improve ferry safety.314
311
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A useful comment on this success was made in an article Statistical analysis
of ship accidents and review of safety level.315 The authors stated: “A
remarkable example in this respect is the improvement of safety of tanker
operations after year 1990…the introduction of new regulations and
guidelines, of safety codes and improved crew training schemes which all
contributed to a drastic reduction of accident frequencies thereafter…” This
was very well illustrated using a graph showing a “Timeline of navigational
accident rates vs. Introduced international maritime regulations, safety
guidelines and codes”.
Ironically, perhaps, but tellingly, IMO‟s GISIS database contains considerably
more comprehensive data on oil tanker spills than on ferry accidents.
INTERTANKO also has a very comprehensive database on the subject that
has been used very effectively in the promotion of tanker accident
reduction.316 It must be asked, then, that if IMO has been so successful in its
campaign to prevent pollution from oil tankers, why it has been so dilatory in
its efforts to improve ferry safety?

4.6.1. Useful road safety statistics in the developed world.
Obviously, road safety statistics must be kept in perspective. There are
hundreds of millions more road vehicles in existence than there are aircraft or
commercial vessels, particularly ferries. The exact numbers are impossible to
calculate, except in the case of aircraft, but the relativities are common
knowledge. So, it is only possible, practically, for the purpose of this thesis, to
use the road accident figures from developed countries. In most less
developed countries such figures are not compiled comprehensively if they
are kept at all.
Ironically, however, Ralph Nader in his seminal Unsafe at Any Speed,
published in 1965 complained of the paucity of road accident statistics
available at that time.317 His very timely and influential work strongly criticised
the approach to safety of the American car industry and its regulators. It
undoubtedly led to very significant improvements in road safety that
commenced with the compiling of significantly more comprehensive, focused
and useful data in the developed countries at least.
The developed country statistics, then, especially the trends that they reveal,
are useful. Mostly that is because they highlight the successes and failures of
the various international, national and regional road safety enhancement
campaigns that have been attempted over the past half-century. In most
developed countries those campaigns have been notably successful overall.
Transport Canada, Ottawa, 22 December 2015, www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/infosheetsmenu-7673/.
315
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Despite rapidly and significantly increasing numbers of vehicles, the absolute
numbers of accidents, injuries and fatalities have declined and continue to
decline substantially.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
World Health Organisation (WHO) and many national governments produce
excellent statistics recording what has happened in developed countries. Less
developed countries are less forthcoming but a useful global comparison
utilising WHO statistics is shown in Appendix B.318

4.6.2. Data shows effectiveness of „carrot and stick‟ approach.
Those successes provide us, in addition to those achieved by the aviation
industry and oil tanker sector, with proven techniques and accurate
benchmarks that can be applied directly to the passenger vessel industry.
They have incorporated both “carrot and stick” approaches in that vehicle
drivers, tanker captains and air pilots are encouraged through educational and
propaganda programmes to behave sensibly. On the other hand, a system of
penalties for bad behaviour, usually in the form of fines, loss of licence or
even imprisonment, has been applied to remind such people of their
responsibilities.
For vehicle drivers, for example, the improvements have started with better
driver education and stricter licensing requirements. Stringent drink and drug
driving regulations are applied with frequent spot checks carried out. Speed
limits are rigorously enforced as are rules banning the use of mobile
telephones while driving. Vehicles above specified ages are checked for
roadworthiness. Drivers and passengers are required to wear seatbelts at all
times.
The comparable aviation regulations are even more stringent and more
rigorously applied. Pilots are required to be regularly checked for health and
fitness, as are the aircraft they command checked carefully for
airworthiness.319 Much the same, as described in the above mentioned IMO
publication Tanker safety, applies to oil tankers and their captains.320
At the same time, the structural, operational, fire and evacuation safety of
aircraft and road vehicles has been improved significantly. Seat belts were
required to be fitted to vehicles in most countries during the 1960s and 1970s.
Predicted crumple rate structures were introduced soon after. Then came
much-improved tyres, brakes and suspensions to the point that during the
1980s and beyond, vehicle safety became a major selling point. Vehicle
manufacturers started to compete on the safety of their products more even
than on their appearance or performance. In the 1990s air-bags, then multiple
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air-bags, became compulsory as did anti-skid braking systems and much
more.321
Another important contributor to improved road safety in developed countries
has been the significant improvements in the roads themselves in terms of
width, surfaces, curvature and banking. Road infrastructure such as lighting,
signage and safety barriers has also been substantially improved. Similarly,
air traffic control technology and procedures are continually being
improved.322 It could also be fairly claimed that marine weather forecasting
has become impressively accurate and timely.
These kinds of structural, equipment, infrastructural and operational
improvements and requirements obviously still have a long way to go in the
ferry industry, particularly in developing countries, but at least the aviation, oil
tanker and road sectors have set an obvious course for it to follow. They have
all contributed to a very significant reduction in the road accident and fatality
rates in more developed countries as the statistics presented below clearly
show.
The psychology profession has devoted considerable study to these aspects
of human behaviour that could, presumably, be adapted to ferry operations.
Its analysis and approaches to primary, secondary and tertiary aspects of
safety are well described in The Oxford Handbook of Prevention in
Counselling Psychology.323
The road safety equivalent of ICAO is IRTAD, the International Traffic Safety
Data and Analysis Group. It is a permanent working group of the Joint
Transport Research Centre of the OECD and the International Transport
Forum. Its influence clearly illustrates the imperative of having high quality
data and statistics as the basis of any campaign or movement to change
human behaviour. There is an obvious need for an IRTAD for the global
passenger vessel industry.
The IRTAD/International Transport Forum “Road Safety Annual Report 2015”
offers considerable encouragement to this thesis.324 The first paragraph of its
Executive Summary states: “ The number of road fatalities declined by 42%
overall between 2000 and 2013 in the 32 countries in the International Road
Traffic and Accident Database (IRTAD) for which data are consistently
available”.325
It continued: “The IRTAD countries with the lowest road mortality rates are
located in Europe: Sweden and the United Kingdom recorded fewer than
three fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013”. However, it noted, more
321

Described in www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_traffic/strategies/en/.
Details in ICAO, 2011 State of Global Aviation Safety, Ibid.
323
At page 149, in particular, Vera, E. M. et al. The Oxford Handbook of Prevention in
Counseling Psychology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2012.
324
Wegman, F, et al. Road Safety Annual Report 2015, International Transport Forum and
International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group of the OECD, Paris, 2015.
325
Ibid. P. 11.
322

124

depressingly, that: “Also, road crash fatalities in IRTAD countries only
represent a small share (6%) of the 1.3 million global road deaths. A full 90%
of casualties occur in low and middle-income countries”. A very similar
situation to that prevailing with ferries except, of course, that there are about
400 times as many road crash fatalities as ferry fatalities. Indeed, traffic
accidents kill more people each day than do passenger vessel accidents in a
year.
As shown earlier in this presentation with passenger vessels, however, IRTAD
is well aware that reporting rates in various countries are not equal. Indeed, it
went to considerable trouble to try to understand the extent of that problem in
a study conducted in 2007. The findings of that study were published in an
IRTAD Special Report, Underreporting of Road Traffic Casualties that was
released by the OECD in June 2007.326 It is a most interesting report that
recognises and offers some solutions to the problems of data collection
described in Chapter 2.
As mentioned above, the WHO has compiled an illuminating list of countries
by traffic-related death rate which compares the road traffic accident fatality
statistics for all the UN member states. Too long to reproduce here, it is
incorporated as Appendix B.327 It compares road fatalities per 100,000
inhabitants per year; road fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles; road fatalities
per 1 billion vehicle-km; and, total fatalities latest year.
It shows some interesting disparities. For example: Only one per cent of the
world‟s registered cars produce 16% of the world‟s road traffic deaths. A
quarter of the world‟s road traffic deaths occur among motorcyclists (23%),
pedestrians (22%) and cyclists (5%) with 31% among car occupants and the
remaining 19% unspecified.
The risk of dying as a result of a road traffic injury is highest in the African
region (An increasing annual rate of 26.6 per 100,000 population), and lowest
in the European region (A decreasing annual rate of 9.3 per 100,000
population). Such figures coincide remarkably with the geographic analysis of
passenger vessel fatalities in Chapter 2.
The Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional
Development has presented the OECD statistics in a useful format.328 It
compares the annual road deaths per 100,000 population of OECD nations
and Australian states and territories and illustrates the disparities that exist
within even a relatively homogenous and wealthy federation, albeit with a
wide geographical, cultural and climatic spread and varying road regulations
and enforcement efforts (See Graph 4.1. below).
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The OECD median number of road deaths per 100,000 population per annum
is five (See Graph 4.1 below) but the comparable figures for Bangladesh are
13.6, D.R. Congo is 33.2, Indonesia is 15.3, Philippines is 10.5, and Tanzania
is 32.9.329 Obviously, those developing countries have far fewer vehicles per
head of population than do OECD member countries. So, let us compare
those countries on the basis of fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles. Australia
is roughly in the middle of the OECD range in terms of annual road fatalities
per 100,000 motor vehicles. Its figure on that measure is 7.3. Comparing
Australia with our five developing countries that are most dangerous for ferry
travel, we have figures of 1,020.6 for Bangladesh, 6,405.4 for D.R. Congo,
36.7 for Indonesia, 135 for The Philippines, and 1,073.7 for Tanzania. 330
These figures, particularly for the African countries and Bangladesh are
frightening and serve to highlight the cultural and resulting behavioural
differences between such developing countries and the developed member
countries of the OECD. Their road fatality records, while much higher, are
roughly proportional to their passenger vessel fatalities as compared with
developed countries. Their approaches to road safety culture and maritime
safety culture are distressingly similar.
As can be seen below, most of the OECD nations have achieved impressive
success in reducing their road tolls. They have developed many proven
techniques that enable them to do so. Many of those are not necessarily
costly. Why then, if so many people in developing countries can afford to buy
and operate vehicles, is their safety record so appalling?331 Why can they not
apply those same simple, low cost techniques to reducing the horrifying
fatality rates in their countries?
The same question can well be asked of ferry and tourist boat owners in those
same countries. This dichotomy between rich and poor countries exposes a
cultural or attitudinal problem that appears to be more significant than simply
the rather more obvious problem of poverty and its resultant malnutrition. It
will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.
Such data, combined with the WHO statistics in Appendix B, confirm the
problem of traffic accident fatalities in poorer countries that essentially parallel
those of ferry accidents in the same countries. More encouraging figures
come, again from the OECD, which show the strong but steady decline in
road accident fatalities in a selection of nine developed nations.332
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4.6.3. Road Deaths per 100,000 population 2013 OECD nations
and Australian states/territories.

Graph 4.1. Road deaths per 100,000 population – OECD nations and
Australian states and territories 2013 (OECD/Australian Government
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development).
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4.6.4. Decline in Road Accident Fatalities 1970-2014
Selected OECD Member Nations.

Graphs 4.2. Steady reduction in road accident fatalities per million inhabitants
from 1970 to 2014 in nine developed OECD member nations (OECD).
Clearly, these nine developed countries have made impressive improvements
over the 45 year period shown. They show what a relentlessly applied effort
can achieve. Most have seen their road accident fatality numbers decline by
around 80 per cent over that period. Between 2004 and 2013, for example,
the OECD median rate fell by 51.6 per cent.333 The rates and degree of
improvement are similar although the starting points were quite different.
While it has certainly improved, the United States stands out as being far
worse than its developed country peers. Its road accident fatalities per million
inhabitants rate is almost exactly double that of France, for example. The
reasons for that will be examined in Chapter 5 where cultural factors are
described.

4.7. Aviation, oil tanker and road safety successes provide
grounds for optimism.
Overall, though, and despite one or two exceptions, the declining trends in
road accident fatality numbers in developed countries are very encouraging.
They provide a basis for optimism such that if similar techniques and
approaches were to be applied to domestic ferry operations in developing
countries, worthwhile reductions in the numbers of both accidents and
fatalities could be achieved.
333
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So, too, do the very significant reductions in oil tanker pollution incidents
globally which, encouragingly, have involved a significant IMO contribution.
Aviation safety successes provide even greater grounds for optimism because
they have been achieved on a practically global basis. They are also more
similar to ferries in an operational sense than are private car or taxi travel, if
only because each aircraft or ferry tends to carry many more passengers than
a car.
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Chapter 5
Behavioural, cultural, economic, educational and geographic
factors
It is clear that poverty and its resulting malnutrition are the most
significant over-riding contributing factors in domestic ferry
accidents and the fatalities that arise from them
5.1.0. Economic considerations.
5.1.1. Poverty, the over-riding factor.
It is clear that poverty and its resultant malnutrition are the most significant
contributing factors in ferry accidents and the fatalities that arise from them. The five
nations with the highest fatality rates are all comparatively poor and have performed
consistently badly from 1966 to 2015 with 60 per cent of the world‟s known fatalities.
They have shown a very slight relative improvement in the most recent sixteen-year
period when they produced 59 per cent of the known fatalities.334
Obviously, none of those five countries: Bangladesh, DR Congo, Indonesia,
Philippines and Tanzania, could be considered „developed‟ but, nor are they at the
absolute bottom of the World Bank‟s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
rankings. Indeed, with GDP per capita figures in 2015 of USD 3,347 and USD 2,900
respectively, Indonesia and the Philippines must be classed as „developing‟ rather
than „undeveloped‟ or „least developed‟ countries where the per capita GDP was less
than USD 955 in 2015.335 That compares with a GDP per capita of USD 35,783 in the
35 developed nations that are members of the OECD.336
Of course, by the same ranking, Bangladesh, DR Congo and Tanzania are
considerably poorer at USD 1,212, 456, and 865, respectively. DR Congo is very
much in the World Bank‟s „Low Income‟ bracket and Tanzania can only be classed as
a „least developed country‟. While Bangladesh‟s per capita income is rising rapidly at
5.3 per cent per annum, it is a country that is developing from a very low base.337
There are other nations with similarly lamentable records of ferry accident fatalities.
China, Egypt, Haiti, Senegal and Myanmar (formerly Burma) have been responsible
for a further 15 per cent of the world‟s known ferry fatalities in the fifty years to
December 2015. The worst ten countries, therefore, have been responsible for more
than 76 per cent, probably 80 per cent, of the world‟s ferry fatalities over that
period.338 The worst twenty countries have been responsible for 90 per cent of
334
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fatalities over that period.339 Generally, their problems are quite similar in that they
are fundamentally economic, cultural, geographic, educational and behavioural.
Poverty and its almost inevitably resultant malnutrition, corruption and fatalism are at
its root. All are also unusually dependent on ferry transport for geographic reasons.
The Economist described the causal connection well in an April 2012 article: Social
status and health- Misery index. It summarised it that “Low social status is bad for
your health. Biologists are starting to understand why”. 340
Ironically, of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities, two of them, China and the
Philippines are among the world‟s four leading shipbuilding nations in terms of
construction gross tons.341 Bangladesh, too, has a rapidly developing shipbuilding
sector. They should be capable of designing and building safer ferries.
Myanmar has more recently become known as a very dangerous country for ferry
travel. As the nation was essentially closed under a military dictatorship for five
decades342 until 2011, very little information about ferry or other accidents was
forthcoming from 1962 until 2007. We do know that ferry accidents in Myanmar have
been responsible for 2.1 per cent of the world‟s total accidents and at least 2.6 per
cent of all ferry fatalities. However, extrapolating from the final nine years for which
we do have data, it seems likely that Myanmar would have been the scene of at least
six per cent of the world‟s ferry fatalities over the past half century343. That would
make the total percentage of fatalities occurring in the ten worst countries closer to
80 than the 76 per cent mentioned above.
Myanmar is a neighbour of and is economically, geographically and climatically, if not
culturally, similar to Bangladesh so it could be expected to have similar ferry safety
problems. It should be included in any table of the worst countries for ferry travel
despite the absence of data because of strict media controls, which prevented the
publication of „bad news‟ for most of the period studied.344
It is inconceivable that there could only have been three fatal accidents in
Burma/Myanmar from 1966 until 2007.345 This is especially so given that the same
source reveals 12 „known‟ fatal ferry accidents producing 584 fatalities in the eight
years from 2007-2015. That is an average of 1.5 accidents per annum and an
average of 49 fatalities per accident.
Adding Myanmar, allowing for the absence of news until about 2007, to the previous
worst ten countries makes it highly likely that at least 80 per cent of ferry fatalities
occurred in the ten worst performing countries. It is notable, and probably not
coincidental, that all ten of those countries spent at least some time under colonial
339
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rule. They have many other economic, cultural, social, geographic and climatic
similarities.

5.1.2. The ten worst countries for ferry fatalities.

Map 5.1. The world‟s worst ten countries for ferry fatalities. They have consistently
been the location of at least 80 per cent of the ferry fatalities over the past half
century. Their main common factors are poverty and archipelagic, lakeland or riverine
geography (Appendix A, BMPVA database).346
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5.1.3. Fatal ferry accidents by country.
Known Fatal Ferry Accidents by Country 1966-2015
Bangladesh
Philippines
Indonesia
China
DR Congo
India
Myanmar
Tanzania
Malaysia
Thailand
UK
USA
Greece
Canada
Egypt
Italy
Turkey
Brazil
Vietnam
Nigeria
Russia
Hong Kong
Australia
New Zealand
South Korea
France
Pakistan
Somalia
Uganda
Denmark
Haiti
Ireland
Japan

84
75
70
50
26
20
16
16
14
14
14
14
13
12
12
12
11
10
10
8
8
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4

Nepal
Norway
Sierra Leone
Yemen
Bahamas
Cameroon
Israel
Madagascar
Peru
PNG
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Albania
Azerbaijan
Cambodia
Guinea
Kenya
Mexico
Netherlands
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Unknown
Zambia
Bahrain
Belgium
Belize
Burundi
Cape Verde
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Costa Rica

4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Cyprus
Djibouti
Dom Republc
Estonia
French Polyn
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Guatemala
Hungary
Iran
Jordan
Kiribati
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Leeward Is.
Macedonia
Malawi
Maldives
Morocco
Panama
Romania
Sao Tome
Senegal
South Sudan
Sudan
Taiwan
Tonga
Turks/Caicos
UAE
Ukraine

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 5.1. Known Fatal Ferry Accidents by country from 1966-2015. Total 675. It is
estimated that, because of the paucity of data and even press reports prior to 2000,
these figures probably represent fewer than 66 per cent of the actual total. Since
2000 reporting has improved but with Myanmar, for example, the available statistics
from between 1966 and 2008 are neither logical nor comprehensive. Much the same
applies to China prior to about 1992. It must therefore be emphasised that the data
presented here relates only to „known‟ accidents and fatalities. It is strongly believed
that there have been a considerable number of „unknown as in un-reported or unrecorded accidents (Appendix A, Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident
database).347
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5.1.4. Ferry fatalities by country.
Known Ferry Fatalities by Country 1966-2015
Philippines
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Tanzania
DR Congo
China
Haiti
Egypt
Senegal
Myanmar
India
Nigeria
South Korea
Estonia
Brazil
Sierra Leone
Greece
Peru
Russia
Yemen
PNG
Somalia
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
Kenya
Thailand
Italy
South Sudan
Uganda
Leeward Is.
Cameroon
Nepal
Belgium

10,370
9,820
6,213
5,186
2,978
2,426
2,163
1,981
1,863
1,514
1,505
1,165
956
912
863
698
372
361
348
324
316
307
301
287
273
259
257
250
243
233
223
195
193

Madagascar
Vietnam
USA
Denmark
Pakistan
Hong Kong
Romania
Burundi
Djibouti
Ghana
UAE
Colombia
Guinea
Albania
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Turkey
Guatemala
Tonga
UK
New Zealand
Turks/Caicos
Zambia
Sao Tome
Germany
Rwanda
Unknown
Lebanon
Dom Repub
Sudan
Comoros
Kiribati
Maldives

185
185
166
162
162
161
161
160
124
120
105
100
94
91
89
87
86
83
78
74
63
61
58
56
55
54
53
44
38
35
33
33
27

Canada
Cambodia
Cape Verde
Israel
Norway
Belize
Chile
Macedonia
Australia
Morocco
Bahamas
Laos
Ukraine
Iran
Mexico
Panama
French Polyn
Ireland
Spain
France
Malawi
Gambia
Japan
South Africa
Taiwan
Costa Rica
Hungary
Latvia
Netherlands
Sweden
Cyprus
Jordan

25
24
22
22
21
18
17
15
14
14
13
13
13
12
10
8
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
2
2
2
2
1
1

Table 5.2. Known Total Ferry Fatalities by Country 1966-2015. Total 58,764. Note: It
is estimated that because of the paucity of available data these figures represent
probably only about 66 per cent of the real total. The country proportions, though,
except for Myanmar, are considered to be considerably more accurate (Appendix A,
Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database).348
Considerable care is required when analysing these figures. For example, Estonia is
highlighted in fourteenth place as the result of just one accident with the capsize and
sinking of the conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry Estonia in 1994. By contrast,
Senegal appears to have experienced only one major accident with the capsize and
sinking of the conventional Ro-Pax ferry Le Joola in 2002. There is no evidence of
any other significant ferry accidents in Estonia but considerable anecdotal evidence
of numerous fatal accidents in Senegal.349
348
349
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5.1.5. Fewer fatalities arise from each developed country accident.
Poverty probably should not, of itself, always be accompanied by malnutrition,
fatalism, corruption, low educational standards, poor regulation and inadequate
enforcement . However, the correlation is consistently and remarkably close as Table
5.3 clearly shows. Accidents do happen in richer countries and on better maintained
and operated vessels but they happen far less frequently and their consequences are
usually far less deadly than in poor countries. As described in Chapter 7, evacuation
facilities, lifesaving equipment, SAR services and, even loading and crowd disciplines
are generally considerably superior in developed countries.
Nor are richer countries immune from corruption. The Sewol inquiry clearly describes
instances of that.350 Indeed, the BMPVA database shows that from 1966 to 2015,
24.6 per cent of fatal ferry accidents occurred in the 35 OECD member countries but
they accounted for only six per cent of the total fatalities over the same period.351
Thus, developing countries require far more urgent reform and will benefit most from
that reform. Thus, it is obvious that those countries are where the ferry accident
prevention process should commence and where international support is required
and where it will be likely to have the best results.

5.1.6. Domestic voyages are much more dangerous.
In its Safety and Shipping Review 2016, Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty, an
insurer, commented thus on passenger ship safety: “Significant concerns remain,
particularly around non-international voyages. Some Asian routes are many years
behind recognised international standards as evidenced by a number of recent ferry
losses in South East Asian waters. Frequent sailings and profit pressures mean
scheduling necessary maintenance can prove challenging”.352 The BMPVA database
confirms that. It shows that 93 per cent of ferry fatalities have occurred on domestic
voyages.353
Travel advisories published by the governments of western developed countries such
as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand give similar advice to
their citizens who are travelling abroad.354 For each of the five most dangerous
countries, that varies from: “Exercise a high degree of caution” for Indonesia, the
Philippines and Tanzania; to “Reconsider your need to travel” for Bangladesh and DR
Congo. In addition to the threats of crime, terrorism, kidnapping, traffic accidents,
disease and political violence, all warn strongly against travel by boat or ferry. They
all urge considerable caution on those who must travel on boats or ferries.
Some travel advisory websites and guide books also recommend that tourists take
great care when travelling by ferry in certain countries, most particularly the
Philippines and DR Congo. The Silent Gardens website, for example, mentions that:
“There are ferries in very good conditions (sic) and there are ships where only the
350
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352
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354
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paint prevents the rust from breaking apart”.355 The website also strongly urges its
readers to study the weather before travelling on Filipino ferries.
Obviously, those dangers are just as real for local citizens as for foreign tourists.
Indeed, they are probably more so as tourists can usually afford superior and safer
travel vehicles or vessels, if they are available, than can locals.

5.1.7. Despite poverty, potential for reform exists.
All the five worst countries are dangerous for ferry travellers, mostly for similar
reasons.356 However, probably apart from DR Congo, all have considerable potential
for reform. Notably, though, two of the worst five countries for ferry fatalities, DR
Congo and Tanzania, are also on the World Health Organisation‟s ranking of the
worst six countries for road traffic fatalities.357 Indeed, the DR Congo is the worst.
Their citizens seemingly can afford large numbers of cars to the point of considerable
congestion in their major cities.
It would seem reasonable to assume that if the national economy has developed to
the point that many citizens can afford cars, then the country should also be able to
afford to upgrade its ferries. Such upgrading is being achieved to a limited and mildly
encouraging degree in Indonesia, the Philippines, Tanzania and, even, Bangladesh,
but there is a long way to go to ensure all vessels in those countries are relatively
safe.
Of the sixth to tenth worst countries for ferry fatalities: China, Egypt, Haiti, Senegal
and Myanmar, only four can be considered to be really poor. China, obviously, should
be capable of significant and rapid domestic organic improvement. Its railway and
aviation sectors are now very safe. It is, however, still constrained mainly by the poor
country problems of corruption and cronyism as has been shown following the recent
major accident involving the Eastern/Oriental Star.358
Again, as can be seen in Table 5.3, below, all of those countries, with the obvious
exception of Haiti, are enjoying impressive rates of GDP per capita growth. They
should, therefore, be capable of self-funding worthwhile domestic reform programs
were they to be encouraged and supported rather than largely ignored by IMO.
It is suggested that if IMO were to concentrate on assisting, encouraging and
supporting the eight worst performing countries with the greatest potential for reform,
that rapid life-saving improvements could be quickly achieved. It would probably be
impractical to invest in reforms in DR Congo and Haiti until after worthwhile
improvements, such as those suggested in Chapter 10, have been achieved in the
other eight countries.
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5.2.0. Economic, educational, political and cultural comparison.
GDP Growth
50 years 2015
% pa.

UN
HDI
2015

UNDP
Education
Index 2013

1,187

1.9

0.892

0.800

616

6,116

4.7

< 955

954

4.4

0.508

616

638

1.9

0.497

35,783

1,281

1-35

1-35

6

2

0.887

0.800

Bangladesh

1,212

161

99

122

17

5.3

0.579

0.447

China

7,925

1,371

136

83

4.1

6.9

0.738

0.610

D R Congo

456

77

109

139

5

3.6

0.435

0.372

Egypt

3,615

92

111

77

3.4

4.2

0.691

0.374

Haiti

829

11

107

141

3.7

0.3

0.493

0.374

Indonesia

3,347

258

60

77

10

3.5

0.689

0.603

Myanmar

1,204

54

114

147

6.0*

0.556

0.371

Philippines

2,900

109

55

83

18

4.2

0.682

0.610

Senegal

911

15

51

52

3.2

6.5

0.494

0.368

South Korea

27,391

51

38

32

1.6

2.6

0.901

0.865

Tanzania

865

53

67

103

9

3.7

0.531

0.426

World

9,996

7,347

100

2.5

0.717

World Bank
High Income
World Bank
Low Income
Least
Developed
countries
Low Income
countries
OECD
Member
countries

GDP/per
Capita
2015

Population
Millions

39,577

Democracy
Rankings

Corruption
Ranking

% of PV
fatalities
50 years

Table 5.3. An economic, political, educational and cultural comparison of the ten
worst performing countries with the OECD countries and selected others. Note that
about 80% of the ferry fatalities occurred in just ten countries (WorldBank,359
OECD,360 Transparency International,361 United Nations Development Programme,362
World Audit.363). * Extrapolated from the figures from the final nine years.**HDI = Human
Development Index.

The focus, then, should be on Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, The
Philippines, Senegal and Tanzania. Even a fifty per cent reduction in fatalities in
those eight countries would reduce the annual global death toll by about forty per
cent. And, of course, of those, China is wealthy enough to reform itself. Its airlines
and railways have very largely managed to do so over the past two decades.

359
360

From www.data.worldbank.org/indicators/.
From www.oecd.org/about/.

361

From www.transparency.org/countries/cpi2015/.
For definition of HDI refer to www.hdr.undo.org/en/human-development-index-hdi and for UNDP
Education index, see www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/education-index/.
363
From www.worldaudit.org/corruption/.
362
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5.3.0. Geographic considerations.
As to geographic reasons why the ten worst countries perform so badly in
comparisons of passenger vessel safety. There are many other developing countries,
some with per capita GDPs that are even lower than those of the most dangerous
ten. That is where geography is a vital factor.
Examining the maps and brief descriptions of the ten countries described below, it is
obvious that they are unusually dependent on water transport. The Philippines and
Indonesia are archipelagic to an extreme with a claimed 25,000 islands between
them.364 Bangladesh is largely overlain by a massive river delta while the DR Congo
is a riverine and lakeland nation, with very few and very bad roads. Tanzania is half
surrounded by vast lakes, not to mention big rivers, as well as having major
population centres on nearby islands off its Indian Ocean coast.
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines are prone to natural disasters.
Indonesia and the Philippines are located on the Pacific „Ring of Fire‟.365 They are in
an area of considerable seismic activity with frequent volcanic eruptions, earthquakes
and tsunamis.366 The coasts of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Tanzania and the Philippines
are subject to severe tropical revolving storms, cyclones or typhoons.367 Numerous
ferry accidents have occurred during such extreme weather events although, with
reasonable skill, care and modern weather forecasting, mariners can avoid the worst
effects of typhoons or cyclones. 368 Tsunamis, however, are very unpredictable but
they have not yet been blamed for a fatal ferry accident, despite the high probability
of some having been caused by the Aceh, or Indian Ocean, tsunami of 2004.369
The five remaining countries are similarly largely dependent on ferry travel. China
has significant large river and canal systems as well as a lengthy coastline and
numerous islands. Haiti comprises half an island. Egypt sends large numbers of its
citizens across the Red Sea to work in Saudi Arabia and on the Haj pilgrimage and
has considerable ferry traffic on the River Nile and Lake Nasser. Senegal is a riverine
nation that is bisected by The Gambia, thus necessitating significant amounts of sea
and riverine travel. Myanmar has many similarities, except for religion, with
Bangladesh.
With roads and railways either impractical or essentially non-existent and air travel
generally too expensive for the greater part of their populations, ferries and other
boats have become the only economically feasible means of travel in such countries
for medium to long distances.

364
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Philippines, 7,100. These figures are supported by www.travel.nationalgeographic.com and
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365
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5.4.0. Cultural and behavioural considerations.
5.4.1. Poverty and corruption are closely related.
Poverty, it seems, is usually accompanied by an absence of democracy. That, in turn,
usually leads to commensurately high levels of corruption. All of our ten subject
countries score poorly on both measures. World Audit compares 150 nations by
measures of corruption and democracy.370 Indonesia appears at number 77 for
corruption and 60 for democracy. The Philippines is 83rd and 55th. Tanzania 103rd
and 67th, Bangladesh 122nd and 99th, and DR Congo 139th and 109th. China is 136th
and 83rd while Myanmar is 114th and 147th. Senegal, at 51st and 52nd is the best
regarded of the ten most dangerous countries for ferry travel. Their rankings are
similar, if 10 to 20 places further down the scale, in the table published by
Transparency International.371 It ranks 167 nations. Table 5.3 is revealing.
Those rankings are obviously both subjective and very debateable. Even
Transparency International, which is the most forthright of the two organisations, only
claims its index to be a “Corruption Perception Index”. The perceptions, though,
generally accord with those of the author who has travelled and conducted business
in all the countries except Senegal and the DR Congo where his son worked for six
months and reported, colourfully, back. They give a useful indication of attitudes to
public safety, regulation and enforcement.
In a recent article posted on Linkedin, maritime commentator Patrik (sic) Wheater
referred to what he complained of as a “numbers racket”. He described the expensive
problem of Port State Control corruption that affects so many internationally operating
cargo ship owners, particularly when operating in Asia and Africa. It seems that “…it
is not uncommon for a fee to be extorted at some ports „to help avoid problems‟”.
Complaints by ship owners, apparently result only in buck passing. Offering a
solution, Wheater suggests, “…we need uniformity and harmonisation. We need an
internationally agreed ship inspection and detention regime…”.372 Much the same
situation, obviously, also applies to ferry safety inspections.
A blatant example of this was described in an October 2016 report in The Australian
newspaper: “Indonesia promised a complete overhaul in the bureaucracy after five
transportation ministry officials were arrested on suspicion that they systematically
extorted sailors and shipping companies in exchange for ship and sailing permits”.373
This situation has many similarities with that pertaining to ferry safety regulation and
enforcement in all the countries described here. Again, IMO shows a similarly
unhelpful reluctance to become involved.
Another cultural problem that is rife in all the ten worst countries is that of „crony
capitalism‟ which is usually legal but which The Economist magazine describes as
happening where industries: “…involve a lot of interaction with the state, or are
370
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licensed by it…” That is obviously a factor with ferry operations in most of the
countries discussed here. The magazine publishes “The crony-capitalism index” on
which four of the ferry industry‟s ten worst countries are listed among the worst
twenty nations.374

5.4.2. So, too, are poverty and malnutrition and inadequate
education.
As described at length in Chapter 1 (1.8.1.), malnutrition is a direct result and close
relative of poverty. It has been shown to retard brain development and reduce the
capability for cognitive thinking.375 It is widely regarded as a direct cause of the
insidious fatalism that is so widespread in developing countries. These are obviously
significant factors in the more widespread inability to avoid accidents in such places.
It also handicaps the ability of those so involved to recover from accidents.376
So, too, is the generally low standard of education that is endemic in such countries.
It contributes to the inability to avoid accidents and is obviously a close relative of
retarded cognitive thinking development. Without at least elementary education, it is
very difficult to implement even the most basic of safety training.
While there is little evidence to show improvements in brain development and
cognitive thinking in the ferry sector in Bangladesh, for example, the dramatic
improvement in life expectancy in that country, described in 5.5.7., offers grounds for
some optimism there in the longer term.

5.4.3. Effects of religion and its also resulting fatalism.
In terms of religion: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Senegal and Tanzania are
predominantly Muslim with some animist, Hindu and Christian influences; the
Philippines, Haiti, and DR Congo are predominantly Christian with some Muslim
and/or animist influences.377 Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist with some Muslim
and animist minorities. A mixed group culturally. While the main religions differ, in all
the countries, except for China, the dominant religion appears to be practiced
assiduously. All, when combined with actual or relative poverty, and its resulting
malnutrition, seem to lead to a severe form of fatalism. The New Oxford English
Dictionary defines that as: “Belief in fatality; the doctrine that all events are
predetermined by fate”.378 In other words, as God or Allah wills or Karma. It seems
that fatalism is an inevitable outgrowth of poverty combined with strong religious
beliefs379.
That fatalism would appear to provide little incentive to such people to try to reduce
their potential for disaster, disease or other types of tragedy. In the Philippines and
374
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Indonesia, in particular, the author has frequently seen people praying before or soon
after boarding ferries. They would arguably be better protected in spending that time
learning the location and operating instructions for the exits and the whereabouts of
any items of lifesaving equipment fitted to the vessel.
Fatalism manifests itself in a general lack of interest or lassitude that is obvious from
the collisions and groundings that so regularly occur in developing countries. Quite
simply, very few people seem to care. The videos in Appendix F illustrate this very
starkly.380 This can also be clearly seen by the general ignorance or absence of care
about the waste, filth and „fouling of their own nests‟ that is practically universal in
such countries. The author has visited all countries discussed except for DR Congo,
Haiti and Senegal and noticed the enormous and ugly amounts of garbage that fouls
the waterways in each. This is symptomatic of the prevailing fatalism and its resulting
lassitude. In reality, however, it seems the only effective cure for fatalism is the
elimination of poverty and its resultant malnutrition.381 That, obviously, will take time.

5.4.4. Irrational passenger behaviour.
Similarly, there is a tendency in many developing countries to abnormal panic or
thoughtless mob movement in the event of an emergency. This has frequently led to
vessels capsizing and has caused major evacuation problems.382 It is not helped by
the negligence and “save themselves first” approach exhibited by some vessel
officers and crews as in the cases of Sewol and Costa Concordia.383 Both of those
accidents, it should be remembered, occurred in developed countries.
Further, passengers can sometimes urge vessel operators to act against their better
judgement and against the passengers‟ own best interests. The BMPVA database
records instances in China and Indonesia where passengers have themselves let go
mooring lines in an effort to get ferries to depart. In the cases recorded, that action
has turned out to be suicidal.384
Passengers have also been known to abuse captains and demand that they not turn
back to port in the face of obvious danger. The captain of a sister ship to the Princess
of the Orient, which sank off the Philippines in September 1998 with massive loss of
life, was roundly abused by many of his passengers when he turned back to port in
Manila in the face of the storm that contributed significantly to the sinking of the
Princess. Needless to say, those passengers rapidly changed their attitude when
they learned of the sinking.385
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5.4.5. Serially offending shipowners.
Another problem is that some ferry owning companies such as Sulpicio Lines, in the
Philippines; Rabaul Shipping, in Papua New Guinea; and Al Salam Transport in
Egypt, have been serial offenders.386 This, obviously, is a problem of inadequate
regulation or enforcement. It is, it seems, a problem in most of the countries
considered.387 A 2013 article on the Philippine news website www.thediplomat.com
described the situation in Malaysia and the Philippines with respect to both ferry and
bus travel.388
Lax enforcement ensures that many companies flaunt any regulations and continue
to operate unchecked even after major fatal accidents. Even trials of offenders have
been abandoned due to an absence of funding for prosecutions. It seems that may
have happened in August 2017 in the case of the manslaughter trial following the
Rabaul Queen inquiry.389 The BMPVA database is replete with examples of little or
no legal action following even very serious accidents.390
The ten nations discussed are not the worst in the world for poverty, disease,
inadequate education, absence of democracy, corruption, excessive faith in deities,
or extensive reliance on water transport, but all these factors are common to all
except for China. That makes them both somewhat unusual and vulnerable to
passenger vessel, particularly ferry, accidents. That combination of factors is
undoubtedly why those ten countries have been responsible for about 80 per cent of
the world‟s recorded passenger vessel fatalities over the past half century.

5.4.6. Human factors far more important than technical ones.
That combination of factors also reinforces the view that passenger vessel accidents
are far more the result of economic, educational, cultural and behavioural causes
than structural or mechanical ones. The two latter factors are discussed in detail in
Chapter 6.
A closer examination of each of the countries concerned shows how those factors
are common to each of them and much more so than in any other known country. It
also leads to the conclusion that, probably apart from the DR Congo and Haiti, each
of the ten most dangerous countries is achieving some improvements in ferry safety,
albeit disappointingly slowly. They do, however, show real potential for such
improvement if they can be encouraged and supported by external organisations
such as a re-invigorated IMO, INTERFERRY, the Worldwide Ferry Safety
Association, wealthier neighbouring nations and the classification societies.
Such external encouragement and support, while expensive, can make for
remarkable and very beneficial change. The Australian led Regional Assistance
386
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Mission to Solomon Islands was an excellent example of what can be achieved when
wealthy and benevolent neighbouring nations such as Australia and New Zealand
make a determined effort to revive a so-called „failed state‟. That 14 year and USD
2.25 billion project was impressively successful.391 It offers an encouraging and
useful model of what could be done, on a much smaller scale, to improve ferry safety
in hitherto dangerous developing countries.

391

See Pryke, J. How we fixed up a failed state, The Australian Financial Review, Fairfax Media,
Sydney, 1-2 July 2017, p.46.

143

5.5.0. Bangladesh.

Map 5.2. Bangladesh showing that a large proportion of the country is overlain on a
major river delta. Its Bay of Bengal coast is frequently battered by significant tropical
cyclones (University of Texas).

5.5.1. Geography necessitates extensive ferry travel
The major Himalayan sourced rivers, the Padma, Meghna, Brahmaputra, Ganges,
Dharla, Teesta and Jamuna, among others, flow through much of the very fertile
alluvial plains of Bangladesh as they empty, via a convoluted, island strewn, delta,
into the Bay of Bengal. They make road and railway building difficult and expensive
but they facilitate cheap “sheltered waters” ferry travel. Thus the country is a major
centre of ferry operations, probably the world‟s busiest. It has been estimated that
about 2,500 registered and the same number of unregistered ferries operate in the
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country392. Other estimates suggest there are as many as 12,000393 or even
21,000394 „motorised‟ vessels working on the country‟s rivers.
Indeed, in 2004, the Bangladesh government estimated that “…the traffic density of
the country‟s inland waterway network generates about 1.57 million passengerkilometres per route kilometre of waterway…”.395 Not coincidentally, it has been one
of the world‟s two worst countries for „known‟ ferry fatalities over the past half century.

5.5.2. Scarce official ferry accident data.
Regrettably, official data describing Bangladeshi ferry accidents is scarce to the point
of being practically non-existent. Indeed, a 2007 published paper on passenger ferry
accidents in Bangladesh claimed that: “No relevant organisation, indeed, maintains a
database of all these accidents”.396 The real situation is likely to be considerably
worse than shown in the BMPVA database.397
Other papers by some of the same authors refer to “thorough analysis of past
accident data” which shows that, “…the main causes of intact stability failures have
been determined: adverse weather conditions and overloading, likely resulting in
crowding to one side”.398 This supports comments made in Chapters 2 and 3, above.
However, this author, while agreeing with the conclusions drawn, doubts the rigour of
such analysis because of the scarcity of useful data.

5.5.3. An improving economy.
Despite its considerable actual and potential agricultural, seafood and mineral
wealth, the nation of 161 million, predominantly Muslim, inhabitants is comparatively
poor with a 2015 per capita income estimated by the World Bank at USD 1,212.
While it is generally regarded as enjoying a form of democracy, it is also perceived to
be one of the world‟s more corrupt societies at positions 99 and 122 respectively on
the Corruption Perceptions Index of democracy and corruption published by
Transparency International399. It is constitutionally secular but 83 per cent of the
population identify as Muslim with 16 per cent being Hindu.400 Malnutrition has been
a considerable problem until recently.
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5.5.4. Violent and dangerous but improving.
Bangladesh continues to suffer from religious and political violence as well as high
crime levels and a bad record of industrial and road accidents.401 Diseases such as
malaria, cholera, tuberculosis and typhoid were once rife but have been significantly
reduced.402 Occupational health and safety, it seems, is a little known concept.
Workplace accidents, particularly fires, are frequent and can be very deadly. The
coast and near coastal rivers have frequently been affected and damaged by
seasonal tropical cyclones. A number of fatal ferry accidents have been blamed on
the effects of such weather events.403 The Bangladesh coast was also affected by
the tsunami caused by the Aceh earthquake of December 2004 although only two
people were known to have died as a result of it.404
The water in the country‟s rivers and along the coast is, from the author‟s observation
and independent reports, dangerously polluted.405 That is a further danger for anyone
falling into the water following a ferry accident. Despite the pollution, large numbers
of sharks and crocodiles are known to inhabit the estuaries and coast. 406
Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 and separating from
India and, later, Pakistan, Bangladesh has suffered significant political instability
often accompanied by violence. This has not, however, prevented its energetic and
ambitious people from steadily improving their standard of living. Indeed, in the 33
years from 1980 until 2012, the life expectancy of the average Bangladeshi improved
remarkably from 49 years to 70.407
While commencing from a very low base, the country‟s GDP has grown at a rate of
5.3% from 1961 to 2015.408 The country is rapidly industrialising, starting with ship
demolition and moving through textile and clothing manufacture, electronics and now
ship building. Until recently a major source of national income has been remittances
from Bangladeshi workers in the Middle East, Malaysia and Singapore. The recent
fall in oil prices has reduced that somewhat.409
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5.5.5. Export vessels are world class, local craft much less so.

Image 5.1. Ironically, Bangladeshi shipbuilder Western Marine Shipyard has built a
number of fine vessels for export. In this case, a substantial looking littoral Ro-Pax
ferry to Denmark (WMS pic).
Rather ironically, given the deplorable safety record of its domestic ferries,
Bangladesh has exported a number of very high quality Ro-Pax ferries to Denmark
and elsewhere.410 This shows that Bangladesh, or at least some of its shipyards, are
building world-class vessels. The shipbuilding industry is expanding and the fact that
it is capable of building for export must be encouraging for the local market in the
long term.
The country has more than four thousand nautical miles of navigable waterways
although even that statistic is rarely cited consistently. That is about three times as
long as its railway system. Most of the local ferries can be observed to be elderly,
badly modified, poorly equipped and inadequately maintained. Many are unstable as
a result of illegal and unwise modifications. Worse, they are routinely very badly
overloaded.411 As described in Chapter 3, paragraph 5.5.2, above, and in the BMPVA
database any extant maritime regulations are routinely ignored and properly qualified
or even alert crew members are rare.412
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5.5.6. Few investigations, few trials, rare punishments.
When accidents do occur, there is usually little or no response from government. No
investigation. No trial. No punishments. While safety regulations do exist, they are
rarely, if ever, enforced as the information sources cited in the BMPVA database so
remorselessly record.413 Any punishments that are imposed are normally little more
than a „slap on the wrist‟.414 Search and rescue services are haphazard at best.415
The Bangladesh Government is well aware of its problem with ferry safety. It
facilitates bureaucratic inquiries into the problem and makes strong statements
condemning the activities of the perpetrators.416 Yet, seemingly, few, if any, reforms
are ever achieved. Major and minor accidents continue to occur with obscene
frequency.
Unsurprisingly, Bangladesh has, for the past half century at least, been one of the
world‟s two worst countries for ferry accident fatalities. Collisions, capsizes and
groundings are the most common causes of fatal ferry accidents in the country. 417
Two dramatic and horrifying Bangladeshi ferry accidents are shown on video in
Appendix F.418 They starkly illustrate the complete lack of interest in good
seamanship and lookout keeping that is unfortunately so prevalent in Bangladesh.

5.5.7. Considerable real potential for improvement.
However, given its rapidly increasing per capita GDP (Table 5.3.) and the existence
of at least two world class shipyards in the country, it appears to have considerable
real potential for improvement in terms of reducing its number of ferry accident
fatalities. Indeed, a handful of modern vessels are reported to have been introduced
and more are believed to be on order.419 The government of Bangladesh is known to
be importing modern ship designs for its own fleet.420 An encouraging development
indeed.
Further, given the nation‟s dramatic improvement in life expectancy thanks to the
combined efforts of the private sector and a number of NGOs, it could be hoped that
what has worked so well in the health sector could be adapted to transport.421 It
would seem to be well worthwhile at least studying Bangladesh‟s health improvement
achievements and how they were achieved.
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5.6.0. China.

Map 5.3. China has a lengthy coastline, many islands and an extensive system of
navigable rivers and canals. It is home to a very large number of ferry services, both
domestic and international (University of Texas).

5.6.1. Geography facilitates extensive ferry use.
As the map shows, a number of major river systems flow through the eastern half of
the country. They are extensively navigable and are utilised widely for both
passenger and cargo transportation. There is also an extensive network of canals. All
are heavily used, as is the coastal shipping system. There are conventional monohull
Ro-Pax ferry services across the Yellow Sea and Bo Hai Gulf and to the numerous
populated islands that dot almost the entire coastline. A number of very serious
accidents have involved such conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries many of which
have been elderly imported ships.422
422
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5.6.2. Very rapid economic development.
China, has developed very rapidly over the three decades to 2016. It has become a
comparatively wealthy country with a GDP per capita of almost USD 8,000 in
2015.423 However, it remains distinctly undemocratic and corrupt as can be seen in
Table 5.3.
The country has a significant shipbuilding industry in fact, the world‟s largest, and is a
major exporter of ships.424 That industry is supported by numerous globally respected
naval architecture and marine engineering schools. It has similarly numerous nautical
colleges that train and educate seafarers at all levels.425 It should be capable of doing
much better in terms of safety. Of course, despite its new wealth, it continues to
suffer badly from the poor country problems of corruption and cronyism.426

5.6.3. Accidents mostly involve domestic ferries.
China‟s ferry accidents have almost entirely involved domestic ferries. They have,
despite the nation‟s increasing wealth, mostly been due to all the poor country
causes described throughout this chapter. While most aspects of life in China have
improved dramatically, mainly thanks to a rapid rise in per capita GDP the country
continues to experience major fatal ferry accidents.427 The latest involved the
Eastern/Oriental Star that capsized and sank in the Yangtze River in June 2015
killing 455, mostly elderly, local people. 428
Part of the problem in assessing the Chinese ferry safety situation is that, until the
late-1980s, China was largely closed to outside news services. The local Chinese
Communist Party was unlikely to publicise deficiencies in its system. We know very
little about any of the accidents that must have occurred prior to that time. Even since
then, we know little because the Chinese government generally will not permit the
release of accident reports except in a very limited form on occasions when criminal
charges arise. It can probably be safely assumed that the real figures, particularly for
the first twenty years, will be considerably worse than shown in the BMPVA
database.429
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5.6.4. Dilapidated, deplorably crewed vessels.
Given the power of China‟s authoritarian government combined with its apparent
national desire to be seen as developed, it is particularly disappointing that the
country has been unable to noticeably improve the safety standards of its ferries.
Having travelled on many of them across large parts of the country, the author has
been unimpressed by the deplorable condition and poor crew work of most of them.
Even modern ferries are often not well maintained and the lack of concentration and
care evinced by crew members can be frightening. Most appear to be more
interested in their cigarettes than the risks of collision or fire.430 No Smoking signs are
routinely ignored by both passengers and crew personnel on vessels of all kinds.
It seems that the lack of courtesy that combines with fatalism and lack of
concentration among car and truck drivers in China has migrated to the ferry industry.
The author was once involved in four road accidents while in a taxi during one short
journey to central Beijing from the Great Wall of China. Despite its rapid rise
economically, China still exhibits many of the developing country traits of poor
maintenance, poor lookout and dangerous modification to facilitate overloading. It
has a long way to go before it reaches fully developed country standards of maritime
safety.
Even the cross-river ferries in Shanghai, which the Chinese government promotes as
a „First World‟ city are filthy and poorly maintained.431 It is apparent that corruption
leads the otherwise powerful authorities to turn a „blind eye‟ towards ferry safety
deficiencies.

5.6.5. China will likely need to be „shamed‟ into improvement.
This is particularly disappointing as Chinese railways, airlines and many bus services
are of a very high standard. Given that such high standards can and are being
achieved on land and in the air, it is disappointing that the same cannot be said about
so many of its ferry services. Even allowing for its population of more than 1.3 billion
people, China should have a much safer, cleaner and more comfortable ferry system
than it currently does. The Chinese government and private companies are capable
of doing much better. It appears, however, that it will have to be „shamed‟ into doing
so.432
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5.7.0. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo).

Map 5.4. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a very large central African
country through and around which run some major rivers including the Congo itself. It
also has some very large lakes on its eastern border (University of Texas).

5.7.1. Geography, economics and politics necessitate water travel.
As with most countries of similar name, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
neither democratic nor really a republic. In reality, for much of its history it has been
ruled by rather brutal dictatorships, both colonial and local. It remains a place of
“indiscriminate violence”433 and developed country government travel websites are
replete with warnings such as, “Reconsider your need to travel” or “Avoid nonessential travel”.434 Thanks to an ongoing state of civil war, there are large groups of
refugees in many parts of the country.
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5.7.2. Corruption “strangles” waterway transport.
DR Congo remains beset by corruption (Table 5.3) that afflicts all levels of society
from the lowest. However, as Michael Brown and Phillipe Nowala et al explain in their
2004 paper Combating Low-level Corruption on Waterways in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, while low level corruption pervades and “strangles” all
commercial activities, including waterway transport, in the country, it is “possible to
make significant reductions” in that corruption.435 Regrettably, it seems that such a
reduction has not been achieved in the intervening thirteen years.
Notwithstanding its vast mineral, rubber, palm oil and timber wealth, the DR Congo‟s
per capita GDP is, thanks largely to very high corruption levels, very low at USD 456
per annum.436 Some 70 per cent of Congolese citizens are claimed to be Christians,
10 per cent Muslim and 20 per cent nativist or animist.437 DR Congo is a large
country that requires vast distances to be covered. Internal travel is difficult and there
is only a very short coastline except along the Rift valley lakes. There are few roads
and railways. As can be seen in Table 1.5, the DRC is also the world‟s most
dangerous country for road travel. Air travel is too expensive for the vast majority of
Congolese citizens and, in any case, the country remains one of the most dangerous
places to travel by air despite the best efforts of ICAO.438

5.7.3. Water – the economical and convenient transport medium.
There are, however, some 14,000 kilometres of navigable waterways spread through
the country.439 The longest stretch of navigable water is 1,700 kilometres on the
Congo River. This makes water, for both cargo and people, the most economical and
convenient medium of transport for most people in the very large country. It is bigger
than Europe.
There is a chain of large lakes running through the Rift Valley in the eastern part of
the country as well as numerous rivers, including the Congo itself. However, many of
those rivers have numerous and dangerous rapids and waterfalls. One set of rapids
in the River Congo, near its mouth, is named the “Cauldron of Hell”, apparently very
appropriately.440 Upstream travel is limited.441 Infrastructure is sparse and made
roads and railways are rare. Both are tediously slow and subject to interference by
bandits. Malaria and yellow fever are rife throughout the country.442

435

Brown, M. et al. Combating Low-level Corruption on Waterways in the Democratic Republic of
Congo: Approaches from Bandundu and Equateur Provinces, Social Science Research Network,
Washington DC, 2004
436
Ibid.
437
World Religions, www.infoplease.com/ipa/AO855613.
438
ICAO, State of Global Aviation Safety, Ibid.
439
From Wohl, E. A World of Rivers, p. 262, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011.
440
Wohl, E, p. 253, Ibid.
441
Ibid.
442
www.our-africa.org/democratic-republic-of-congo/poverty-healthcare/.

153

5.7.4. Many ferry accidents go unreported.
Because of poor communications in much of the country, it can be assumed that
many, if not most, ferry accidents go unreported. It is therefore believed that their
number is considerably higher than shown in the BMPVA database.
“Known” fatal ferry accidents are more or less evenly spread between the Rift Valley
lakes and the rivers. Usually the river boats are considerably smaller and less
seaworthy than those navigating the lakes.443 So the numbers of deaths arising from
each accident on the lakes are usually much higher although the numbers of
accidents are fewer.444 All the usual poverty driven human error causes are cited for
practically all the accidents that occur in DR Congo with overloading being the
predominant cause.445 An abundance of crocodiles and hippopotamus in the rivers
and lakes add to the hazards that are not helped by an absence of any formal search
and rescue services. It is claimed that 170 people were “taken” by crocodiles along
one small section of the Congo River, near the capital, Kinshasa, in 2012 alone.446
Most of the river boats, called pirogues, are little more than large wooden canoes
and, even the comparatively rare larger river vessels are mostly elderly, poorly
maintained powered steel scows and barges. Their captains and crews generally
have little or no formal maritime education or training. The lake ferries tend to be
larger and were mostly pre-fabricated in northern Europe. When built, they were
undoubtedly seaworthy. However, again, they are poorly maintained and mostly
incompetently operated.447 All vessels, it seems, are commonly badly overloaded and
largely devoid of life saving equipment. River and lake travel is really only for the very
poor and very desperate.
Apart from the numerous canoes and barge or scow-like, steel built, powered or tug
pushed river boats very few significant vessels have been built in-country. There are
a few relatively modern fast ferries called Carnot Rapides that operate on the Congo
River near the nation‟s capital, Kinshasa. They are imported and tickets to ride on
them are reported to be very expensive.448

5.7.5. Water travel is still the safest and most reliable means.
While travel by water in DR Congo is extremely hazardous, it is regarded by a
leading in-bound tour company to be safer and more reliable than road, rail or air.449
Of the five worst countries for passenger vessel accident fatalities, there is little doubt
that DR Congo, a nation of 77 million desperately poor people, will be the most
difficult in which to bring about reform. As with Haiti, it seems most unlikely to be able
to be reformed in the sense of ferry safety, in the foreseeable future. It appears that
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little has changed there since Joseph Conrad wrote his novel Heart of Darkness,
which starkly describes the atmospherics of the place, in 1902.450

5.8.0. Egypt.

Map 5.5. Egypt with its lengthy Red and Mediterranean 6ea coasts, its important Nile
River and its extensive delta as well as the large, man-made Lake Nasser, has a
requirement for numerous ferry and tourist boat operations (University of Texas).
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5.8.1. Geographic, cultural and economic problems prevail.
Egypt, with its mostly Muslim population of around 92 million is, with a per capita
GDP USD 3,615 per annum in 2015, one of the wealthier of the ten nations
described here despite its history of political instability.451 It is also notably
undemocratic and corrupt as shown in Table 5.3.
However, cultural problems, not the least of which appear to be political repression,
corruption and fatalism, have ensured that it has a very poor record for ferry and
tourist boat safety. It continues to experience frequent fatal accidents. 452 The greater
number of accidents have occurred on the River Nile and Lake Nasser in mostly
small tourist vessels and river ferries. The major accidents, in terms of fatalities, have
occurred mostly in the Red Sea. They involved large, poorly modified and unstable
conventional Ro-Pax ferries that are engaged in the trade of transferring large
numbers of Egyptian workers to and from Saudi Arabia and pilgrims travelling to
Mecca for the Haj.453

5.8.2. Modified, elderly Ro-Pax ferries make matters worse.
The two worst accidents involved much-modified and elderly European conventional
Ro-Pax ferries that had stability robbing, additional decks placed above those with
which the ships had originally been designed and constructed. Neither the Salem
Express nor the Al Salam Boccaccio 98 should have been permitted to operate in
their modified condition.454 As described in Chapter 3, both ships were obviously,
even to the non-professional eye, neither stable nor seaworthy. Notably, they failed
to comply with the Stockholm Rules.455
On the River Nile, vessels seem to have routinely been significantly overloaded and
often badly mishandled. Even those owned by major international hotel companies
such as Germany‟s Kempinski Group‟s Kempinski Ganna, which caught fire in
October 2003 have not been immune from such problems.456

5.8.3. Regulation of inland waterways vessels is non-existent.
Many of the smaller vessels operating on the River Nile and Lake Nasser are simple
wooden feluccas that are traditional, lateen rigged sail powered inshore boats that
are picturesque and very attractive to tourists. They, cross river vehicular ferries and
hotel cruise boats have been involved in numerous fatal accidents. 457 It is probably
only when tourists die in such accidents that they are noticed in the outside world. It
is believed that many accidents go unreported. Most such vessels are unlicensed
and their captains and crews lack formal qualifications. Indeed, from the author‟s
451
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personal observation, many are illiterate. That would preclude them from gaining
such qualifications.

5.8.4. Crowded waterways – collisions are common.
The Nile is crowded with passenger, cargo and work boats. Collisions between them
are common. As recently as January 2016, at least seventeen people were killed
when a ferry sank in the Nile delta.458 This followed a collision in Cairo between an
unlicensed party boat/ferry and a cargo boat in July 2015 that resulted in 36
fatalities.459 As is the norm in developing countries, the local authorities profess
concern and promise to tighten regulations and enforce them more rigorously but,
soon after any accident, those good intentions are quietly forgotten.460

5.9.0. Haiti.

Map 5.6. Haiti comprises about one third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. It is
located in the tropical “Hurricane Belt” and relies extensively on water transport
around its coasts and islands and on rivers and lakes (University of Texas).
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5.9.1. Geography and poverty lead to reliance on water transport.
Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America occupies the western third of the island of
Hispaniola.461 It has a lengthy coastline and numerous rivers, lakes and islands. Its
11 million inhabitants rely on water transport for much of their movement around their
comparatively small country.
Located in the Caribbean „Hurricane Belt‟, Haiti has been badly affected by a number
of severe hurricanes over recent years.462 They and earthquakes kill large numbers
of citizens annually in a country that is not at all robust in the face of such natural
disasters. Even day-to-day sea voyages are made risky by the strong trade winds
that blow regularly through the aptly named Windward Passage that separates the
North West of the country from nearby Cuba.
This former Spanish, Dutch then French colony, gained its independence after a
devastating revolution in 1804 when it became the world‟s first nation comprising
mainly black former slaves. While technically „free‟, Haitians have continued to suffer
from poverty, natural disasters and political chaos and repression for most of the two
centuries since independence. The original indigenous Carib inhabitants were
practically wiped out in the fifty years following the Spanish settlement of the island
by Columbus in 1493. It was essentially repopulated with African slaves managed
and bred with by Spanish and, later French, masters. Finally, in the twentieth century,
Haiti spent 19 years under American administration.463
Inevitably, therefore, corruption and very restricted democracy are major handicaps
to economic progress and its concomitant safety improvements. Table 5.3 shows
Haiti at 107 in the Democracy Index and at 141 in its Corruption counterpart.
Haiti‟s major, but obviously not very lucrative, industries include mining, mainly
bauxite, and agriculture, mostly sugar, fruit and vegetables. However, it seems to
have a largely subsistence economy. Hence, despite considerable foreign aid, mainly
from the USA, the GDP per capita is only USD 829 per annum, the lowest in the
Americas. GDP growth has averaged a depressing 0.3 per cent per annum over fifty
years (See Table 5.3.). Malnutrition, it seems, is a significant problem.

5.9.2. Ferries are commonly dangerously unseaworthy.
As with most similarly impoverished countries, the vessels travelled on by the
inhabitants are commonly unseaworthy, incompetently manned and often
overloaded. Ironically, they often revel in optimistic names such as God‟s Will, Praise
the Lord and Lazarus.464 These, obviously, reflect the widespread Christian beliefs of
the inhabitants, some of whom, it seems, also practice an animist variation known as
Voodoo. Both sets of beliefs, combined with widespread malnutrition, no matter how
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they are intermingled, would appear to give rise to a strong sense of fatalism, a
common factor in most of the ten worst countries.465

5.9.3. Little real prospect of ferry safety improvement.
Given its history, its ongoing political chaos, its susceptibility to natural disasters and
its depressed economy, it would appear that Haiti has few or no prospects for
improving the safety of its passenger vessels in the short to medium term. Sadly,
therefore, like DR Congo, it appears unlikely to benefit from any international efforts
to support the implementation of such improvements in the short term. There are
many more promising places to start.

5.10.0. Indonesia.

Map 5.7. Indonesia comprises an archipelago of a claimed 17,000 islands that
necessitate considerable sea, and some river, travel for its citizens and visitors. While
its main population centres lie in the equatorial belt, it still suffers from occasional
severe monsoonal wind and weather events (University of Texas).
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5.10.1. Archipelagic geography necessitates water travel.
With 258 million people spread over 17,000 tropical islands and a comparatively fast
growing per capita Gross Domestic Product of USD 3,347, Indonesia is the third
richest of the ten worst performed countries compared. It, like its neighbouring and
similarly densely populated Philippines, is one of the fastest growing Southeast Asian
nations. Both countries would seem to have good economic and social potential for
rapid and substantial improvements in ferry safety.
As their maps make clear, both countries depend heavily on marine transport for
commerce, tourism and family contact. Apart from just their adjoining location, the
two countries are similar in many ways. They are at approximately similar levels of
development. Both are semi or near democracies and enjoy the benefits of a
relatively free press. However, as Table 5.3. clearly shows, both are still significantly
corrupt. While they both are subject to a dominant religion – Muslim in the case of
Indonesia and Roman Catholicism in the Philippines – their practice is generally
considered to be liberal.466
Indonesia is particularly rich in extractive resources: minerals, oil and gas, rubber,
palm oil, rice, timber and seafood, are the most important. Those resources are not,
however, always very efficiently or cost effectively extracted compared with more
developed countries. Industry suffers from frequent and sometimes dramatic
government policy changes.467

5.10.2. A resource rich but poorly managed nation.
Although Indonesia is rapidly becoming richer, the riches are not always well or fairly
distributed and many poor country problems remain in terms of, particularly, health
and safety. Crime, corruption, terrorism, disease, occupational safety and poor
education levels are ongoing problems. Travel safety on land, at sea and in the air
remains problematic.468 Indonesia has continued to experience serious and deadly
passenger vessel accidents right to the end of the period studied in 2015 and since
with two in the first week of 2018.469 As with Bangladesh, DR Congo and the
Philippines, developed country tourists continue to be warned on their countries‟
travel websites to avoid or at least be very careful about ferry travel.
Overloading, inadequate maintenance and untrained crews continue to blight the
Indonesian ferry industry. It would not be unfair to repeat claims made in a 1998
article in the Norwegian shipping newspaper TradeWinds that “… black market ticket
sales are reported to be rampant”.470 And that the 2,200 passenger capacity ferry
Bukit Siguntang , “… recently sailed carrying 4,800 passengers. According to the
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official (quoted), passengers should not worry as the vessel was constructed in
Germany and employs enough safety measures to face any emergency”. 471

5.10.3. Many Indonesian ferries are unsafe.
According to The Jakarta Post, “More than half the ferries sailing from Merak port in
West Java to Sumatra Island fail international safety standards…”.472 That was
published in 2003. Despite considerable support from Australia from 2007 to 2010,
during which USD 17 million was spent on the Indonesian Transport Safety
Assistance Package that focused on passenger ferries and coastal Ro-Ro ships
operating between Kupang and Rote island in West Timor, little, if any, improvement
can be discerned.473 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, Australian broadcaster Jon Faine
devoted a chapter in his book From Here To There to a voyage in that same area in
2009.The chapter is titled, very appropriately, Scary Ferry.474 It very accurately
encapsulates the dangers of ferry travel, not only in Indonesia, but in most poor,
corrupt and undisciplined countries.
Indonesia has a significant local shipbuilding industry but it is mainly focused on nonpassenger vessels except for very small ones. Its passenger fleet is very old
comprising mostly cast-offs from Japan and Korea together with a few newer, but not
new, fast ferries from Australia, Japan and Singapore.475 As can be gleaned from the
case studies in Chapter 3, too many of them still are poorly maintained and
negligently operated. The Indonesian Government implemented a regulation in 2007
that banned the purchase of foreign ships more than ten years old. It was then
estimated that more than sixty of the 167 Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessels then operating in
the country were more than 25 years old. Even the director of government owned
ASDP Indonesia Ferry doubted that “…shipping lines will be able to meet the
requirement”.476 He seems to have been completely correct. However, as can be
seen in Table 1.6. even Indonesian government owned ships have not been not
immune from fatal accidents.
In 2010 Indonesia was estimated to have 210 internal Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax ferry routes
along with eight landing craft Ro-Pax ferry routes and three routes utilising high
speed ferries.477 This estimate seems low to the author who has travelled widely in
Indonesia. Furthermore, it fails to take into account the numerous passenger-only
ferry routes utilising mostly smaller vessels especially on lakes and rivers and close
to coasts. Nor does it account for passenger only vessels operating from tourist
resort areas such as Bali and Lombok and the Thousand Island group north of
Jakarta. These disputed statistics merely highlight the lack of accurate information
that makes it difficult to determine the real extent of the Indonesian ferry safety
problem.
471
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5.10.4. IMO has tentatively tried but failed in Indonesia.
IMO, at the behest of INTERFERRY and the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association,
has made some token efforts to try to encourage improvements in ferry passenger
safety in Indonesia.478 Working with the World Bank, IMO in 2009 set itself an
ambitious goal of reducing ferry deaths by 90 per cent by 2019.479 No measurable
improvements have been perceived to date.480 Indeed, further fatal accidents have
occurred in 2016, 2017 and 2018481. Almost nine years later, at the end of 2017,
there seemed to be no hope of the goal being achieved at all. There were two fatal
ferry accidents in Indonesia in the first five days of 2018!
Similarly, Indonesia‟s road and aviation accident statistics are deplorable. Indeed, a
number of Indonesian airlines have been banned from most other countries‟ airspace
and airports. Overcrowding of aircraft and the unauthorised boarding of passengers
appears to affect both the aviation and maritime sectors. The fatal crash of a military
cargo aircraft in 2015 that killed 141 people brought this to light. Some 29 of the 141
fatalities were alleged to be illegal fare paying passengers.482
That situation is slowly improving with the assistance and support of ICAO and the
aviation departments of surrounding countries, primarily Australia and Singapore.
However, its appalling road accident record at least shows the country is becoming
wealthy enough to support a large fleet of cars.483 Presumably, that indicates there
must be sufficient money available to devote some to improving the local ferry fleet.

5.10.5. Potential for assisted improvement is evident.
Again, most of the behavioural and cultural deficiencies that cause travel accidents
remain common and widespread in Indonesia. They should gradually be eliminated
as the country‟s wealth improves. The potential for change is evident. The recent
improvements to its aviation industry and its rapidly improving health standards offer
promise of similar improvements in sea travel safety. Regrettably, however,
Indonesia continues to experience fatal ferry and tourist boat accidents that
particularly affect its tourist industry.484 It is unlikely, though, that much will be
achieved without urging and more effective support from external sources such as a
reformed and revitalised IMO as well as Australia‟s Australian Maritime Safety
Authority (AMSA) which has already provided considerable assistance in improving
Indonesia‟s Ro-Pax ferry fleet.485
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5.11.0. Myanmar (Burma).

Map 5.8. Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is located at the northern end of the
Bay of Bengal between Thailand and Bangladesh. Apart from religion and population
size, it shares many of the same cultural, geographic and economic characteristics
as Bangladesh. It has a lengthy coast, numerous offshore islands and overlays a
major river delta system (University of Texas).
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5.11.1. Politically repressed, geographically water dependent.
Myanmar, spent most of the last fifty years of its history largely cut off from the world
under the rule of a repressive and notoriously corrupt military dictatorship.486 Prior to
that it was occupied for four years as part of the Japanese Empire and spent two
centuries as a British colony.487 Until 2012, it had only experienced about six years as
a semi-democracy.
Despite its considerable mineral, timber, agricultural and oil and gas wealth, most of
the 54 million ordinary citizens of Myanmar are poor with a GDP per capita of USD
1,204 per annum as shown in Table 5.3.488 The economy is largely subsistence and
for many years was dominated by a military facilitated opium and heroin industry.
Because the country was effectively closed to the outside world for more than forty of
the fifty years studied, its rate of economic growth is unknown. It is believed to have
been negligible except for the uncounted illicit drug industry.489
The same Table shows that Myanmar stands at 114 and 147, respectively on the
Transparency International democracy and corruption perception indices. Despite
considerable reform since 2011, the country remains backward, corrupt and only
semi-democratic at best. It also suffers from significant ethnic and religious unrest.490
The media is very tightly controlled. So, it shares most of the problems of all the ten
worst performing nations for passenger vessel safety. The only real difference is that
it is the only one of the ten whose religious affiliations are predominantly Buddhist. In
all other respects, it is very similar to Bangladesh and, judging from its fatal ferry
accident record since opening somewhat to foreign media in 2007, its fatality
statistics will be similar if adjusted for their population differences and extrapolated
over the full fifty-year period studied.491

5.11.2. Geographically and climatically similar to Bangladesh.
Geographically, in particular, Myanmar is very similar to Bangladesh. It is located at
the head of the Bay of Bengal on which it has a lengthy coastline. The country is
overlain with an extensive river system, primarily the Irrawaddy, Chindwin and
Salween rivers that flow through Myanmar from the Himalayas to the deltas through
which they enter the Bay of Bengal. There are numerous populated islands along the
coast that can largely only be accessed by sea.
Climatically, Myanmar is almost entirely tropical and the coast is subject to cyclonic
storms as well as strong monsoon winds. While the coastal and low-lying areas in the
centre of the country are hot, the northern highlands and mountain areas can be
cool. Considerable rainfall ensures that floods are frequent and that the highland
rivers flow very swiftly at times. With little road or rail infrastructure but rivers that are
486
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navigable for long distances, it is unsurprising that water transport is very important,
particularly over longer distances492.

5.11.3. Ferry fatality record is likely to be far worse than reported.
Burma/Myanmar‟s effective closure from the remainder of the world from 1966 until
2006/7 meant that very little news was available from the country.493 The ruling
military dictatorship enforced rigorous censorship. Bad news, such as that reporting
on fatal ferry accidents has been hard to come by.494 Indeed, the BMPVA database
records only three fatal ferry accidents over that forty-year period. Some 667 fatalities
arose from those three “known” accidents (an average of 17 fatalities per annum) and
none of the three vessels involved was named.
Since 2007, when the once „pariah‟ state started to open to the outside world, twelve
accidents affecting named vessels and causing 584 fatalities have been recorded (an
average of 73 fatalities per annum).495 The earlier data is obviously completely
inadequate. The true figures must be considerably higher. By extrapolating from the
2007-2015 statistics, a logical case can be made for more likely figures of at least 75
accidents and 3,250 fatalities over the whole period from 1966 to 2015.

5.11.4. Myanmar remains a dangerous place for ferry travel.
A predominantly Buddhist and poverty driven fatalism completes the list of factors
that have led to Myanmar being a dangerous place for ferry travel despite its almost
overwhelming necessity for the average citizen of the country.496
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5.12.0. The Philippines.

Map 5.9. The Philippines, like Indonesia, is an archipelago comprising more than
7,000 islands. Sea travel, therefore, is practically unavoidable (University of Texas).
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5.12.1. Ferry travel unavoidable in the most archipelagic nation.
The Philippines, with its population of 109 million, increasingly better-educated
people also appears to have real potential for improvement in domestic ferry
safety.497 The country has enjoyed rapid growth in GDP per capita, albeit from a low
base. Thanks to remittances from the many Filipinos working overseas and from new
industries, such as call centres, it is becoming steadily wealthier.498 While the
collapse in oil prices in 2014 reduced the potential for Filipino employment in the
Persian Gulf Arab countries and Singapore,499 improving local economic conditions
appear to have ameliorated the detrimental effects arising from that development. 500
Despite its encouraging prospects, and significant recent improvement, it remains
one of the world‟s ten deadliest countries for passenger vessel accidents.501
However, it is, since 2000, no longer the deadliest mainly thanks to better information
becoming available about other countries. A sad dichotomy is that the Philippines is
home to about 190 maritime schools and universities providing their graduates to the
global maritime industry, yet the manning and operation of local vessels clearly
continue to be sadly lacking in skill and seamanship.502

5.12.2. Ferries remain dangerous despite recent improvements.
The Philippines, between 1995 and 2005, introduced a Domestic Shipping
Modernisation Program. It was funded by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
of Japan and administered by the Development Bank of the Philippines.503 Its
objectives were fleet modernisation/renewal and port development. Despite many
loans being made, not much seems to have been achieved except for facilitating the
sale of elderly Japanese ships into the Philippines and the sale of Japanese
earthmoving equipment for port development. Of course, it seems that most foreign
aid, particularly Japanese sourced foreign aid, is intended to benefit the donor at
least as much as the donee.
The statistics recording known ferry accidents in the Philippines are considered to
significantly underestimate the reality504. Indeed, officers of the Philippine Coast
Guard have claimed that taking smaller vessel accidents into account would increase
the numbers of fatalities by more than 100 per cent.505 A common comment is to the
effect that: “…far-flung incidents sometimes does (sic) not catch the attention of the
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national media (except where casualties are simply too many)”.506 There are some
4,800 passenger vessels registered in the Philippines of which most are motor
bancas. They operate over more than 1,700 routes.507 There are, of course, many
more passenger carrying vessels that are unregistered.

5.12.3. Fatality record is probably worse than it appears.
It must also be emphasised that, while many of the accidents in the Philippines
involve small vessels, those causing massive death tolls, while fewer in number,
without exception, involve substantial steel, usually conventional Ro-Pax, vessels.
Those, presumably, are largely crewed by graduates of those same maritime schools
and universities mentioned in 5.12.1. If so, it can only be assumed that their training
is deficient.
The ferry safety situation in the Philippines is generally similar to that applying in
neighbouring Indonesia. However, the Philippines appears to be benefiting from a
more rapid introduction of new and safer ferries that is slowly putting it ahead of
Indonesia in terms of ferry safety. These are very encouraging local initiatives that
should, through the force of competition, lead to a general improvement in the
standards of both the wider local fleet and its operators.508 The more influential local
media in the Philippines would seem to be having a positive encouraging effect on
that.

5.12.4. Fast growing tourist and ship building industries will inspire
safety improvements.
The Philippines does have an active and growing local shipbuilding industry which is
sufficiently competent to produce steel and aluminium vessels for export. Indeed, in
tonnage terms it is the world‟s fourth largest shipbuilding nation. Its shipbuilding
output includes large, high-quality cargo ships from builders such as Japanese
owned Tsuneishi,509 Korea‟s Hanjin Heavy Industries and Keppel of Singapore and
sophisticated aluminium fast ferries from Australian owned Austal,510 as well as
smaller steel and aluminium vessels from Cebu based Colorado Shipyard 511 and the
Herme Shipyard in Bataam. It should, therefore, be able to produce safe and
seaworthy vessels for the local market. So far, however, it seems that until very
recently, most deliveries of safe modern vessels for domestic operations have been
from Chinese and Japanese yards.512
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Both Indonesia and the Philippines are also noticing the economic and safety
benefits accruing from a fast growing tourist industry.513 Fatal passenger vessel
accidents involving foreign tourists can do enormous damage to a country‟s image.
Most of those seriously invested in the tourist industry in both countries are well
aware of that. They will undoubtedly work hard to ensure local ferries are world class
in terms of safety.
The considerable output from the country‟s maritime schools means that very large
numbers of Filipinos are gaining experience on the generally better run vessels
owned in developed countries. They are, through practical experience, learning the
correct, safe way to operate ships. The author has observed Filipino officers and
seamen working well and professionally on foreign flagged and owned ships. He has
talked with numerous ship owners who seem satisfied with their Filipino crews. It is to
be hoped that they will return to the Philippines to take up positions in the crews of
the newer, safer vessels that are being introduced into the country.

5.12.5. Government is well aware of the ferry safety problem.
In conjunction with the Manila based Asian Development Bank, the Philippine
Government created and published a strategic plan, Philippines: Transport Sector
Assessment, Strategy and Road Map in 2012.514 That provided a framework for a
transport infrastructure, economic and safety development plan for the period
“through” 2016. The resulting 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan (PDP),
“…envisions a „safe, secure, efficient, viable, competitive, dependable, integrated,
environmentally sustainable and people oriented Philippine transport system‟”. 515
Noble intentions but, from the author‟s observations, the improvements may be
happening but they are happening disappointingly slowly.
As with Indonesia, increasing wealth and better health and education should help to
lift the safety standards of Filipino ferries and their operators. Given some real
support and encouragement by IMO, and wealthier neighbours such as Japan,
Australia and Korea, the Philippines would seem to have considerable potential for
substantial improvement. Again, the country has an overabundance of cars to the
point of having to endure very bad traffic congestion problems. It should thus be able
to afford much better ferries.516
A significant advance has been the 2012 move by the government to amalgamate all
the formerly uncoordinated government bodies that were once responsible for
maritime matters into one, the Marine Industry Authority (MARINA) that is responsible
for the safety, competitiveness and functional performance of the Philippine maritime
industry.517 That provides hope and already some limited achievement. The PDP
does provide at least an outline map for future improvement.
The Philippines is starting to see some substantial investment in safe, modern and
economical ferries. As described in Chapters 1, 2 and 6, a local company
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Archipelago Ferry Corp owned by the Pastrana family, has introduced a substantial
fleet of “FastCat” catamaran Ro-Pax ferries that were designed by Sea Transport
Solutions in Australia and built in China by the Bonny Fair Shipbuilding group.
Notably, these inherently safe vessels are fully equipped with high-quality, modern
safety equipment and passengers are thoroughly briefed in their use. They are also
very well maintained. The company has ordered a number of similar but larger
vessels. It should be noted, however, that the company‟s MV Fastcat grounded,
without significant damage and with no injuries, on its maiden voyage while departing
Tubigon port in Bohol en route to Cebu on 16 December 2016.518 It appears that
competent masters are still scarce in the Philippines.

5.12.6. Some promising local examples of safety improvements.
It is to be hoped that the example of the Pastrana family and their competitors,
Starlite Ferries Inc,519 which is rebuilding its fleet with new conventional Ro-Pax
ferries from Japan,520 and Oceanfast Fast Ferries, which is also re-building its fleet
with modern Australian designed and locally built fast ferries,521 will be followed by
many other Filipino ferry owners. Presumably, if Philippine airline companies can
reach modern international standards, so too can their ferry companies. In 2017, the
country, in a long awaited move, banned the importation of second hand ferries of
any kind.522 It has, through MARINA, initiated numerous regulatory reforms since
2005.523 They, despite several reverses, do appear to be having a positive effect on
safety.
It should be noted, however, that despite the best of publicly professed intentions to
improve, accidents continue to happen. Indeed, Starlite Ferries‟ Starlite Atlantic sank
off Batangas in a typhoon on 26 December 2016 with the loss of at least 19 lives. 524
The author has looked closely at a Starlite owned ferry, the Starlite Pioneer, in
Caticlan port on Panay Island in February 2017. He was unimpressed. It appears to
be the worst kind of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry, bluff bowed and apparently
unstable.525
The Philippines appears to be the country most open to reform and where reform has
actually commenced driven largely by the private sector. While it has a long way to
go, it would probably be the best place to start a major ferry safety reform campaign
supported by IMO, INTERFERRY, wealthier neighbouring nations, the classification
societies, international development banks and, even some of the appropriate NGOs
which claim to want to improve the life expectancies of poorer people. On the face of
it, the Philippines has the greatest potential for the kind of rapid improvement that
518
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should encourage similar reform programmes in the other countries with bad ferry
safety records.

5.13.0. Senegal.

Map 5.10. Senegal is almost bisected by the much smaller nation of The Gambia.
The country has a long, exposed Atlantic Ocean coastline as well as numerous major
rivers, their deltas, and lakes (University of Texas).

5.13.1. Geographically and culturally vulnerable.
Remarkably, and probably erroneously, Senegal, a West African former colony of
France has achieved the notoriety of its ninth place on the „League Table‟ of
passenger vessel fatalities entirely thanks to one accident. That involved the capsize
and sinking of the grossly overloaded Le Joola off the mouth of the Gambia River
which runs through the tiny nation of The Gambia which, in turn, effectively bisects
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Senegal.526 The accident occurred in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the The
Gambia which suggests the voyage involved was an international one. That fact
should have aroused the interest of IMO but it failed to do so.

5.13.2. Ferry accident data is inadequate.
The Le Joola sinking of 26 September 2002, which killed 1,863 people, is the only
fatal accident recorded in the BMPVA database to have involved a Senegalese
vessel.527 That seems very unlikely to be correct. Despite the strong French influence
over its former colony, it remains poor and geographically dependent on ferries
thanks to its lengthy coastline and extensive river and lake systems.
Senegal, located at the far western point of Africa has a similar 500 year colonial
history to most of its neighbours. Commencing with the Portuguese in 1440, it then
came under Dutch, French, British and, finally, French colonial rule again. It became
independent in 1960. A country of some 13.5 million people, it is generally politically
stable and has been described as “quasi democratic” by BBC News in its country
profile.528 Indeed, it is widely regarded as one of the most stable and prosperous
African nations. It is multi-ethnic and secular.
Table 5.3 shows Senegal to be the most democratic and least corrupt of the ten
worst nations for ferry fatalities. It has a fast growing economy based on tourism,
fishing, agricultural products, oil and gas, fertilisers and, allegedly, manufacturing
including shipbuilding and repair. That seems as dichotomous as the absence of data
about passenger vessel accidents in the country. Much of the information gained
about Senegal from an online search is unusually contradictory. It is very difficult to
believe.

5.13.3. Rich resources, poor people.
Once primarily a slave marketing centre, Senegal, despite its strong French
connections, is about 95 per cent Sunni Muslim and about five per cent Christian.
Although its per capita GDP is growing impressively, as is so often the case in Africa,
most of the population remains very poor. Diseases, mainly malaria, dengue fever,
tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid, hepatitis and similar, are rife. Life expectancy is 60
years from birth and literacy is only about 50 per cent with females being most likely
to be illiterate. Road travel is particularly dangerous and petty crime common.
The author has been able to find few local or international media, safety agency or
government reports as to other fatal passenger vessel accidents. Indeed, those that
do exist describe accidents with small numbers of casualties while mentioning the
poor ferry safety record in the country. That reputation cannot, logically, be entirely
due to one accident.529

526

Refer to 3.17. for details.
Appendix A. Ibid.
528
The most plausible source of information about Senegal comes from www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-14093674/.
529
Appendix A, Ibid.
527

172

However, despite the absence of data, the country has a poor reputation for
passenger safety. If the photographs of Le Joola prior to its sinking, such as that
shown in Chapter 3, are any indication, gross overloading of ferries in the country
would appear to be normal behaviour. Indeed, the Australian government‟s
“Smartraveller” website warns Australians to exercise a “High degree of caution” in
Senegal and to, “Reconsider your need to travel outside Dakar (the capital)”. 530 It
also warns that: “The standard of public transport in Senegal is poor. Ferries, in
particular, are often dangerously overcrowded”. The comparable British and
Canadian websites offer similar warnings so there must be some basis for them.
Perhaps fatal ferry accidents occur so frequently in Senegal that they are not
considered newsworthy.
It can be surmised that most of the accidents involve small local vessels known as
pirogues and that they mostly kill local people. Presumably, if they were rich foreign
tourists, much more publicity would ensue. Two YouTube reports on 2013 voyages
on Ro-Pax river ferries confirm that massive overloading continues to occur.531

5.13.4. Ferry accidents mostly kill local people.
The author has seen photographs of river ferries in Senegal and neighbouring The
Gambia. They starkly confirm the Smartraveller and similar comments regarding
gross overloading. Recent reports of fatal ferry accidents during international
voyages between The Gambia and Senegal mention eight deaths in 2013 and five in
2014. On each occasion, there were Europeans among the dead.532
The case of Le Joola, putting it among the world‟s worst ferry disasters made it
internationally newsworthy, especially as a number of French citizens died in the
sinking, but the subsequent inquiry was perfunctory at best. All blame was attributed
to the ship‟s master and, since he sank with his ship, no criminal charges could be
laid.533 Again, judging from earlier photographs of the Senegalese government
owned ship, gross overloading was normal. Although two ministers were dismissed
as a result of the sinking, it seems that safety standards were, and probably remain,
very low. 534 While it does tend towards the cautious in its warnings, it appears that
the Smartraveller website has good grounds for its comments on Senegalese ferries.
Meanwhile, Le Joola was replaced in 2007 by an impressive new ship Aline Sitoe
Diatta which was built by the highly reputable German shipyard Fassmer.535 It is of
similar size to the sunken ship and was largely paid for by the German Government
and the Euro Bank. It would be interesting to learn whether or not the overloading
lesson has been learnt.
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5.14.0. Tanzania.

Map 5.11. Tanzania is surrounded by and dotted with very large lakes and rivers as
well as having three significantly populous island groups located off its coast
(University of Texas).

5.14.1. Geographically and economically vulnerable.
Tanzania, as can be seen in Table 5.3, is generally regarded as being of middle rank
among developing countries in terms of both corruption and democracy. It also has a
useful and encouraging rate of growth in GDP per capita and enjoys the benefits of a
substantial and growing tourist industry. It has significant mining and agriculture
sectors but the benefits of the growing economy are not well spread. The vast
majority of the population remain very poor.
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The country is surrounded on two sides by very large lakes and is dotted with many
others and crossed by numerous large rivers. It also has a lengthy Indian Ocean
coast off which lie three populous island groups, notably including Zanzibar and
Pemba, to the north of Dar es Salam, which are popular and historic tourist
destinations. It is a „wet‟ country that has considerable scope and need for water
transport.

5.14.2. Inadequate reporting conceals a bad safety record.
Unfortunately, though, it has a very bad record for ferry safety. Although most of its
recorded fatal ferry accidents have occurred over the past twenty years, it is among
the five worst countries in that regard. Indeed, it comes in as fourth worst.536 It is
suspected that, due to inadequate reporting of accidents prior to 1996 its real record
could well be much worse. There is no obvious or known reason why it should
suddenly have started to experience fatal passenger vessel accidents from when the
Tanzanian Government owned Bukoba sank in Lake Victoria in 1996 with massive
loss of life. 537 Perhaps the publicity arising from that accident alerted the outside
world to the dangerous reality of Tanzanian ferries.
While Tanzania remains a home for dilapidated old ferries on its lakes and coast and
most of the local accidents have involved such vessels, it has imported a number of
modern, well-equipped ferries since the mid 2000s. Illustrating the cultural and
behavioural problems pertaining to the country, even a very fine example of a
modern fast catamaran ferry the Kilimanjaro II was involved in a significant fatal
accident that killed at least 25 people and was entirely due to very bad
seamanship.538
Tanzania has a very mixed and still dynamic ethnic and religious background. The
populace includes traditional tribal Africans who practice a mix of animist and
Christian religions. Along the Indian Ocean coast ethnicity is more mixed with
Portuguese, Arab, Indian, German and English blood mixed in. The Muslim religion is
stronger there but so is Catholicism and, increasingly, evangelistic Christianity. This
seems to have led to the same kind of fatalism that is prevalent in all the other
countries where passenger vessel accidents are abnormally frequent.539
This fatalism is evident in the focus on praying before a voyage that takes
precedence over studying the safety facilities of the vessel concerned. That is if there
actually is any safety equipment on the vessel. The author has observed such
behaviour and a complete lack of interest in such items as life jackets and rafts. In
fact, on the island of Zanzibar he noted that lifejackets were very scarce and
generally regarded as a waste of time and money. Life rafts were practically invisible
except on the newest vessels.
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5.14.3. New vessel safety compromised by old operational failings.
Also obvious was the absence of any interest in keeping a good lookout, even from
high-speed vessels. The normal judgement and care required to safely berth vessels
without damage was also obviously absent. Despite the generally, but not always,
benign weather conditions applying in the region, all of the local ferries showed
numerous dents and other minor damage. Most vessels were in poor to very
dilapidated condition, even when less than twenty years old. Image 3.20 showing the
Spice Islander illustrates this phenomenon very clearly in the case of an older vessel.
As discussed in previous case studies describing other similarly developing
countries, the vast numbers of cars in the capital, Dar es Salaam, indicate that some
of Tanzania‟s growing wealth is being spread. That should mean that the country
could afford to upgrade its ferries. In fact, a trickle of modern, well-equipped ferries is
entering the country.
The Kilimanjaro II is one of them. It is both modern and well equipped. It has six near
sister-ships. However, it was once plainly the victim of very poor seamanship on the
part of its crew. Driven too fast for the conditions, it nose-dived into a sea. Twentyfive of the passengers sitting on its bow were swept overboard and, following a
botched rescue effort, they drowned.540
Normal, global standards of seamanship would have prevented the accident in the
first place and then would have ensured the recovery of many more, if not all, of the
passengers who were swept overboard. In any case, none of the passengers should
have been permitted to travel on the bow in any conditions.
Skagit, too, was comparatively modern but she had been dangerously modified and
made unstable in order to enable greater carrying capacity. She had been badly
overloaded and incompetently handled. Thus, some 293 people died when the
vessel capsized in 2012 between Zanzibar and Dar es Salam.541

5.14.4. Good reform potential once bad habits are eliminated.
Tanzania has a long way to go in terms of ferry safety but, like the other seven
promising countries mentioned above (excluding DR Congo and Haiti), and thanks to
its improving economy, it appears to have real potential for improvement. Again, such
reform is unlikely to be locally inspired or generated, even with a fast growing tourism
industry. Any reform that comes about will require support and encouragement from
IMO, European nations and, possibly, the classification societies and NGOs.

5.15.0. The ten most dangerous countries in summary.
With the probable, realistic and tragic exceptions of DR Congo and Haiti, the author
considers that the remaining eight of the worst ten countries have very real potential
for the reform of their ferry services. With the support of ICAO, those countries have
540
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generally managed to achieve significant improvements in the safety of their civil
aviation operations. Indonesia, though, is still regarded as a laggard by ICAO.542 This
has been achieved through a combination of introducing better, more modern and
safer aircraft with improvements in ground facilities, air-traffic control, and actual flight
operations.
Owing to data deficiencies, Myanmar has been included in this list but only by
extrapolating from its record since 2007.543 Given its similarities with neighbouring
Bangladesh and its appalling record over the years 2007-2015, it seems logical to
have done so. As China is economically strong enough to fund and organise its own
internal reforms, that leaves only seven nations, having real potential for reform, but
require substantial assistance to achieve it.
More positively, the economies of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar and the
Philippines are all improving.544 Those countries are steadily becoming less poor.
That should definitely assist in the improvement of their ferry safety records.
The ten worst countries combined have been responsible for at least 78 per cent,
and probably 80 per cent, of the world‟s ferry fatalities over the half-century to 2015.
It is obvious that if IMO and other supporting organisations were able to bring about
worthwhile reform in just seven of those ten countries, and encourage China to
reform itself, it would make a very significant improvement in the global ferry fatality
statistics. Haiti and DR Congo could be tackled later.
Given their apparent potential for rapid reform, it would seem logical to attempt the
Philippines first, followed by Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tanzania, Myanmar, Egypt and
Senegal, in that order.
If IMO could be persuaded to follow the example of ICAO, it seems reasonable to
expect that similar improvements could be achieved with the ferries in those
countries. First, though, IMO must be prepared to change its „mindset‟ or policy of
“not interfering in the internal matters of its sovereign member nations”. Such
activities need not represent interfering. Rather, they should be presented as
assisting, supporting and encouraging those nations to bring about much needed
reforms. What is required from IMO is leadership of the kind that ICAO has been
demonstrating for decades.
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Chapter 6
Technical factors – Mechanical, structural and design
Fewer than eight per cent of fatal ferry accidents and two
per cent of fatalities were caused by mechanical or
structural failures. Human factors are almost invariably the
cause of fatal accidents.
6.1.0. Human factors are almost invariably the cause of fatal
accidents.
6.1.1. Technical factors have caused fewer than twelve per
cent of fatal ferry accidents and two per cent of fatalities.
Human error is the real problem.
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, the majority of passenger vessel accidents
have been caused by various forms of human error. Fewer than twelve per
cent of the 750 known fatal accidents that occurred between 1966 and 2015
were caused by technical factors, pure accident, sabotage, murder or
suicide.545 Of those, fewer than eight per cent of fatal accidents resulted from
mechanical or structural failure. In terms of numbers of fatalities, the figure
was nearer two per cent.
Similar proportions apply to the 91 per cent of passenger vessels that are
ferries. Accidents attributed to non-human induced mechanical failure rarely
result in fatalities. Even if a vessel‟s engine or engines break down, or if it
catches fire, it will normally be able to be towed to a safe harbour. Such
accidents are rarely reported in the general or, even, maritime media.
Certainly, as a perusal of the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident
(BMPVA) database makes clear, fatalities have on occasion arisen from such
failures .546 However, examples of such accidents are rare. Of the 681 fatal
ferry accidents listed, only 14 or 0.2 per cent were described as resulting from
„engine failure‟ or „disintegration‟ as classified under Type of Incident. Of
those, seven, or 50 per cent, involved the disintegration of Filipino motor
bancas.547 However, all of those have ultimately been the result of poor
maintenance, inadequate design or construction or general negligence, all
human factors.
Indeed, even the capsizes of various Filipino motor bancas following the loss
of an outrigger float due to structural failure, could be construed as being due
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to human errors in their design, construction or, more likely, maintenance.
One, two or all three must surely be at fault. The disintegration of the large
motor banca Kim Nirvana, described in Chapter 1, is a good example of that.

6.1.2. Most structural or mechanical failures are due to human
error, usually inadequate maintenance.
Examining the database columns in the BMPVA database: Claimed cause;
Author assessed cause; and, Inquiry adjudication, numerous references to
„human error/unseaworthy‟ can be found.548 In almost every case, however,
the only conclusion that can be drawn from the available facts is that any of
the very few alleged mechanical or structural failings were primarily due to
some form of human error such as negligence, inadequate design, dangerous
modifications or poor maintenance.
No cases of pure mechanical or structural failure that are entirely devoid of
human influence are recorded in the BMPVA database.549 In fact, if a
spontaneous mechanical failure occurs, except in the case of motor bancas, it
is very unlikely that the vessel concerned will proceed into a catastrophic fatal
accident. Similarly, there are very few known examples of spontaneous, nonhuman induced structural failure that have led to fatal accidents. Pure
technical failure simply does not happen. It is irrelevant as a cause of
passenger vessel fatalities.
Of the fourteen cases described in 6.1.1, seven were wooden motor bancas,
one was an aluminium catamaran, one was constructed of FRP and another
of steel. The remaining four were all of wooden construction.

6.1.3. Fires, too, are primarily due to human error.
Much the same applies to fires. While the database lists numerous examples
of fires, there are none that have ignited spontaneously. All can be attributed
to human errors of either omission or commission.550 Discarded cigarette
butts have been a major cause of fires. They have been thrown onto oil or
petrol puddles, paper and plastic furnishing material, among petrol fuelled
cars and motor cycles, and into inflammable cargoes. Fires have, on rare
occasions, been caused by collisions and by fuel, particularly petrol, being
stored dangerously close to hot engines. It must be emphasised that such
incidents are very rare and that discarded cigarette butts are the major cause
of such ignition. Again, they are all, ultimately, caused by human error.
Indeed, Melbourne broadcaster Jon Faine graphically describes his concern
at such cigarette carelessness in the chapter titled Scary Ferry in his 2009
book From Here to There.551 He was horrified by the carelessness of both
passengers and crew on an Indonesian conventional Ro-Pax ferry on a
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voyage during which they routinely ignored NO SMOKING signs and, indeed,
threw smouldering cigarette butts onto an oil and petrol soaked vehicle deck.
Personal observation by the author and anecdotal comments confirm that
nothing has changed since in that regard.
The impressive and active European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has
become so concerned about the problem of fires on conventional Ro-Pax
vessels that it conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the subject. A very
clear and remarkably practical report of that inquiry: Study investigating cost
effective measures for reducing the risk from fires on ro-ro passenger ships
(FIRESAFE), was published in 2016.552 Unsurprisingly, the main and most
practical recommendation arising from that inquiry focused on the need for
better training of mariners. Perhaps that was because only two of the report‟s
eight authors were naval architects! They, presumably, would have
recommended complex and expensive engineering solutions to an essentially
human behavioural problem.
IUMI, the International Union of Marine Insurers, too, has expressed its
concern over the safety of Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessels particularly with respect to
their vulnerability to vehicle deck fires.553

6.1.4. Almost all vessels are at least adequately designed and
built.
The reality, as stated in Chapter 1, is that most vessels are at least
adequately designed and built. Putting aside human errors, even the most
basic of vessels can be navigated safely if they are operated in the manner
and in the environment for which they were designed. A competent seaman
can and one has even circumnavigated much of the globe in a log canoe.554
It is incomprehensible, therefore, that IMO should waste significant quantities
of time and money in arguing about mathematical formulae related to
tolerance for damage resulting from a hole in a hull.555 This, in fact, happened
in November 2016 during a meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee of
IMO.556 It would be far more sensible if IMO were to focus its efforts on
preventing the hull being holed in the first place.
Given the foregoing, IMO could safely assume that the vast majority of naval
architects and shipbuilders have the problems of holes in hulls well under
control. IMO, unfortunately, does appear to have a strong inclination towards
552
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trying to find expensive technical solutions to simple human problems. This
inclination appears to be fuelled by North European and Scandinavian design
consultants and naval architecture academics promoting their own, usually
complex and expensive solutions to perceived problems.557 A corporate sense
of proportion in IMO would be very welcome. It would be far better if it were to
focus its limited resources on the real causes of most safety problems. As well
as modelling itself on ICAO, it would probably be beneficial if it were to closely
examine the activities of the very impressive European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA).
Perhaps, if IMO were to focus more on its self-declared role whereby: “IMO
measures cover all aspects of international shipping – including ship design,
construction, equipment, manning, operation and disposal – to ensure that
this vital sector for (sic) remains safe, environmentally sound, energy efficient
and secure”, there would be fewer fatal ferry accidents.558

6.2.1. Conventional, monohull Ro-Pax ferries are statistically a
very significant problem.
There is one very important exception to the general rule concerning
structural and mechanical causes of accidents. That concerns the very
convenient but conceptually unseaworthy conventional monohull Roll-On–
Roll-Off (Ro-Ro) or Roll-On-Roll-Off Passenger Vehicle (Ro-Pax) ferries that
have been involved in 135 or 18 per cent of fatal ferry accidents and 25 per
cent of fatalities over the fifty years studied.559 It is estimated that around
4,000 to 6,000 conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are currently in service.
That figure includes cross-river ferries and landing craft types of all sizes.560
For the 16 years from 2000 to 2015, the monohull Ro-Pax percentage of fatal
ferry accidents reduced from 18 to 16 per cent. However the percentage of
ferry fatalities attributable to monohull Ro-Pax accidents increased
significantly from 25 to 32 per cent over that same period.561 There were a
total of 91 accidents causing 10,031 fatalities involving conventional Ro-Pax
ferries in that latter period. This is quite disproportional to the actual numbers
of such vessels in the industry.562 It is more nearly proportional to the
increasing numbers of elderly monohull Ro-Pax ferries being sold to poorer
countries.
The Ro-Pax concept developed during the Second World War when a
demand arose for large amphibious landing ships to transfer tanks, trucks and
other large vehicles directly onto beaches during seaborne invasions. Thus
557
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were Landing Ship Tanks (LST) conceived.563 They evolved into various
forms and sizes of landing craft for civilian use. Then, during the 1960s, quite
large and complex monohull Ro-Pax ferries were designed and built, initially
in Northern Europe, but soon after in North America, Japan, Korea and
Australia.564 Such expensive ships necessitated considerable investment by
the ferry industry in both vessels and their attendant infrastructure such as
berths and loading ramps.

6.2.2. Fatal conceptual flaw of conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries makes them particularly vulnerable in an accident.
Ro-Pax ferry vehicle decks and access doors, except in the case of multihulled Ro-Pax ferries, have proved to be fatal conceptual design flaws. They
have numerous vulnerabilities.565 They, as can be seen from the BMPVA
database, are made much worse by age and inadequate maintenance as well
as by stability-robbing modifications and inadequate crewing.566 They have a
significant propensity to capsize and sink following incidents such as
capsizes, groundings and fires that other vessels would normally survive.
Even the staunchest exponents of the conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry
concept in Northern Europe have had to admit that the concept has its flaws.
In its Public Final Report, the Safer EURORO “Thematic Network” based at
the University of Strathclyde‟s Ship Stability Research Centre presented a
number of suggested means by which monohull Ro-Pax ferries could be
made safer.567 In something of an EU funded case of „locking the stable door
after the horse had bolted‟, the report urged a number of professionally selfserving design and structural changes but mostly ignored the fundamental
problem of human error. Many of the recommended „improvements‟ had, in
any case, already been implemented six years previously with the introduction
of the Stockholm Rule.568
Interestingly, 60 per cent of the vessels described in the case studies of major
accidents in Chapter 3, were conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries. One of
their major flaws is that they are conceptually required to have at least one,
and frequently two, large holes in their hulls just above the static waterline.
They are the doors giving access to the vehicle deck or decks. The Chapter 3
case studies highlight the particular vulnerabilities of such craft. The
accompanying images illustrate those weak points well. They are generally
large vessels and, so, experience very high death tolls when they are involved
in accidents. Because their main role is to carry motor vehicles, they
sometimes experience fuel spills, particularly of petrol, on the vehicle deck.
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Several fatal fires on conventional Ro-Pax ferries have been caused by
carelessly discarded cigarette butts igniting those fuel spills.569
Because of their usually large and complex structures, egress from capsized
conventional Ro-Pax ferries is often difficult, if not impossible. As the data in
the BMPVA database clearly shows, capsizes are the almost inevitable
outcome of collisions and groundings when conventional Ro-Pax ferries are
involved because their stability is compromised by the free surface effect of
water on their vehicle decks.570 This egress difficulty is often made worse by
the illogical positioning of life jackets. This subject has been well explained by
respected American naval architect Bruce Hutchison in his October 2017
paper, Capsize Egress and Survival with Particular Reference to Ro-Ro &
Passenger Vessels.571 Mr Hutchison further explained that: “A salient feature
of many (Ro-Pax) capsizes is the rapidity with which it (sic) proceeds”.
A brief and very simple article describing the dangers of Ro-Ro ships from a
crewman‟s perspective was published in 2016 under the heading: 8 Reasons
That Make Ro-Ro Ship Unsafe to Work On.572 Its revelations are disturbing. It
is a pity that IMO‟s “Panel of Experts” and other conventional Ro-Ro apologist
theoreticians, mentioned below, will be unlikely to read them.
IMO, impressively, published a paper in 1997 that recognised many of the
weaknesses and risks associated with conventional monohull Ro-Ro (or RoPax) vessels.573 However, it examined all the known „problem areas‟ but
ranked crew inadequacies in seventh and last place in their rankings.
Regrettably, however, its “Panel of Experts” focused on north European
vessels and continued with its highly technical and theoretical approach to
very obvious and quite simple problems. In that region, by 1997, the safety
problems had largely been contained. The by then well-known problems of
conventional Ro-Pax vessels in developing countries were, as usual, not
considered nor even mentioned. They have, as noted, continued unabated
and largely unrecognised by IMO.574

6.2.3. Southward migration of elderly monohull Ro-Pax ships
is a serious danger.
Since the 1970s, older, obsolete and surplus examples of conventional RoPax ships have migrated southward through the Mediterranean to Africa and
from Japan to China, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia.575 Al Salam
Boccaccio 98, Da Shun, Le Joola, Sewol, Tamponas II, Moby Prince, Salem
Express, Senopati Nusantara, Princess of the Stars and Spice Islander were
all typical examples of that phenomenon. Even as recently as February 2017,
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an elderly Stena Ro-Pax-Rail ferry was sold via Greece to Iran.576 And, even
worse, in March 2017, Washington State Ferries of the United States sold a
63 year old monohull Ro-Pax ferry Evergreen State to Grenada for USD
300,000.577 This, after seeing its passenger only ferry Skagit sold on, via an
intermediary, to Tanzania and capsizing and sinking in 2012 with the loss of
150 to, more likely, 296 lives.578
The Evergreen State, apart from being very old, was designed for the
sheltered waters of Puget Sound, not for the exposed waters of the aptly
named Windward Islands. Skagit, incidentally, was built to a Gulf of Mexico
crew/supply boat design with an extra deck added to give it more passenger
space and less stability. That further facilitated the overloading that led to its
capsize. It was sold, via an intermediary, for a similarly derisory USD
400,000.579
Even more alarmingly, BC Ferries, the British Columbia provincial government
owned ferry company is understood to have sold a 65 year old protected
waters Ro-Pax ferry to windy Fiji.580 Reportedly, this August 2017 sale was
inspired by the inability of BC Ferries to arrange scrapping of the vessel in
North America because of the amount of asbestos it contained.581 It must be
emphasised that both Washington State Ferries and BC Ferries are
government owned organisations.582
While there were several fatal accidents involving conventional Ro-Pax ferries
in Northern Europe such as those involving European Gateway, Herald of
Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star, Estonia and others, the problem became
much worse in the developing world.583 It was made so by the gross
overloading that was commonly practiced on dangerously modified and poorly
maintained and operated vessels there. Most of the really large death tolls
have arisen on elderly, significantly modified and often neglected Ro-Pax
vessels operating in developing countries.584 Some of those are described in
detail in Chapter 3.
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Described in Shippax.com web news site on 25 February 2017.
Refer to the Washington State Ferries press release of 1 March 2017.
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Institute, New York, 2012.
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6.2.4. Thirty-two per cent of ferry fatalities have involved RoPax ships. Ninety-eight per cent of those occurred in
developing countries.
Since January 2000 some 32 per cent of ferry fatalities involved conventional,
mostly elderly, second-hand Ro-Pax ferries. Of those, 98 per cent occurred in
developing countries.585 This is disgracefully disproportionate.586
While there have only been eight known fatal Ro-Pax accidents, and 11
fatalities, in Northern Europe since 2000, there have been seventeen
accidents resulting in 186 fatalities in the Mediterranean Sea.587 So, even the
so-called developed countries of Spain, Italy, France, Turkey and Greece
have not yet been able to make their Ro-Pax ferries completely safe. The
known Ro-Pax death toll in developing countries reached 9,809 in 58
accidents between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2015. The comparable
figures for developed countries were 224 fatalities in 33 accidents.588

6.2.5. Conventional Ro-Pax ferry fatality summary 2000-2015.

Region/
Country

Conventional Monohull Ro-Pax Ferry Fatality Summary 2000 - 2015
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a
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)

Accidents
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*All BC Ferries

Oceani
a
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8

2

17

4

NIL

14

2
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2

91

11

19

186

6

NIL

5,989

2

3,739

79

10,031

1.4

9

11

1.5

N/A

428

1

89

40

110

1%

1%

2%

0%

0%

58%

0%

37%

1%

100%

Table 6.1. Conventional Monohull Ro-Pax Ferry Fatality Summary 2000-2015
(BMPVA database).
The numbers of fatalities in developing countries are obviously exacerbated
by the overcrowding and evacuation, smoking discipline, lifesaving and
rescue problems that are the norm there. There were seven fatalities per RoPax accident in developed countries but 169 in developing countries. 589 So,
thanks to the poverty factor, you are more than 24 times as likely to die in a
Ro-Pax accident in a developing country as elsewhere.590
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Put bluntly, developing countries simply do not have the cultural, educational,
regulatory and enforcement wherewithal to ensure the safe operation of such
complex and inherently vulnerable ships as conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries.
The dangers of elderly, poorly maintained, imported, conventional Ro-Ro and
Ro-Pax ships was noted by Lu Cheng in the Chinese magazine World Ships
& Boats in 2000591. Lu described the capsize and sinking of the sixteen year
old Japanese built Ro-Pax Da Shun in Bo Hai Bay, northern China in 1999.
That accident starkly highlighted the risks associated with poorer countries
importing such vessels from richer ones. Without exception, the conventional
Ro-Pax ferries involved in fatal accidents in developing and Mediterranean
countries are old.592 Fortunately, albeit slowly, the Chinese government
seems to have heeded Mr Lu‟s warning. Less fortunately, many other ferry
dependent developing countries have failed to heed that warning.
During the 1990s numerous conferences were held by naval architecture
schools, learned institutions, classification societies and, of course, by the
Maritime Safety Committee of IMO to investigate the problems of conventional
monohull Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessel safety.593 These followed and were largely
inspired by the European Gateway, Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian
Star, Jan Hewelius and Estonia disasters among others. Probably the most
important development arising from those was the implementation of the socalled Stockholm Rules (Or Stockholm Agreement) in the North European
countries in 1996.594
The Stockholm Agreement was made among several Scandinavian and
North-West European Ro-Pax ferry operating states and IMO. Its objective
was to prevent further accidents involving conventional Ro-Pax ferries.
Fundamentally, the rules aimed at improving the stability and hence the safety
of such vessels by addressing their most basic conceptual design weakness.
That was to significantly reduce the so-called „free surface‟ effects of water on
their low, long, open and wide vehicle decks. This was achieved through an
amendment to and development of the SOLAS Code. They also defined
operating limits as to wave heights and sea conditions. The Rules only apply
to international voyages among the 18 nations involved. They did not come
into force for six years (in 2002) and there were a number of exemptions.595
While the Stockholm Rules, unarguably, has been effective in preventing
further fatal accidents in those countries, it has, arguably, been equally
effective in moving the problem southward. The ships that were deemed
unsafe to operate in the Baltic and North seas and English Channel were
591
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simply sold to operators in the Mediterranean and Africa. There they were
frequently modified to increase their capacity and inadequately maintained so
as to make them even less safe.596 They have been involved in numerous
accidents, some of them fatal. Indeed, too many of them as the BMPVA
database so clearly shows.597
Ironically, IMO claims its measures cover all aspects of international shipping
including, among others, disposal of vessels.598 Clearly, it has failed
completely to prevent the sale (or disposal) of dangerous, elderly, monohull
Ro-Pax ferries from richer to poorer countries. That gross and tragic failure
should be more widely exposed, condemned and corrected.

6.2.6. Dangers of „grandfathering‟.
There was also the problem of „grandfathering‟ whereby older ferries were
permitted to continue to operate with only very minor modifications made to
slightly improve their safety.599 The discussions and debates on that matter
and their resultant compromises were hardly the finest demonstration of the
ethics and professionalism of the naval architecture profession, most notably
of the academic and regulatory branches of it. Safety, which should never be
compromised, often was, particularly where it concerned the safety of nonnorthern European people. Nor, however, could the discussions and debates
withstand the lobbying efforts of, mainly north European, Ro-Pax ferry
owners, designers and builders and their self-proclaimed „objective‟ academic
advisers.
As with so many such controversies and debates, the real problem was
obscured. The safety of passengers was accorded less importance than the
investments of owners and the reputations of certain naval architects,
shipbuilders and regulators. Remarkably, the clearly flawed concept of
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries was permitted to survive with relatively
few changes. Simultaneously, of course, many of those same actors, tried
very hard to prevent and delay the introduction of the modern, high-speed,
aluminium catamaran Ro-Pax ferries600 that have proved to be so much safer
and less expensive than their conventional steel monohull predecessors. 601

596

For example Al Salam Boccaccio 98 and Le Joola as described in Chapter 3.
See Appendix A, Ibid and, more particularly, Appendix H, List of known fatal Ro-Pax ferry
accidents.
598
Refer to Introduction to IMO, Ibid.
599
„Grandfathering‟ with not very onerous restrictions has been permitted under both SOLAS
and the Stockholm Rules.
600
Mostly developed initially in Australia by the Incat and Austal shipbuilding companies. See
Jeffs, A. Ibid.
601
The author contends that the motive for the original introduction of the High Speed Craft
code was a deliberate attempt by the maritime authorities of, particularly, the UK, Denmark
and Germany to prevent the development of such craft in Australia because those European
countries possessed no such technology.
597

187

6.2.7. Fast ferries, particularly multihulls, are very safe ferries.
That negative activity actually resulted in an unintended positive consequence
in the implementation of the High Speed Code by IMO. That Code has
contributed to the excellent safety reputation of high speed ferries generally
operating on both domestic and international routes.602 Ironically, if certain of
the very stringent safety provisions of the HSC Code, particularly those
pertaining to fire safety, were to be extended to conventional Ro-Pax ferries, it
would be likely to make them significantly safer.603 For the purposes of this
work, fast or high speed ferries are defined as those having a service speed
exceeding 25 knots.
Without exception, all 36 known fatal high speed ferry accidents have been
attributed to human error.604 Of those, 27 (75 per cent) were either collisions
or groundings. Seven (19 per cent) of those 36 accidents involved fast RoPax ferries and they resulted in a total of nine fatalities, less than two per cent
of the total of fast ferry fatalities and an infinitesimal proportion of all ferry
fatalities.605 There have been 554 fast ferry fatalities but, of those, 318 (or
57%) were the result of just two accidents involving passenger only fast
ferries in Tanzania.606
One of those involved the Skagit, a modified, four engined, Gulf of Mexico
crew/supply Offshore Service Vessel (OSV) fitted with an additional deck that
made it unstable in open sea conditions, particularly when overloaded. That
vessel was originally built for Washington State Ferries to operate in the
benign waters of Puget Sound on the west coast of the United States. It was
sold, via an intermediary, to Tanzania where, soon afterwards, operating in
the open Indian Ocean, and apparently grossly overloaded, it capsized killing
an estimated 296 people, 53 per cent of the fifty year fast ferry fatality total.
Frighteningly, similar vessels are currently operating in the Philippines. They
are former crew/supply OSVs that have been converted to ferry operations by
the simple but dangerous expedient of adding an extra passenger deck. 607
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Image 6.1. The demise of the formerly Washington State Ferries owned
Skagit serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of selling inappropriate
vessels to developing countries. In this case Tanzania (Wikipedia).
Two years later, in 2014, another fast ferry Kilimanjaro II nosedived at speed
in rough seas off Zanzibar.608 Twenty-five passengers, who should not have
been riding there, were washed off the bow and drowned. There was no
significant damage to the ferry and, remarkably, little effort appears to have
been made to recover the victims. Kilimanjaro II was a very well designed,
built and equipped vessel from the Australian shipyard Richardson Devine
Marine.609 It was, quite clearly, operated negligently to the point of
recklessness.
Fewer than 20 (less than one per cent) fast ferries of the approximately 2,000
that have ever been built have operated in Tanzania. It is very disturbing,
therefore, that 57 per cent of all known fast ferry fatalities have occurred in
just two accidents in that country.610 Having closely observed and
experienced ferry operations there, the author is unsurprised at that appalling
reality.
Notably, seven of the 36 known fatal accidents involving fast ferries occurred
in the Pearl River delta region of China around Hong Kong, Macao and
Zhuhai. There are considerably more fast ferries, catamarans and jetfoils,
operating in that area than anywhere else on earth.611 Those seven accidents
resulted in 21 fatalities, an average of three per accident with a maximum of
four. All were caused by allisions or collisions. Most fatalities were due to
impact injuries.612
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6.2.8. Fast ferry fatality summary.
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9
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69

12.5%

31
8
17
1
55
4

Table 6.2. Summary of fast ferry fatalities by vessel type and region 19662015 (BMPVA database).
Eleven of the total of 36 fatal fast ferry accidents involved hydrofoils or jetfoils,
a disproportionately high percentage of 30 per cent. The author estimates that
fewer than 13 per cent of fast ferries are of the hydrofoil or jetfoil type.613 It is
interesting and telling that five fast ferry owning companies had vessels
involved in at least two fatal accidents each. Ten fatal accidents, or 28 per
cent of the total, involved Italian built craft. This, also, is disproportionate.614
In terms of the overall safety record of fast ferries, it is very important to note
that, while they represent no more than five per cent of the total global ferry
fleet, they have been involved in fewer than .05 per cent of the fatal accidents
recorded in the BMPVA database. Even more importantly, they were
responsible for a mere .01 per cent of fatalities. Fast ferries, especially
properly designed, constructed and maintained multi-hulled fast ferries, are
indeed very safe ferries.615 Catamaran fast ferries have not been known to
capsize or sink, except for one suspicious recent case in the Philippines.616
Trimaran ferries are not known to have ever been involved in any fatal
accidents.617
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57.5%
31%
100%

Of the 554 fatalities that occurred in fast ferry accidents, 435, or 79 per cent
involved monohulls, 36 (6.5 per cent) involved hydrofoils and jetfoils and 82,
or 15 per cent, catamarans.618 As catamarans, at around 1,200 in total,
represent 60 per cent of the total fast ferry fleet, monohulls 26 per cent and
hydrofoils and jetfoils 14 per cent, catamaran fast ferries are clearly
considerably safer than other types.619
There are two main reasons for this. Properly designed constructed and
maintained catamaran (and trimaran) ferries are both more stable and less
likely to sink than conventional monohull ferries. They are more stable
because they are considerably wider compared with their length and usually
have a significantly lower centre of gravity. Therefore, they are very unlikely to
capsize. Indeed, none are known to have done so.620 Further, their widely
separated hulls are also multi-compartmented. Most of those compartments
are watertight.621 So, in the event of their grounding or colliding with another
vessel, the majority of those compartments will not be breeched enabling the
catamaran to remain afloat and reasonably level.
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6.3.1. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are inherently
dangerous.

Image 6.2. General arrangement drawing of the Estonia, previously Viking
Sally, a typical but particularly tragic example of a late 1980s conventional RoPax ferry. Note particularly that the lower of two, wide-open vehicle decks is
barely above the static waterline. There is even accommodation beneath the
lower vehicle deck and, therefore, below the static waterline. The bow and
stern doors inherent in the traditional, monohull Ro-Pax design concept, make
the vessels particularly vulnerable to flooding of the vehicle deck and beneath
it (Source: Viking Line brochure).
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In addition to the damaged stability, and even undamaged stability,
vulnerability that their design concept involves, conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries have also proved to be exceptionally vulnerable to fires. Those fires
have mostly ignited in their vehicular cargoes or on spilt fuel on their vehicle
decks and spread rapidly, especially where their vehicle decks are partially
open to the elements. The fire on board the Norman Atlantic in the Ionian Sea
as recently as December 2014 is a case in point.622 A vehicle deck fire on that
ship resulted in 32 fatalities.623
Naturally, owners of existing conventional Ro-Pax vessels and those
financially dependent on them such as Ro-Pax designers, builders and
equipment suppliers as well as academic naval architect „expert witnesses‟,
advocated that existing vessels should have been “grandfathered” and
allowed to operate largely as built.
The author believes the concept of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries is
fundamentally dangerous. The idea of a vessel usually able to be opened at
both ends, with a large open vehicle deck between, protected by complex
mechanical doors and positioned only slightly above the vessel‟s static
waterline, simply incorporates too many weak points.624 Even when there is
only one vehicle door located at one end of the vessel as in the case of
„landing craft‟ type Ro-Pax ferries, that vulnerability remains because the
single access door is normally at the bow and the vehicle deck is usually too
close to the vessel‟s static waterline.

6.3.2. Multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries have proved to be
significantly safer.
Correctly designed, constructed and maintained multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries
are quite different in that their vehicle decks are located well above their static
waterline. Any water taken aboard can, by virtue of that height above their
waterline, be simply drained away by gravity. Their two or three distinctly
separate hulls are sub-divided into numerous watertight compartments. Even
their bridging decks are normally buoyant in themselves. In the case of the
Incat 98 metre vessel illustrated in Image 6.3, there are eight such
compartments in each hull.
Further, the larger examples are wide enough to not require a forward vehicle
access door. Vehicles, even large semi-trailers can be easily turned around
on the vehicle deck. Importantly, under the HSC Code, they are required to
have far superior fire prevention systems than their conventional monohulled
counterparts that operate under the SOLAS Code.625 Conclusively and very
notably, not one multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferry has been involved in any kind of
serious accident since they were first introduced in 1988.626
622
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Image 6.3. shows a General Arrangement Drawing of a 98 metre high speed
catamaran Ro-Pax ferry designed and constructed by Incat in Tasmania. It is
not unique. A number of competing vessels have been built by Austal,
Damen, Finnyards and other shipyards.627
Notably, apart from their impressive safety records, such vessels operate at
about double the speed of conventional monohull competitors having the
same passenger, vehicle and cargo capacities. Obviously, at those higher
speeds, they can offer double the voyage frequency. Their capital costs are
considerably lower.628 They could also be operated at similarly lower speeds
to conventional monohull Ro-Pax vessels with significantly reduced fuel
consumption and no reduction in safety standards.

627

Finnyards is defunct but each of the others has a website.
In October 2017, Robert Clifford, the Chairman of Incat, advised the author that the
average price for a new Incat 110 metre vessel was around USD 90million. In the same
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press release, October 2017. www.austal.com. And refer to Clarksons at www.crsl.com.
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6.3.3. Multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries are far less vulnerable to
human error.

Image 6.3. General arrangement drawing of a 98 metre high speed
catamaran Ro-Pax ferry designed and built by Incat in Tasmania. Its vehicle
deck is well above the waterline. There is no forward vehicle door. All
vehicles, including large trucks, can be turned around on the vehicle deck so
enabling stern only access ( www.incat.com.au).
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Given their now well proven and nearly impeccable safety record, it must be
asked why so many regulatory obstacles were put in the way of their
development by IMO and various Northern European national marine safety
authorities during the early to mid-1990s even as a number of conventional
Ro-Pax ferries came to grief. Could it have been a conspiracy to protect the
designers, builders and suppliers of equipment to such conventional vessels?
Or, perhaps, a move designed to protect the value of the existing fleet?

6.3.4. Even conceptually unsafe vessels require human errors
to kill.
Although conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries and the Filipino motor bancas
are problematic because they are conceptually dangerous, they still require
human errors to cause them to kill people .629 If properly maintained, equipped
and operated, they can still safely carry passengers from port to port. They do
so every day. However, they do undoubtedly have a much worse record for
both the number of fatal accidents involving them and for the number of
fatalities arising from those accidents. The simple fact is that, due to their
designs and structures, they are considerably more vulnerable than other
vessels to the effects of human errors.
Motor bancas have in theory a much better record than monohull Ro-Pax
ferries. The author believes that this is largely due to the poor recording of
fatal ferry accidents in the Philippines and the relative sizes of the vessels.
There have been 14 known accidents involving motor bancas from 1980 to
2015. They resulted in 483 fatalities for an average of 35 per accident. Of
course, monohull Ro-Pax ferries, being much larger, normally carry
significantly more people and operate further offshore than do motor bancas
so, numbers of fatalities per accident in Ro-Pax accidents are invariably
considerably higher.
It should be repeated, though, that despite their conceptual vulnerabilities,
motor bancas still require some form of human error to initiate a fatal accident.
However, in the event of such an accident, their design or structural
deficiencies make them far more dangerous than other vessels.
Conversely, catamaran and trimaran ferries have an almost blemish free
record over the 40 years that they have been operated commercially. The
BMPVA database shows only two accidents resulting in more than four
fatalities.630 Both were passenger only vessels. The first involved the Sleipner
which was driven at high speed onto granite rocks off the west coast of
Norway. This was a clear case of human error in the form of poor lookout and
poor seamanship that killed 16 people.
The next was Kilimanjaro II that was driven into a wave at high speed, off
Zanzibar, washing a number of passengers overboard from its foredeck,
629
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Appendix A, Ibid.
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where they should not have been permitted to be anyway. Obviously, this was
also human error, in the form of negligence and bad seamanship. While there
was no significant damage to the vessel, 25 passengers were left to drown
after being washed overboard.
Apart from those accidents, which certainly were not due to structural or
mechanical causes, the BMPVA database records only 17 „known‟ fatal
accidents involving catamaran fast ferries. Thirteen of those were collisions,
one a fire, and three „Man Overboards‟ or suicides. Even the fire, on Stena
Voyager, was attributed to engineering negligence.631 Interestingly, six of the
collisions occurred in Hong Kong‟s crowded waters where very large numbers
of fast catamaran ferries operate.632
Most importantly, only the Sleipner accident resulted in the almost complete
destruction of the vessel. Of the others, vessel damage was superficial or
minor at worst. The Kilimanjaro II was almost undamaged. In summary,
catamaran and trimaran fast ferries, both Ro-Pax and passenger only, have
an excellent safety record. Even if suffering complete engine failure, which is
very unlikely given their two widely separated engine rooms, they will remain
afloat until repaired or towed home. The author has experienced the failure of
all four engines in an Incat Ro-Pax ferry in the English Channel between
Guernsey and Weymouth. The vessel eventually reached home unassisted
on the power of one engine but it was not a frightening experience in any way.

6.4.1. The HSC Code – An unforseen benefit.
A significant unforseen and probably unintended benefit has arisen from the
obstacles put in the way of the development of fast catamaran ferries in the
early to mid-1990s, mentioned above. They have, since 1996, been subject to
the IMO HSC Code (High Speed Code).633 While originally intended for
vessels engaged in international voyages, the code has been widely adopted
in domestic use. That has undoubtedly been a good thing as it covers all
aspects of safety including stability, fire, lifesaving, structures and navigation.
If such a strict approach to IMO‟s ISM Code had been applied to conventional
Ro-Pax ferries, particularly as it applies to stability, fire prevention and lifesaving, there would undoubtedly have been fewer fatalities since. The HSC
Code is based on and similar to the ICAO code for aircraft. The ferry travelling
public would benefit from its wider or, preferably, universal adoption.
Fast ferry designers, builders, owners and operators seem to have coped very
well with the HSC Code, despite its allegedly onerous requirements.634
Importantly, it does not appear to have detracted from the profitability of fast
ferry operations. In fact, high speed ferries, generally, have a distinctly
631
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superior safety record to that of slower conventional craft. Indeed, of the 32
known fatal, non-Man Overboard, accidents involving them, all were clearly
the result of human error.635 The HSC Code, regrettably, cannot prevent that.
While the original intentions for the implementation of the HSC Code may
have been somewhat malignant in trying to restrict and impede the
development of high-speed aluminium catamaran ferries from outside Europe,
the final, probably unintended, consequences have been generally beneficial.
Perhaps the main safety features of the HSC Code, particularly those
concerned with fire prevention and suppression, should be adapted to
conventional ferries also and, indeed, to all passenger vessels engaged in
both domestic and international trade.

6.4.2. Little likelihood of technical factors causing accidents.
So, apart from the dangerous exceptions of Filipino motor banca ferries and
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, there is little likelihood of structural or
mechanical failures causing ferry accidents. The fatal accident statistics
confirm this. Because there have been so few „known‟ fatal ferry accidents
caused by technical factors, it appears that little can realistically and
practically be done to further reduce their incidence.
Even the concept of motor bancas is not entirely dangerous. Their safety
could easily, simply and cost-effectively be considerably improved. In reality,
thousands of them operate safely enough everyday around the Philippine and
Indonesian archipelagos. A stronger structure connecting the outrigger floats
to the central hull and more buoyant outriggers would solve most of their
problems. Of course, better maintenance and well-enforced rules to prevent
them operating offshore and/or by incompetent crews or in bad weather would
also bring about a significant improvement.
The oil tanker sector was required to substantially modify the construction of
its vessels to incorporate „double skin‟ hulls in the early nineties. It coped very
well with that. There is no reason why monohull conventional Ro-Pax ferries
could not be phased out in the same way as were single skin tankers. IMO‟s
MARPOL 1992 regulations, which managed that phase out, provide an
excellent model for a similar global phasing out of conventional monohull RoPax ferries.636 A ten year phase out would seem to be a practical
arrangement.
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Image 6.4. This approximately 20 metre Filipino motor banca on which the
author was a passenger in February 2017 was held together with string. In
fact, mostly monofilament fishing line. Its „stabilising‟ outrigger float was a
bamboo pole! The Philippine Coast Guard mandated „lifejackets‟ issued to
passengers were flimsy, tiny water ski vests (Author).

6.5.1. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are the major
problem technically. They should be banned.
Monohull Ro-Pax ferries, then, are the major problem. They are conceptually
dangerous and construction of new examples should be banned. Existing RoPax ferries should be phased out and either converted to other uses or
scrapped, as were single-skinned oil tankers in the 1990s. Many of the world‟s
best naval architecture and equipment manufacturer minds have been long
devoted to conceiving a solution to the inherent deficiencies of conventional
monohull Ro-Pax ferries. They have not succeeded. Their talents would be
better devoted to other, fundamentally safer, craft.
No one has come up with a workable solution to the dangers arising from low
opening vehicle access doors and a wide-open deck that is located only
slightly above the vessel‟s static water line. All manner of expensive „band-aid‟
solutions have been applied but none of them will really work en extremis.
They simply have too many conceptual weaknesses that leave them more
vulnerable to the effects of human errors than are other design concepts.
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Ironically, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are also notably more
expensive in terms of capital and crew costs than their high speed aluminium
competitors.637 Further, if those aluminium vessels were to operate at similar
speeds to conventional mono-hulled, steel Ro-Pax vessels, they would be
even cheaper to operate as their fuel consumption would be significantly less
than that of conventional monohull vessels thanks to the lower resistance of
their fine hulls.638
There is an ongoing role for Ro-Pax ferries but all future examples should be
built as multihulls or beamy, low-profile monohulls. If it is imperative to persist
with monohulled vessels they must be loaded and unloaded from the stern
only. There should be no bow doors and vehicle decks must be located
significantly higher above the static waterline than is current practice. Designs
for and actual examples of such vessels exist.639
An example of a practical design for such a vessel from leading Dutch
shipbuilder Damen is shown in Image 6.5. Two examples of that design are
now operating safely and successfully in the open Atlantic Ocean off Canada.
However, if we persist with building and operating conventional monohull RoPax ferries, we will continue to experience the same kinds of accidents
resulting in massive death tolls as we have for the past half-century,
especially if they are operated in developing countries.
This should not present an economically, professionally or socially disruptive
problem to the owners, designers, equippers and builders of monohull
vessels. They will just have to adapt to the safety reality of multi-hulled ships
or of mono-hull ferries without bow doors and with vehicle decks located
higher above their static waterline than is common practice. The oil tanker
sector provides an excellent example of how such an adaption could be
accommodated.
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Image 6.5. General arrangement drawing of the 2017 launched Damen 5510
monohull Ro-Pax ferry designed and built for operation in the open North
Atlantic Ocean off Eastern Canada. The profile of the 55 metre LOA vessel
shows that the vehicle deck is safely located well above the static waterline
and there is no bow door. A scaled up version of the same design concept
could enable semi-trailer trucks to turn around onboard (Damen).
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Image 6.6. This comparatively small (55 metres LOA) Ro-Pax ferry developed
by Dutch shipbuilder Damen shows that monohull Ro-Pax ships are feasible if
sensibly designed without bow doors and with higher than normal vehicle
decks and stern doors. Two such vessels are successfully operating in the
open Atlantic Ocean off Canada‟s east coast (Damen).

6.5.2. Simple, standardised smaller ferry designs would help.
With smaller ferries there is substantial potential for the introduction of simple,
standardised designs that could be built almost anywhere of aluminium, FRP,
HDPE or even steel. Such vessels could be powered by diesel outboard
engines that require no „through-hull‟ fittings. If of catamaran hull form, as they
should be, they can be practically non-capsizable and unsinkable due to their
beam and use of numerous watertight compartments in each hull.

6.5.3. Human factors almost always the cause.
The data presented and discussed throughout this chapter confirms very
conclusively that, apart from motor bancas and conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ships, there is no particular class of passenger vessel that is inherently
dangerous for structural, mechanical or design, in other words „technical‟,
reasons. Human factors are almost invariably the cause of fatal accidents
and, despite their conceptual weaknesses, most of the major fatal accidents
involving bancas and conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries have ultimately
been caused by human failings unrelated to their conceptual design
weaknesses .640 The human failings simply exacerbated those weaknesses.
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Chapter 7
Human factors – The roles of data collection, analysis,
training, education, psychology and insurance –
Developing a safety culture
Human error: Wrongful decisions, mistakes, blunders,
carelessness, miscalculations or negligence made by or
on the part of human beings.
7.1.1. Human error – the main overriding cause of almost all
fatal ferry accidents.
The statistics described, interpreted and analysed in the foregoing chapters
show with considerable clarity that the main overriding cause of almost all
fatal ferry accidents is human error. In all its various forms, human error has
been the primary cause of 98 per cent of the almost 60,000 fatalities arising
from the 750 passenger vessel accidents described and discussed here.641 Of
those, 681, or 91 per cent, occurred on ferries and tourist boats.
Obviously, therefore, effective modification of inadequate or dangerous
human behaviour must be the primary objective of any reform efforts. As
achievements in other transport sectors, particularly road, oil tankers and
aviation, illustrate very clearly, such safety improvement objectives can
realistically be attained.
Human behaviour can be modified in order to achieve realistic reform
objectives. There are specialist professionals, using mostly psychological
techniques, and behavioural modification who are trained to encourage such
modification. Of course, traditional maritime and naval training in developed
countries used to do that on an ongoing basis.
It is notable that all known airlines, most major oil and mining companies, airforces, navies and many railway operators employ or retain human factor or
safety managers and/or consultants who combine the disciplines of
engineering, psychology and ergonomics with the objective of improving
safety.642 In stark contrast very few ferry or smaller cruise ship-owning
companies appear to do so. In reality only the very largest or most safety
conscious of them, such as Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Stena, P&O Ferries, Sydney Ferries, Thames Clippers, Washington State
Ferries, Archipelago Ferries and BC Ferries do.643
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Indeed, in the ten worst countries focused on in this study, no ferry owners or
ferry owning companies, except Archipelago Ferries in the Philippines, are
known to employ or even consult such specialists.644 It is obvious that more of
them should!
Most of those people are trained professionals who may be psychologists,
master mariners, ergonomics engineers or airline training or check pilots or
have various combinations of such qualifications. They closely study how and
why accidents or near misses have occurred. More importantly, they devise
ways to encourage, train and educate human participants to avoid repeating
the same kinds of errors in future.
There are numerous human factor consultants who could, indeed should, be
retained as consultants by ferry owning companies that are too small to afford
staff experts.645 The key, though, is that someone should be made
responsible for such matters. The possibilities for human error should be
investigated, described, analysed and plans made and measures taken to
prevent them.
The study of human factors in all manner of corporate, military or government
activity has become a recognised professional discipline646. By focusing on
the subject in an organised, objective and intellectually analytical way, the
consciousness of operational employees can be systematically raised to
ensure that they are sufficiently disciplined as to be constantly aware of the
safety ramifications of their actions; to be situationally aware; and, most
importantly, alert. They need to be made almost instinctively responsive to
any abnormality.
This overwhelming preponderance of human factor causes highlights the
potential for a significant reduction in ferry fatalities to be achieved by human
factors professionals and a wider but closer managerial focus on human
errors. That would, in developing countries, be a pioneering and likely very
worthwhile activity. As Wayne K. Talley, a prolific pioneering researcher into
human factors in maritime accidents put it; it is more constructive to regulate
human actions on ships than the physical condition of ships.647 Given the
foregoing, particularly Chapter 6, there can be little argument with that. Talley
also explained, in another paper, his findings that passenger vessel accidents
caused by human rather than environmental, structural or mechanical factors
result in significantly worse casualties.648
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Having extensively studied the safety improvements achieved in the aviation,
mining, oil and gas, rail, road transport, construction, international shipping
and manufacturing industries in developed countries, it is obvious that
attention from human factor experts has contributed substantially to them. The
most obviously similar problems and the most impressive results have been in
the aviation industry that has improved so significantly since the 1970s.649 It
seems very likely that the improvements gained from involving human factor
experts with ferry operations could be expected to be similar. They can
interpret and describe procedural safety deficiencies and devise training,
education and promotional programmes to eliminate them.

7.1.2. Behavioural improvement is achievable.
The preliminary figure for passenger vessel fatalities in 2016 came to an
estimated 800. That comprises 534 known deaths plus an allowance, based
on the author‟s long experience and analysis of the data available, of an
additional 50% for unreported fatalities. For 2017, the figures were
significantly worse at 742 known deaths giving an estimated total for the full
year of at least 1,100, a 39 per cent increase on 2016. The 2016 total was the
lowest death toll in fifty years according to the Baird Maritime Passenger
Vessel Accident database.650 In reality, it is probably the lowest in history, or
at least since passenger carrying vessels first developed some four thousand
years ago.
The 2016 figure of about 800 fatalities compares with the next best year,
2013, when there were about 900. It compares with an estimated average of
around 3,000 fatalities per annum over the past fifty-one years. That is a
remarkable achievement.
It was a very encouraging development and shows what can be achieved
when ferry owners, operators and regulators take more care than usual. The
death toll was on course for a significantly lower figure until the end of
September 2016 but a spate of fatal accidents occurred in October,
November and December that ruined the excellent result that had been
achieved until then. Indeed, until the end of September 2016, there had only
been about 180 reported deaths.651
Of course, and probably inevitably, the first day of 2017 saw a major accident
occur just off Jakarta in Indonesia when a 30 metre wooden, passenger only
ferry, the Zahro Express was destroyed by fire and 40 or more people
perished. The usual human factors seem to have applied: an overloaded,
poorly maintained vessel with insufficient lifesaving equipment aboard. This
„accident‟ occurred within the immediate vicinity of the headquarters of the
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Indonesian Coast Guard about two nautical miles off the port of Batavia. 652 As
usual, there has been no published report of any subsequent inquiry. The
facts will have to be gleaned from sparse general media reports.
Five months later, in May 2017 another fire, this time commencing on the
vehicle deck, consumed an elderly but substantial Ro-Pax ferry Mutiara
Sentosa 1 on a voyage across Indonesia‟s Java Sea from Surabaya to
Balikpapan. While not yet precisely known, the death toll looks likely to have
exceeded 40.653 The global ferry death toll, meanwhile, continued to rise
throughout 2017. Showing what can be achieved with the correct approach,
the Philippines had recorded no ferry fatalities in 2017 until 21 December
when the catamaran fast ferry Mercraft 3 sank in a storm killing about 11
passengers.654 No details of that accident are yet known. However, given the
type of vessel concerned and the prevailing conditions, it appears very
suspicious.
While we can only hope that this is not a sign of things to come, it is ominous
nevertheless. As usual, most of the fatal accidents in 2016 and 2017 occurred
in poor or „poorish‟ countries. The Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Uganda,
Yemen, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Egypt were the more notable
offenders in 2016. Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Malaysia
and Myanmar have continued to be in 2017. In the first five days of 2018 there
were two fatal ferry accidents in Indonesia. Not a promising start
There were fewer accidents with fewer resulting fatalities in 2016 in a number
of other countries including developed nations such as New Zealand, Italy and
France.655 There were, as always, collisions, fires, capsizes due to
overloading, sinking in storms or typhoons, a capsize and sinking while
crossing a dangerous bar and the almost inevitable lifeboat drill „accident‟.
Without exception, all could be attributed, as usual, to human error. As could
hundreds of non-fatal accidents and „near misses‟. They are rarely reported or
recorded, unfortunately, so we learn little or nothing from them.

7.1.3. Accidents don‟t just happen.
Fires don‟t just happen, nor do collisions or capsizes of overloaded vessels.
Storms, particularly typhoons, are well and clearly predicted now, even in the
Philippines. They, like dangerous sandbars, can be easily avoided thanks,
largely, to good navigational charts, GPS satellite navigation systems and to
readily accessible and cost free satellite weather tracking websites.656 All that
is required is at least adequate seamanship, proper maintenance, care and
situational awareness. In every case the human factors of greed, negligence,
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lack of training, absence of situational awareness and stupidity are the real
causes of these fatalities.657
It is notable that five of the usual worst ten countries for ferry accidents
appeared again in 2016 in leading roles with the accidents with the biggest
death tolls occurring in them. They are consistently bad performers. To recap,
78 to 80 per cent of the known ferry fatalities over the past 50 years have
occurred in those ten worst countries. They are: The Philippines, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Myanmar, Haiti, Egypt, Tanzania, Senegal, China and the DR
Congo. A further twelve per cent of fatalities occurred in just ten more
countries so that at least 90 per cent of fatalities arose in a mere 20 countries
or about ten per cent of the world‟s total countries.658 Of those, 93 per cent
occurred on domestic voyages.659
While the DR Congo and Haiti are obviously far too poor and corrupt to have
any serious potential for short-term safety reform, all the others in the worst
ten have definite potential and should be capable of doing much better. The
Philippines, Bangladesh and Senegal did notably better in 2016, which is
gratifying, but they are still home to far too many accidents that continue to
result from the same human related causes.660
Without wishing in any way to detract from the impressive (about 11%)
reduction in the number of fatalities in 2016 from the previous lowest total in
2013, the numbers are clearly still much too high. The „known‟ data for 2017 is
discouraging with the number of fatalities increasing by about 50 per cent over
2016.661 Given their causes and their concentration in only ten countries, it
has to be possible for the death toll to be reduced significantly further.
The global aviation industry has shown the way. Its record over the past 30
odd years has been very impressive.662 It recognised early and accepted that
human factors were the predominant causes of accidents and went about
reducing them logically, scientifically, and very systematically on a global
basis, even in the countries with poor ferry safety records. It works
assiduously, globally and constantly to train, educate, promote and discipline
airline employees at all levels to ensure they are eternally vigilant in matters of
safety.
The techniques developed to bring about those improvements are well
known.663 As mentioned above, there is now a distinct profession comprising
human factors consultants and managers who service the aviation, railway,
657
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mining, oil and gas, road and parts of the maritime industries, among
others.664 They are experts at changing mindsets and behaviour. Their
psychological analyses and disciplined processes are the keys to reform.
As far as is known, very few human factors specialists are employed or
consulted by the maritime, particularly ferry, sector. They should be. They are
obviously very effective in other industries even in so-called poor countries.
IMO is and has been for many years very well aware of the „human element‟.
It has, “Since the 1980s …increasingly addressed the people involved in
shipping in its work”.665 The International Maritime Organisation should, at the
very least, be encouraging the use of human factors specialists in the twenty
worst countries for ferry fatalities.
The use of the word “encouraging” should be carefully noted. IMO doesn‟t
need to “interfere” in the internal affairs of its “sovereign member countries” as
it is so loathe to do. All it needs to do is emulate its civil aviation counterpart
(ICAO) and encourage the kinds of human error reduction reforms that have
been so effective in that industry.

7.2.0. The six most dangerous human factors.
The six most common human factors that are the root cause of the errors that
lead to fatal passenger vessel accidents are defined and described below.
However, as a reminder, Figure 1.1. is reproduced here as Figure 7.1. to
illustrate the hierarchy of the human errors that cause such accidents.
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Poor seamanship

All Other

Figure 7.1. The hierarchy of human errors. Author assessed causes of fatal
passenger vessel accidents 1966-2015. By accidents on the left and by
fatalities on the right. (BMPVA database).

7.2.1. Unseaworthy vessels.
As shown by an analysis of the data in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel
Accident database this is clearly the major human error cause of passenger
vessel accidents. It is obviously closely related to negligence and the two
factors are, in reality, almost inseparable. Negligence, in this sense, is
deemed to be more deliberate than careless. Between them, they were the
cause of 51 per cent of fatal accidents. There can be little doubt that a vessel
is unseaworthy if it capsizes or simply sinks without involvement in a collision
or grounding, for example. Vessels become unseaworthy because they are
badly maintained; dangerously modified; poorly designed; or, badly
constructed. They also become unseaworthy when they are overloaded or
otherwise negligently operated. They must be adequately or properly manned.
All those factors are the inevitable result of human errors of omission or
commission. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary aptly and accurately
describes seaworthy as: “Of a ship etc: in a fit condition to undergo a voyage
and to encounter stormy weather”.666
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7.2.2. Poor lookout.
The next most significant cause of accidents is poor lookout. Lookout has
been defined as: “A person or party employed or stationed to look out; a
reconnoitering boat or vessel”. 2. „The action or an act of looking out”. 667 This
failing has caused 21.5 per cent of accidents and a similar percentage of
fatalities.
It is indisputable that collisions, allisions and groundings can have only one
real cause and that is inadequate lookout keeping. That arises from any
number of primary causes that range from fatigue, physical eyesight
deficiencies, drug or alcohol use, illness such as influenza, inadequate
training, inadequate discipline or, as can be seen in the YouTube videos of
the Bangladeshi accidents in Appendix F, to sheer stupidity or lack of
interest.668 It seems that malnutrition caused apathy or fatalism are the main
ultimate driver of such causes as explained in Chapter 5.
All commercial and leisure mariners globally, and vehicle drivers and aircraft
pilots, are expected to know the „Rules of the Road‟ or COLREGS669 but,
obviously, they are as frequently ignored at sea as they are on land in
developing countries for mostly the same reasons.670

7.2.3 Overloaded vessels.
Overloaded vessels are quite clearly unseaworthy vessels but, for the
purposes of this analysis, they have been kept separate because they are
only one of a number of specific factors that may make a vessel unseaworthy.
To overload a vessel is to: “load with too great a burden or cargo, put an
excessive load on”.671 While at 15.9 per cent, they are only the third biggest
cause of accidents, they are, at 33.7 per cent, the major cause of fatalities.
Obviously, overloaded vessels have far more people and/or other cargo
aboard than they should so that, when they are involved in accidents, they
can be expected to have higher fatality rates than correctly loaded vessels in
similar situations. The Le Joola and Spice Islander accidents are good
examples of that phenomenon.672
Overloading has many parents. Greed, obviously, and stupidity, ignorance,
inadequate regulation and non-existent enforcement are some of the more
common. Mostly, operators in poor and poorly regulated countries, seem to
get away with overloading but, when something goes wrong, such as a
collision or grounding, or, even, too sharp a turn, an overloaded vessel
becomes a very dangerous vessel. They are less stable and, inevitably, have
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significantly less life saving equipment than necessary. Overloading will
invariably exacerbate other safety deficiencies.
Overloading, unsurprisingly, usually involves unseaworthy, poorly maintained
or neglected vessels.

7.2.4. Negligence.
Negligence, obviously, is something of a „catch all‟ word that encompasses a
number of human errors. More specifically, though, it is used here in the
sense of its New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of: “Lack of
attention to what ought to be done; failure to take proper or necessary care of
a thing or person; lack of necessary or reasonable care in doing something;
carelessness”.673
An Indian study of the causes of 25 sinkings in the Arabian Sea in the three
years to October 2007 concluded that in 23 cases, “…the primary cause was
Indian seafarers not exercising due care or displaying their professional skills
in discharging their duties…”.674 Interestingly, while that study was revealed
by the Deputy Director General of Shipping in India, it failed to appear on the
Directorate‟s website. However, while unseaworthy vessels, poor lookout and
overloaded vessels could also, of course, be described generally as
negligence, they are better described more specifically when the evidence of
them is obvious.

7.2.5. Poor seamanship.
Another „catch all‟ expression that is closely related to negligence and is used
here when the evidence points to it as the sole most precise description of the
cause of an accident. Seamanship in this case can be defined as: “… the art
or practice of managing a ship or boat at sea; the skill of a good seaman”.675
In the BMPVA database, as far as numbers of accidents are concerned, poor
seamanship is classified among “Others” but, among numbers of fatalities, it
is the fifth biggest cause at 4.3 per cent of fatalities.

7.2.6. Suicides/Accidents.
These somewhat nebulous words are used to describe obvious suicides, man
overboard and slip and fall accidents. In many cases it is difficult to be certain
as, for example, with a person overboard, whether it is a fall or suicide or,
even, a murder. That is, was it accidental or deliberate? The vast majority of
such incidents involve cruise ships rather than ferries and drugs or alcohol
appear to often be involved. Suicides and accidents comprise 4.1 per cent of
673
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fatal passenger vessel accidents but are immaterial as far as the total
numbers of ferry fatalities are concerned.676

7.2.7. The hierarchy of accident causes.
It must be emphasised that this hierarchy is author assessed and is derived
from the often very limited reports that are available as to the causes of many
of the „known‟ accidents incorporated in the BMPVA database. Nevertheless,
there is no better available source of such information so it must suffice for the
purposes of this thesis. In any case, where full, descriptive official reports
have become available, they have generally, with the notable exception of the
multi-national Estonia, inquiry, agreed closely with the author‟s
assessment.677

7.3.1. Analysis of human factors or errors and their effects –
the human element.
Considerable research has been conducted into this subject, particularly since
1980. Several learned and practical books have been written and numerous
papers and articles published. Many of those have been cited in earlier
chapters.678 All that thought and effort has led to considerable improvement in
the safety consciousness and behaviour of mariners in developed countries.
Much of this has been achieved by better training methods and a relentless
focus on the importance of situational awareness to mariners, particularly
watch keepers. Crews and other employees of ferry companies must be
constantly reminded to think safety. Safety consciousness has to be drilled
into them so that it becomes practically instinctive as it is in the aviation
industry. The development and maintenance of a safety culture is now widely
considered to be imperative.
Regrettably, however, practically all of that improvement has been seen in the
developed world. As has been shown often enough in the foregoing, poorer
developing countries continue to experience an alarming frequency of fatal
passenger vessel accidents. They, almost without exception, (93%) involve
domestic ferries. In reality, in the first seventeen years of this third millennium,
the average annual global death toll has changed very little.679 And, most
importantly, human error remains the predominant cause of maritime
accidents even in western developed countries.
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The seemingly impossible imperative is to transfer some of that research,
training, thought, education, discipline, regulation and enforcement from the
developed to the developing worlds. While in the African countries educational
standards, generally, are low, in Asian maritime nations, with the notable
exception of Myanmar, the majority of people have received at least a primary
education.680 That means that effective safety training and education should
be achievable in at least half of the worst ten countries. Again, sadly, there
seems to be considerable reluctance, or at least an absence of will, on the
part of IMO to at least try to emulate the very successful work of its ICAO
counterpart in such countries.
Norwegian researchers Rumawas and Asbjornslett overstate the obvious with
respect to the Philippines and other developing countries in their paper A
proposed model to account (for) human factors in safety critical systems. 681
Quoting Spouge, Lawson and Weisbrod, they introduce their paper with the
comment that: “The conditions are characterised by low operating standards,
cheap fares, mixture of cargo and passengers, low safety awareness,
inadequate regulations, inadequate vessels, second-hand fleet, overcrowding
and unpleasant services”.682 They have then tried to create a mathematical
model to predict and prevent fatal human errors affecting ferry operations.
Their approach seems far too complicated to be likely to be introduced in
practice. Human behaviour seems rarely to comply with mathematical models.
It can be analysed and described far more simply and effectively without using
them.
An American Bureau of Shipping analysis was more realistic.683 It at least
gathered real data that was as accurate as possible from the US, UK, Canada
and Australia. There inquiries are open, fair, careful, and their determinations
publicly available. Their work that, obviously, excludes developing country
data, concludes that 50 per cent of maritime accidents “are initiated by human
error” while a further 30 per cent were ”due to failures of humans to avoid an
accident”. That, presumably, amounts to almost the same thing. Their
analysis provides an illuminating overview of human error causal factors in
developed countries. Regrettably, due to the data deficiencies that afflict all
such studies, including this one, they did not examine their developing country
counterparts.
Several organisations and individuals have tried to instil a safety culture into
governments and ferry operators in developing countries. IMO has at least
paid lip service to the ideal. It has given minimal support and its imprimatur to
an effort by INTERFERRY, in concert with the Worldwide Ferry Safety
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Association, to encourage improvement in Bangladesh and Indonesia.684 That
programme had the laudable but completely unrealistic objective of reducing
ferry fatalities by 90 per cent over the ten years from the end of 2005.To its
credit, though, perhaps the dramatic reductions in fatalities in 2013 and 2016
may have been due in some measure to the programme. Unfortunately,
however, the other years in the sequence showed no real improvement and
large numbers of fatalities have continued to occur in both countries since.685
As far back as May 1991, J. R. Spouge published a paper Passenger ferry
safety in the Philippines in which he compared the risk of ferry travel in the
Philippines with that in the UK.686 He came to the logical conclusion that, “…
the most important underlying cause of the accident record is poverty and
therefore the most effective solution is not naval architectural but lies in
economic and political development”. While very largely correct, in the sense
of poverty induced fatalism, ignorance and carelessness, he did overlook the
obvious conceptual design deficiencies of the flimsy motor bancas and
neglected elderly and often poorly conventional modified Ro-Pax ferries that
continue to be widely used in the Philippines despite their appalling safety
record.
There is little doubt, though, that the widespread attention to human error
induced accidents in many areas of endeavour in the developed world since
the 1980s has had many positive results. Indeed, the author contributed to
one such programme in the mid-1970s. It was inspired and directed by Sir
Tristan Antico, Chairman and managing director of a then large Australian
building materials company Pioneer Concrete. Antico had become alarmed at
the number of human error caused accidents affecting his employees and
determined to significantly reduce them. Basically, through personal example,
good communications, humour, leadership and training, a very sound safety
culture was imbued throughout the company‟s work force. Employees were
reminded to think safety. A significant reduction in minor and major accidents
ensued within two years.687 A safety culture was imbued.
One of the world‟s largest ferry owning companies, Canada‟s state owned BC
Ferries, has shown what a focus on human errors can achieve. In a major
awakening, following the scandal arising from the grounding and sinking of its
Ro-Pax ferry Queen of the North in 2006, BC Ferries made significant efforts
to improve its safety behaviour throughout the very large company. In the
following decade it has only suffered two known fatalities and no significant
vessel damage. The company attributes that success to maintaining a
constant focus on safety on the part of all its employees.688
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Regrettably, this dramatic and substantial improvement has been tarnished by
BC Ferries‟ inexplicable sale of a very elderly sheltered waters Ro-Pax ferry to
Fiji.689 The company has somewhat redeemed itself since with the very
conditional sale of its 53 year old ferry Queen of Burnaby.690
The Philippines Government, through its Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), has implemented an extensive regulatory programme since
2013.691 While progress has been slow it has been discernable and provides
a good example of what can be achieved by a determined developing country
government.692
The inculcation of a safety culture is achievable if enthusiastically promoted
from the top. It would certainly be a good investment in any organisation,
particularly those involved with public transport.693

7.4.1. Wider analyses of human factor roles in fatalities.
Probably the best, most effective, in terms of inspiring reforms, and most
widely reported MBOI was that into the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize.694
Even more focused and therefore interesting was an analysis of the accident
and the subsequent inquiry by investigative journalist Mick Hamer that was
published in The New Scientist on 23 July 1987.695 Mr Hamer‟s article
presents a devastating summary of the main points made in the report of
Justice Sir Barry Sheen‟s very thorough Formal Investigation into the
circumstances of the accident. It describes a litany of human errors on the
part of almost all involved from senior management through the master to the
lowliest seaman. It also describes the inevitable attempts to „cover-up‟ the
facts and shift the blame, particularly by the vessel‟s owner and the
responsible government authorities. Mr Hamer‟s most salient points were:





“The capsize took about 90 seconds…”
“The speed of the capsize was the direct cause of the high death toll…”
“It is the fundamental design of the ferry that, I understand, is the
problem…”, M. Thatcher, Prime Minister.
“I have no evidence to support the view that this was due to any fault in
the design of the ship”. J. Moore, Secretary of State for Transport.
“…naval architect told the inquiry that …roll-on roll-off ferries should
have a subdivided car deck to prevent water from sloshing across…”
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“The rapid capsize caused the great loss of life. That is the area which
is so difficult”, Sir Barry Sheen.
“The shipping companies (Ferry owners) are now fighting a scarcely
veiled rearguard action to delay or shelve (deck) subdivision”.
“The immediate cause of the accident was not a subject of controversy
at the inquiry. The bow doors…were open. The assistant bosun, whose
job it was to close them, was asleep”.
“When the speed reached 16 knots, the water began to enter the bow
doors and the ferry was doomed”.
“Much of the evidence at the inquiry concerned the slipshod operating
methods of the vessel‟s operators”.
“The buccaneering spirit of the company…”
“The inquiry heard that on another occasion, another ferry had sailed
with its watertight doors open. Again, this was because the crew
member…had fallen asleep”.
“Communications in the company were so poor that…”
“Captain Martin, Townsend Thoresen‟s senior captain sent a
memorandum saying: „It is so important to the safety of the ship that
they (the bow and stern doors) are closed, we should have bridge
indication‟. The company treated this request with derision”.
“The company had plenty of warnings. Its captains regularly pointed
out serious deficiencies”.
“Following his review of safety in the wake of the sinking of Townsend
Thoresen‟s ferry the European Gateway, in 1982 (6 fatalities), Captain
Martin wrote: „The company could be considered negligent on a
number of points, particularly when it affects commercial interests‟”.
“He warned about the dangers of overloading”.
“The company replied that this was an operational matter, implying that
overloading did not affect the safety of the ship”.
“…shore staff counted the number of passengers boarding the
ships…separate counts by the crew on board had been abandoned to
remove the possibility of discrepancies…”
“Nevertheless, several captains carried out spot checks because the
captain is legally liable if the ship is overloaded. These spot checks
revealed large discrepancies between the two counts”.
“The possibility of overloading was all the more serious because the
draughts were virtually never read”.
“…Townsend Thoresen…relied on declarations of the weight of their
lorries by drivers. These declarations were frequently false…by an
average of 10 per cent”.
“The Herald of Free Enterprise was almost certainly overloaded on the
night of the accident…”
“The company‟s strategy at the inquiry was to admit its shortcomings
and to argue that it had remedied them. P&O took over Townsend
Thoresen three months before the accident”.
“ The shipowners (P&O and rival Sealink), through the General Council
of British Shipping, and after talks with the Department of Transport,
have started a research programme on ferry safety. The research will
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be carried out by Three Quays Marine Services, part of P&O, and Hart
Fenton, part of Sea Containers, the owners of Sealink”.
“…the lawyer representing the Secretary of State for Transport at the
inquiry, questioned whether this study was a device to forestall, or
delay, subdividing car decks near the waterline”.
“Marshall Meek, vice-president of the Royal Institution of Naval
Architects, said that the principle of subdividing decks dated back to
before the Titanic, Britain‟s worst maritime disaster. He said: „Ro-ros
are more likely to capsize‟”.
“Meek said that he strongly suspected that the shipowners often hid
behind the delays in achieving international agreement to avoid costly
changes in design”.
“…a senior nautical surveyor…said that it was policy for Britain to
negotiate changes in design through the International Maritime
Organisation. He gave an example concerning lifeboats…” which took
18 years to be implemented.
“I cannot understand the reluctance… to lead the field in safety”,
Justice Sir Barry Sheen.
“On 1 May, two Sealink train ferries collided off Dover…On 2 June, a
Townsend Thoresen ferry ran aground just outside Larne Harbour in
Ireland. In neither case was there injury”.696

Townsend Thoresen, it should be remembered, is the company that
threatened to sue the author‟s company, Baird Publications, for defamation
after it published a series of articles exposing the safety deficiencies of many
English Channel and North Sea ferries, including but without specifically
mentioning Townsend Thoresen‟s ships, in the months prior to the Herald of
Free Enterprise tragedy. It was also the owner of the Ro-Pax ferry European
Gateway which capsized on the opposite side of the North Sea, killing six
people five years before the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized.697 Townsend
Thoresen was purchased by P&O Ferries three months before the latter
accident.
The Sheen Inquiry exposed the multitude of human errors of both omission
and commission that were the norm among major ferry operators in some of
the most developed countries at the time. Many of these had been highlighted
in the articles written by Dag Pike and published in Baird Publications‟
magazine Work Boat World that are mentioned above.698 It took nearly a
decade and three more major Ro-Pax ferry accidents, involving the
Scandinavian Star, Jan Heweliusz and Estonia, and a further 1,116 fatalities
before any significant reforms were implemented in Northern Europe699 with
the implementation of the Stockholm Rules.700
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Inevitably, even the Stockholm Rules involved considerable compromise and
prevarication on the part of ship owners, their consulting and employed naval
architects and some national regulators. However, as the data in the BMPVA
database shows, the rules have been effective in the Northern Europe region
in which they apply.701
Tragically, they have still not been implemented elsewhere and the same
kinds of human errors, or worse, continue to cause numerous significant fatal
accidents every year. The reports of the MBOIs into the Rabaul Queen and
Sewol accidents are disappointingly reminiscent of that into the Herald of
Free Enterprise disaster.702 Worse still, those reports of very thorough
inquiries are exceedingly rare. Most other fatal ferry accidents are barely
inquired into or reported on at all.
As with road accidents in developed countries prior to the publication of Ralph
Nader‟s influential Unsafe at Any Speed,703 when accidents were routinely
investigated by untrained junior policemen, investigations of ferry accidents in
developing countries are generally accorded a very low priority. Indeed, apart
from the three inquiries mentioned above and that into the Marchioness
collision and capsize as well as most of the Hong Kong Marine Department‟s
accident inquiries, useful reports emanating from MBOIs are disappointingly
scarce, particularly in developing countries. They are practically non-existent
in the countries where most of the major fatal ferry accidents occur. Of
course, inevitably, the most thorough inquiries and the most enlightening
reports are produced in the countries where fatal ferry accidents occur least
frequently.

7.5.1. IMO‟s Human Element Vision.
As have most other maritime organisations that are concerned with safety,
IMO has devoted considerable time, money and discussion to solving or
reducing the problem of human error. Most particularly during the mid-1990s,
IMO reviewed and revised its STCW (Standards of Training Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers with an increased focus on human factors or the
human element.704 Further, in 2006 and through to 2010, it again reviewed the
STCW Code and Convention culminating in the, so-called, Manila
Amendments which entered into force on 1 January 2012.705 It declared: “The
safety and security of life at sea, protection of the marine environment and
over 90% of the world‟s trade depends on the professionalism and
competence of seafarers”.
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Such resolutions and many like them illustrate an understanding and
realisation of the importance of human factors to the safety of maritime
activity. There is little doubt that wider realisation, combined with a focus on
the dangers of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, has led to a significant
reduction in the numbers of ferry accidents and fatalities in the developed
world, the OECD countries in other words. That is shown clearly by the data in
the BMPVA database.706 However, and tragically, that message is obviously
not getting through to most of the developing countries where, since 2000, the
accident and fatality rates have remained largely constant.
Indeed, despite the best declared intentions of IMO and its far more
enthusiastic and effective collaborators in INTERFERRY and the Worldwide
Ferry Safety Association, their combined plan to reduce global ferry fatalities
by 90 per cent over the ten years from 2005 to 2014 has sadly and very
embarrassingly failed.707 That failure was not due to an absence of effort and
good intentions on the part of INTERFERRY and its associated WFSA, rather,
it was due more to a lack of will on the part of IMO.708
So, IMO has paid attention to human factors, elements and errors and even
allowed for them in revisions to its STCW and SOLAS codes. The problem is
that human errors are continuing to cause fatalities in passenger vessel
accidents and IMO seems to be at a loss as to what to do to prevent them in
developing countries in particular. IMO continues to make grand statements of
realisation and intent but it also continues to fail to follow up with action on its
own part. It fails most notably to persuade or support its poorer “sovereign
member nations” to take any action inspired by its grand statements.
IMO also tends to focus excessively on the, nonetheless important,
contributing factors of fatigue and poor working conditions rather than on
proven potential cures such as more and better safety training and more
rigorous disciplines. It would be preferable if it left the fatigue and working
condition problems to its related organisation the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and took a more holistic approach to all human factor
problems.

7.5.2. Classification societies, too, have researched human
error extensively.
The classification societies, particularly Lloyd‟s Register, DNV GL, Bureau
Veritas and ABS, have analysed, researched, discussed and published
extensively on the maritime dangers of human error for more than thirty years.
They have made numerous recommendations as to how human errors could
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be significantly reduced, if not eliminated.709 As with the similar efforts of IMO,
however, their work has very definitely borne fruit in developed countries.
There, as the data in the BMPVA database clearly shows, there has been a
very significant reduction in the numbers of both accidents and fatalities. Their
influence, however, has been negligible in the developing countries where the
vast majority of fatal ferry accidents have occurred and continue to occur.710
They effectively have little or no influence on domestic ferry operations in
developing countries. In such countries the activities of the classification
societies is almost entirely focused on international shipping, particularly
cargo shipping. Few, if any, domestically operating passenger vessels are „in
class‟ there.711 It is to be hoped that situation will change eventually.
Nevertheless, their work has been approached thoroughly and scientifically
and its results are of considerable value even allowing for their largely
ineffectual dissemination to those places where they could be most useful. If
nothing else, they could provide useful educational, training and propaganda
material if IMO were to seriously encourage safety improvements in the
developing countries where they are most needed. The classification societies
have undoubtedly met with considerable success in many of the developed
countries where both the number of ferry accidents and their deadliness have
been significantly reduced over the past two decades.712 At least they have
shown how the human error problem should be approached.
Their newsletters, corporate magazines, brochures and conference papers
have consistently promoted the requirement and the means to reduce human
errors. DNV GL, for example, in an online article, compares the ferry industry
crew fatality rate in OECD countries with whole of industry „best practice‟ and
shows it is ten times higher in the maritime industry. 713 The article promotes
three safety goals: “using human error as a symptom of weakness in the
system, rather than as an explanation for an accident; to manage major
accident risks; and, to assess and improve the safety culture”. It states, very
reasonably, that: “People are making mistakes but it is very seldom that the
mistakes are deliberate”. Further, it reasons: “…the deliberate violation link is
almost non-existing and that the wrong action or judgement is the main
contributor to accidents”. In other words, as Joseph Conrad put it so well more
than a century ago in his novel Lord Jim, we need to determine “why”
accidents happen much more than “how” they happen.714 Few Marine Boards
of Inquiry, as they are currently constituted, manage to determine “why”.
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Moving toward a discussion of safety culture, the article states that: “If the
ferry industry wants to improve in this area, it needs to establish an
understanding of the company‟s responsibility to facilitate good human
performance. If human error occurs it needs to be treated as a symptom of
weakness in the system, and not as a standalone human error”715. It says,
“safety culture has been defined in many different ways in literature, however
the saying „it‟s what you do when no one is watching‟ sums up the definitions
quite well”.716
Lloyd‟s Register, too, has highlighted the human factor problem in many of its
publications. An example is its October 2008 publication, Human Focus.
Under the heading, The human element: A perfect storm, it describes, “The
list of reported problems involving the people in shipping seems to grow all
the time”.717 It mentions many of the problems described elsewhere in this
work, such as: “Navigation accidents… Slips, trips and falls. Near misses.
Morale… Terms of employment. Accommodation conditions. Human error.
Poor equipment maintenance… Attitudes and culture. Communication
difficulties… Fatigue. Complacency. Poor training. Lack of experience. Shipshore conflicts”.
The articles mention problems of adapting to new technology; competence
requirements lagging new regulations and technology; and, outsourcing and
subcontracting. They say: “It is time to rethink how people are incorporated
into the maritime system”. Further, it states, very presciently: “The human
element is widely accepted as the greatest source of operational risk to
modern ships. For ship operators, being able to manage this risk effectively
will help to reduce incidents involving damage to life, vessels, cargo and the
environment, as well as encouraging an effective, motivated and satisfied
workforce”.
Lloyd‟s Register has gone to considerable lengths, and expense, to establish
and fund the Lloyd‟s Register Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU) that
operates as a charity to help “protect life and property and support education,
engineering-related research and public engagement”.718 It has sponsored
significant research and, most significantly in the present context, a Cardiff
University study into “safety and perceptions of risk in the maritime sector”.719
The most useful and revealing paper arising from that research reveals very
significant differences between perceptions of risk and the reality of accidents
in the minds of mariners. The study also highlights the scarcity of useful data
describing „ship level‟ events and seafarer injury. 720 This ongoing problem is
described in 2.1.3.
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Impressively, the Lloyd‟s Register Foundation in its Insight report on global
safety challenges for 2017, mentions the “safety challenge” of passenger
ferries. It recommends as follows: “Seek to influence the IMO to enforce
regions to take up regulations that would make ferries safer in design and
methods of use”.721
French based Bureau Veritas, too, has backed similar studies and in 1999
published the very useful and impressively honest book Safety at Sea –
Policies, Regulations & International Law, by Philippe Boisson.722 It is a very
comprehensive review of all aspects of maritime safety approached from a
very practical and realistic legal perspective.
The statistics show clearly that all the research by the governments of
western developed nations and their associated research and educational
institutions and classification societies is having a positive effect on maritime
safety in those developed countries.723 That is laudable and gratifying. The
problem described, analysed and considered in this thesis is that those
valuable reforms are not, however, being effectively introduced into the much
more needy developing countries. They, after all, are where the major part
of the problem has always been and continues to be.

7.5.3. Governments, generally, are well aware of the human
error problem.
Marine and transport departments of developed country governments are well
aware of human error as a major cause of accidents. Many of them go to
considerable trouble and expense to educate, train and inform mariners of the
dangers of such accidents. They sponsor, facilitate and organise numerous
accident avoidance programmes. They also assiduously investigate accidents
and widely disseminate the reports of those investigations and publicise the
lessons that can be learnt from them. Some of them, such as the Transport
Department in the Australian state of New South Wales, employ behavioural
scientists such as psychologists with that in mind.724 Regrettably, those
practices are generally non-existent in the developing countries where so
many of the fatal ferry accidents occur.
Countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Japan,
the United Kingdom and all the west European and Scandinavian nations
have similar and very highly developed systems in place that are focused on
accident avoidance. Hong Kong and Singapore, with their particularly
crowded waterways and high general standards of living and education, are
similarly conscious of the dangers of human error caused marine accidents.
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In Australia, for example, the New South Wales state government Office of
Transport Safety Investigations is responsible for “identifying „why‟ (author‟s
quotes) an accident or incident occurred and to make recommendations to
prevent a similar occurrence happening in the future”.725 As of 17 April 2017,
the OTSI website listed thirty complete or “in-progress” Investigation Reports
on ferry accidents or incidents on Sydney Harbour dating from February 2004
to October 2016. Most were minor and only two involved one and four
fatalities respectively.726 However, all were carefully investigated and the
lessons learnt publicised. All the other Australian state governments have
departments that take similar approaches.
Nationally, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau performs a similar function
for accidents and incidents that occur in Commonwealth waters beyond state
boundaries. Its reports are detailed, readable, instructive and widely
disseminated.727 They also: “…seek to identify safety issues and encourage
safety action to reduce the risk of future accidents and incidents”. They aim to
determine „why‟ accidents occurred.
The United Kingdom, similarly, has its Marine Accident Investigation Branch
which conducts investigations into and reports on all significant marine
incidents and accidents.728 The MAIB‟s objectives are identical to those of its
Australian counterparts. So, too, are New Zealand‟s Transport Accident
Investigation Commission729 and Canada‟s Marine Accidents and
Investigations section of its Transport and Infrastructure Department. 730
Because it has dual civil and military roles, the United States Coast Guard
carries out policing activities in addition to the investigation and analysis
activities of its counterparts in other countries. Nevertheless, it performs all
their other accident prevention activities. The US Coast Guard‟s Office of
Investigations & Casualty Analysis leads the,”…Coast Guard‟s investigation
program to promote safety, protect the environment, and to prevent future
accidents”.731
Most other developed nations take similar approaches to the problem of
maritime transport safety. The data in Appendix A show that their efforts have,
unsurprisingly, been largely successful. Those governments share their
knowledge among themselves both through and beyond IMO at various
conferences, seminars and symposia held around the world. They are
remarkably co-operative and constructive and mostly work diligently to reduce
the human error effect on marine safety. As a result, they mostly use similarly
effective educational, promotional and enforcement techniques.
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Even the governments of developing countries such as the Philippines,
Bangladesh and Papua New-Guinea are well aware of the safety deficiencies
of their domestic ferry industries. The author has discussed the problem at
length with a number of senior maritime officials in each of those countries.732
They unanimously agree that human error is the real cause of most fatal
accidents. Their difficulty lies in persuading their governments to take
constructive action to remedy the problem. At least, though, despite generally
inadequate support, they have been employed by their governments to try to
improve domestic maritime safety. Further, as noted in 7.3.1, the Philippines
has recently been making considerable regulatory efforts towards that
objective.

7.5.4. Industry and professional associations are similarly
active.
The global ferry industry association INTERFERRY733 has a domestic ferry
safety sub-committee (Of which the author is a member) that investigates
safety matters and trends and actively promotes greater ferry safety,
especially through its associated organisation, the Worldwide Ferry Safety
Association.734 The latter organises specific focused ferry safety conferences
annually in New York to date. Encouragingly, however, its 2019 conference
will be held in Bangkok. INTERFERRY also holds annual conferences at
changing venues around the world. They always have a safety component in
which IMO involvement is encouraged. Indeed, the WFSA conducts
International Student Design Competitions in conjunction with government or
operator representatives from developing nations. It also promotes „e-learning‟
and the greater use of weather and navigational technology.
The recently appointed (late 2016) chief executive of INTERFERRY, Michael
Corrigan, was previously the CEO of BC Ferries where as COO in 2006 he
dealt with the aftermath of the fatal Queen of the North foundering.735 He has
actual experience of such accidents, and the importance of their human
factors. He has done much to prevent their recurrence. The WFSA should, it
might be argued, become more effective as some of its conferences are held
in developing countries rather than New York.
Nevertheless, the WFSA, through its active research programme, has
compiled generally similar causal statistics for ferry accidents to the author‟s.
Its data are not as extensive but their trends are similar. It states, for example,
that 95 per cent of ferry accidents occur in developing nations (the same
figure as the author)736 and that, using “liberal” criteria, “… 86 per cent of lives
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lost were linked to human error”.737 This compares with the author‟s estimate
of 98 per cent. The WFSA has, in conjunction with INTERFERRY, as
mentioned in 7.5.1 above, been trying to work with IMO in Bangladesh,
Indonesia and the Philippines to promote greater ferry safety. Disappointingly,
those efforts have met with negligible success so far except, to a still limited
extent, in the Philippines.
The London based professional association for master mariners, The Nautical
Institute, has arguably carried out more research, educational and
promotional work on the marine human error problem than any other
organisation. It has published widely and constructively on the subject. Apart
from numerous magazine articles and conference papers, it has published
substantial books such as: Managing Safety and Quality in Shipping;
Improving Ship Operational Design; Human Performance and Limitation for
Mariners; Casualty Management Guidelines; Collisions and Their Causes;
Managing Collision Avoidance at Sea; and, Maritime Education and
Training738. A number of those have been cited elsewhere in this work but all
share the objective of reducing human errors in the maritime domain.
Despite all that valuable effort, in his January 2017 editorial, the Nautical
Institute‟s President, Captain Keith Stevens, commented to the effect that the
safety message fails to get through.739 Despite the expenditure of
considerable effort and money by most shipping companies injuries and
deaths continue. This, he said, is irrespective of “nationality, culture, gender or
age of the seafarers”. He recommends more concentration on training
seafarers to think and act “in the now”. The heading on his article, “Being
aware, staying safe”, summed up his message well. In other words, training
them to think and concentrate. This is something that is clearly not happening
sufficiently, even in the developed world where his organisation, of necessity,
most closely focuses its efforts.
Another very valuable maritime safety encouragement organisation is the also
British based CHIRP Maritime.740 CHIRP (Confidential Hazardous Incident
Reporting Programme) encourages incident reporting, even of minor incidents
and „near misses‟, in an endeavour to encourage learning from such
experiences. The organisation arose from the aviation industry, where such
experiential learning is widely valued and used. It is becoming more widely
known and recognised in the maritime industry although, regrettably, mainly in
developed countries. It publishes very valuable instructive articles in its own
newsletter and more widely. They are simple and based closely on actual
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experiences.741 IMO has been alerted as to its work by the UK
Government.742
Again, as with so many other human error reduction efforts, they are largely
effective in developed nation environments but practically invisible in the
developing countries where they are obviously most needed. So, too, are so
many of the other human error focused texts that have been cited in previous
chapters. A similar experience has confronted road safety campaigners in
developing countries.743 This, obviously, has become a major component of
the human error conundrum – how do we transfer proven human error
reduction techniques to the poorer countries where they are most needed?
How do we encourage the inculcation of a safety culture into such countries?

7.6.1. How, then, is a “safety culture” to be developed?
The Australian state government body Workplace Health & Safety
Queensland informs us that:A safety culture is an organisational culture that places a high level of
importance on safety beliefs, values and attitudes – and these are shared by
the majority of people within the company or workplace. It can be
characterised as „the way we do things around here‟. A positive safety culture
can result in improved workplace health and safety (WHS) and organisational
performance.
For a safety culture to be successful it needs to be led from the top – that is,
safety culture needs to be embraced and practised by the CEO and senior
managers.744
As with the wider topic of human error, safety culture has been extensively
studied, written about and promoted. It is related to and bound up in the ever
more intensive safety consciousness that has become widespread in most
developed countries since the early 1980s. Led by the aviation, oil tanker and
road safety developments described in Chapter 4, the promotional techniques
have been notably effective. They have, as a result spread widely through
most forms of human activities in those countries and elsewhere.
However, while there are some encouraging developments occurring in
places such as the Philippines,745 the concept of a safety culture is still little
known and unappreciated in the poorer parts of the world except in the
aviation industry. It is to be hoped that as has happened in the developed
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world, aviation safety consciousness will gradually spread through ferries to
road safety and beyond.
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland asserts that even in industries such
as construction, where safety used commonly to be disregarded, a safety
culture can be developed and encouraged by implementing these culture
actions:1. Communicate company values
2. Demonstrate leadership
3. Clarify required and expected behaviour
4. Develop positive safety attitudes
5. Personalise safety outcomes
6. Engage and own safety responsibilities and accountabilities
7. Increase hazard/risk awareness and preventive behaviours
8. Improve understanding and effective implementation of safety management
systems
9. Monitor, review and reflect on personal effectiveness.746
Such may be appropriate in developed countries enjoying high general
standards of education. Their likely effectiveness in poorer countries is
doubtful, however. The ongoing problem of poverty caused fatalism as
discussed in Chapter 5 seems to be a major obstacle to reform. It is,
unfortunately, a problem that is very difficult to solve.
There are many useful and accurate descriptions of „safety culture‟. One of
the better and more widely used comes from the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Commission. It states:
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to,
and style and proficiency of, an organisation‟s health and safety
management.747
Put more simply, perhaps, a good safety culture can be promoted and
developed by good training techniques and practices and leadership example.
Again, a more cynical view based on the author‟s personal observations in
developing countries and the reports of the MBOIs into the Rabaul Queen and
Sewol disasters, suggests that such visions of a safety culture may be more
likely to be realised in developed and well-educated countries.748 In
developing countries, more brutal, militaristic techniques for instilling a safety
culture among employees appear more likely to be successful. There is little
evidence of any safety training of ferry crews being conducted in developing
countries. Perhaps, therefore, an organised campaign of customer avoidance,
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or a boycott, might force recalcitrant ferry owners to act to introduce the kinds
of readily accessible safety training programmes that are required.
A 2015 study Measuring Safety Culture on Ships Using Safety Climate: A
Study among Indian Officers was revealing as to how difficult it is to instil a
safety culture among officers in a developing country environment.749
Importantly, it found among these comparatively well-educated seafarers,
that, “The perception of safety level of seafarers was found to be low
indicating the existence of misalignments between safety culture values and
the actual safety climate”. It also found national culture, probably
unsurprisingly, to be an important factor in efforts to promote a safety culture.
The study also found that: “Although the (IMO) ISM Code is considered to
provide a good basis for safety management, the extent of its implementation
is a widely held concern with ISM audits and statutory surveys widely
perceived to be of very limited benefit in helping to drive forward positive
changes in safety management and leadership”. So, as recently as 2015, it
found that, “…there appears to be a significant gap between espoused safety
values and those actually found on board…” This is not encouraging.
By contrast, though, Lu, C. S. and Yang, C. S. found in a 2010 study of
Taiwanese ferry crews that, a “… greater safety climate will lead to better
safety behaviour and further reduce accident occurrences”.750 This, perhaps,
reinforces the view that it is more likely that an effective safety culture can be
instilled in a developed, educated country, like Taiwan.
Mr Lu has studied ferry safety widely in the context of Taiwanese operations.
He determined that, “…crew members‟ ability was the most important
dimension in the passenger ferry context…”.751
Britain‟s Royal Navy, while far from flawless as far as accidents are
concerned, has maintained a generally good and effective safety culture for
generations. A reason for this may well be that the Navy, “…fosters
cheerfulness and nourishes its collective memory”.752 This was proposed in a
managerial advice essay by Andrew St. George. He states that the captain
sets the mood of a vessel and that good communications are enhanced by
“banter” and “informal networks”. The Royal Navy‟s “style of leadership”, he
suggests, “fosters trust, respect and collective effort”. It is an approach that
has facilitated an effective safety culture for well over a century.
Often, but usually only in wealthier and military communities, humour can be
very effective in promoting the safety message. It has certainly helped in the
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Royal Navy and the author noted and utilised it in his Pioneer Concrete
experience.753 The Canadian aviation safety promotion company System
Safety uses humour widely in its promotional literature and videos.754 Humour
can be very effective psychologically in promoting safety culture.
Swedish based Stena Line is one of the world‟s largest ferry operators.
Impressively, if disappointingly unusually, it employs a safety manager. In the
1990s he was Mr Per Nordstrom, who is, among other things, a qualified
naval architect. Mr Nordstrom spoke at the Cruise & Ferry 95 Conference in
London on the subject: The human factor in ferry safety.
Importantly, he commented as follows: “I am convinced that there is a human
error behind close to 100 per cent of all accidents at sea”. Further, he
emphasised: “There is though, one significant problem with ferries. When
something goes wrong or out of hand it can effect and involve many hundreds
of passengers”. He added: “We as shipowners have to take full responsibility
of how the ship is built, equipped, maintained and last but not least manned
and organised”.755 Mr Nordstrom also commented on the need for ferry
owners to deal with education, training, motivation and organisation in order to
develop a safety culture. Significantly, Stena Line has never suffered a
serious, multiple fatality ferry accident.
Researching a paper published in the journal Industrial Safety on Cultural
factors in maritime accidents, Finnish ethnologist Anne Ala-Pollanen
examined the 121 accidents recorded as occurring in the Baltic Sea during
2011.756 This was undertaken against a background of maritime culture. Ms
Ala-Pollanen points out that, while most recent studies largely blame human
factors for maritime accidents, “…there are no worldwide standardized
accident reporting systems in the maritime domain to summarize causal
themes from accident data…”.She states that: “Accidents are not usually
caused by a single failure or mistake, but by the confluence of a whole series,
or chain, of errors”.
She also raised another possible maritime cultural problem in its “emphasis
on masculinity” and maritime traditions that may now be outmoded if not
obsolete. An interesting idea.

7.6.2. The aviation industry, as usual, shows us the way.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the aviation industry, particularly since about
1980, has successfully shown all other industries the way with respect to
safety training, education and culture. The story of the recovery of the Qantas
Airbus A380, QF32, from a very dangerous and damaging engine explosion is
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an example of the aviation safety culture working to perfection.757 It describes
the recovery from a situation that could easily have degenerated so as to
cause hundreds of deaths. All the positive factors of aviation safety culture
were displayed there.
The aviation industry has been imbued with a much more safety conscious
culture than the maritime industry. Partly, this must be due to the clear
effectiveness dichotomy that distinguishes ICAO from IMO. Partly it may be
because ships work in two dimensions rather than the three of aircraft. That
requires greater situational awareness. Partly it could be because aircraft
travel so much faster than ships, thus requiring much greater concentration.
And, partly, it may be possible that the generally much greater asset value of
aircraft than ships ensures that their operators focus better.
Despite the best efforts of shipowners, governments, classification societies,
professional associations and the maritime media, the safety message is still
failing to get through to seafarers as Captain Stevens‟ comments in 7.5.4.
make clear. Obviously, it must very effectively concentrate the minds of
aviators to know that if they do make an error, the high speeds at which their
aircraft operates makes fatalities almost inevitable. Seafarers are equally as
aware that usually any errors they make will not result in fatalities. Their
minds, therefore, are less likely to be as focussed as are those of aviators.
These factors make it unlikely that the rigorous operational standards and the
very strong safety culture of most aviation industry operators will ever be fully
transferred to the maritime industry. Nevertheless, they provide an excellent
and well proven model for the maritime industry to copy. The inarguable fact
is that the aviation industry‟s safety education, training, culture and techniques
have been impressively successful for nearly four decades. The maritime
industry, particularly the ferry sector, should follow aviation‟s example much
more closely than it does.
The author discussed elsewhere the strange safety dichotomy between the
aviation and maritime industries as follows:-

7.6.3. Aviation vs. Maritime – A strange safety dichotomy
Having studied the problems of maritime safety – particularly with respect to
passenger vessels – for nearly forty years, I have been struck by the vastly
different attitudes prevailing in the aviation and maritime industries.
I am well aware that I am far from the first to notice this but I think that what
really amazes me is that this strange dichotomy endures. It seems irrational to
me that, generally speaking, the lives of aviation passengers are regarded as
being far more valuable and important than their ship or boat passenger
counterparts.
757

Hughes, A. J. What Air Crash Investigations Didn‟t Tell You About QF 32 (Airbus 380),
Airlines & Aviation, 26 December 2014, Reprinted on LinkedIn, 22 January 2017.

230

This also manifests itself in the differing attitudes and consciousness of
mariners and aviators. Perhaps, having been trained in both spheres, I am
more conscious than most of the differences.
I well remember a short voyage I took aboard a Royal Australian Navy Attack
class patrol boat from Melbourne to Westernport in the early eighties. It was
neither the first nor the last such voyage I have been fortunate enough to take
on the vessels of a number of navies. What stood out, however, was that this
particular boat was commanded by a naval aviator. His pre-voyage safety
briefing was careful, comprehensive and comprehensible, even by the lowliest
and youngest rating in his crew. I have, notably, never experienced the same
again.
Now that I am more than ever intently studying the problem of fatal passenger
vessel accidents, I am often reminded of that fundamental attitudinal
difference between most mariners and most aviators. I hasten to note that I
use the word “most” very advisedly as I have seen and experienced “careless
cowboys” in both worlds.
In its many clear and concise texts on maritime safety, command,
seamanship and navigation, the always excellent Nautical Institute frequently
refers to aviation industry procedures by way of illustration of best, or at least
better, practice. They are very right to do so since the dichotomy between the
aviation and maritime industries is most starkly defined in their differing
approaches to safety.
Obviously, approaches to safety also differ within both transport media. For
example, oil and gas service vessel and gas tanker personnel are generally
far more safety conscious than their counterparts operating fishing boats or
passenger vessels except, mostly, cruise ships. That statement is derived
both from my personal observation and from accident statistics.
A notable and very interesting phenomenon is that both the numbers and
rates per flying hours and passenger miles of passenger aircraft accidents
and fatalities have been steadily declining over the past half century. With
passenger shipping, the opposite has been the case. This is partially due to
the fact that reports and records of passenger vessel accidents were scarce
until the advent of the internet. Until about 2000, many shipping accidents
were simply never reported. Aviation accidents, on the other hand, were
faithfully and comprehensively reported and recorded assiduously and in
great detail. Apart from in the richest, most developed countries, maritime
accidents were widely ignored.
This relative absence of passenger shipping accident statistics offers a very
sharp contrast between shipping and aviation and probably best sums up the
dichotomy between the sectors. Aviation is very careful to collate, compile,
study and learn from its accident statistics. Shipping, generally, tries very hard
to suppress them.
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I invite readers to refer to the International Maritime Organisation‟s online
GISIS database and its accident statistics. This Global Integrated Shipping
Information System is a well meaning but completely inadequate attempt by
IMO to match its aviation counterpart, ICAO, in the provision and study of
accident statistics. Sadly, GISIS, apart from as far as the rich developed
countries are concerned, is almost completely useless. Refer to some of the
more notable developing country accidents you know of and see how GISIS
approaches their recording. Then compare and contrast that with ICAO‟s
treatment of even the least known aviation accidents. It is a very and tragically
revealing exercise.
Starting from this paucity of data, the differences between aviation and
maritime approaches to safety multiply dramatically. Anyone who has
travelled by either ferry or passenger aircraft would be well aware of the
differences between the approaches to safety in the two sectors. Safety is
serious business in aviation. In shipping, regrettably, it is too often a
grudgingly made afterthought at best.
Safety regulations and reporting requirements are rigorously enforced globally
in aviation. In shipping, even in developed countries, they are frequently
regarded lackadaisically. In developing countries they are generally ignored.
Shipping has much to learn from aviation in terms of safety and many other
matters. It is high time we took the aviation example much more seriously. 758
Safety, it seems, is a state of mind. That state of mind is dominant globally in
aviation and in developed country shipping but practically and tragically nonexistent in most non-aviation activities in developing countries.

7.6.4. Adapting proven human error solutions to the maritime
industry.
Israeli American psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
demonstrated that humans are “wired to make mistakes”.759 However, they
showed that people value and take note of gains and losses, thus making
their behaviour able to be modified. Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize
in 2002 for his work on behavioural economics.
This ability to modify human behaviour has been proved almost ad nauseum
in successful campaigns to improve safety in almost all industries and much
of public behaviour in most developed countries. It would seem that the
psychological techniques the pair researched and developed in the 1970s and
1980s should be readily adaptable to the maritime industry, even in
developing countries.
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In their work on improving safety in complex systems, Marais et al described
the “interactive complexity” of “tightly coupled” systems such as aircraft,
aircraft carriers, air traffic control towers and nuclear power plants.760 They
also referred to ferries and described the “complex interactions” in the Herald
of Free Enterprise accident.
Using a rather convoluted and confusing diagram, they described quite clearly
how: “The type of bottom-up decentralized decision-making advocated for
HROs (High Risk Organizations) can lead to major accidents in complex
socio-technical systems”.761 This analysis was based on the Herald of Free
Enterprise accident. They described ferries as complex and high-tech and
claimed that “… learning from accidents is not the only or even the most
effective way to lower risk in high-tech systems”.
Their analysis compares the objectives of greater reliability and safety in
systems and suggest that they sometimes conflict. They logically claim that a
systems approach to safety is more likely to be effective than a component
approach.
Other marine accident analyses describe issues of language, fatigue and
working conditions as being contributors to human errors. Language,
however, seems unlikely to be a factor in domestic ferry accidents where
almost all fatalities (93%) have occurred. Fatigue and working conditions
logically appear to be significant contributors. However, obviously, elimination
or improvement of those in developing countries will require very significant
government intervention.762

7.7.1. Better training would eliminate many problems.
With some 180 active maritime training and education institutions, it is
incongruous that the Philippines continues to have such a bad ferry safety
record. That, the author has been advised by Commodore Dante La Jiminez,
is due to the fact that almost all graduates of those institutions are employed
outside the Philippines.763 The fact that their graduates are in considerable
demand from developed country shipowners confirms that advice.
So, as in most, if not all, of the twenty most dangerous countries for ferry
accidents, it appears that crew training is dangerously deficient, at least as far
as domestic ferries are concerned. The 2016 Allianz Safety & Shipping
Review from leading marine insurance underwriter, Allianz, confirms that.
Discussing passenger ship safety, it states that: “some Asian routes are many
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years behind recognised international standards, as evidenced by a number
of ferry losses in South East Asian waters”.764
One of the major handicaps restricting an insurance led safety improvement is
due to the very inadequate data available about domestic ferry accidents in
developing countries. Indeed, at the International Union of Marine Insurers
2017 Conference in Tokyo, in which the author participated, there was a100
minute workshop dedicated to the problems of „Facts & Figures‟.765 Indeed,
the marine and Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurance sectors appear to be
increasingly interested in the risks associated with domestic ferry operations.
The very fact of the author being invited to address the 2017 IUMI Tokyo
Conference indicates that. The marine insurance sector, generally, could be a
very powerful reforming influence as far as domestic ferry safety is concerned.
Fortunately, it appears likely that it will be.
The Allianz Review describes an increase in fatigue related insurance claims,
low crew numbers and a “future staffing shortage”. It comments that
“…training remains below par in some areas…”. Complacency, boredom,
drudgery and “routinisation” have been described as additional human error
inducing factors in an editorial in trade magazine Ferry Technology.766 All
these would indicate an urgent need for increased and improved training of,
particularly domestic, ferry crews. Much greater discipline of crews is equally
urgently needed.
Leading Australian fishing vessel owner Hagen Stehr AO, wrote in May 2016
that: “Training is still an unappreciated field of endeavour”.767 Mr. Stehr is the
founding chairman of the Australian Maritime Academy. He is well aware of
the safety deficiencies of the fishing industry that are similar to those exhibited
by the ferry industry.
Describing problems he sees in the fishing industry, he commented: “…I did
advocate strict laws and controls in the maritime and fishing sectors
concerning training, skills and knowledge, for our crews to become more
professional, committed, have a pride in their positions, and to eliminate the
„she‟ll be right mate‟ attitude so entrenched in our industry”. He concluded his
comments thus: “The conclusion is that training and tough analysis of skills
are imperative in a safety conscious industry and you can never get enough
training.
Another Australian, Captain Kim Cleggett, the founder of International
Maritime Services, a global vessel delivery and crew training business,768
commented to the author thus: “Many of the (Asian) crews we work with have
the paper qualifications but they lack the experience and „hands on‟ training
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required to make them competent. We frequently need to retrain them to
make them safe to go to sea with”.769
As Lu and Yang, in their 2010 paper Safety climate and safety behaviour in
the passenger ferry context describe it, “…the majority of workplace accidents
and injuries can be attributed to the unsafe work practices of employees
rather than unsafe working conditions”.770 Their work was based on a study of
practices in a Taiwanese ferry industry context but set against research into
wider, global literature.
They concluded that a management led and inspired safety climate is vital
and that, “…safety training and emergency preparedness are positively
associated with safety behaviour, including safety compliance and safety
participation, whereas safety policy and safety communication have a positive
but not significant influence on safety compliance”.771 In other words, their
very extensive research confirms that effective safety training significantly
improves safety behaviour and consciousness.

7.7.2. Who will pay for such training?
Who will pay for such training in developing countries? Ultimately, it will
probably be a combination of national government and foreign aid money. An
extant example is the support provided to Indonesia by the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority. Meanwhile, however, private companies such as
the large Dutch shipbuilding company Damen Shipyards Group are practical
and effective benefactors. In the Philippines, for example, Damen joined with
the Netherlands Shipping Training Centre in 2016 to offer a training course
they have developed for Philippines based ferry crew. The launching press
release explained: “The training package will feature a number of elements,
including rules and regulations (ISM Code), crew and crisis management and
– important in public transportation – cross-cultural differences”.772
As with most other aspects of ferry safety in developing countries, the wheel
does not need to be re-invented. The maritime industry in developed countries
and many other industries globally have excellent training programs that could
readily and economically be adapted to local conditions even in the most
impoverished of nations. Again, what is required to make it happen is a
willingness on the part of IMO and the national governments concerned to
ensure that it does happen. Very regrettably, there is little evidence of such
will forthcoming from IMO headquarters in London or from the capitals of the
countries concerned. It seems more likely that the private sector, some NGOs
and benevolent neighbouring developed countries will make things happen,
perhaps with some encouragement from insurers.
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7.8.0. Insurers to demand reforms.
While most of the smaller vessels that are involved in fatal accidents are
believed to be un-insured, the larger ones – with the biggest death tolls –
appear to be at least partially insured, especially in Indonesia and the
Philippines. Press reports of the aftermath of accidents often refer to
insurance claims and disputes, particularly in the Philippines.773 In developed
countries ships are invariably insured. Passenger compensation costs, even
in developing countries, are apparently increasing rapidly. They have already
done so in developed countries. This, obviously, is of considerable concern to
insurers who can be expected to act rationally and logically in their own best
interests in response.
As far back as in 2000 at the London conference of the International Union of
Marine Insurance (IUMI), a leading underwriter, David Davies of Royal and
Sun Alliance said that a major cruise ship loss “would blow the guts out of the
market”.774 The rapid growth in the predominantly American owned cruise
industry over the last twenty years has highlighted the problems facing the
marine insurance sector. Obviously, American litigation habits make the
problem particularly alarming to insurers in that jurisdiction but those habits
are inevitably spreading globally. IMO has dithered and a division between
rich and poor countries has opened as the value of a human life has been
debated. Is, for example, a Filipino worth as much as a Frenchman?
Commencing at an IMO conference in Athens in December 1974, the
dithering and debate finally resulted in the „Entry into force‟ in April 2014, forty
years later, of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers
and their Luggage by Sea (PAL).775 According to IMO: “The Convention
establishes a regime of liability for damage suffered by passengers carried on
a seagoing vessel”. However, unless such was caused recklessly, the
carrier‟s liability, including for death or injury, can be limited to 250,000 SDR
(Special Drawing Rights), or about USD 345,000, per person. The Convention
requires carriers to be insured accordingly.
At the time of publication none of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities
were signatories to the PAL Convention. Indeed, by January 2016 only 24
countries were.776 Again, IMO has shown itself unwilling, even with more than
forty years to prepare, to persuade, cajole, demand or influence its poorer
member states to take this elementary step towards ensuring greater ferry
safety.
While the passenger vessel insurance debate has tended to focus on cruise
ships because of the staggering amounts of money likely to be involved – one
incident with passenger deaths, pollution and salvage involved could easily
773

There are numerous examples in Appendix A, particularly with respect to Sulpicio Lines
and Negros Navigation.
774
Reported in Seatrade Cruise Review, Stuart, D., Escalating risk, Seatrade Group, London,
December 2000, p. 37.
775
For details refer to www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/.
776
According to Shoreline Passenger Solutions, www.shoreline.bm/sps_faq/.

236

exceed USD 1 billion. Indeed, it already has in the case of the Costa
Concordia.777 However, in the 1990s, the Norwegian protection and indemnity
club (P&I Club) Skuld, had to pay out on the Scandinavian Star, Estonia and
Sleipner ferry disasters, among others, that cost 1,057 lives in total. By the
beginning of 2000, Skuld was in financial trouble and required restructuring.778
The availability and costs of insurance cover for ferries, therefore, is already a
problem in developed countries and becoming one in developing countries
where larger ferries operate such as Indonesia and the Philippines. It is
difficult to imagine that the insurers of ferry owning companies such as
Sulpicio Lines and Negros Navigation, or their successors, have failed to see
the implications of the spread of accession to the PAL Convention. It seems
inevitable that even their governments will eventually accede to it.
Meanwhile, such companies are evidently at least partially insured. Given
their appalling accident records, the risks involved in insuring them must give
all marine insurers and P&I clubs considerable food for thought. It must also
make careful and responsible operators think about how much of their own
premiums subsidise such irresponsible operators. No doubt they will be
informing their insurers of their concerns.
The International Union of Marine Insurance, which represents hull insurers
as distinct from protection and indemnity insurers, and its members are well
aware of the safety problems facing developing country ferries. They have a
sound overall general knowledge of the appalling safety record of ferry
owners in such countries. Their problem, which they openly acknowledge, is
that they lack accurate, detailed data with which to properly estimate risk. 779
The topic has been extensively discussed at their annual conferences, most
particularly in Hong Kong in 2014 and Tokyo in 2017. At the former
conference naval architect Stuart Ballantyne gave a very detailed explanation
of the ferry safety problem in developing countries and proffered some
practical potential solutions.780
The author was subsequently invited to deliver a paper on developing country
domestic ferry accidents at the IUMI 2017 Conference in Tokyo.781 He
suggested that the insurance industry should do more, in its own best
interests, to encourage greater safety consciousness among ferry operators
and regulators in such countries. As described in 7.7.1, the industry, at that
conference, lamented the paucity of available data on marine accidents
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generally and domestic ferry accidents in particular. The IUMI 2017
Conference dedicated a session to that problem.782
So, clearly, the marine and protection and indemnity insurance providers are
well aware of the problem and of the problems they face as ferry operators in
developing countries increasingly seek to purchase insurance cover from
them. They are already aware that the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest
growing for hull cargo and P&I insurance premium income.783 However, so
far, they have little passenger vessel claims experience in the region. 784 It can
be assumed that, as that happens, insurers will require much greater
emphasis on safety from those owners. Insurance obviously involves risk but
it is not gambling. Insurers will ensure that the vessel operators they insure
behave responsibly.
Insurers, generally, are becoming increasingly proactive in risk reduction. The
industry‟s interest in obtaining more and better data about ferry safety risk is
indicative of that. An interesting related move made by major industry
participants could be readily adapted to the ferry sector. In that example, five
major marine insurers have united to refuse to insure fishing vessels that have
been blacklisted for pirate fishing, also known as illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing.785

7.9.0. Proven human error solutions are well known.
The topic of human error, particularly maritime human error, has been widely
researched, analysed, discussed and written about. Numerous very effective
solutions to it have been developed, proposed, promoted and effectively
implemented. It has been approached rigorously in most commercial and
government activities, including maritime activities, in most developed
countries. Those solutions have proved to be very effective in widespread
practice across many industries and many cultures.786
Even in developing countries, industries such as aviation, oil tanker, mining
and offshore oil and gas implement safety regimes that are identical to those
in force in the developed world. They are equally as effective there.
Employees from developing countries working in developed countries have
been readily trained to developed country safety standards.
So, standard developed country safety training techniques could readily be
transferred to developing countries – as they already are in certain industries
– if only the will to do so were there. The real problem lies in the unwillingness
of national governments to act and the absence of any apparent will on the
part of IMO to persuade them to so act or to support them in doing so.
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Further, as ferry operating businesses in developing countries mature, they
will increasingly need to purchase hull, cargo and P&I insurance. Before
insuring such risks, insurers will obviously do everything they can to reduce
them. They will certainly not insure against almost inevitable disasters. That
must have a positive effect.

239

Chapter 8
Evacuation, lifesaving and search and rescue deficiencies
It‟s no use having the best most expensive evacuation and life
saving equipment available if it is unable to be readily accessed or
launched or, even worse, if the master of the vessel and his crew
are incompetent. Equipment and procedures must be practical and
appropriate to the local cultural, educational and economic
situation.
8.1.0. Evacuation, lifesaving and SAR deficiencies cause
many fatalities.
Sadly, the BMPVA database is replete with instances of fatalities being
directly attributable to inadequate evacuation or escape equipment,
organisation or procedures.787 The same applies to lifesaving equipment and,
after the event, to inadequate or botched search and rescue (SAR) efforts.
While, obviously, such problems arise occasionally in developed countries,
they continue to occur with disappointing frequency in developing ones.
Combined, they contribute to significant numbers of unnecessary fatalities.
Normally, the most common accidents, groundings, collisions, allisions and
disintegrations, happen very rapidly. Too frequently, they result in capsizes.
Thus an organised evacuation is usually more difficult than from accidents
involving fires and explosions.788 When a vessel capsizes, as it usually does except in the cases of multihulls - following those common accidents, there is
rarely sufficient time available to organise a disciplined and orderly
evacuation. Survivors find themselves in the sea and dependent upon any
lifejackets, lifeboats or liferafts and Emergency Position Indicating Radio
Beacons (EPIRB) that happen to float free. Otherwise, they must rely on
flotsam. Lifesaving equipment should be purchased and installed with that
reality in mind.
The BMPVA database records 750 fatal passenger vessel accidents from
1966 to 2015.789 Notably, ferries were involved in 681 (or 91%) of them. Of
the total PV accidents, 555 or 74 per cent resulted from collisions, allisions,
groundings, disintegration or straight capsizes. The difficulty of evacuation or
escape from such accidents is emphasised by the fact that 90 per cent of the
known fatalities arose from them. Conversely, 97 accidents, or 13 per cent of
the total, resulted from fires or explosions that resulted in eight per cent of all
fatalities.
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8.2.1. Evacuation difficulties are the primary problem.
An orderly and successful evacuation depends upon a number of factors. The
first is the speed of the accident. Allisions, collisions, groundings and
disintegrations usually happen very rapidly and often result in capsizes and/or
nearly immediate sinkings.790 This problem is exacerbated in the case of
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries by their complex internal layouts and
structures.791 When neither crews nor passengers are trained or even briefed
as to how to respond to such an accident, the chances of a successful
outcome are small. They are even less so if exit signs are inadequate; if
safety exits are locked or blocked; and, if life jackets and rafts are invisible or
inaccessible as they often are from the author‟s observation. Small, enclosed
monohull ferries or tourist boats are particularly dangerous in such
situations.792

8.2.2. Some vessel types are much harder to evacuate.
Successful evacuations also depend on the damaged stability and buoyancy
of the vessel. If it submerges quickly, there is obviously a major impediment to
evacuation. If exits are locked or if, as in the case of the Sewol, the
passengers are ordered by the master to remain in their cabins, chances of
survival are negligible.793 Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are
particularly susceptible to damaged stability deficiencies and tend to lose
buoyancy almost instantly if capsized.
Aluminium or FRP multi-hulled ferries, therefore, are incomparably safer in
such accidents than are monohull ferries constructed of any material. 794
Catamarans tend to remain largely afloat and relatively stable even after
severe accidents. The only known instance of that not happening was in the
1999 case of the Sleipner where the vessel grounded on a granite reef at
such speed that it practically disintegrated.795 More of the 16 fatalities in that
case were due to impact injuries than to drowning or hypothermia. Even then,
apparently, the wreckage of the vessel remained upright and largely above
water.
Even large monohull Ro-Pax ferries such as the Herald of Free Enterprise,
Jan Heweliusz, Estonia, Al Salam Boccaccio 98, Le Joola and several others
have tended to capsize and/or sink very rapidly following an accident.796 This
largely precludes significant evacuation and, in any case, the lifeboats with
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which they have been expensively equipped have proved to be largely
useless.

8.2.3. Evacuation problems have been studied extensively.
Numerous academic, classification society, maritime media and regulatory
studies have been made about evacuation from ships and of human reactions
to and behaviour during such evacuations. One Korean study published in
2003 examined IMO‟s May 1999 “guidelines for the evacuation analysis of
Ro-Ro passenger ships to prevent loss of life in maritime accidents”.797 It
concluded that the IMO proposals were insufficient to increase, “…the degree
of passenger safety to a satisfactory level”.
It gave as an example the botched evacuation from the non-fatal and not very
serious grounding of the aluminium catamaran fast ferry St. Malo off Jersey,
in the Channel Islands, in 1995.798 That accident, which resulted in minor
injuries and mild hypothermia for 55 elderly passengers, was more due to
officer incompetence than to the IMO guidelines.799 The captain was widely
criticised by the subsequent MBOI and in the media for his illogical evacuation
procedure which followed his appalling seamanship in taking the dangerous
short cut that originally caused the grounding.
The vessel did not sink and, as is always the case, the vessel itself, if it
remains afloat, is the best place of refuge for survivors. Indeed, all those
aboard could have stepped directly off the vessel onto rescue craft, of which
many were available, without getting wet. Instead, the captain unnecessarily
deployed his vessel‟s inflatable liferafts and directed his passengers to jump
into them from heights of more than a metre. They were where the ankle
fractures, hypothermia and other injuries were sustained among the
passengers.800
While the authors of that paper drew the correct conclusions from their study,
their analysis and reasoning was wrong. They stated that: “This shows that
evacuation analysis is meaningless in practical situations if it does not take
account of rolling, pitching and listing of the ship and panic of the
passengers”.801 In reality, this author contends, only the listing of the ship was
relevant in the St. Malo case. It could not roll or pitch as it was hard aground
on rocks. The most important factors contributing to the injuries of the
passengers were the captain‟s original negligence and the incompetent
manner in which he directed the evacuation. His was clearly human error and
no amount of mathematical analysis can explain or justify that.
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8.2.4. Meaningless mathematically based evacuation analysis.
Mathematically based evacuation analysis is indeed meaningless. Very few
accidents are the same. Nor do human beings react uniformly to them.
Vessels, crews, masters, weather conditions and types of passenger
reactions differ from case to case. They cannot be modelled in the abstract.
Equations are of little or no use in predicting weather or human behaviour.
Evacuation principles and practices can only realistically be studied and
taught as generalities and by studying cases of actual accidents. The most
important preventative measure is to employ captains who are quick thinkers,
innovators and improvisers who have common sense.
The study‟s authors would have done far better to have examined the much
less successful evacuations of the Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia
which they mentioned in their introduction but failed to examine.802 Those
accidents starkly exposed the inadequacies of evacuation procedures and
equipment in 1987 and 1994 and which have barely improved today except
where evacuation chute systems with integrated inflatable life rafts, or marine
evacuation systems (MES) are fitted, mainly to fast ferries.803
All the St. Malo accident really proved was that fast aluminium catamaran
ferries are exceptionally safe even in the hands of a negligent and
incompetent captain. Human errors from the Titanic through the Estonia and
St. Malo to the Kilimanjaro II and many more prove that, even if you have an
excellent vessel and equipment, a negligent or incompetent captain will
largely negate that.
A more recent study took a psychosocial approach to examining passenger
“knowledge and perceptions of safety and risk during voyage at sea”.804
Essentially, that Norwegian focused study showed that older passengers took
more notice of safety briefings than their younger counterparts and that in vivo
safety briefings, as are standard practice in aviation, were more effective than
video only instructions. It took a somewhat more realistic approach to the St.
Malo grounding than its Korean counterpart but still missed the point of the
lessons learnt from it. It did, however, learn enough to present serious doubts
about the value of IMO‟s 2002 evacuation analysis.

8.2.5. The importance of effective safety briefings.
The study emphasised the importance of effective safety briefings for both
feelings of passenger security and the likelihood of a successful evacuation. It
should be noted, though, that the subjects of the Norwegian study were
affluent, generally well-educated and travelling on well constructed and
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equipped and competently crewed vessels. Rather unlike their counterparts in
developing countries who would be unlikely to be given a safety briefing at all.
This same theme was examined in a 1999 article How to cope with crisis point
– Understanding how passengers react in an emergency is crucial to safe
evacuation in Lloyd‟s Cruise International.805 This described a British study of
the case of the May 1999 fire and sinking of the cruise ship Sun Vista in
daylight in glassy calm weather in the Malacca Straits. Although it was a near
perfect evacuation with all 1,104 people aboard safely evacuated by lifeboat
to almost immediate rescue, it was a most unusual scenario. However, the
important point made was that it is “…essential for crew to understand how
humans tend to react in a crisis or a crowd”.
This experience was reinforced in a contemporary Canadian study reported in
Lloyd‟s List in 1999.806 That study was made in the context of ferries and
tourist boats rather than cruise ships. It simulated evacuation behaviour and
passenger paths. It discovered that it is wrong to think that passengers
necessarily panic. Rather, they “…defer to figures of authority even when they
are wrong”. The problem occurs when the figures of authority, usually the
captain, let them down. Even then, though, panic does not necessarily ensue.
Evacuation remains a topic of considerable debate. Organisations as diverse
as IMO, INTERFERRY, the Institute of Marine Engineers, the Bahamas
Maritime Authority, the British MCA, the International Council of Cruise Lines,
the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, DNV-GL, Lloyd‟s Register, the U.S.
Coast Guard, Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the British maritime union,
Nautilus, and many others have looked frequently at the problems of
passenger ship evacuation and the deficiencies of lifeboats and their
launching systems.807
While some slight improvements have been made, the recent appalling
disaster of the Costa Concordia evacuation in 2012 proves that there is still a
long way to go.808 That applies to the cruise ship sector that takes such
problems very seriously. The ferry sector in developing countries is another
matter again. It is much worse and, generally, owners and crews have proved
to be uninterested in safety matters. Even in developed countries, however,
safety briefings and availability of and access to life jackets and rafts can still
be wholly inadequate.809
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8.2.6. Exits and life saving equipment must be accessible,
obvious and easily used.
It is regrettable that the great majority of fatal accidents in developing
countries are caused by allisions, collisions, groundings capsizes and
disintegrations.810 They, almost invariably, as mentioned, result in rapid
capsize or sinking. So, in such countries, especially in smaller vessels,
lifejackets ought to be worn at all times and lifeboats, Carley Floats, strobe
lights, EPIRBs and liferafts should be of the simple „float free‟ type. That
would give survivors of such accidents some hope of remaining afloat until
rescuers find them.
Outbreaks of fires, from whatever cause, usually provide sufficient time for an
orderly evacuation to take place if the vessel‟s crew is well trained and
disciplined and adequate lifesaving equipment is fitted. That, obviously, is not
always the case as we saw with the Tamponas II, Moby Prince, Norman
Atlantic and numerous other examples.811
Even in developed countries, to give two recent instances, inadequately
briefed passengers relied on directions from officers and crew who were more
interested in saving themselves than attending to passengers. This happened
in Italy with the Costa Concordia grounding and capsize in 2012 and with the
capsize of the Sewol in Korea in 2014. In the former case the passengers
were largely left to their own resources while the master and officers
evacuated. In the latter the passengers were ordered to remain in their cabins
as the vessel sank and, again, the officers evacuated.812 This resulted in 32
deaths in the case of the Costa Concordia and nearly ten times as many,
mostly teenage children, on the Sewol. In both cases the responsible ship
masters and some of their officers, following exhaustive MBOIs and criminal
trials, were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.813
The author, as mentioned previously, published a series of articles written by
Dag Pike that described the many safety deficiencies of Ro-Pax ferries
operating in the English Channel and North Sea during the mid-1980s. Apart
from numerous unsafe operating procedures, the articles described such
dangerous practices as obscuring exit signs and even chaining exit doors
closed. The author has also observed many other examples of dangerous
practices in the United Kingdom as recently as 2013.814 One particularly
egregious example, in the early 1990s, was aboard a near sister-ship to the
Thames tourist ferry Marchioness shortly after that vessel capsized following
a collision in 1989 with 51 fatalities resulting.815 The exit doors were
insufficient and lifejackets very difficult to access. There was no safety
briefing, just a blatant request for a tip from the crew.
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During various travels through South East Asia in recent years, the author has
sailed on numerous, mostly smaller, domestic ferries and tourist boats. Few, if
any, beyond Singapore and Hong Kong are equipped with sufficient,
accessible or effective lifejackets. Even on Hong Kong‟s iconic Star Ferries,
life jackets are difficult to access.
Life rafts or Carley Floats are rare, EPIRBs and strobe lights even rarer and
printed evacuation instructions or verbal safety briefings non-existent. Exits
are often blocked by cargo or passenger luggage. Crews rarely appear
concerned with either the comfort or safety of their passengers. There are
exceptions but, as of early 2017, they are rare.
Even in highly developed countries, ferry safety is not always taken
sufficiently seriously. For example, the author travelled on two ferries on Lake
Zurich in Switzerland in October 2017. Both were operated by a Swiss
government owned company, Zurichsee. Neither offered printed or verbal
safety briefings; there were no life rafts or Carley floats obviously fitted; and,
life jackets were stowed obscurely. This, despite the very cold water on which
they operated. Two emails were sent to the managing director of Zurichsee
enquiring about these deficiencies but no response has been received.816

8.3.1. Little effective safety equipment reaches developing
countries.
A vast amount of evacuation, lifesaving and SAR equipment and training in
techniques is available on the world market. However, regrettably, despite the
best efforts of some generous rich country governments, very little of it finds
its way to the appropriate places in developing countries. Consequently, in the
twenty nations in which 89 per cent of passenger vessel fatalities have
occurred, such equipment and training in its use is scarce to non-existent.
Except, that is, for training in the Philippines. That country has numerous
maritime schools and colleges but they seem to be very largely focussed on
providing graduates for international rather than domestic employers. Filipino
domestic ferries and tourist boats, except very new ones, are generally poorly
equipped. As in all the other countries discussed, few, if any, EPIRBs or
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) are known to be fitted there.
Even where such equipment is fitted to ferries in developing countries, it is
often of inferior quality and of impractical sizes and inaccessible. For example,
the author has noted on recent ferry and tourist boat voyages in Thailand and
the Philippines that lifejackets are sometimes required to be worn. That would
be a considerable improvement if the lifejackets issued were actually of
adequate size and quality and capable of supporting an unconscious survivor
with his or her face out of the water. They were not. They were cheap and of
very poor quality and poorly maintained. Apparently, they were more intended
to satisfy regulatory inspections than for any lifesaving effectiveness.
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8.3.2. Much IMO “approved” safety equipment is heavy,
difficult, expensive, impractical and even dangerous.
Much of the equipment that is available in both rich and poor countries
continues to be heavy, expensive, difficult and even dangerous to use.
Lifeboats and their launching equipment continue to be a major problem. Too
many lifeboat launching drills result in fatalities.817 Some inflatable life rafts
are still being sold that require the use of a powered crane to launch them.
Indeed, as recently as 2013 the author travelled on an elderly (36 years)
English ferry, the Scillonian III with such an arrangement.818 If there had been
engine failure, which often accompanies an accident, an absence of hydraulic
power would have made life raft launching very difficult, if not impossible.
It is becoming apparent that traditional, standard life boats are becoming an
expensive and sometimes dangerous anachronism. Most serious accidents
such as those that befell the Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star,
Estonia, Al Salam Boccaccio 68, Moby Prince, Sewol and Costa Concordia
found them wanting, if not completely useless.819 On all except the latter,
evacuation was the fundamental problem. However, those survivors who did
manage to evacuate were rarely able to access the lifeboats, if any, that were
launched.
Ferries, certainly, and even most cruise ships, rarely venture far from other
marine traffic. Any survivors are unlikely to have to wait long for rescue,
usually considerably less than 48 hours, especially when, or if, their vessel is
fitted with a now globally mandatory automatically activated EPIRB. EPIRBs
and AIS transmitters are inexpensive and very effective. Even the Rabaul
Queen was equipped with one that worked effectively (albeit via stations in
New Zealand and Australia.) and led to a rapid rescue effort.820 Even that,
sadly, was too late. The grossly overloaded and under-equipped vessel
capsized quickly and sank causing the deaths of many passengers.

8.3.3. Conventional lifeboats are an expensive, complex,
heavy and largely inadequate solution.
Following the sinking of the Titanic in 1912 various types of lifeboat and
various ratios of them to the numbers of people on board have been
mandated by various authorities, ultimately by IMO with its SOLAS Code.821
Lifeboats have undoubtedly saved many lives but mostly under favourable
conditions. Launching them, particularly larger and heavier examples, in
anything but benign conditions can be very dangerous. This is confirmed by
the numerous examples of lifeboat drills gone wrong in the BMPVA
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database.822 That list, of course, only records passenger vessels. Lifeboat
drills on non-passenger vessels have killed many more people.
Lifeboats and their launching and retrieval systems have undergone
considerable development in the century since the Titanic sinking. One
notable feature of that development is that they have steadily become larger,
heavier, more complex and, inevitably, more expensive. So have their
launching systems. That, also inevitably, is largely the result of the ever
increasing amount and complexity of the regulations covering their
construction and operation.823
As Captain Phillip Rentell MNI, an experienced cruise ship master described it
in an essay in the Nautical Institute magazine Seaways, passenger ship
evacuation is, “A master‟s worst nightmare”.824 There he described the
dangers of a, “…slow and cumbersome davit launching system”. He
advocated the then (in 2000) recently introduced evacuation chutes. He
explained that in anything more than very light winds the possibility of safely
launching more than half a passenger ship‟s lifeboats was slim. He further
doubted the effectiveness of “archaic” lifejackets in keeping survivors‟ faces
out of the water and in reducing hypothermia. His conclusions about then
current safety and survival systems in use in 2000 were generally negative.
Little has changed since despite a number of IMO and other conferences that
were aimed at encouraging improvement.
Captain Rentell‟s essay drew considerable comment in subsequent issues of
Seaways from his fellow master mariners. Almost all were supportive and
some described even worse problems.825 Essentially, even after more than a
century of SOLAS and its predecessors, experienced and thoughtful
passenger ship masters have serious doubts about the effectiveness of
SOLAS mandated safety equipment and evacuation procedures.

8.3.4. Evacuation and lifesaving equipment should be simpler,
lighter, cheaper and easier to use.
Given that reality, it seems logical and practical that even vessels operating
well offshore should be equipped with inflatable life rafts accessed via
evacuation chutes as on aircraft. They are far less expensive and lighter than
traditional rigid hulled lifeboats and considerably simpler and easier to launch
and access.
A number of companies such as Liferaft Systems Australia, Zodiac of France
and Viking Lifesaving Equipment of Denmark manufacture proven systems. 826
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Described accurately as “Marine Evacuation Systems”, they can be deployed
in less than a minute and are able to evacuate 100 people in fewer than four
minutes per raft.827 They will also more reliably „float free‟ than traditional
lifeboats have been known to be and even their access chutes are buoyant
and so provide additional refuge for survivors.

Image 8.1. Liferaft Systems Australia (LSA) evacuation chutes and liferafts
deployed as Marine Evacuation Systems (MES) from an Austal built fast
trimaran Ro-Pax ferry in a training exercise (LSA pic).
For vessels operating on inshore or riverine routes (in other words, almost all
domestic ferries) effective evacuation and survival systems can be simpler
and less expensive still. Obviously it would be preferable if passengers were
required to wear lifejackets at all times on board. However, if that is
unacceptable or impractical, they should at least be properly briefed on their
location and how to don them. Carley floats, EPIRBs and strobe lights should
also be of the „float free‟ type to allow for the likely reality of a rapid capsize or
sinking. They would at least offer accident survivors a reasonable chance of
recovery.

8.3.5. Currently mandated safety equipment is often
inappropriate to poor tropical countries.
Regrettably, in both rich and poor countries, much of the equipment mandated
by IMO and national authorities is inappropriately heavy, expensive, complex
and expensive to maintain. It requires careful and frequent training to ensure
that crews are capable of using it effectively. Similarly, if passengers are
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briefed at all on the „safety features‟, as the airlines call them, of their vessel, it
is usually a cursory and frequently ignored briefing given, on a usually
unintelligible public address system, after the commencement of the voyage.
Evacuation, lifesaving and survival would be more economical and likely to be
successful if simpler, lighter and less expensive equipment were to be
specified.
Indeed, much of the IMO and national authority prescribed equipment is
designed with rich, North Atlantic countries and economies in mind. It has
been lobbied for and promoted by manufacturers in such countries. It tends to
be heavy, complex and expensive to buy and maintain. It is also intended for
use in very cold water. A very understandable primary objective for it is to
prevent or reduce hypothermia in cold climates. The safety equipment
prescribed for poor tropical countries should be more appropriate for warmer
environments and relative poverty. It should be significantly cheaper, simpler,
lighter and easier to use. It should require practically no maintenance so
inflatable equipment is generally inappropriate.
It is notable, albeit arguable, that lifeboats, rescue boats and their associated
launching and recovery equipment are heavy, complicated, expensive, highmaintenance and frequently dangerous. While no one, apparently, has
carefully studied the subject, it is entirely possible that over the last fifty years
more people have been killed or injured in lifeboat drills or training exercises
than have been saved by them. The design of simpler, safer and lighter
lifeboats and their associated launching equipment could make a worthy topic
for future study. That could possibly be inspired by the organisation of a global
contest with a significant cash prize as the reward for success.

8.3.6. Alternative, more economical, safety equipment is
available.
Alternative solutions are readily available and many are of lower cost than
some of the mandated equipment prescribed for ferries. There are also lighter
and more effective solutions available that may be more expensive but which
have been proved to be very effective even in poor conditions.
Much more appropriate to coastal and riverine ferry operations in developing
countries would be the modern development of what IMO describes as Rigid
Liferafts or the Carley Float, the Karly Float.828 They are fitted to many
commercial vessels in Australia and beyond including tourist boats and small
ferries. They are compact and easy to both stow and launch. They are very
durable and require practically no maintenance, other than an occasional
wash. A twenty person version is priced at USD 900 retail in Australia. In
China, they are even less expensive. That compares with an enclosed
inflatable liferaft of the same capacity for around USD 5,000 plus biennial
servicing costs of about USD 1,000.
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The author has seen numerous versions of them fitted to ferries and tour
boats in many parts of the world. For domestic ferries operating close to shore
they are a sensible and economical solution. They should be used more
widely.

Image 8.2. An inexpensive, lightweight Carley Float or “marine rigid lifesaving
life float and raft” of traditional style but made of HDPE. It is manufactured by
Chinese company Zhenjiang Matchau Marine Equipment Co (From
website).829
As they are simple, flat and „Rotomoulded‟ from HDPE, the 20 person Karly
Floats could undoubtedly be manufactured for considerably lower prices in
developing countries. While they are one metre by 2.1 metre flat rafts
weighing 37.5 kilograms, more “boat-shaped” and protective craft could also
be readily, cheaply and lightly manufactured from HDPE. The author has seen
locally manufactured examples on tugs in the Philippines. They would provide
greater protection to survivors but would cost probably 50 per cent more than
Karly Floats. Like them, though, they would require minimal maintenance.
Much the same applies to lifejackets. On the same website, SOLAS compliant
commercial coastal lifejackets are advertised at USD 30.830 They are
presumably manufactured in China. The author has purchased similar
lifejackets from his local yacht chandler in Australia for USD 12. Strobe lights,
lifebuoys and EPIRBS are all now available at similarly low prices, especially
in developing countries.831 So, there is no excuse financially for adequate life
saving equipment to not be fitted at a price for a complete package of
considerably less than USD100 per person.
829
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Image 8.3. The 20 person Karly Float is simple, light, effective and
comparatively inexpensive. (Image from www.karlyfloats.com.au ).
Even less expensive and therefore appropriate to very poor countries such as
DR Congo and Haiti would be the pool noodles‟ described in Chapter 1.832
They should not cost more than 50 US cents each. Indeed, that was their
retail price in Australia in 2016 for models fitted with flashing LED lights. They
are easily stowed, maintenance free, simple to understand, easy to use and
readily deployed. They will keep a conscious adult afloat indefinitely. While
not recommended where superior alternatives are affordable, they are
significantly better than nothing.

8.4.1. Search and Rescue failures remain a serious problem.
Considerable amounts of government and private donor money have been
spent on the provision of search and rescue services and their associated
equipment. This is particularly the case in western developed countries but
also in China, the Philippines and South Korea, three of the worst performing
countries as far as ferry fatalities are concerned. All three have substantial
coast guard organisations. However, all seem to fail too frequently in both
preventing accidents and in being in the right place at the right time to conduct
effective SAR operations. Indonesia, too, has a coast guard but it appears to
832
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be even less effective than those of the other three nations mentioned. In the
other six countries of the worst ten, SAR services are practically non-existent.
Any hope of rescue there will, in the absence of fatalistic indifference, be
based on the possibility of assistance being provided by a vessel
coincidentally passing by.833
Almost all developed coastal countries possess SAR organisations of a
generally high standard. They tend to be very effective and reliable with
strong traditions of service. Combined with the widespread use of EPIRBs,
AIS and high quality safety equipment, they ensure that the chances of
survivor recovery are high. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland,
France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Greece, Turkey and the United States have had adequate to
good SAR services in place for well over a century.834 Ironically, but
unsurprisingly, they are less likely to experience fatal accidents in the first
place.
Most have well co-ordinated partnership arrangements with defence forces
and bodies such as customs services. Their floating and flying assets can
readily be pressed into service to assist with SAR operations when required.
That effectively multiplies the capabilities of the SAR service itself. The use of
substantial fleets of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters as well as patrol boats
and warships significantly enhance the chances of finding and recovering
survivors of a passenger vessel accident.
Most developed countries now require strict adherence to IMO‟s ISM, SOLAS
or High Speed Craft codes or a local equivalent for domestic operations. They
also tend to have well-established and equipped SAR services. These are
often a mixture of both government and voluntary services. There is even a
well- organised and funded NGO, the International Maritime Rescue
Federation (IMRF) that represents such services and organises international
SAR conferences where developments are discussed.
Developed country SAR services also appear better able to effectively cooperate with commercial tug and OSV operators and commercial shipping
more widely to assist with SAR activities. They are generally happy to assist
because they may require help themselves one day. This kind of effective cooperation exemplifies the spirit and intent of the IMO SAR Code and makes
the SAR function in the developed world generally very successful. In a
coincidental way it happens to some degree in developing countries but it
would be better if more structured arrangements could be established there. A
formal recognition by all parties that such co-operation exists would seem
likely to make it more effective.
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8.4.2. Excellent models exist for effective SAR organisation.
Numerous histories of the various national rescue services have been
written.835 They describe their people, processes and equipment in
considerable detail. All offer excellent proven models for SAR services that
could be adopted elsewhere if the money were available. Similarly, many
excellent books have been published on the subjects of rescue and
salvage.836 Most would provide useful guidance to any national government in
any attempts it might make to improve its SAR services. So would the
websites of the various national organisations.837
The development of those services was boosted during the Second World
War with the establishment of very effective Air Sea Rescue (ASR) services
by the UK, USA, Australia and Canada in particular. These were developed to
recover downed pilots who were very expensive to replace. Japan, notably,
was largely devoid of such services and suffered from crippling losses of
pilots as the war progressed. Effective radio-location devices and fast
recovery boats were highly refined through the course of the war.838 Some
13,000 aircrew and hundreds of sailors were recovered by the British ASR
service during the course of WW II. The other Allied services were similarly
successful. They proved to be a very good investment and an excellent model
for succeeding civilian rescue services.
Civilian rescue services have also proved that rapid SAR response
organisations can be a very good investment.
The wartime ASR services developed doctrine and techniques for search and
rescue that were easily and very effectively passed to their civilian
counterparts for peacetime use.839 Their vessels, equipment, communications
systems and procedures all had widespread civilian applications. Interestingly,
T. E. Lawrence, of Lawrence of Arabia fame, was very constructively involved
with the development of new and improved fast rescue craft in the 1920s and
1930s.840 He applied considerable intellect to their developmen.
IMO has developed and invoked a Search and Rescue Convention (SAR) that
guides the wider maritime world generally in SAR matters.841 However, as is
becoming tediously familiar, the SAR Convention appears to have had little
effect in developing countries. That is particularly so in the ten countries
835
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concentrated on in this study. Very little appears to be happening in them in
the form of establishing and maintaining either governmental or NGO
organisations for SAR. Fortunately, most such countries have comparatively
crowded waterways so that opportunistic rescues by passing vessels are the
norm. Passing vessels, however, as has been noted, cannot always be relied
upon to undertake rescues.842 The absence of formally focused SAR
organisations is an unfortunate fact of life in many developing countries. It
significantly reduces the chances of successful discovery and recovery of
maritime accident survivors.

8.4.3. IMO‟s SAR Convention has proved to be effective where
implemented. EPIRBs and AIS are very effective when fitted.
The SAR Convention, generally, while certainly of benefit, particularly for
training purposes, in developed countries, has been less useful elsewhere.
One more recent (1999) component of it, however, has contributed to rapid
SAR responses in cases such as the Rabaul Queen.843 That is the
widespread mandatory introduction of automatically activated Emergency
Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB) by IMO and co-operating
nations.844
When registered, maintained and stored correctly in a „float free‟ situation,
EPIRBs do facilitate rapid responses to distress calls as, in addition to
transmitting a MAYDAY distress message, they incorporate a GPS which
broadcasts the precise position of the distressed vessel. Unfortunately, since
they cost about USD 250, few vessels operating domestically in developing
countries are equipped with EPIRBs. It would be better if they were made
mandatory on a global basis as they are in developed countries. It would be
better still if the fitting of AIS transceivers were also made mandatory.
More recently, the development of effective, efficient and relatively easy to
use unmanned vehicles or „drones‟ have been promoted as having a SAR
role. This would seem to be logical, achievable and probably very cost
effective, particularly for the search part of the activity. At the International
Maritime Rescue Federation Future Technology Panel meeting in 2016,
Professor John Dalziel of Dalhousie University, Canada, described the work
being done at his university on assessing the possibilities for using unmanned
vehicles in SAR activities.845 Their preliminary conclusions were very positive.

8.4.4. Real efforts being made to promote better SAR services.
Both the International Maritime Rescue Federation and the Worldwide Ferry
Safety Association have tried hard to promote the establishment of effective
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SAR organisations throughout the world.846 Kiersten Reid-Sander of the
WFSA presented an illuminating paper on the subject at the 2015
International Maritime Rescue Conference.847 In that she highlighted the
paucity of SAR resources in the ten worst and a number of other countries.
Despite their best and very generous efforts, the two organisations have so
far met with little success in developing countries. Inevitably, they have been
least successful in the ten worst countries for fatal ferry accidents.
The WFSA works to define and explain the extent of the ferry safety problem.
It promotes the quest for effective solutions to it. Its data on the SAR
deficiencies of, particularly, poorer countries is an important component of
that role.
For its part, the IMRF, which obviously focuses on SAR aspects, has
developed two very useful online information services that can be freely and
very beneficially accessed by both developing country and developed country
SAR services. Released at the World Maritime Rescue Congress in
Bemerhaven in 2015, the Rescue Boat Guidelines (RBG) and the Mass
Rescue Operations (MRO) library collate global case studies and experience
to accelerate the SAR learning experience.848

8.5.0. Evacuation, lifesaving and SAR deficiencies remain
although practical and economical solutions are available.
Despite the many advances made during the fifty years considered here, most
of the benefits of them have accrued to developed nations. The poorer parts
of the world, especially the ten worst performing countries discussed here,
have made little or no progress. The challenge remains to transfer or adapt
such proven effective developments to the very real needs of the countries
where most fatal ferry accidents continue to occur.
Emergency egress from many ferry types, most particularly conventional
monohull Ro-Pax vessels, remains a significant problem even in developed
countries. It requires particular attention, however, in developing countries
where most such vessels seem now to meet their fates. Again, the design
concept of such ferries makes them particularly vulnerable in the event of an
accident, many of which result in capsize.849
Evacuation systems, lifesaving equipment and SAR services could all be
significantly improved at affordable cost everywhere except, probably and
unfortunately, DR Congo and Haiti. If such improvements were to be made,
very substantial numbers of lives would undoubtedly be saved.
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The actual costs of doing so would be achievably low if the will were there to
try to reduce fatality rates. The capital costs of the lifesaving equipment need
be no more than USD 100 per passenger on a typical small, 40-50 passenger
ferry. Sensibly but minimally maintained, largely by just an occasional wash in
fresh water, that equipment should last considerably more than a decade. So,
a real outlay of less than USD 10 per annum per passenger seat or space
could ensure a much greater degree of survivability from ferry accidents. An
EPIRB, at around USD 350 and an AIS transceiver at USD 500 per vessel
would improve the chances of survivor recovery immeasurably.
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Chapter 9
National and international regulatory and enforcement
deficiencies
Too many regulations, not enough enforcement.
9.1.0. A global problem.
I think one point we could all agree on is that the solution does not
necessarily lie in creating more and more legislation. Over the last three
and a half decades, IMO has adopted several shelves full of rules and
regulations. They have certainly helped to improve the situation.
However, regulations are only effective if they are put into practice and
are enforced and there is no doubt that many IMO conventions and
other standards are not implemented as rigorously as they should be.
Before adopting still more regulations, we should, therefore,
concentrate on assuring that the ones that already exist are, in fact,
applied to all ships throughout the world.
W. A. O‟Neil, Secretary-General, IMO, 19902003850

9.1.1. Too much regulation – Too much bureaucracy – Too
much corruption – Too little competence - Too little
enforcement – Too little effect – Too little will to reform.
The preceding chapters describe a litany of regulatory and enforcement
deficiencies that have served to facilitate the making of human errors. While
most obvious in those countries having the worst records for ferry fatalities,
which are almost invariably comparatively poor and less developed, they are
not alone. Richer, developed countries continue to experience, albeit more
rarely and usually less deadly, fatal accidents for the same ultimate human
error reasons. They, however, have been better prepared and financially able
to invest in the training and education of mariners that is so essential to
reducing human errors as well as in the SAR systems to recover from them.
IMO has focused on the implementation of its SOLAS Code.851 However,
although it applies on all domestic and international voyages except by
warships or ships navigating on the North American Great Lakes, it tends to
be ignored for both domestic and international voyages in or between poorer
countries. It should, like the IMO MARPOL and COLREGS codes, be more
rigorously implemented domestically in all IMO member nations. IMO, apart
from the occasional token conference, has evinced little serious and practical
850
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interest in trying to reduce the numbers of ferry accidents by properly
implementing its codes in developing countries.
It has been particularly remiss in not implementing its casualty and near miss
reporting and Safety Investigation codes or its IMO Member State Audit
Scheme (IMSAS) in any of the twenty most dangerous countries for ferry
travel except China.852 Although only in force since January 2016, IMSAS
would appear to be an obvious and effective means by which IMO could
encourage improvements in domestic ferry safety in developing countries.

9.1.2. IMO is well aware of the domestic ferry safety problem.
Clearly, as can be seen from Secretary-General O‟Neil‟s obviously heart-felt
comments, successive heads of IMO have been well aware of the problems
that face their organisation. However, all have been reluctant to get involved
at the member nation level. They all respond to the „why can‟t you do more?‟
question with similar answers to the effect that: “We cannot interfere in the
internal affairs of our sovereign member nations”.853 This, then, is the kernel
of the problem. The vast majority of ferry fatalities, 93 per cent, occur on
domestic voyages but this jurisdictional hurdle very effectively prevents IMO
from making more than token efforts to prevent them.854
Another serious problem for IMO is the very effective lobbying that sometimes
diverts it from its usually well-intentioned course. The London based NGO
InfluenceMap claimed in October 2017 that certain corporations and shipping
industry associations had undue influence over IMO decision making,
particularly with respect to shipping exhaust gas emissions.855 Its report stated
that: “…at the most recent IMO environmental committee meeting 31% of
nations were represented in part by direct business interests”. It said, “The
IMO appears to be the only UN agency to allow such extensive corporate
representation in the policy-making process”. The author noted similar
influences at work in the early days of the introduction of fast aluminium
catamaran Ro-Pax ferries when owners, designers and builders of
conventional Ro-Pax vessels worked closely with their government IMO
delegates to retard that development. Perversely and amusingly, that lobbying
had an unintended but widely beneficial consequence with the introduction of
the HSC Code.
Unsurprisingly, IMO and various shipping industry associations such as
BIMCO, the World Shipping Council and the International Chamber of
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Shipping attacked the InfluenceMap report.856 InfluenceMap responded
vigorously and was supported by credible shipping industry leaders such as
Warwick Norman, CEO of RightShip, and the Chairman of the International
Bunker Industry Association. Indeed, the chairman of the IBIA, Jens Maul
Jorgensen was quoted thus: “The IMO has become an impenetrable system
in which political factors again and again trump well thought-out decisions that
involve common sense and considerations for shipowners and operators
around the world”.857
It is notable that the widely quoted IMO press release, in which SecretaryGeneral Lim Kitack refuted the criticism of its efforts on emissions reduction,
was not available on the IMO press release archive a month after its
publication.858

9.1.3. IMO, generally, fails to „follow-up‟.
IMO has promulgated and published numerous „Codes‟ related to the
promotion of safety. The problem is that it provides them with little or no
effective follow-up or support especially with respect to domestic operations in
developing countries. It could well be asked whether this, too, is due to the
kinds of „corporate capture‟ mentioned above. This is its most obvious failing.
Its rectification would undoubtedly lead to a very significant reduction in the
numbers of ferry fatalities.
The inadequacies of IMO mirror those of its parent body the United Nations
Organisation and many of its other operating subsidiaries except, most
notably, ICAO. Then President elect, Donald Trump, summed up the views of
many when, in December 2016, he stated on Twitter that: The United Nations
has such great potential but right now it is just a club for people to get
together, talk and have a good time. So sad! 859
That is a very commonly held view globally that is often expressed by donors
to, beneficiaries of and observers of UN activities. Certainly, the article in
Bloomberg Businessweek from which that quotation was taken, lists a litany of
bureaucratic incompetence, corruption, „wastefulness and sclerosis‟ on the
part of the UN generally.860 The author and members of his family have
observed and experienced such deficiencies personally in countries such as
Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Ethiopia, the Philippines and DR Congo. The
whole UN organisation including subsidiary bodies such as IMO, FAO,
UNICEF, UNHCR and others would undoubtedly benefit from drastic reform.
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Apart from ICAO, few UN subsidiaries appear, to the interested observer, to
be working either effectively or economically.
Wastefulness, certainly, is widely evident. There is an obvious need for much
tighter administrative control and significantly greater accountability
throughout the organisation. Corruption, too, is facilitated by an absence of
standard commercial management controls. The author has experience as a
victim of that in dealings with FAO.861 IMO, like much of the UN, would benefit
from less funding and more spending and behavioural discipline. The
solutions to the problems outlined here will not require any significant funds.
Rather, they must be very carefully costed, planned and administered. Simply
throwing money at such problems will not help. It is more likely to encourage
further corruption and incompetence.
Another apparently significant contributor to the deficiencies of IMO is its
remoteness from the places where most ferry accident problems occur. Its
headquarters location in central London seems to very largely restrict its focus
of attention to the North Atlantic region at best and only to Europe at worst.
While European accidents are generally well described in its GISIS database
of marine accidents, the same certainly cannot be said for accidents in Asia,
Latin America or Africa, for example.862 Similarly, IMO evinced far more
interest in the Costa Concordia sinking than in several far deadlier accidents
that occurred in Asia and Africa in the same year. They seemed to barely to
register on the institutional mind of IMO.
Meanwhile, fatal ferry accidents continue to occur in Asian and Latin
American countries, where there are generally plenty of regulations but
minimal enforcement, and in African countries where there are practically
none of either. The difficulty is to determine who should take responsibility for
that state of affairs and then to ensure that someone does so. Should it be
IMO? Should it be the local authority? Should it be a combination of both? Or,
should it be a separate external body such as a specialised ferry safety NGO
if both IMO and the local authority are beyond redemption?

9.1.4. IMO is the most important weak link in the regulatory
chain but there are many other national versions of it.
Obviously, such decisions will very much depend on local conditions. In
reality, it will probably involve a combination of all players with support and
urging from both local and international media and developed country
governments. Nothing significant is likely to happen without strong public and
media demand for safer ferries. Similarly, given IMO‟s aversion to interfering
in the internal affairs of sovereign member states (indeed its legal duty to not
interfere), particularly in matters concerned with domestic voyages, its
involvement will need to be of the persuasive, supportive and advisory kind.
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That, done properly, such as by the judicious use of IMSAS, could be very
effective.863 Despite its many obvious weaknesses, IMO is generally and
widely well-regarded within the maritime industry.864 Probably that is on the
basis that there is no alternative.
The various IMO instruments such as SOLAS, COLREGS, MARPOL, SAR,
ISM, HSC and Code of Safety for Small Passenger Ships, among others,
provide an excellent and very useful foundation or framework that would be
readily adapted by national governments to provide the basis for their own
regulations.865 In most cases, it seems, that has been done. COLREGS, for
example, are mandatory, even if not normally closely adhered to, in all
member nations. MARPOL, while not legally mandatory, is effectively so in
almost all countries. The practical deficiencies lie in IMO‟s inability to
effectively promulgate or promote its other generally very sensible and
practical codes in developing countries. The same applies also to the general
apparent lack of interest on the part of many developing country governments
in enforcing such regulations as they have in place.

9.1.5. Oil tanker reforms show what IMO is capable of.
It is disappointing that IMO has been unable or unwilling to apply itself to the
domestic ferry safety problem. It showed what it is capable of in working with
the oil tanker industry, through INTERTANKO, and many national
governments to bring about a very significant reduction in the number of oil
spills since 1970. Described in Chapter 4, that campaign reduced the number
of marine oil spills by more than 90 per cent between 1970 and 2015 despite
oil tanker numbers more than doubling over the same period.866 The oil tanker
experience shows that IMO would be similarly capable of acting to reduce the
numbers of ferry fatalities. It simply requires the will to do so.
Chapter 5 described the economic, social, cultural and geographic factors that
contribute to the disproportionately large numbers of ferry accidents and
fatalities that occur in the ten worst performing countries. That chapter also
mentions the politico-legal barriers to reform that are endemic in those same
countries. The following pages describe the regulatory and enforcement
realities of the ten most dangerous countries. Those realities are also very
largely applicable to most of the next ten worst performing countries. The
safety problems of the twenty most dangerous countries are generally similar.

9.2.1. The Philippines – Major enforcement weaknesses but
government is well intentioned and has good potential.
The Philippines provides good examples of most of the ferry safety problems.
It has clear and well-defined maritime regulations in place that trace their

863

Refer to 9.1.1. Para 4.
The author has discussed IMO widely among the global maritime industry generally.
865
Details of all IMO codes are listed in the Bibliography, or refer to www.imo.org.
866
Refer to 4.5.2.
864

262

origins to the nation‟s half century of American colonisation.867 They have
since been modified and adapted to comply generally with current IMO codes.
Those regulations are intended to be enforced by a substantial bureaucracy in
MARINA (The Marine Industry Authority) and a relatively well-equipped,
managed and manned Coast Guard.868
The reality, though, is that the theoretically effective system is not yet so.
Through corruption, disinterest, cronyism or any number of other cultural
reasons, negligent, greedy ferry owners largely ignore MARINA, the PCG and
the regulations they are charged with enforcing. They actively lobby against
safety reform. Otherwise, when that fails, presumably, they bribe officials of
those organisations. This is so particularly in the provinces beyond the capital
Manila.
As has been noted elsewhere in this work, that situation is changing with
promising results. That change, though, is coming about very slowly. It is
obvious, however, that without a very focussed and strong „naming and
shaming‟ effort conducted from outside the Philippines, it will be a very
lengthy and difficult process to overcome the inertia of the existing system.
Assassination of journalists and others who expose corrupt behaviour is not
unusual there.869 The appalling safety records of ferry owning companies
such as Sulpicio Lines and their owners should be made known worldwide.
Potential passengers everywhere should be warned against travelling on their
ships.
The print and electronic media in the Philippines frequently expose marine
safety deficiencies in the country. The government promises reform and the
wider ferry industry reacts against it on the grounds of impossible expense. A
2017 article in The Manila Times typically highlighted the problem.870 In 1999
the Philippine Government mandated the implementation of the ISM Code in
domestic shipping including for passenger vessels. This was supplemented a
year later with the adoption of the National Safety Management Code (NSM)
in domestic shipping to cover all vessels.
Inevitably, there was “…continuing opposition from stakeholders who
expressed concern on the burden and difficulties in complying with the
international standards imposed by the ISM Code”.871 In 2015 the government
rescinded the NSM Code and imposed the ISM Code for domestic voyages.
Subsequent fatal accidents involving the Ro-Pax ferry Starlight Atlantic and
other vessels confirmed that the ISM Code continued to be ignored through
2016. As the author of that article concluded: “The recent sea mishaps have
somehow diminished the confidence in the fervent commitment of improving
867
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the safety record of domestic shipping. It is incumbent on government and the
shipowners/management and crews to reverse that perception”.872
There are very brave crusading individuals and associations in the Philippines
that are promoting greater safety and the elimination of corruption in the local
maritime industry. Led by Commodore Dante La Jiminez, president of the
Philippine Association of Maritime Institutions, a multi-sectoral task force to
Save the Seafaring Industry was established in 1994. However, as detailed in
local maritime magazine Marino World, “Midstream stakeholders blocked
powerful opportunists tailor-fitting ordinances to serve their vested interests.
The movement apparently, “…lost wind gradually against the inspired task
force”.873
Filipino “…ferry captains are required to submit a document called the Master
Oath of Safety Departure (MOSD – testifying that the vessel meets all
requirements and disclosing the number of passengers on board – to the
coast guard before every sailing”.874 The same 2009 article in Time describes
inadequate coast guard oversight, document falsification and government
good intentions. It concludes with a comment from the transport industry
under-secretary and MARINA administrator, Elena Bautista: “The main issue
here is the safety culture of the Philippines,” she said. “We have very, very
low regard for safety”.875 Meanwhile, the July 2016 appointed director of
MARINA, Marcial Amaro, was dismissed on 4 January 2018 by Philippines
President Rodrigo Duterte for alleged “excessive foreign travel”.876 Perhaps
he attended too many IMO meetings?
The author, having travelled extensively, both domestically and internationally,
on the two main Philippine airlines, Cebu-Pacific and Philippine Airlines,
disputes Ms Bautista‟s allegations about the safety culture of the Philippines.
From his experience and observation, those airlines maintain world-class
safety standards. Their unblemished record proves it. If the Philippines
government, presumably encouraged and supported by ICAO, can ensure
that its airlines can maintain those standards on both international and
domestic flights, it should be able to do the same with its ferries.
Encouragingly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there are a number of local
domestic ferry operators that are operating safe vessels safely and promoting
themselves accordingly.877 Even without external support for safety reform,
the strong competition provided by well-funded newcomers such as
Archipelago Ferry Corp, owner of the FastCats and its competitor Oceanfast
Fast Ferries, will eventually inspire wider improvement.878 They, and other
companies, have established their businesses by promoting their international
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safety standards. It is to be hoped that other ferry owners will learn from their
example.
Meanwhile, the President of the Philippine Register of Shipping, William
Hernandez, commented that, despite a strong effort by MARINA in promoting
greater safety, much remains to be done. He alleged that ship maintenance is
inadequate and that class certification is handed out corruptly. He said that
the government needed to do better in “promulgating its rules”.879
There is much more to be done in the Philippines but its brave and largely
free press and frequently well-intentioned, semi-democratic government
should enable reform to be gradually achieved. That reform movement would
be much stronger if it were better supported by IMO. In reality, though, it is
more likely that foreign media exposure of the dangers of domestic ferry travel
there will damage the tourist industry and force local ferry owners to behave
better. The government has the tools, it just needs the will to use them
effectively. A dedicated global ferry safety NGO could expose the dangers of
Filipino ferry travel by facilitating the placement of revealing articles in
newspaper travel sections, travel magazines and travel guides. The resulting
commercial pressure would help to encourage reform.

9.2.2. China, too, is well intentioned but slow acting.
China, too, has substantial, well-organised, well-manned and well-equipped
maritime authorities and an impressive, quasi-naval coast guard.880 It has a
central government that loudly espouses its intention to eliminate corruption
and, like the Philippines, it has numerous well-regarded nautical schools that
should be improving the quality of the captains and crews who man its ferries.
However, as in the Philippines, old bad habits are very slow to be corrected.
„The system‟ again. That system, unlike in the Philippines and Indonesia, is
not democratic and the press is not free.
While corruption is known to be still rife, the central government proclaims its
anti-corruption credentials and has been very publicly punishing corrupt
officials recently, even at the highest levels. China has, in addition to the
Maritime Safety Administration of the Ministry of Communication (CMSA) and
Coast Guard, some 20 local maritime administrations in each of the major
maritime provinces.881 The CMSA, alone, has a fleet of more than 500 boats.
The Chinese Coast Guard and a number of other maritime departments such
as customs and fisheries also have numerous patrol craft.882
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Following a number of accidents, especially the sinking of the Ro-Pax ferry
Dashun in the Yellow Sea in 1999 with 290 fatalities, the Chinese
Government introduced new safety rules. They applied particularly to
conventional Ro-Pax vessels. A total of 249 Chinese ships sank in 1999
leading to 769 deaths.883 The State Maritime Bureau ruled in the next year
that all coastal ferries including river ferries that enter coastal waters were
required to fit a „Black Box‟ Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) within 12 months.884
Less than two years later, the Ministry of Communications banned individually
owned companies from operating passenger ferries. Reportedly, the ministry
claimed that China‟s more than 80,000 individually owned shipping
businesses were the main cause of shipping accidents.885 Those businesses
did not only operate ferries.
Needless to say, there have been numerous accidents involving Chinese
ships since 2002. There have been many fatalities arising from passenger
ship accidents in domestic operations.886 It is believed that the annual number
of accidents has reduced but, because of the absence of data for the period
prior to 2000 and, to a lesser degree since, it is impossible to make accurate
comparisons. The known annual numbers of ferry fatalities do seem to be
declining, however.
The Chinese authorities appear to now be conscious of their ferry safety
problem and are attempting to eliminate it. Judging from the data for the past
decade, they are making progress, albeit slowly. The Oriental/Eastern Star
disaster of 2015 was a notable setback.887 However, China‟s Communist
government does have the power, the personnel and the equipment to
achieve substantial safety reform if it applies itself fully to achieving that
objective. A Chinese Government endorsed presentation made at the
December 2017 ASEAN Ferry Safety Forum in Shanghai revealed some
interesting data and some encouraging intentions.888

9.2.3. Indonesia – Plentiful regulations, regulators and
investigators but insufficient enforcement.
Indonesia possesses both a Directorate General of Sea Communications and
a Coast Guard, now known as the Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia
(BAKAMLA).889 They are well established, well manned, possibly to the point
of over-manning, and relatively well equipped. The country has more than
adequate regulations that are generally in accord with IMO‟s codes. It has
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even banned the importation of ships including ferries but more in an
endeavour to protect the local shipbuilding industry than to improve safety.890
Indonesia also has a seemingly well intentioned but largely ineffectual
transport safety organisation, the National Transportation Safety Committee of
Indonesia, (NTSC), that is responsible for investigating and analysing ferry
accidents, among others.891 It is meant to publicise its findings. As is so often
the case with accident inquiries, it has been suggested by local naval architect
and Marine Safety Investigator, Aliek Nurwahyudy, that there is too much
focus on the how of the accident and too little on the why. However his
summary of recommendations for the period 2003-2013 attributes almost all
accident causes to human factors. Inadequate supervision and training as
well as crew fatigue are listed as the most important factors.892
Indonesia has an ongoing close and supportive maritime cooperation
relationship with Australia.893 The current president, Joko Widowi, has
declared his country to be “a global maritime fulcrum” with a vision of better
managing all Indonesia‟s plethora of maritime resources.
That vision, however, is proving very difficult to realise. There are “entrenched
interests” and „turf wars‟.894 “Getting the adequate resources for BAKAMLA
continues to be challenging” and, finally, the director of BAKAMLA was, in
April 2017, facing corruption allegations.895 That is in keeping with the general
reputation for rampant corruption that surrounds both the Indonesian Navy
and Coast Guard.896 So, despite the best of presidential intentions, maritime
safety reforms are proving very difficult to realise in Indonesia.
Again, as the country values its important and rapidly growing tourist industry,
achieving safety reform will be most effectively inspired by international media
exposure. That would be well enhanced by serious support from IMO.

9.2.4. Bangladesh has similar problems to Indonesia.
Bangladesh, too, has a substantial and very well manned Department of
Shipping and a well equipped coast guard.897 There are some excellent and
dedicated senior bureaucrats who have for many years been attempting to
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institute safety reforms. The good intentions are there as is the equipment for
enabling the enforcement of regulations and, when properly directed, rescuing
survivors from ferry accidents.898
Despite its possession of those attributes and assets, Bangladesh remains a
very dangerous place in which to travel on ferries. As noted in Chapter 5, its
economy is growing rapidly and its overall life expectancy has improved
dramatically over the last three decades. It has a growing and high quality
export ship building industry and a relatively reputable international airline,
Biman, with new private sector competitors entering the business.899 Biman is
approved to fly into Europe and has not suffered a fatal accident since 1984.
If a country can operate airlines safely and build sound ships locally, it should,
in theory, be capable of ferry safety reform. In Bangladesh that parallel is
handicapped, though, by its unstable politics, corruption and overwhelming,
self-serving bureaucracy. That bureaucracy, generally, seems to largely act
as a very negative „dead hand‟ in stifling reform. It illustrates clearly that it is
possible to have too many regulations and too many regulators to the point
that they just get in the way of reform. Its press is only partly free and the
country would best be described as a ‟limited‟ democracy. Unfortunately, its
tourist industry is practically non-existent so it cannot be used as a lever to
introduce reform.
Bangladesh is in some ways similar to the Philippines in that it has proved
that it can operate airlines safely. From its own resources assisted by foreign
companies and NGOs, with apparently little or no government involvement, it
has very impressively managed to make dramatic improvements to the life
expectancy of its people.900 It has dramatically reduced its former health
problems. It has shown that it is very capable of reform. If IMO were to adopt
ICAO‟s “no country left behind policy” and support local safety reform,
Bangladesh would seem to have considerable potential to overcome its
numerous handicaps.

9.2.5. Tanzania. Chaotic but having realistic reform potential.
Tanzania has a most interesting history. Even more interesting is the history
of Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous offshore island province of the Republic of
Tanzania. While serious fatal ferry accidents have occurred on Tanzania‟s Rift
Valley lakes and rivers, the two most deadly recently occurred off Zanzibar.
They involved the Spice Islander and the Skagit. The former led to about
2,976 fatalities and the latter, 293.901 They happened in 2011 and 2012
respectively.
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The offshore archipelago of Zanzibar has its own maritime regulations that are
separate from the Merchant Shipping Act that governs mainland Tanzania.902
This, it seems, leads to considerable confusion. Zanzibar is not a sovereign
nation and, theoretically, Tanzania is responsible for Zanzibar as far as
international treaties and conventions are concerned. So, Tanzania is
responsible for ensuring that Zanzibar adopts legislation that accords with
IMO conventions and codes. However, as Mr G. Kazi explains, in his
remarkably prescient 2010 University of Oslo Masters thesis Conformity of
Zanzibar Maritime Legislation with International Safety Conventions…, “…like
many developing countries, many of their laws are just ink on the page hence
it is not surprising that practically nothing is done”.903
While the constitutional arrangements of Tanzania/Zanzibar are unusual and
complex, its maritime safety regulations, as Mr Kazi commented, are treated
with the same disdain that is common in all the dangerous countries
discussed here. The Tanzania Ports Authority is responsible for the regulation
and administration of all Tanzanian mainland ports including those on the
rivers and very large lakes that surround the country.904 Probably inevitably,
though, the President of Tanzania dissolved the board of the Ports Authority
and sacked the permanent secretary of the transport ministry in December
2015. The reason for that, allegedly, was corruption.905
This, perhaps, explains the inability of Tanzania/Zanzibar to regulate for ferry
safety and to enforce those regulations effectively. Yet, Tanzania is a
comparatively wealthy country with substantial mineral, agricultural and
forestry resources. It has a large and fast growing tourist industry taking in
both the mainland and the Zanzibar islands. By many measures it is
economically, politically and socially more advanced than at least four of the
worst ten countries for ferry fatalities.
It should be able to effectively reform its ferry safety enforcement but will
obviously require assistance in that from IMO and some benevolent European
nations. To better motivate it to initiate reform it would be useful for some
„naming and shaming‟ of delinquent ferry operators to be carried out by the
international travel media.

9.2.6. Myanmar is probably worse than it looks.
Myanmar‟s capacity for reform is difficult to effectively analyse. Having
experienced its own „enlightenment‟ recently and become at least semidemocratic, it does appear to have some potential. However, it is still
regarded as the most corrupt of all the nations examined here.906
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It is also difficult to accurately analyse the real extent of its ferry safety
problem except to suggest that it is undoubtedly considerably worse than the
BMPVA database statistics indicate. The reasons for that are due to the
significant under reporting explained in Chapter 5.
The country‟s overriding handicap, however, is appalling corruption which
very largely prevents any kind of regulatory or enforcement reform.907
Myanmar is rich in many resources and has a very fast growing tourist
industry. The economic importance of that may, again, be a lever for
promoting safety reform through a „naming and shaming‟ campaign. Naming
and shaming of Myanmar‟s dictatorial political leaders appears to have made
a positive contribution to the country‟s „enlightenment‟ between about 2007
and 2010. More positive, ICAO style, support from IMO would undoubtedly be
valuable as would practical help from developed Asian countries such as
Singapore, Japan and Taiwan.

9.2.7. Egypt, despite its many problems, has reform potential.
Egypt is placed second of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities on the UN
Human Development Index.908 Its situation is the same for GDP per capita
after China. It enjoys a large and lucrative tourist industry that involves
significant aquatic tourism. That is supported by a reliable airline, Egypt Air,
that is sufficiently safe as to be permitted to fly into Europe and the USA.909
Indeed, its tourism industry comprises one per cent of the world market.910
That involves significant travel on both ferries and tourist boats on the River
Nile and in the Red Sea. The country cannot afford to gain a reputation for
abnormally high levels of ferry fatalities.
There is an Egyptian Authority for Maritime Safety and a General Authority for
River Transportation.911 Both appear to be at least adequately manned and
equipped and have promoted themselves with impressive mission statements
on their equally impressive websites. They are subsidiaries of the Ministry of
Transport. In addition, the Egyptian Coast Guard possesses a fleet of more
than 100 patrol and rescue vessels of varying shapes, sizes and seaworthiness ranging upwards from around 10 metres LOA.912 Most of them are
known to have been acquired as foreign aid gifts so how well they are
operated or even how many are operational is questionable.
Egypt has a significant maritime training institution and many of its more
ambitious student seafarers attend foreign institutions.913
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However, while the publicity material disseminated by the Maritime Safety
Authority emphasises the word “safety”, a careful perusal of its propaganda
material reveals a greater focus on Suez Canal and port operations and their
profitability. That, presumably, and thanks to its enormous toll revenues, is
where the Authority‟s attention really lies. Egypt‟s appalling ferry safety record
tends to confirm that. Its adherence to IMO codes and conventions appears to
be mostly „lip service‟.
As for how Egypt could improve its ferry safety record, there are numerous
obstacles. First, the usual problem of corruption that is endemic in all the ten
worst countries.914 While Egypt is only mid-range (the same as Indonesia) on
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, it is generally
recognised as having significant problems in that regard. The country
obviously has more than adequate maritime safety regulations and regulators.
Its problem is how well those regulations are enforced. Given its disgraceful
fatality record, it is quite obvious that they are far from adequately enforced.915
Thanks to the vital importance of its tourist industry, Egypt is almost uniquely
vulnerable to bad publicity concerning that sector. That is certainly where
publicity pressure for reform could effectively be concentrated. Of course, it
would be preferable if IMO were able – and willing – to support and persuade
Egypt to reform its ferry safety practices on its own account. Yet again, it is a
country with an airline (Egypt Air) that has proved itself capable of operating
consistently to international standards. That being so, why can its maritime
sector not do the same?

9.2.8. DR Congo, Haiti and Senegal will be difficult, if not
impossible, to reform.
Many generally well-intentioned local and foreign individuals, organisations
and governments, including the United Nations and many of its agencies,
have noted the need for economic, governance, health and safety reform in
those three countries and have attempted to achieve it. Sadly, they have so
far met with little success.
Unfortunately, despite possessing substantial maritime bureaucracies, there is
little evidence of anyone in those countries taking the implementation and
enforcement of maritime regulations seriously. They are sadly, as far as this
work is concerned, completely dysfunctional „failed states‟, both economically
and in terms of governance. Regrettably, there seems little potential for ferry
safety reform in any of them in the foreseeable future. Reform efforts would
be more profitably directed at the other seven countries where real potential
exists.
While only the most adventurous of tourists visit such places, the international
tourism media should be more thoroughly and frequently warned as to the
dangers of ferry travel in those countries. Developed country „travel
914
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advisories‟ do try to publicise the dangers of ferry travel there but it would be
helpful if the general travel media were able to do more.916

9.2.9. The twenty worst countries for ferry fatalities and their
potential for reform.
The author has analysed the existing effectiveness of the national maritime
authorities of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities as follows:-917
Philippines - Slowly improving but still corrupt and inadequate.
Bangladesh - Slowly improving but still corrupt and inadequate.
Indonesia - Slowly improving but still corrupt and inadequate.
China - Strong systems but corrupt. Reformable domestically.
Egypt - Weak. Corrupt but reformable.
Tanzania - Weak. Corrupt. Reform will be slow and difficult.
Myanmar - Weak. Corrupt. Reform will be slow and difficult.
Senegal - Almost non-existent. Weak and corrupt.
DR Congo - Non-existent. Beyond realistic reform.
Haiti - Non-existent. Beyond realistic reform. 918
The next to worst ten countries for ferry fatalities: India, Nigeria, South Korea,
Estonia, Brazil, Sierra Leone, Greece, Peru, Yemen and Somalia need to be
considered differently.919 Estonia is listed on the basis of just one accident,
the Estonia sinking.920 Greece has suffered many accidents but few recently.
It is showing definite signs of improvement.921
Estonia and Greece have substantial maritime regulatory regimes and, very
largely, the means to enforce them. The remaining eight countries continue to
experience frequent fatal ferry accidents. Of them, Sierra Leone, Somalia and
Yemen, given their very unstable political situations, seem unlikely to be able
to be reformed in the short term. The other five nations, India, Nigeria, South
Korea, Brazil and Peru, appear to have reasonable prospects for reform. So,
twelve of the twenty most dangerous countries for ferry travel appear to have
real potential for significant safety improvements.

9.3.0. Enforcement deficiencies are the core problem.
Given the preponderance of human error causes of ferry accidents it is
obvious that the fundamental problems are behavioural rather than
mechanical or structural. So, equally obviously, the responses to those
problems must primarily be aimed at improving human behaviour.
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In most but not all of the nations studied there is considerable regulation
already in place. Arguably, in some cases there may be too much. Also,
arguably, there may be too many bureaucrats charged with enforcing that
regulation. As former IMO Secretary-General O‟Neil pointed out, the problem
lies in enforcing the regulations that already exist.922 That enforcement should
involve encouragement and education just as much as penalty and
punishment. Both „carrots‟ and „sticks‟ are required.
IMO is well equipped to assist with the carrots of persuasion and
encouragement, if it chose to utilise them, but the sticks of enforcement and
education must be the responsibility of national governments. Almost all of
those, particularly the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities, have both marine
departments and coast guards.923 The problem with those, obviously, is that
they are largely ineffectual. That is mainly due to poverty and its resultant
corruption. Those countries require considerable support, encouragement
and, probably, hectoring to become effective.
Regulatory and, most particularly, enforcement deficiencies are clearly the
core problem. Addressing them will be the key to reducing the waste of
passenger lives in domestic ferry accidents. Persuading or forcing ferry
owners, their crews and the bureaucrats who control them to behave better
will be the most rewarding factor in ferry safety reform. That, clearly, is the
role of national governments with support from IMO. Such reform is
achievable as has been shown by the ICAO and oil tanker examples. 924
Notably, in its recently published Insight report on global safety challenges,
the Lloyd‟s Register Foundation suggested that a potential solution to the
safety challenge posed by passenger ferries is to, “Seek to influence the IMO
to enforce regions to take up regulations that would make ferries safer in
design and methods of use”.925
Judging from their historical performance records, it will not be easy to
motivate reform in either the IMO or any of the national governments of the
worst performing countries. There is considerable inertia there. There is a
disappointing absence of the will to achieve safety reform in many areas of
human activity, not just in ferry travel. Inevitably, then, some substantial
„naming and shaming‟ will be necessary to overcome that largely cultural and
economic inertia so as to initiate the necessary reform.926 That would best be
supported by something similar to the „No country is left behind‟ system
promoted so effectively by ICAO.927
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Indeed, to a still too limited degree, that is already happening through both
formal and ad hoc arrangements. For example, the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority has for some years been assisting Indonesia to improve its maritime
safety.928 The same Australian department also assists other neighbouring
island nations to Australia‟s north.929 An NGO, the International Maritime
Rescue Federation, in collaboration with the United Kingdom‟s Royal National
Lifeboat Institution, has conducted children‟s lifesaving programmes in
Tanzania.930
There are numerous effective maritime safety improvement programmes
being used in developed countries. They can or would be excellent models for
developing country governments to follow. There are also commercial courses
that focus on the same subject.931 IMO developed a Technical Assistance
Subprogramme in Maritime Safety for casualties on ships not covered by the
provisions of international regulations. That was offered to “Member
Governments wishing to enhance the safety of such ships” in 1999.932
Obviously few took up the offer.
Naming and shaming would best be undertaken by an international NGO. If
carried out globally and focused on serial delinquents, it could have a
significant effect, particularly if it starts to affect a country‟s tourist industry.
Such a campaign should be coordinated with the marine hull insurers and
protection and indemnity clubs in their own best interests. If an owner is
publicly criticised and cannot purchase insurance, he really has no option
other than to reform. Similarly, if the tourist guides, magazines, websites and
other media warn tourists against travelling with particular delinquent owners,
they will eventually suffer. They will be forced to behave better.

9.4.0. Effective regulatory and enforcement reform is possible
but will require cultural and behavioural modification.
As extensively examined and discussed in Chapter 5, there are numerous,
mostly poverty caused, cultural handicaps that retard ferry safety reform.933
Democratic developed countries have very largely instituted effective safety
regulations and enforce them rigorously although, mostly, with a light touch.
The data show that such systems significantly minimise the risks of ferry
accidents.934 Table 5.3. effectively summarises and highlights the economic
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deficiencies that are the root cause of social and cultural problems that lead to
the appallingly bad safety records of the ten worst countries.
Such problems, however, can be largely and very economically eliminated.
They are not insoluble. Neither are the so-called geographic problems of
archipelagic, riverine or lakeland nations that are, in reality, not problems at
all. Rivers, lakes and sheltered seas provide such nations with very low cost
and lightly polluting transport media. If utilised safely and sensibly, they can
be significant national assets.
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Chapter 10
Some possible solutions – What is to be done?
There are numerous ways in which ferry safety,
particularly developing country domestic ferry safety,
could be significantly improved. The aviation industry and
the cruise and oil tanker sectors have shown the way.
10.1.0. Human error is the fundamental problem and IMO is
currently an inadequate solution.
Wide-ranging statistical analysis of considerably more comprehensive
passenger vessel accident data than has been used previously highlights the
fundamental problem.935 The BMPVA database records 750 „known‟ fatal
passenger vessel accidents that occurred between 1 January 1966 and 31
December 2015. There have undoubtedly been many more that are so far
unrecorded.
Clearly, cruise ship and fast ferry, particularly multihull fast ferry, accidents
and their resulting fatalities are statistically negligible. Cruise ship, casino ship
and cargo liner accidents caused only 688 or 1.2 per cent of the 59,600
fatalities that occurred between 1966 and 2015. They were almost invariably
engaged on international voyages and carrying developed country
passengers. A significant proportion of those fatalities are likely to have been
suicides or drunken falls.
Ferry accidents in developed countries, particularly since the Estonia sinking
in 1994, have been rare and have produced few fatalities. Fast ferry accidents
have been extremely rare. They have resulted in 544 (0.9%) fatalities over the
fifty year period studied here. Accidents involving multihull fast ferries have
been even rarer. They resulted in 69 deaths (0.1%).936
Clearly, then, by far the major part of the problem lies with ferries, particularly
mono-hulled or outrigger stabilised ferries of the vulnerable conventional RoPax and motor banca types. More specifically, they are ferries undertaking
domestic voyages in developing, largely archipelagic, lakeland and riverine
countries. Some 76 per cent of ferry fatalities occurred in just ten such
countries. A further 14 per cent of fatalities have occurred in an additional ten
similar countries. So, 90 per cent of the world‟s ferry fatalities have occurred
in just ten per cent of its nations. Thirty-two per cent of the ferry fatalities from
2000 to 2015 occurred on conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries. Ninety-three
935
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per cent of them occurred on domestic voyages. Of those fatalities, 98 per
cent were clearly due to human factors. Especially vulnerable vessels such as
conventional Ro-Pax and motor banca ferries simply exacerbate those human
errors.
As the extent, location and reasons for the ferry safety problem have been
made clear in the foregoing chapters, what then is to be done to ameliorate, if
not eliminate, it?
Recognising the vital facts described above, there are numerous ways in
which ferry safety, particularly domestic ferry safety, could be significantly
improved. Broadly, the aviation industry and the oil tanker sector have shown
the way. As, to a significant degree, have the cruise shipping sector and
developed country road safety campaigners. Most of the suggested
improvement techniques have already been proved in those fields of activity.
They are described in more detail below but, in brief, they are:-

1. First and foremost, reduce the incidence of human errors through improved
training, education, encouragement, management and operational disciplines
and proper enforcement of existing regulations in all maritime nations.

2. To achieve that, reform the remote, North Atlantic centric, disengaged and

disinterested IMO, rather than replacing it. Unless, that is, it refuses to be
reformed. Ensure that it focuses on solving the very significant problem of
developing country domestic ferry fatalities. Relocate its headquarters to a
South-East Asian city other than Singapore. That should preferably be Manila
or Bangkok because of their comparatively free press.

3. Encourage IMO to persuade its laggard member states to simplify and
properly enforce their existing safety regulations as they affect domestic
ferries.

4. Encourage IMO to develop the „will‟ to practically assist, support and work

„with‟ developing countries without patronising them. It does not need to
„interfere‟ in their domestic affairs. Its ISM Code can be extended by member
states to include vessels engaged on domestic voyages.937 The current „lip
service‟ from IMO is wholly inadequate. The importance of „face‟ in developing
countries must be recognised. IMO should expand the useful work it already
does in educating developing country maritime regulators at its World
Maritime University.

5. Domestic ferry travel should be equally as safe as international ferry, cruise
ship, oil tanker and air travel. IMO should be responsible for both domestic
and international ferry safety globally. ICAO has almost entirely achieved that
with aviation. Why not IMO with ferries? Aircraft operate in three dimensions,
ships in only two. It should, therefore, be easier to reform shipping safety.
ICAO should be adopted as the model for IMO reform.
937
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6. Revise IMO‟s SOLAS Code to be simpler, more practical, economical and

applicable to developing countries using its own HSC Code as a model.
Implement the SOLAS/HSC and ISM codes domestically in all member
nations as has more effectively been done with MARPOL and COLREGS, for
example.

7. IMO should ban new construction of conventional, monohull Ro-Pax

ferries. They are exceptionally dangerous in the wrong hands. Conversely, it
should encourage the building of multi-compartmented, multi-hulled ferries of
all sizes, construction materials and speeds. Including Ro-Pax ferries.

8. IMO should ban the sale of all second-hand conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries to developing countries. It should rigorously enforce that ban by
„naming and shaming‟ delinquent companies, officers and countries.

9. IMO should focus its reforms on the twenty worst performing, most

dangerous countries. It should encourage and support the reform of national
maritime authorities in the twelve of those countries that have realistic
potential for improvement. They are the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Tanzania, Egypt, South Korea, India, Nigeria, Brazil, Peru and
Russia.

10. IMO should introduce a simple, standard format accident inquiry and

reporting model internationally to determine why accidents happen. It should
promote its Member State Audit Scheme (MSAS) much more effectively than
it does currently to the most dangerous countries.

11. IMO should establish a detailed, standardised and all-encompassing

global database of official accident inquiry and media reports of serious
accidents and incidents to replace its almost useless GISIS database. That
database should include details of „near misses‟. If its member states refuse
to contribute to compiling that database, IMO should compile it itself or hire
someone to do it for it.

12. Utilising that database, IMO should promote a culture of learning from
major, minor and „near miss‟ ferry accidents as is normal in aviation.

13. IMO should encourage and support the establishment, improvement and

expansion of search and rescue services in developing countries and improve
SAR co-ordination and communication between neighbouring countries.

14. IMO should acknowledge and respond, through encouraging appropriate

regulation and enforcement, to the fact that inadequate vessel maintenance is
a much bigger problem than design and construction deficiencies.

15. IMO should require the use of human factors specialists by ferry owners
and regulators to develop and promote a safety culture.
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16. IMO should encourage classification societies to be more pro-active,

preferably on a pro-bono basis, in developing countries to assist them to
promote a safety culture.

17. IMO should ban smoking aboard all vessels at all times as on aircraft.
18. The wider ferry industry should be encouraged to improve and semi-

standardise vessel design, construction and equipment as in aviation.
Preferably using multi-compartmented, multi-hulled vessels. All passenger
vessels should be compulsorily equipped with EPIRBs and, preferably, AIS.

19. The wider maritime industry should develop simple, lighter, and less

expensive evacuation systems and lifesaving equipment that is more likely to
be fitted and used.

20. The wider ferry industry, IMO and national governments should be

encouraged to introduce improved computerised „fool proof‟ universal ticketing
systems to ensure that accurate passenger manifests are created.

21. The wider ferry industry, IMO and national governments should

encourage passenger behavioural reform and national „learn-to-swim‟
campaigns.

22. National governments should severely punish convicted delinquent

owners, officers, crews, classification societies and regulators. They should
widely publicise such punishment.

23. If IMO will not or cannot be reformed, a global NGO to promote greater

ferry safety should be established. It should use „naming and shaming‟
techniques similar to those used by Amnesty International, Greenpeace,
WWF, Transparency International and Sea Shepherd, for example, to expose
the greed and negligence of bad shipowners and corrupt bureaucrats. Market
forces should then encourage those shipowners to reform.

24. That NGO should be established to raise public consciousness of the
dangers of bad ferries globally and to campaign for substantial safety
improvements.

25. That NGO should introduce a global vetting system, similar to Rightship,

for all passenger vessels, their owners, officers and crews especially those
operating domestically.938 In co-operation with the International Union of
Marine Insurers, it should encourage hull and P&I insurers to wield their
considerable power for reform.939 It should also co-operate with the wider
travel industry and its publications to ensure the travelling public are made
aware of the dangers of unsafe ferries.
938
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In addition to the reforms of IMO and of national governments advocated
here, there are numerous reforms and improvements that could be
undertaken by ferry operators themselves. They are described in sections
10.6.0. to 10.14.0. below.

10.1.1. Reducing human errors must be the primary focus.
Human error, it has been made clear, is by far the most common and
important causal factor in fatal ferry accidents. 940 The most effective
solutions, obviously, will be those that successfully address that ultimate and
overriding cause of 88 per cent of ferry accidents and 98 per cent of ferry
fatalities. There is much that could and should be done to reduce human
errors so as to achieve a substantial reduction in the global ferry death toll.
Those improvements need not be very costly if carried out sensibly. It is far
more a question of collective will than of money.
Human behaviour can and has been changed for the better in aviation, public
health, construction, cruise ship and oil tanker operations, mining and road
safety, for example. It can be done. More and better training, education, more
rigorous disciplines and punishments and human awareness campaigning are
the keys.
What will be required to achieve this will be a lengthy and powerful
international public relations, lobbying and media campaign to bring the
problem of unnecessary ferry fatalities to the attention of the general public.
Such a campaign could be inspired and organised by a reformed International
Maritime Organisation or, if IMO is completely ossified as it appears to be,
more likely, by the proposed Non Government Organisation described
below.941 It is notable that IMO is mentioned in 19 of the 24 suggested
improvements summarised above.
The parent body of IMO, the United Nations Organisation, has launched a
campaign “Clean Seas” to rid the seas of garbage, particularly plastics.942 If
that has been possible, why not a FerrySafe campaign led and promoted by
IMO?943 Similarly, IMO‟s MARPOL and COLREGS codes have been
implemented universally including domestically in all member nations, at least
in theory. There seems to be no reason why the SOLAS, ISM and HSC codes
could not also be so implemented.
In fairness to IMO, although the evidence of continuing fatalities condemns its
lack of effectiveness, it has publicly demonstrated its consciousness of the
human factors problem. Its Resolution A.947(23), adopted on 27 November
2003, titled Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for the Organisation
940
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showed a clear awareness of the problem.944 Similarly, in 1999, the then
Secretary-General, William O‟Neil, in a presentation to IMO‟s Maritime Safety
Committee, urged that strong and effective action be taken with respect to
Casualties on (Passenger) Ships not covered by the provisions of
international conventions. 945 Since then, a number of conferences have been
held at which human factors have been considered but other than a significant
reduction of the annual number of fatalities in 2013 and 2016, little has
changed.946 In the intervening years and since, in 2017, the annual numbers
of fatalities have returned to normal.
One such conference was an Asia-Pacific Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies
Forum held in Busan from 12-15 April 2005. There, a representative of the
U.S. Coast Guard, Commander Bryan R. Edmond, an engineer, presented a
very optimistic paper Current State of International Consideration of Human
Factors.947 Perhaps his research was handicapped by the absence of a
comprehensive and readily accessible database of fatal ferry accidents at that
time. Perhaps he was simply ahead of his time. Subsequent events have
shown that his optimism as to potential reform was sadly premature,
particularly in the context of an “Asia-Pacific” forum.
Further, IMO has, in its prescient Manila Statement on Enhancement of the
Safety of Ships Carrying Passengers on Non-International Voyages, which
was adopted in Manila on 24 April 2015, recommended some of the above
suggested reforms.948 Sadly, there has been no sign of any subsequent action
aimed at implementing those recommendations on the part of IMO.
Intriguingly, the author and a colleague were actively and deceptively
precluded from attending and participating in the conference at which those
recommendations were developed.949 The author suspects that the Manila
Conference was something of a „Show Conference‟ designed as a vehicle to
present IMO‟s thoughts on domestic ferry safety and to demonstrate its
concern about the problem.950

10.1.2. Simplify, improve and, above all, enforce existing
regulations.
As stated by former IMO Secretary General O‟Neil twenty years ago, IMO and
its member states have enacted enough regulations.951 What they need to do
now is to properly enforce, or facilitate the enforcement of those already in
existence.952
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The process should start with remedying, particularly simplifying, the very
obvious deficiencies in existing international and national regulations and,
much more importantly, their enforcement.953 This should commence with the
ten worst affected nations.954 Reforms could then be extended to all other
nations starting with the next ten worst countries. Encouragement of better
behaviour on the part of owners, operators and passengers would help and is
entirely achievable955. Improved vessels,956 evacuation and safety equipment
and search and rescue services957 would also bring about significant
improvement as would better passenger education.958

10.2.0. Reform of IMO would be the preferred solution.
10.2.1. IMO appears remote, disengaged and disinterested in
developing country domestic ferry fatalities.
The International Maritime Organisation suffers from a disappointing
perception of disengagement and remoteness and an appearance of being
much too North Atlantic focused. While it has made some small, tokenistic
efforts in the form of organising expensive but largely unrepresentative
meetings, conferences and seminars in Tanzania, Kenya, the Philippines,
Indonesia and Fiji,959 among others.960 IMO‟s consultative process is generally
restricted to a very carefully selected audience that is unlikely to want to make
changes or to „rock the IMO boat‟! Such events appear to achieve very little
apart from projecting an image of concern.
In its current form and with its current self-serving corporate culture, IMO has
not yet and seems very unlikely to make any worthwhile contribution to the
raising of safety standards in the domestic ferry sector. This is particularly so
with respect to domestic ferries operating in developing countries. And they,
after all, comprise the bulk of the problem. IMO and the ferry voyaging public
would both benefit from wide-ranging and substantial reform of the
organisation as outlined below.
IMO gives the impression of having no serious interest in the domestic ferry
fatality problems of the ten nations in which 80 per cent of the world‟s ferry
fatalities have occurred. Nor, indeed, does it seem to have made any
substantial effort in many of the ten next worst nations. It appears „Pontius
Pilate‟ like in its desire to „wash its hands‟ of such problems and to transfer the
blame for them to national governments. Most of the printed matter it
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produces on the subject of ferry safety would most accurately be described as
platitudinous.961 The corporate culture of IMO is arrogantly and ignorantly selfsatisfied and self-serving to the point of negativity. It seems to find it difficult, if
not impossible, to accept questioning, criticism or even suggestions. It mostly
just ignores them as the author has discovered from personal experience over
many years.
IMO is invariably very slowly reactive rather than proactive. Normally, a
disaster, scandals or multiple disasters are required to motivate the
organisation to act. Even then, it appears much more willing to act or
comment if such disasters occur in Europe. For example, the capsize of the
Costa Concordia in 2012, which killed 32 people, inspired far more attention
and comment from IMO than anything that has ever happened in Asia, the
Pacific or Africa. In the same year there were 293 fatalities when the Skagit
capsized off Zanzibar; the Rabaul Queen capsized off New Britain with 170
fatalities; an unknown ferry on the Brahmaputra River with 251; and, the
Shariatpur in Bangladesh with 185. A total of 900 fatalities. And, of course,
there were many other less newsworthy accidents.962
In that year there were ten reported accidents in which many more people
were killed than in the Costa Concordia disaster but they all happened beyond
Europe and, so, went largely unreported or commented on as far as IMO was
concerned. 963 IMO tells us it „consults‟ widely but then, frustratingly, usually
fails to act in any constructive way. It issues statements following its
information sharing forums but they are devoid of commitments and timelines
for action on the part of their participants.
This contrasts distinctly with the publicly expressed desire of the two most
recent IMO secretaries-general, Koji Sekimizu and Ki Tack Lim, at least, to
the effect that: “The public expects safety standards on domestic passenger
ferries to be as strong as those on international vessels”,964 and “I will ensure
that the utmost focus is placed on improving implementation (of rules) at a
global level”.965
Ki Tack Lim went on to say: “But perhaps the most valuable tool we have in
this respect is the Member State Audit Scheme”.966 This is a sadly hollow, if
not actually delusional, claim as only one IMO member state, China, of the ten
most dangerous countries, was a member of the MSAS at the time of going to
press.967 IMO has a long way to go before it fulfils its laudable objectives. The
961
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reality of its actions diverges dramatically from its rhetoric. It does not appear
to be short of funds, just the will or determination to properly analyse the
problem and then improve the safety of passenger vessels.
While it would be preferable if IMO were able to be reformed, if it is so ossified
as to be beyond reform or redemption, it would better be supplemented and
substantially replaced by a ferry safety focussed NGO, FerrySafe.org or
SafeFerry.org, perhaps?

10.2.2. IMO must develop the „will‟ to effectively support and
assist developing countries to improve their domestic
maritime safety standards by working „with‟ them.
While acknowledging, but not in any way accepting, the restraints placed on
IMO by its legally-prescribed inability to interfere in the internal affairs of its
sovereign member states,968 it could, were it to develop the will or
determination to do so, assist significantly without so interfering. It is a matter
of approach.
IMO should work „with‟ its sovereign member states to educate, encourage
and train them to similarly encourage, educate, train and enforce better
behaviour among their local ferry owners, operators and regulators. It should
develop a corporate sense of proportion and concentrate on curing the human
factor problems rather than the very significantly less important technical ones
that it seems to be obsessed with and on which it has spent so much money.
Its apparently substantial financial and time resources should be directed at
real problems rather than at speculated or possible ones.969 That should be
done in a culturally sensitive manner. A greater focus on simple human
behavioural factors and requiring fundamentally safer vessels is all that is
required. Finessing the proven inadequate existing rules using complex and
arcane naval architectural mathematical formulae seems to be an expensive
waste of time and money. Developing a global maritime safety culture should
be its primary objective. Safety, in the case of ferries, is a behavioural rather
than a technical problem.
The biggest problem hindering the reform of IMO is that it is always very
difficult to change the course of a large and well-entrenched bureaucracy.
While IMO obviously benefits from the contributions of some dedicated staff
and committee members, committee chairmen and delegates, its public face,
as observed by the author, is generally quite different. IMO‟s employees
appear to be self-satisfied, self-serving people on very good salaries and
enjoying generous perquisites. As also do its consultants. They are very
comfortable and, so, unlikely to want to promote change, especially reform.
They firmly believe that they know best.
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Employment by IMO appears to be something of a sinecure, right up to
Secretary-General level. It should not be. Such reluctance to change or
reform will be endorsed and supported by many, but fortunately not all, of
IMO‟s generally very self-indulgent national delegates. It will also tend to be
endorsed by certain ferry owners, designers, builders, naval architecture firms
and academics and national maritime administrations, particularly from
Northern Europe and Scandinavia. IMO serves them well. It largely suits them
exactly as it is. They know how to lobby IMO very effectively.

10.2.3. IMO HQ should move to centre of real maritime world.
IMO‟s headquarters should be moved to somewhere nearer the centre of the
real maritime world. It is remote from the area where it is most needed.
London is too attractive a subsidised home to sinecured delegates and staff
from developing countries to enable any constructive work to be done there. It
is too far from where most of the problems actually occur. It is no longer the
„centre of the maritime universe‟. Asia undoubtedly is. It is interesting, by
contrast, to note that the International Maritime Rescue Federation, a
charity/NGO based in low-rent, remote Stonehaven, Scotland, has opened a
regional office in Shanghai.970

10.2.4. Passengers have a right to expect domestic voyages
to be equally as safe as international ones and airline flights.
Passengers should be entitled to expect that they would be equally as safe on
domestic as on international voyages. Secretary-General Ki Tack Lim stated
this personally.971 This is generally the case on both domestic and
international flights with only a few exceptions in Africa, Latin America and the
former Soviet Union.972 IMO should follow the example of its sister
organisation ICAO and oversee domestic voyages just as closely as
international ones, even if through a carefully supported proxy. ICAO suffers
from a similarly restrictive charter as IMO but it has not allowed that to prevent
it from making very significant improvements to the global aviation industry
including with respect to domestic flights. 973 It is apparent that ICAO is
notably better led than IMO. Leadership seems to be the key to their disparity
in effectiveness.

10.2.5. Reform IMO with ICAO as a model.
IMO should be reformed with ICAO as a model. It does not need to be
replaced unless it refuses to be reformed. The IMO GISIS accident database,
for example, must be substantially upgraded and maintained. It is wholly
inadequate. If IMO is unaware of the extent of the ferry fatality problem, it is
unsurprising that it is so reluctant to do anything constructive about it. If that
database improvement cannot be done „in-house‟, as seems likely, it should
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be contracted out to a free enterprise operator subject to appropriate checking
and auditing.974 ICAO‟s iSTARS database provides an excellent template or
benchmark. 975 So, too, does its associated SKYbrary database.976 Another
excellent example of defining the problem with a database is the international
road safety equivalent, IRTAD.977 They show what intergovernmental
organisations are capable of when properly directed.
The Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database shows what can be
achieved by a private organisation with a very small fraction of the resources
of IMO. It is incomparably more comprehensive and informative with respect
to ferry accidents, particularly domestic ferry accidents, than is GISIS. Its
content has been offered to IMO without charge but that offer was rejected. 978
The ferry and tourist boat industry and its regulators should relentlessly
plagiarise from, copy and follow the aviation industry and the activities of
ICAO. The oil tanker and cruise ship sectors, too, are showing the way. They
all provide excellent models. Indeed, they do for the entire maritime industry.
The global ferry industry, through its industry association, INTERFERRY,
should assiduously and relentlessly lobby for the reform of IMO if only to
eliminate the rogue operators who give the ferry industry a bad name. This
would obviously be in the best interests of legitimate operators. Even though a
fatal ferry accident may occur in Bangladesh, Tanzania or the Philippines, it
still harms the image of ferry operators everywhere.979

10.2.6. Revise IMO‟s SOLAS Code to be more economical
using the HSC Code as a model.
IMO‟s SOLAS Code standards are generally far too expensive and, often,
inappropriate to be realistically complied with widely with respect to domestic
voyages in developing countries. 980 There must be room for realistic
compromise. When the SOLAS requirements are unaffordable and
inappropriate, they will be ignored. It is quite feasible to design and construct
more affordable and appropriate vessels and evacuation and safety
equipment suited to poorer and mostly warmer countries. SOLAS should be
adjusted accordingly using the HSC Code as a model. That would encourage
the governments of developing countries to introduce more appropriate
regulations.
The extension of an appropriately modified version of the HSC Code to cover
all ferries and tourist vessels everywhere, whether or not they are operating
domestically or internationally, or at high speed, should be undertaken
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quickly. 981 It is very effective and has been accepted by designers, builders,
classification societies, operators and regulators alike.982
In both developed and developing countries very few vessels built to or
operating under the HSC Code have been involved in fatal accidents. The
number of fatalities thus arising have been miniscule.983 It works very
effectively and should be an all-encompassing globally implemented rule.
There is no excuse for permitting lower safety standards on domestic
voyages. They simply need to be more appropriate and affordable. It is on
domestic voyages, after all, that 93 per cent of ferry fatalities occur.

10.3.1. Ban new construction of conventional monohull RoPax ferries.
Conventional Ro-Pax ferries, which have been involved in at least 18 per cent
of known total accidents, have been responsible for at least 25 per cent of
known ferry fatalities over fifty years.984 In the final sixteen years of this study,
however, they have been involved in 16 per cent of accidents but have been
responsible for 32 per cent of fatalities, almost entirely in developing
countries. That is grossly disproportionate. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax
ferries represent considerably fewer than 10 per cent of the total ferry
population. The statistics speak for themselves. Their bow and stern doors
and low, wide vehicle decks make them uniquely vulnerable to human errors,
especially when inadequately manned and maintained.
Future Ro-Pax ferries should be required to have at least two hulls linked by
an appropriately strong and durable bridge deck. The hulls should each have
at least six watertight compartments of which none should have a volume
exceeding 20 per cent of the total volume of that hull. The bridge deck and
vehicle deck should be a minimum of four per cent of the waterline length of
the vessel above its laden static waterline. No vehicles or passengers should
be able to be stored or carried below that level. Bow doors should not be
permitted. Fire prevention and extinguishment rules should not only be strict
but they should be strictly enforced.985
The construction of new monohull Ro-Pax ferries with bow doors to their
vehicle decks should be banned.986 Bow doors destroy the watertight integrity
of the vessel. Vehicle decks on monohull Ro-Pax ferries should be
constructed to be a minimum of four percent of the vessel‟s water line length
above its static loaded waterline. All conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries
currently in service should be phased out as quickly as possible. The sale of
second-hand conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries should likewise be
banned.
981
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Unfortunately, many owners, designers and builders of conventional monohull
Ro-Pax ferries have propagated the myths that their multi-hulled counterparts
are fragile and expensive to build operate and maintain. That is largely
because they are mostly built of aluminium and operate at high speeds. Their
very effective lobbying appears to have largely convinced IMO personnel of
those fallacies.
In reality, aluminium multi-hulled fast Ro-Pax ferries are significantly less
expensive to build, operate and maintain than are their conventional steel
counterparts of the same economical capacity. Their safety record is almost
unblemished. Otherwise, obviously, in a conservative industry like shipping,
few, if any, would have been sold.
Further, multihull Ro-Pax ferries do not have to operate at high speeds, nor do
they have to be constructed of aluminium. Very importantly, because of their
greater beam, they can enable semi-trailer trucks to turn around on board,
thus obviating the need for dangerous bow doors.987 Steel multihull Ro-Pax
ferries could be designed to operate efficiently at the low speeds common in
developing countries. They would then be very economical indeed. They
would also be incomparably safer than their monohull counterparts. The key
to safety, aside from human factors, is stability and unsinkability. Speeds,
construction materials or size are irrelevant.

10.3.2. Sales of elderly, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries
to developing countries should be banned immediately.
The IMO facilitated and promoted Stockholm Agreement has been in force for
over twenty years. 988 It should be replaced as it only serves to protect
„dinosaur‟ Ro-Pax ferries and their owners, specialist designers and builders.
It should be re-written so as to promote the design and construction of safer,
more seaworthy vessels. It has, admittedly, proved to be effective, so far, but
only in Northern Europe where it has had the unfortunate consequence of
encouraging the southward export of unsafe ferries.989 The „grandfathering‟ of
rules only permits and encourages such dangerous practices.990
Given that practically all ferry accidents result from human error, IMO must be
persuaded that the complex mathematical naval architectural formulae that it
and its Scandinavian maritime authority contributors promote will not in any
way solve the problem. Conventional Ro-Pax ferries are especially vulnerable
to human errors. They may be safer now, than they were, in disciplined,
developed north European countries but they have continued to be very
dangerous elsewhere. Indeed, the increase in the percentage of fatalities due
to Ro-Pax accidents since 2000 seems largely due to this phenomenon of
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southward migration. Old, poorly maintained ferries that have been
dangerously modified are the main culprits.991
The on-sale of elderly North European, North American and Japanese ferries,
particularly Ro-Pax, to poor countries should be banned. IMO could enforce
that. Indeed, it already claims that IMO “measures” cover ship disposal so it
should have already been doing that.992 Clearly, it has failed to do so.
It has effectively halted the sale of unsafe and inadequate oil tankers so why
not ferries?
In the interim, it is believed that the Philippines Government has, in late 2017,
banned the importation of all second hand ferries.993
The international funding agencies (WB, IMF, AID, AIIB and ADB, etc.) and
commercial banks should be counselled by IMO re funding for the purchase of
such „clapped out‟ vessels. Indeed, they should be advised to not assist with
the funding of any kind of unseaworthy or unrealistically expensive vessels.
The World Bank, IMF, ADB, AIIB, AUSAID, JBIC, USAID and similar funding
agencies should be encouraged to fund simple, seaworthy ferries rather than
larger, complex ones which really only benefit naval architects and ship
builders from developed countries. The completely impractical “affordable”
Ro-Pax ferry concept promoted by Finnish naval architecture firm, Deltamarin,
at the INTERFERRY 2016 Conference in Manila is just the sort of emotively
promoted concept that such funding agencies can be regrettably easily misled
into financing. 994

10.4.1. Focus reform effort on most dangerous countries.
Reform efforts should initially be focused on the six of the ten most dangerous
countries where they appear likely to be most successful. It should exclude
China which should be capable of carrying out its own reform if shamed into it.
China, incidentally and tellingly, is the only one of the ten worst countries to
have been audited under the IMO‟s Member State Audit Scheme. Those six
countries, then, are: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines and
Tanzania. Four Asian and two African. Regrettably, DR Congo, Senegal and
Haiti appear too difficult to tackle at first. Once significant reform has been
achieved in those six countries, efforts could be re-directed to the next six
countries down the list.

10.4.2. National authority reform.
National authority reform should start with three or four of those countries, for
example, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines and Tanzania, and then
work through the list. Compare the powers and capabilities of national
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maritime authorities and coast guard services in statistically safe and unsafe
nations. What could they achieve if assisted and supported by IMO and
neighbouring developed nations?
IMO should support the improvement of the maritime authorities in terms of
regulation, enforcement and search and rescue (SAR) services in such
countries preferably with the assistance of nearby developed nations. For
example, Australia with Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua-New Guinea,
Singapore with Myanmar, New Zealand with the Pacific island nations, Japan
with the Philippines, and the USA, Canada and European nations with various
central and South American and African countries. This is actually happening
in a limited way but with little input evident from IMO. For example, the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority works with its counterparts in Indonesia,
Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands. Comparing and benchmarking
with proven effective organisations such as the United States, Canadian and
Japanese coast guards, Britain‟s Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority would be a good place to commence.
Coastguards and government SAR services must be increased and upgraded. NGOs and classification societies could donate services and
hardware as part of their corporate social responsibility promotions. There are
excellent models for effective, economical SAR services in many of the
developed countries.

10.5.1. Introduce a standard format accident inquiry model.
IMO should implement a standard format accident inquiry model from which a
standard form report should arise. It should also report on „near miss‟
incidents. That then should be included in a standardised, global database of
all PV accidents and incidents. So far its Casualty Investigation Code of 2010
has failed to do this except in OECD countries. Similarly, GISIS has almost
completely failed to be utilised except in some OECD countries. Except for
China, none of the ten worst countries have adopted it at all. It should be
simplified with a “short form” version for use in developing countries.
All fatal and total hull loss accidents should be properly investigated by a
legally but simply and inexpensively constituted MBOI. Causes should be
determined, blame allocated and lessons learnt recorded. IMO should provide
a universal template for such inquiries based on the Rabaul Queen,
Marchioness and Herald of Free Enterprise inquiries. To date, IMO‟s Casualty
Investigation Code, London, 2010, has been largely ignored outside the
OECD countries. 995 This is not because the Code is inadequate. Rather, it is
the usual failure of will on the part of IMO. The Code does not require rewriting, just sensible enforcement.
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The British and Australian inquiry and reporting systems are simple and
effective and, importantly, prompt.996 In particular, the Australian Transport
Safety Bureau‟s Transport Safety Reports are normally published less than
two years after the event. They are formulaic, well illustrated and provide an
excellent single page summary of the accident and the lessons learnt from it.

10.5.2. Improve database of accidents and enquiry reports.
It is impossible to achieve reform without knowing the scope and extent of the
problem. It is imperative, therefore, that detailed and accurate databases be
compiled, and maintained in perpetuity, describing all significant passenger
vessel accidents and “near misses”, both fatal and non-fatal, by every country.
They should be combined into an international record.
The Rabaul Queen997, Herald of Free Enterprise998 and Marchioness999
inquiries and reports make for excellent templates. All such reports of fatal
and total constructive loss accidents should be recorded in perpetuity on a
database preferably maintained by IMO. As well as documenting the findings
and penalties recommended or imposed, such reports should highlight the
lessons learnt from the accident and the inquiry.
They should be profusely illustrated and the names, biographical details and
photographs of owner company directors and managers published as well as
those of ship‟s officers deemed to be responsible. These should be recorded
in perpetuity and extensively cross-referenced on the database advocated
above to enable passengers, potential crewmembers and insurers, for
example, to make informed decisions. 1000 So should changes to owner
company names such as in the case of Sulpicio Lines.
The aviation industry, again, shows the way. It has several independent safety
ratings agencies that are active, responsive and effective. Two of the more
notable are Airline Ratings and Skytrax Ratings.1001 They offer good models
to the ferry industry.
IMO should learn also from the model of the road safety equivalent of ICAO
and itself. That body is IRTAD, the International Traffic Safety Data and
Analysis Group, a permanent working group of the Joint Transport Research
Centre of the OECD and the International Transport Forum. Its successes are
proven and are based on high quality data and statistics that are the
imperative foundation of any campaign to change human behaviour. Its efforts
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have led to a 42 per cent fall in road fatalities in the 14 years to 2013 in the 32
countries involved with its programme.1002

10.5.3. A culture of learning from minor accidents and „near
misses‟ should be widely promoted.
This is widespread in aviation and is encouraged by many national aviation
authorities as well as by ICAO. There is even a private, non-profit, global
organisation CHIRP (Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme)
that originated in the United Kingdom, and which promotes “Aviation and
Maritime Confidential Reporting” of minor accidents and near misses. 1003 This
with the objective of promoting a culture of learning from your own and other
peoples‟ mistakes. While obviously well-established in the aviation industry,
CHIRP would appear to have a long way to go before it is well established in
the poorer countries where most ferry fatalities occur. It is, nevertheless, a
very worthwhile innovation that could, in theory, contribute substantially to a
useful reduction in ferry fatalities if adopted more widely.

10.6.0. Improve vessel design, construction and equipment.
10.6.1. Design, construction and equipment of vessels should
be economically and climatically appropriate.
Passenger vessels and their equipment should be designed and constructed
appropriately to the countries and economies in which they are to be used.
Cheaper, simpler, safer and more durable, preferably multi-hulled, vessels
should be the objective. Catamaran and trimaran ferries have proved to be
significantly safer on both domestic and international voyages than have their
monohull counterparts.1004
As explained in Chapter 6, apart from the obvious problems with conventional
monohull Ro-Pax vessels and Philippine „bancas‟, that make them more than
normally vulnerable, there is little wrong with vessels generally. Technical
failures are the cause of negligible numbers of fatalities. That is not to say,
though, that vessels cannot be improved. They can. Obviously, multicompartmented, multihull vessels significantly improve the chances of
passenger survival in the event of an accident.
Unseaworthy and overloaded vessels are the biggest killers. 1005 Eliminating
them by regulation and enforcement will be impossible except in the very long
term. Again, aid agencies and NGOs could assist here with the provision of
simple, inexpensive and seaworthy craft. Inevitably, unseaworthy vessels are
unlikely to be equipped with even the most basic safety equipment such as
life jackets, liferafts, Carley floats, EPIRBs, strobe lights, flares and AIS. Aid
organisations could also assist with this.
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The author has discussed ideas for safer vessels with a number of practical
naval architects and ship builders. For example, Stuart Ballantyne, principal of
noted naval architecture firm Sea Transport Solutions, has long advocated
designing vessels that “run out of deck space long before they run out of
stability or buoyancy”.1006 This in an endeavour to prevent overloading. He
also advocates steel-hulled craft of catamaran hull form with numerous watertight compartments in each hull and a minimum of „through-hull‟ fittings. They,
even if minimally maintained, should ensure seaworthiness.
Fortunately, an enterprising Filipino ship owning family has invested in at least
20 Ro-Pax catamaran ferries to Mr Ballantyne‟s designs. They are currently
operating successfully around the country. Unfortunately, though, even at
their present rapid rate of introduction, they will take many years to replace all
the old and dangerously dilapidated ferries that continue to operate in that
country.

Image 10.1. One of the twenty + modern Ro-Pax catamaran ferries designed
by Sea Transport Solutions that are being operated by Fast Cat Ferries in the
Philippines. At least ten more such vessels are planned (FastCat Ferries).
Leading Tasmanian based ship builder Toby Richardson of Richardson
Devine Marine specialises in the construction of aluminium catamaran fast
ferries which have been exported to many developing countries such as The
Seychelles and Tanzania.1007 Mr Richardson also advocates catamaran hull
1006
1007

Mr Stuart Ballantyne in numerous discussions with the author.
Mr Toby Richardson in a discussion with the author. August 2015.
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forms for the same reasons as Mr Ballantyne. However, Mr Richardson
believes that smaller catamaran ferries (To about 15 metres long.) could
efficiently and economically be „rotation‟ moulded from HDPE as with the
Carley floats mentioned above. Such craft, as can be seen in Chapter 6, could
well be powered by reliable and easily maintained diesel outboard motors that
would also eliminate any need for through-hull fittings. Again, the keys are
simplicity and series production of very simple designs.

10.6.2. Promote standardised safe ferry types and designs.
The ferry industry should encourage a reduction in the variety of ferry types
and designs. They should be more standardised as are buses and aircraft.
Even berthing and loading/unloading infrastructure could be beneficially
standardised. It will save money and enable more seaworthy, economical and
maintainable vessels to be constructed, maintained and surveyed at more
reasonable prices. They don‟t all need to be built by one company just as
buses and aircraft are not. Nor need they be standardised designs. They
should, however, be built in uniform dimensional classes to facilitate
economical building, maintenance, berthing and survey. Such standardisation
need not preclude innovation and improvement.
Competition within certain fixed capacity and dimensional parameters should
be encouraged. Simplicity, economy and seaworthiness are the keys. Buses
and aircraft types show how that can be done. For example, Boeing 737 and
Airbus A320 aircraft share essentially the same dimensions and engines and
can be boarded via the same „Skybridges‟ at airports world-wide. So do
Boeing 777 and 787 and Airbus 330 and 350 models. Buses globally are of
uniform width and mostly constructed to carry 56 seated passengers.
As described above and more extensively in Chapter 6, future Ro-Pax vessels
should be catamarans or trimarans of the Austal, Damen, Incat and Sea
Transport Solutions types or simpler, less expensive versions of them.1008
They do not have to be high speed. They do not necessarily have to be
constructed of aluminium. They could be constructed of steel or HDPE. Any
future monohull Ro-Pax vessels should not be permitted to have bow doors.
Stern vehicle ramps and doors should be significantly higher above their
waterlines than is current practice. They should be similar in concept to the
latest (2017) Damen vessels for Canada.1009 Existing monohull Ro-Pax
vessels should be rapidly retired, very closely watched by authorities, and the
voyaging public warned of their dangers. Capacity increasing, stability robbing
modifications should be banned.
Even passenger only ferries would be significantly safer if they were required
to be properly constructed, multi-compartmented, multi-hulled vessels. The
statistics shown in Appendix A prove without doubt that such vessels are far
more likely to protect their passengers and crew in the event of any
imaginable kind of accident than are any alternative designs.
1008
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10.6.3. Mandate fitting of simple, inexpensive lifesaving
equipment.
The development of simple, durable, easily used and inexpensive life-saving
equipment should be encouraged. Pool noodles, lightweight lifeboats, cheap
HDPE Carley Floats and simple, cheap, lightweight rescue boats would all be
more appropriate and more likely to be fitted in warm developing countries.
1010
Inflatable equipment that requires regular and expensive maintenance
and checking should be avoided. The cost, weight, complexity and
maintenance of all such equipment should be significantly reduced from those
required by SOLAS. It is possible. North European equipment is generally too
heavy, expensive, complex and difficult to store, maintain and use in
developing countries.
Essentially, the expensive, complex and heavy life saving equipment and life
boats that are prescribed by IMO and national authorities in those countries
are often quite inappropriate and unnecessary for poor countries. More
appropriate and affordable standards need to be developed for developing
countries. Ironically, in many cases, they may also even be better for rich
countries. Safety specifications can too often be commercially rather than
economically driven mainly for the benefit of the safety equipment
manufacturers. Their products are not durable or rugged enough to survive
where maintenance is unlikely and climatic conditions destructive. Simpler,
cheaper, more durable devices would be more likely to be adopted where
they are needed.
Carley Floats. today, are economically rotation moulded in large numbers
from high-density polyethylene (HDPE) in much the same way as modern
canoes, dinghies and kayaks. They are resistant to sunlight and should last
fifty years with essentially no maintenance. They can be moulded in high
visibility colours. If enough of an improved global standard design were to be
manufactured, unit costs could be significantly reduced.
If of double-sided design, it wouldn‟t matter how they are launched or landed,
they would still provide useful buoyancy on and alongside them for significant
numbers of survivors. HDPE floats weighing up to 50 kilograms could easily
be launched by two people and could assist up to twenty people with children
and the elderly able to be hoisted out of the water on to the float itself.
Because most passenger vessel accidents occur in tropical waters,
hypothermia would not be a significant problem with such floats.
Meanwhile, while widely fitted to ferries in developed countries, modern
versions of Carley Floats are very rare in the developing countries where they
would be of considerable value.
The use of simple and very inexpensive lifesaving devices should be
encouraged. It is pointless to insist upon equipping vessels with rich country
1010

As described in 1.14.1.

295

devices in regions that cannot afford them. Even the most basic of lifejackets
cost USD 10 or more on the world market. That is two weeks‟ income in some
of the countries discussed here. Much cheaper and easier to use would, for
example, be „pool noodles‟ which would cost around US fifty cents each if
purchased in bulk. They provide simple, long-term buoyancy and are very
easy to store in convenient places aboard vessels. They are also easier to
use than lifejackets.

Image 10.2. Pool noodles, would provide cheap, easy-to-use and easy-tostow buoyancy aids that, while frowned on by rich country regulators, would
save lives. They cost about USD 0.5 in developed countries.
Much the same applies with lifeboats and liferafts. Rich country mandated
types are much too expensive to purchase and maintain in developing
countries. They are complex and beset with rules and „use-by‟ dates that
appear to be primarily for the benefit of their manufacturers.
EPIRBs, while having „use by‟ dates, because they are battery powered,
remain a very economical SAR tool. They should be compulsorily fitted as
should be AIS.
Again, those improvements could be achieved both quickly and economically,
particularly if IMO could be persuaded to be rational in the application of its
standards. It must take account of the economic realities applying in poorer
countries. Comparatively inexpensive safety improvements in terms of
vessels and their equipment are readily available.

10.6.4. Recognise that inadequate maintenance is a vastly
bigger problem than bad design or construction deficiencies.
Poor maintenance is a much worse cause of fatalities than inadequate design
or construction of vessels.1011 This fact should be highlighted at both the
international and domestic levels. Passengers should be informed that if a
ferry appears poorly maintained, it probably is. Thus it should be avoided.
National governments should be encouraged to enforce sensible basic
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maintenance standards while also encouraging the fitting of low maintenance
safety equipment.

10.7.0. Introduce improved universal ticketing systems.
Overloading is one of the major causes of fatal ferry accidents. It is, for
obvious economic reasons, a particularly prevalent problem in developing
countries. IMO and national maritime authorities should introduce simple and
effective ticketing systems to help prevent overloading and to ensure the
production of an accurate passenger manifest.
On shorter voyages where a detailed manifest would be impractical, an
accurate headcount should be taken as a minimum and recorded away from
the vessel concerned. A simple hand written book at each terminal would
suffice.
Even the poorest and most primitive of countries are sufficiently computer
literate to operate such systems. Almost everyone, even the poorest, have
access to a modern mobile telephone. Systems are being developed to book
and board public transport vehicles, including ferries, using such devices. 1012
Such systems and their associated operator training could be donated by IMO
or wealthier neighbouring countries. Obviously, this will first require other
reforms particularly with respect to enforcement.
In any case, every passenger vessel, world-wide, should be surveyed and a
safe “Personnel Limit”, including all people, both passengers and crew,
determined. That limit, rather like a Plimsoll Line, should be printed and
embossed. in characters at least 25 cm high, on each side and on the
transom of each vessel. For example: “PL 350”. A global publicity campaign
should be conducted to inform passengers of the measure. It should advise
them to make their own count and not to embark on any ferry that appears
overloaded.

10.8.0. Utilise human factors specialists.
Human factors specialists have contributed significantly to safety
improvements in aviation, trucking, mining, construction, oil and gas, railways,
manufacturing, cruise ship and other industry sectors. Their skills would be
readily adaptable to ferry operations. The International Maritime Organisation
must overcome its fear of “interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign
member nations” and encourage the injection of such experts into the worst
performing countries even if only on a consulting basis.
An extensive Web search reveals that most airlines have „human factors‟
managers or similar. EasyJet, Emirates, Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines, Thai
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Airways, Virgin and Qantas are examples.1013 The only passenger vessel
owners that seem to have similar positions are Carnival, RCCL, P&O Ferries,
Thames Clipper, BC Ferries and Stena. Of smaller ferry companies, that is
the few that have websites, none list the employment of such specialists. This
is an important difference between aviation and shipping. Even railways in
western developed countries have human factors, ergonomics and safety
managers. This would seem a very effective way of raising safety
consciousness within ferry companies.
A specifically nominated executive with a clearly defined brief needs to have
both responsibility for and the means to carry out the safety consciousness
task in every ferry owning company. Even the smallest airline companies
seem to have someone carrying that job description. The website of the
Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors, the profession‟s
governing body, lists numerous employee and consulting practitioners. 1014
Even the smallest of ferry companies could afford to consult with such
specialists if they cannot afford to employ a full time human factors executive.
It is imperative that safety consciousness be raised and appropriate safety
disciplines and procedures be introduced throughout the ferry industry. Those
disciplines and procedures need to be assiduously promoted and continually
enforced. Thus the requirement for human factors specialists to conduct that
work through training, checking, testing and ensuring simple rules are in force
and, above all, enforced. The imperative of developing a safety culture among
all ferry owners and regulators must be relentlessly encouraged and
promoted.1015
Fatalism, it has been shown, is endemic, as is corruption, in most, if not all, of
the poorer countries discussed.1016 Human factors specialists would appear to
be well equipped professionally to modify or eliminate these significant
behavioural faults. However, poverty, and its close relative, malnutrition,
obviously, make such necessary reforms difficult.

10.9.0. Encourage classification societies to assist on a pro
bono basis.
Do we really need classification societies? They originated through a
requirement to determine whether vessels were insurable. Aviation doesn‟t
have them despite their best efforts to move into that sector. Insurers should
be able to estimate risks for themselves. They are well aware of the data that
is available and of the risks that they highlight.
Classification societies don‟t yet seem to contribute anything obviously
constructive in the domestic sector in developing countries. Developing
country governments and vessel owners cannot afford to retain them.
1013

Each of them has an Occupational Health and Safety department or equivalent. Some
have separate Flight or Aviation Safety departments.
1014
See the Institute‟s website www.ergonomics.org.uk .
1015
As described in 7.6.1.
1016
Described extensively in Chapter 5.

298

They could, however, use much of the excellent and valuable research and
technology they have developed in and for developed countries – which have
already paid for it – and make it available to developing countries at little or no
cost. It could lead to the saving of many lives and would have a valuable
public relations or corporate social responsibility (CSR) benefit for the
classification societies.
To vessel owners and governments in developing countries, classification
societies seem like very expensive auditors,1017 rather like the „Big four‟
accounting firms that so often overlook frauds and mismanagement.1018
Indeed, the Sewol Inquiry revealed collusion between ship owner and the
Korean classification society.1019
It is encouraging, however, to note that the Lloyd‟s Register Foundation in its
Insight report on global safety challenges for 2017, mentions passenger
ferries as a safety challenge and urges that IMO be influenced, “to enforce
regions to take up regulations that would make ferries safer in design and
methods of use”.1020

10.10.0. Encourage passenger behavioural reform.
10.10.1. Consumer education of ferry passengers should be
widely promoted.
Consumer education of ferry passengers should be promoted everywhere. If a
vessel looks overloaded or poorly maintained don‟t go aboard, could be a
starting theme. As in aviation, ferry passengers should be educated and
disciplined to listen to and obey the instructions of the crew. They should be
required to pay attention to safety briefings. This can be achieved.
The author has travelled widely by aircraft in China since the early 1990s.
Passengers then were unruly, undisciplined and dangerous, with cigarette
smoking widespread. By the early 2000s this behaviour had been completely
eradicated. Badly behaved passengers were simply removed from aircraft and
usually severely fined, if not imprisoned. That proved to be an effective
method of enforcing good behaviour.
Bad passenger behaviour is not countenanced in developed countries. Why
should it be in developing ones? The aviation industry has proved that
1017
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behaviour can be controlled. It must similarly be controlled on ferries and
tourist boats in those countries.

10.10.2. Aviation-like seating rules should apply to smaller
and fast ferries.
Passengers on certain, smaller and less stable ferry types should have to
remain seated while berthing and unberthing as in aircraft when landing and
taking off and in turbulence. They should have to remain seated until mooring
lines are secure and the vessel safe and stable alongside. This was
suggested to the author by Torleif Stokke, managing director of Servogear AS
of Norway following observations from a few days spent in the Philippines. 1021
They should also be required to wear effective life jackets at all times aboard
small, open ferries. A stark example of this problem is the list developed by
Hong Kong‟s venerable and comparatively substantial Star Ferries as
passengers rush to disembark.1022 Passengers on smaller high speed ferries
should be required to wear seat belts in the same way and at the same times
as on aircraft.

10.10.3. NO SMOKING rules should be as rigorously enforced
at sea as in aviation.
The problem of smoking on board and the complete disdain for NO SMOKING
signs is common in most developing countries. Smoking has been the cause
of numerous fatalities.1023 It used to be a problem in the aviation industry,
particularly smoking in aircraft toilets. Now, thanks to substantial penalties, it
simply does not happen. Similarly, there should be no smoking on any vessel
at any time.
The airlines, ICAO and IATA, collectively, have ensured that massive
penalties apply to those caught breaking the rules and warnings are routinely
given before and after take-off as part of the safety briefings given on all
flights. Cabin crews are trained to be vigilant in such matters and electronic
warning systems direct any smoke detections to the aircraft commander in the
cockpit. Ferry owners should be required to do the same.
Canada‟s BC Ferries, for example, in December 2017 banned smoking on all
its ferries and in all its buildings. It is hoped that other owners will soon follow
that excellent example.
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10.11.0. Encourage owner, officer and crew behavioural
reform.
10.11.1. Basic officer and crew training, education and
behaviour must be improved.
There are numerous aspects of seamanship, navigation, pilotage, safety
consciousness, situational awareness and organisational discipline that
require careful attention in all the unsafe countries. They are common to all
and are very obvious even to untrained outside observers. Unless they can be
eradicated, there is little hope of achieving any of the necessary reforms.
Perhaps acknowledged nautical safety promotional organisations such as The
Nautical Institute could be supported by and work on behalf of IMO to effect
better training of officers and crew in developing countries. The NI has proved
to be very effective in developed countries. There is no reason why its
methods could not be adopted in developing ones.
For example, all masters and officers should be required to undergo strict and
substantial training in the proper use of barometers. Many, currently, are not
so trained. The former Chief of Staff of the Philippine Coastguard, Galtiero
Dela Cruz, described this to the author as a factor in the propensity of Filipino
captains to sail into the face of typhoons.1024 They simply do not understand
the relationship between rapidly falling barometric pressure and the likelihood
of severe storms. That is if they even check their ship‟s barometer at all.
All masters and watchkeeping officers should be trained and re-trained,
throughout their careers, to „look out the window‟, to frequently check the
barometer and not be mesmerised by electronic instruments. The author has
discussed this problem with many experienced ship masters and senior Coast
Guard officers such as Carlos Agustin, the first Commandante and founder of
the Philippine Coast Guard, and the one time master of the cruise ship
Silverseas Discoverer.1025 All complained of electronic distractions and even
the use of electronic games on the bridge.
Much more discipline would appear to be required generally in this respect.
Crews should also be trained in the use, maintenance, proper storage and
location of the safety equipment carried aboard their vessels. They should be
made much more aware of the connection between cigarette smoking and
fires aboard vessels.
Owners, too, should be educated to the effect that: “if you think safety‟s
expensive, try a disaster”! Again, all ferry owners should be encouraged to
see the value in developing and promoting a safety culture within their
organisations. The marine insurance industry could assist with this.
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10.11.2. Delinquent owners, masters and officers should be
severely punished.
Owners, masters and watch keeping officers, particularly serial offenders, of
delinquent vessels should be very severely punished when fairly found guilty
of significant transgressions. Such punishments should be widely publicised.
Negligence, overloading, inadequate stability and poor lookout equate with
manslaughter and should be punished appropriately and publicised widely.
Changing social standards and expectations of their leaders by citizens will
increase demand for higher standards of regulation and enforcement. The
callous response to the Sewol sinking by South Korean President Park Geunhye did not help her attract sympathy when she was impeached for corruption
in 2016.1026 IMO should respond to such demands.
Callous, unscrupulous owners, particularly repeat or serial offenders such as
the Go family‟s Sulpicio Lines, Townsend Thoresen, Al Salam Maritime
Transport, Rabaul Shipping, Aboitiz Shipping, Negros Navigation, Minoan
Flying Dolphins, and numerous others, should be publicly named, shamed
and severely punished to discourage them from causing further fatalities.1027
Serial offenders should be banned by IMO.1028
Modern communication and news dissemination capabilities, especially those
provided by the Internet, make a global „naming and shaming‟ campaign
feasible at minimal cost. Defamation laws will largely be impotent in the face
of such a campaign. A public interest defence will be difficult for perpetrators
to overcome, particularly for serial offenders. Poorly behaved car
manufacturers, investment advisors, insurers and airlines, among others,
have recently been forced to improve their behaviour or have been driven out
of business by public opinion enhanced and assisted by the Internet.

10.11.3. Problem of fatalism must be rectified.
The cultural problem of fatalism, largely resulting from malnutrition, is a
significant factor in causing the human errors that lead to fatal ferry accidents
in the poorest countries. This is graphically illustrated in many of the reports
on such accidents, particularly in Tanzania, Bangladesh, DR Congo, Haiti and
Myanmar. The YouTube videos of the Bangladeshi accidents in Appendix F
show this starkly, particularly in the case of the collision where the larger ferry
stands on after the collision as though nothing had happened. Its crew and
passengers do nothing to help. 1029 They do not even throw one of the several
readily available life rings to survivors in the water.

1026

For example, Murdoch, S. Park apology for ferry disaster, The Australian, Sydney, 30
April 2014, P.10. And, Murray, L. South Korean president impeached, The Australian
Financial Review, Sydney, 11-12 March 2017, P10.
1027
Appendix A, Ibid, and Tables 1.6. ,1.7. and 1.12.2.
1028
Such as those listed in 1.12.2.
1029
Appendix F. Video footage of ferry collision and capsize in Bangladesh.
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This is a very significant human factor problem which must be eradicated
through education and encouragement but, probably most realistically, by a
reduction of poverty. Unfortunately, and obviously, that will be a long time
coming.

10.11.4. Withhold insurance from proven bad owners.
To a large extent this already happens through the normal workings of the
global marine insurance market. Obviously, rational marine insurers are not
going to risk their company‟s funds on proven bad owners or operators.
Nevertheless, further efforts could be made in this area by encouraging
insurers to only provide cover to owners and ships that have been objectively
vetted by a specialised agency such as Rightship ( See 10.13.2.), SafeFerry,
perhaps.
Insurers, both of hulls and protection and indemnity, have real power, except
in the poorest countries, to encourage safety improvements. They have done
so very effectively in developed countries. They need to spread their
knowledge and influence to developing countries. Commercial and public
opinion pressures on insurers and classification societies could motivate them
as suggested by Philippe Boisson.1030 It is in their own best interests to do so.

10.12.0. Improve evacuation, search, rescue and recovery.
When all else goes wrong, we turn to improvements in search and rescue
services and equipment. As has been seen, these are practically non-existent
in most of the countries with the highest accident and death tolls. Indeed, they
are still inadequate in many richer countries as we saw with the Estonia
sinking, as described in Chapter 3 (3.13). Such services are very expensive
and, in reality, unlikely to exist except in the rich world.
Radio and satellite communications (Satcom) distress communications and
AIS should be better organised on a global basis, preferably by IMO. While
EPIRB distress alerts are generally very effective, VHF radio automatic
distress signals should be on the same channel worldwide and it should, as
well as distress calling be the operating channel during SAR operations. At
the same time, strong radio operational disciplines must be enforced. The
various Satcom suppliers should be co-ordinated in a similar manner. The
communications difficulties experienced by the Heraklion and Estonia and
during their subsequent SAR operations starkly illustrate such problems1031.
The author is unaware of any subsequent improvements being made in that
regard.
Beyond the OECD countries, evacuation, lifesaving and SAR knowledge,
facilities, equipment and services are scarce at best and non-existent at
worst. Developing nations require considerable assistance in creating and
expanding these important components of their maritime activity. The IMO,
1030
1031

Boisson, P. Op cit.
Described in their case studies in Chapter 3.
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richer nations and their institutions such as SAR organisations, classification
societies and maritime industry associations could do much more to
contribute and assist in this regard.

10.13.0. Raise public consciousness of the safety problem.
10.13.1. Global approach required.
A „rogue‟s gallery‟ describing unsafe ferries and their owners could be drawn
from the database suggested in 10.9.1, above, and economically published to
„name and shame‟ them on the Internet. Serial or even repeat offenders such
as those listed in Tables 1.6. and 1.7. in Chapter 1 should be publicly vilified
with their names distributed to all government and commercial travel advisory
media. This, again, would be best undertaken by IMO if it were prepared to or
capable of maintaining a comprehensive and accurate database of maritime
accidents. It cannot rely on its sovereign member states for assistance in
compiling such a database. That database should be global and should
contain a cross-referenced list of owning companies and their directors,
owners and managers to warn potential voyagers about the negligent ones.
Naming and shaming of bad operators would be very effective.
Should IMO be unwilling or unable to maintain such a database, it would
probably be better undertaken by a specialised and focused, private, nonprofit organisation or NGO. That organisation could, again, be partially funded
by the classification societies as part of their CSR duty. They could be
assisted by subscriptions paid by responsible ferry operators wishing to
promote their safety consciousness. Further funding could come from IMO
and development banks, for example. Intending or potential passengers
should be able to go to an easily accessible online database to determine the
risks of their intended voyage.
The International Maritime Bureau Anti-Piracy Centre offers an excellent
model for such an organisation.1032 Transparency International also has much
to offer.1033 So, too, does the International Maritime Rescue Federation. 1034
The dramatic improvement in life expectancy achieved in Bangladesh
described in Chapter 5 showed what could be done by NGOs and companies
working together without government involvement.1035
Well-funded philanthropic institutions such as the Gates, Moore, Packard,
Pew, Nippon, Lloyd‟s, Paul Allen, Commonwealth of Learning and Clinton
foundations should be encouraged to support a global public
education/advertising campaign to promote safe ferry awareness.
A global public inquiry led by a passionate and powerful politician such as
former Australian Transport Minister, the Hon. Peter Morris undertook with his
1032

See www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/
See www.transparency.org.
1034
Refer to IMRF in 10.5.
1035
Described in 5.5.4.
1033
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“Ships of Shame” Inquiry in 1992 should be instituted.1036 That inquiry
exposed the appalling behaviour of many bulk ship owners and charterers
that cost the lives of many of their crew members. It resulted in significant
improvements to the global operations and safety of bulk ships. It was a very
effective „naming and shaming‟ operation that could well be emulated with the
ferry industry.
A global Ferry Safety promotional organisation should be established to
manage and promote this. Sea Safety? SafeFerry? Safe Seas? Safe at Sea?
FerrySafe.com? This should be non-profit and could be based on the
information presented in this thesis and subsequently continuously updated.
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association, based in New York, works very
constructively in this field but suffers from a lack of funding and, consequently,
personnel. 1037 It could well be incorporated into such an organisation.
As well as advocating reform, it could maintain and further develop the
BMPVA database, perhaps combined with an improved GISIS as well as an
App to enable intending ferry passengers to check by mobile phone on the
safety record of any ferry, or its owner, that they may be considering travelling
with. Bad owners and bad ships should be named and shamed. Conversely,
good owners and safe ships should be praised and highlighted. This has been
very effectively achieved in the aviation industry with its independent safety
rating organisations such as Airline Ratings and Skytrax ratings.1038

10.13.2. Implement a global „vetting‟ system for passenger
vessels.
A global vetting system for passenger vessels similar to that operated by
Rightship in the oil tanker/bulker sectors could be implemented and managed
by the global ferry safety promotion organisation mentioned above. 1039
Tanker and bulker operators who are devoid of a positive Rightship vetting
are increasingly finding themselves „beyond the pale‟. In a number of cases
such as with Steamship Mutual, the P&I club, insurers are refusing to cover
them. A SafeFerry version of Rightship would be a logical development.
Another possibility would be the Vessel Risk Rating system released in July
2017 by the German vessel tracking website www.fleetmon.com in
association with the London based International Marine Risk Rating
Agency.1040

10.14.0. Promote swimming lessons globally.
A large number of ferry fatalities have occurred because many passengers
and some crews were simply unable to swim. This is an unfortunate fact of life

1036

Morris, P. Ships of Shame Inquiry, House of Representatives, Canberra, 1992.
See www.ferrysafety.org .
1038
See www.airlineratings.com and www.skytraxratings.com.
1039
See www.rightship.com .
1040
Refer to the Fleetmon press release of 7 July 2017 on www.fleetmon.com.
1037
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in many developing countries even, perhaps surprisingly, in archipelagic
countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia.
Swimming lessons and water safety education should be encouraged in all
countries. Public education campaigns such as have existed in Australasia
and much of Europe and North America for generations should be established
globally. Even in Muslim countries, girls should be particularly encouraged to
learn to swim, if necessary in gender segregated classes. Women and girls
seem to die in disproportionately large numbers in ferry accidents.
The richer world, through its charities and NGOs, should encourage the
establishment of simple learn-to-swim programmes in the coastal and riverine
regions of developing countries. Already, the WFSA and Interferry have
participated in the WHO‟s Global Report on Drowning. An inability to swim is
mostly a result of poverty although it can be due to religious beliefs. The death
tolls arising from many of the accidents studied in this thesis would have been
significantly lower had more of the victims possessed even rudimentary
swimming ability.

10.15.0. Conclusion.
The dramatic and continuing success of the aviation industry in improving its
safety record in the thirty years to 2010 shows what could be achieved by the
global ferry and tourist boat industry and its regulators.1041 So too do the
successes of the road safety authorities in most developed countries. Even
the Philippines which, for decades had one of the worst records for ferry
safety, now appears to be achieving worthwhile improvements. Thanks to the
guidance provided by the aviation industry, road safety, cruise and tanker
sector examples, the ferry and tourist boat industry should be able to reform
itself in considerably less than three decades. It has the valuable benefit of
aviation‟s pioneering efforts to work with in the form of proven techniques and
benchmarks.
Developed country ferry owners and their industry association INTERFERRY
should, in their own best reputational interests, be assisting with greater
efforts to make domestic ferry travel safer in developing countries.
INTERFERRY does have an active domestic ferry safety sub-committee and,
through his own personal experience, its CEO is exceptionally safety
conscious.1042 In fairness, it has contributed significantly to the efforts of the
WFSA. INTERFERRY is, as it should be, generally, promoting the benefits of
safer ferry travel globally.
Similarly, there are many examples and lessons to be gained or copied from
the very successful road safety improvement, „Learn-to Swim‟, anti-smoking
and health improvement campaigns that have been carried out in most of the
developed countries. Most of those can be readily adapted to the ferry and
tourist boat industry.
1041
1042

Indeed to zero fatalities in 2017 on commercial jet aircraft.
Refer to 7.5.4.
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The United Nations‟ Clean Seas global campaign on marine litter, announced
on 23 February 2017, provides IMO with a very impressive „in house‟ example
of what it could do were it to have the will to do so. 1043
Nevertheless, the outlook is positive if the International Maritime Organisation
could be inspired, persuaded or forced to reform itself from being a selfsatisfied and self-serving bureaucracy to a well led, proactive agent of change
and reform such as is its aviation counterpart ICAO. It should very actively
work “with” its needy member states to achieve comprehensive global ferry
safety reform. ICAO provides a near perfect model of what the IMO should be.
Even if IMO is really so moribund that it cannot or will not be so moved, it is
still possible that a global private organisation or NGO, „FerrySafe‟ or
„SafeFerry‟, perhaps, using effective „naming and shaming‟ publicity
techniques similar to those utilised by environmental NGOs, could drive
substantial improvement.
The implementation of any and, preferably, all of the above recommendations
would undoubtedly lead to significant reductions in the annual global ferry
accident death toll.
Despite all the obvious problems and roadblocks described, it is very
encouraging to note the significant reduction in the number of fatalities in
2016. At 473 recorded and approximately 710 estimated, it was significantly
better than the previous best year ever, 2013, where the figures were 615
recorded and, probably, 900 actual.1044 Why was this so, apart from a general
media led consciousness raising? Or, was it simply good fortune? While 2017
started badly with 40+ fatalities in Indonesia on January 1, and a total of 742
„known‟ and probably 1,100 actual for the full year, at least 2016 showed that
significant improvements are achievable.
During 2016 and 2017 there was considerable speculation globally about the
prospects for „driverless‟ cars and „autonomous‟ ships. It seems likely that
such developments will eventually come to pass. However, while autonomous
bulkers, tankers and container ships, for example, are possibly feasible, the
prospect of „autonomous ferries‟ seems remote, except over very short
distances in very calm water. There are simply too many humans involved
with their operations for the human element to be eliminated.
There is a gross and tragic attitudinal, cultural and operational dichotomy
between the aviation and ferry industries and their international and domestic
regulators with respect to their approaches to passenger safety. That illogical
division can and must be eliminated. It is hoped that this work will go some
way towards achieving that.

1043
1044

See Clean Seas global campaign on marine litter, Ibid.
Appendix A, Ibid.
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Appendices
A. Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database. Database of
passenger vessel accidents, their locations, causes and number of deaths
resulting. Compiled by the author and assistants employed by Baird
Publications, Melbourne. (Attached in electronic pdf form.)
B. List of countries by road traffic related death rate. World Health
Organisation statistics.
C. Personal email letter from Commodore (Retd) Gualterio Dela Cruz, former
Chief of Staff of the Philippines Coast Guard, 7 October 2016.
D. Letter to the editor of Work Boat World magazine from Captain Peter
Sharp, managing director of Rabaul Shipping, owner of the Rabaul Queen.
E. List of Known Fatal Fast Ferry Accidents 1966-2015 compiled from
Appendix A, BMPVA database.
F. Two YouTube videos of Bangladeshi fatal ferry accidents.
G. IMO Manila Statement on Enhancement of the Safety of Ships Carrying
Passengers on Non-International Voyages.
H. List of known Fatal Ro-Pax Ferry Accidents 1966-2015 compiled from
Appendix A, BMPVA database.
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Appendix B. List of countries by road traffic related death rate. World Health
Organisation statistics.

Country
Afghanistan
Africa
Albania
Algeria
Americas
Andorra
Angola
Antigua &
Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central
African
Republic

Road
fatalities
per
100,000
inhabitants
per year
15.5
26.6
15.1
23.8
15.9
7.6
26.9

Road
fatalities per
100,000
motor
vehicles
722.4
574
107.2
127.8
33
7.9
992

Road
fatalities
per 1
billion
vehiclekm
n/a

6.7
13.6
18.3
5.4
5.4
10
13.8
8
13.6
6.7
13.7
6.7
24.4
27.7
15.1
23.2

20
24.3
18.2
7.3
7.1
83
36
19.6
1020.6
16.9
32.9
10.7
26
8177.2
167.2
205.2

n/a
n/a
n/a

17.7
23.6
23.4
8.3
30
17.4
27.6
6
26.1

76.7
91.6
50.3
17.2
328.1
107.2
1385.1
9.5
229

n/a
n/a

32.4

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Total fatalities
latest year
(adjusted/estimated
figures by WHO
Year, data
report)
source
4,734
2013
246,719
478
2013
9,337
2013
153,789
6
2013
5,769
2013
6
5,619
546
1,252
455
943
52
107
21,316
19
1,282
746
81
2,855
114
3,476

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

n/a

676
477
41,059
601
5,072
2,635
6,136
2,114
130

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

4336.5 n/a

1,495

2013

5.2
5.8
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7.3
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

55.9
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
6.2
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Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
Denmark
Dominica
Dominican
Republic
Eastern
Mediterranean
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Europe
Federated
States of
Micronesia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
GuineaBissau
Guyana

24.1
12.4
18.8
16.8
26.4
24.2
13.9
9.2
7.5
5.2

497
51.1
104.5
83.3
1063
40.2
38.4
21.1
133.7
9.2

6.1

8.5

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

3,089
2,179
261,367
8,107
1,174
5
676
395
840
59

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

13.9

654

2013

4

22,419
196
11

2013
2013
2013

3,052

2013

122,730
3,164
10,466
1,339
1,527
90
23,837
84,589

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

2
51
258
3,268
383
544
514
3,540
6,789
1,013
2,939
3,211

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

751.9 n/a
864.4 n/a

468
138

2013
2013

33.2
3.5
15.3

6405.4 n/a
6.7
44.7 n/a

29.3

94.9 n/a

19.9
20.1
12.8
21.1
24.1
7
25.3
9.3

139
183.8
148.7
163.7
2171.5
11.8
4984.3
19

1.9
5.8
4.8
5.1
22.9
29.4
11.8
4.3
26.2
9.1
19
27.3

24
58.9
4.4
7.6
196.4
998.7
54
6.8
443.1
12.6
114.7
9462.5

27.5
17.3

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
4.8
5.8
n/a
n/a
n/a
4.9
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Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall
Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique

17.4
7.7
4.6
16.6
15.3
32.1
20.2
4.1
3.6
6.1
24.2
11.5
4.7
26.3
24.2
29.1
2.9
18.7
22
14.3
10
22.6
28.2
33.7
73.4
10.6
8.7
9.4
28.4
35
24
3.5
25.6
5.1

1021.7
20.7
6.1
130.1
36.7
92.7
151.2
7.6
9.7
7.3
828.9
61.7
6.5
151.4
101.4
640.7
86.9
34.2
127.3
67.5
24.8
64.8
474.8
133.4
128.2
16.1
10.7
49.1
2963
1310.4
29.9
19.5
1352.5
6.8

n/a
n/a

5.7
24.5
12.2
12.3

141.8
228.7
35.6
43

-

21
11.9
18
31.6

88.4
36.8
209
1507

n/a
n/a
n/a

1,408
765
15
238,562
38,279
24,896
6,826
188
277
3,753
4,924
320
5,971
1,913
3,983
12,891
3
629
1,220
971
205
1,088
584
1,448
4,554
320
46
198
6,506
5,732
7,129
12
3,920
22

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

3
952
158
15,062
0
597
74
6,870
8,173

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

4.7
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
3.9
5.3
n/a
n/a
n/a
8
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
12.6
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Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of
Moldova
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent
and the
Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon
Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea

20.3
23.9
17
3.4
6
15.3
26.4
20.5
3.8
25.4
14.2
4.8
10

250.8
196.4
399.8
6
8.4
164.3
1491.1
615.4
5.2
85.3
283.9
14.1
38.4

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

10,809
551
4,713
574
272
931
4,706
35,621
192
924
25,781
1
386

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

16.8
20.7
13.9
10.5
10.3
7.8
15.2

1306.5
114.7
99.3
135
15.8
13.7
50.9

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

1,232
1,408
4,234
10,379
3,931
828
330

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

12.5
8.7
18.9
32.1
18.1

61.8
31.4
53.4
3521.1
2103.3

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

437
1,881
27,025
3,782
33

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

8.2
15.8
3.2
27.4
27.2
10.4
8.6
27.3
3.6
6.6
6.4

31.7
171.9
1.8
119.7
956.4
34.5
43
2414.2
20.2
13.7
9.5

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
7.6

9
30
1
7,898
3,844
735
8
1,661
197
360
132

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

19.2
25.4
25.1
9.5

240 n/a
4480.5 n/a
133.9 n/a
21.2

16

108
2,664
13,273
4,899

2013
2013
2013
2016

4.5
6.7
n/a
n/a
n/a
4.4
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South-east
Asia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Sao Tome
and Principe
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab
Emirates
United
Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Western
Pacific
World
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

17
3.7
17.4
24.3
19.1
24.2
2.8
3.3

101
5.3
70.9
2872.8
49.7
1667.4
4.7
4.7

316,080
1,730
3,691
9,221
103
303
272
269

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

31.1
18.8
32.9
36.2
16.6
31.1
7.6

5454.5
374.9
1073.7
74.6
295.8
3653.4
98.1

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

60
1,543
16,211
24,237
188
2,123
8

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

14.1
24.4
8.9
17.4
27.4
13.5

58.9
154.4
37.3
107.8
836.8
35.3

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

189
2,679
6,687
914
10,280
5,099

2013
2013
2013
2009
2013
2012

10.9

38.2 n/a

1,021

2013

2.9
10.6
16.6
11.2
16.6
24.5

5.1
3.6
12.9
7.1
28.5 n/a
n/a
300 n/a
55 n/a

1,827
34,064
567
3,240
42
22,419

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

328,591
1,250,000
5,248
3,586
3,985

2013
2013
2013

17.3
17.4
21.5
24.7
28.2

7.8

3.5
4.3

69
436.6 n/a
670.9 n/a
429.8 n/a
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Appendix C
Email to the author from Commodore Gualterio Dela Cruz, PCG (Retd) former
commanding officer of the Philippine Coast Guard on October 7, 2016
I wish to share with you, some information on the sinking of a RORO-Passenger/Cargo
vessel, MV Princess of the Orient, which happened sometime in Sept 1998. Some details of
the vessel and the synopsis of the incident can be found by browsing on the computer,
pertaining to this incident.
After my retirement from the Navy in 1996 and for the next couple of years, I found myself in
the golf course, most of eh time. Among my golfing buddies then, were the senior executives
of Negros Navigation, one of the leading domestic shipping companies. Most of the ships are
the RORO-Passenger types and operates from Manila to Southern ports of the country. When
my golfing buddies with Negros Navigation (or NN) gave me ships tickects, when they knew I
was going to Iloilo City, a southern city in Visayas. In turn, my friends with Negros Navigation
asked me to take note of the things on board the vessel, which, to me, would need
refinements or revisions. I took the ship ride. By the way, the names of the NN vessels, then
were named after " Saiints" , such as "St Peter de Apostle", etc.
While on board the ship and underway enroute from Iloilo City to Manila, somebody has
informed the Ships Captain of my presence, and invited me for breakfast at the Captain's
table. During our casual conversation, he mentioned of the sinking of MV Princess of the
Orient on that fateful day in Sept 1998, They way he recalled the events, seems vivid in his
mind.
In his statements, on the day of the incident, he was the Master of one of the vessels of NN
fleet and scheduled to depart from Port of Manila to Iloilo City. As part of his routine activities,
prior to leaving port, was to check on the loading status of the vessel and prevailing weather
condition. He took note of the path of the incoming typhoon and strength of the gusty winds,
but since his ship was a 13,500 GRT vessel, by regulations, his vessel is cleared to sail.
While steaming inside Manila Bay, the sea condition was tolerable, hence continued his
voyage. The nautical distance from the Port of Manila to the mouth of Manila Bay, facing the
West Philippine Sea, is about 35 nautical miles or some three hours travel time. Based on his
statements during our conversation, as soon as his ship passed the mouth of Manila Bay, the
sea conditions was noted to be getting rough and the distance between wave highest, seems
to get higher and longer. Perhaps, after evaluating the path of the incoming typhoon and his
responsibility to the owners of the ship on his control, to include passengers and cargoes, he
decided to turn around and return back to Port of Manila.
On his return sailing route, northwards to Manila, he meet the MV Princess of Oreint heading
on his southern route. Upon seeing the MV Princess of the Orient, proceeding on the
southern route, the passengers on board the NN vessel, demanded an explanation from the
ships officers on why their NN ship was returning back to Port of Manila. To most of the ships
passengers, for the vessel to return back to Port of Manila, would mean additional expenses,
plus some changes in their planned trips. In turn, and as related by the ship captain, he has to
secure the ship's navigational areas and engine spaces, and ships offices for security
reasons. The passengers were getting restless and shouting was everywhere.
After a couple hours after the ship has change course back to Manila, the ship radio
communications systems has intercepted calls for assistance to rescue a commercial ship,
sinking off between Batangas and Mindoro, sea area. From then on, the maritime
communications traffic was heavy on exchanging messages for assistance. At the time, the
said NN ship was inside Manila Bay and relatively far to render assistance. Upon reaching
Port of Manila, the vessel just drop anchor and waited for the inclement weather to subside.
When the vessel was at anchor already, almost all of the passengers, went to see the ship's
Captain and expressed their deep gratitude for his hard and wise decision to cancel his trip
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and returned back to Port. The passengers were all praises to the ship's captain.
When I related the story to my friends at the NN management, they too have a regard for the
said ship captain. According to my friends with NN, then, the said ship captain is from Iloilo
and has good grades in school. As noted, the said ship captain was ahead of his
contemporaries and has been noted to diligent in his assigned tasks. His wife is a school
teacher in one of the local public schools in Iloilo. He finished his nautical course in the local
private school, but has noted to assumed responsibility in his junior billets on board different
ships. At this writing, I don't know his present assignment and lost track of him.
As mentioned earlier, the vessels of NN are mostly named after "Saints".
In my experience in the corporate world, to cancel a trip of a vessel as big as the NN vessel in
this incident, would entail additional expenses for the shipowners, and delays in the
schedules of the passengers and cargo on board. The ship captain has placed his profession
and reputation, on the line. In the words of James Michiner, in one of his books entitled, "The
Bridges of Tokori", when he said, "Where do we get such men".
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Appendix D
Email from Captain Peter Sharp, owner of the Rabaul Queen, to the editor of
Work Boat World magazine, February 2015
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Appendix E
Known Fatal Fast Ferry Accidents 1966-2015
Deaths
554
1983 Hungary
2
1989 Hong Kong
4
1991 China
2
1991 Norway
2
1992 Canada
1
1994 Hong Kong
3
1994 China
4
1996 Italy
4
1998 Canada
1
1998 Hong Kong
1
1999 Norway
16
1999 UK
1
2000 Hong Kong
4
2000 Russia
6
2001 Greece
1
2005 South Korea
1
2007 Australia
1
2007 Italy
4
2007 Australia
4
2007 UK
3
2007 Vietnam
3
2007 Italy
1
2007 South Korea
1
2008 China
1
2008 Ireland
1
2008 Vietnam
1
2008 Italy
1
2009 China
2
2010 Malaysia
22
2011 France
1
2011 Vietnam
15
2012 UK
1
2012 Tanzania
293
2014 Tanzania
25
2014 Turkey
1
2015 Indonesia
120
Year Country

Vessel name

Vessel type

Material Tonnage Length (m) Year built Builder

Owner

Claimed cause

Author assessed cause

Siraly
Apollo Jet
Unknown
Sea Cat
Royal Vancouver
Unknown
Unknown
Procida
The Cat
Flores
Sleipner
Stena Discovery
Universal MK 2006
Voskhod 42
Aeolos Express II
Kobee 5
Dawn Fraser
Sagestra Jet
Pam Burridge
Stena Voyager
Unknown
Giorgione
Kobee
The Venetian
Stena Lynx III
Vina Express
Ettore Morace
Unknown
Unknown Express Boat
Condor Vitesse
Unknown
Condor Rapide
Skagit
Kilimanjaro II
Serkici-Harem Ferry
Marina Baru 2

Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast

Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Steel
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Steel
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
Alum
FRP

Unknown
Hong Kong Macau Hydrofoil
Unknown
Fylkesbaatane I Sogn og
Royal Sealink Express
Unknown
Unknown
Aliscafi SNAV
Bay Ferries
HK/Macau Hydrofoil Co
Hardanger Sunnhordlanske
Stena Line
TurboJet Fast Ferries
Rosrechflot
NEL Lines
Miraejet Co
Sydney Ferries
Rete Ferroviaria.Ital Govt
Sydney Ferries
Stena Lines
Unknown
Siremar Lines
Miraejet Co
CCKC Cotai Jet
Stena Lines
Vina Express Lines
Siremar Lines
Unknown
Unknown
Condor Ferries
Unknown
Condor Ferries
Seagul Transport Company
Azam Marine Company
Istanbul Fast Ferries (IDO)
Unknown

Collision with barge convoy
Control system failure
Collision with sampan
High speed grounding
Collision with BC Ferry
Fast ferry ran over sampan
Collision with sampan
Grounded then capsized
Trawler ran under ferry in fog
Hit wreck at speed
Grounded at high speed
Ferry wash capsized boat
Hit tow cable at speed at night
Collision with barge
Poorly attached mooring bitts
Collision with whale?
Collision with dinghy
Collided with cargo ship
Collision with wooden cruiser
Fire in engine room
Collision with cargo ship
High speed grounding
Collision with whale?
High speed collision
Man overboard
Collision with small boat
Crashed into breakwater
Collision with dredger
Collided with timber barge
Ferry ran down trawler
Junk breakdown, collision.
Person overboard
Bad weather
Nosedived into wave
Car overran loading ramp
Capsized and sank in choppy sea

Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Neglgence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Suicide/Accident
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Suicide/Accident
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy

hydrofoil ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
hydrofoil ferry
catamaran ferry
jetfoil ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
hydrofoil ferry
monohull ferry
jetfoil ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
hydrofoil ferry
hydrofoil ferry
jetfoil ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
hydrofoil ferry
hydrofoil ferry
catamaran ferry
monohull ferry
catamaran ferry
hydrofoil ferry
catamaran ferry
monohull ferry
catamaran ferry
catamaran ferry
monohull ferry

25
345

27
42

1962
1981

275
320

39
40
43

1988
1990

262
5,617
270
260
19,638
850
220
5,364
267
34
392
34
19,638
67
32
306
300
4,113
180
350
300
120
5,007
220
5,000
95
320
5,200
150

43
91
24
42
125
43
40
103
24
41
50
41
127
32
28
28
43
81
35
38
40
34
87
40
87
34
37
88
30

1991
1997
1999
1997

2001
1998
1998
1999
1998
1996
1989
1994
2005
1996

1997
1997
1989
2010
2007

Almaz Shipyard, Russia
Marinteknik, Sweden
Unknown
Kvaerner Fjellstrand, Norway
Kvaerner Fjellstrand,Norway
Unknown
Unknown
Rodriquez Messina, Italy
Incat, Australia
Boeing Corp, USA
Austal Ships, Australia
Aker Finnyards, Finland
FBM Marine,UK/ Philippines
Almaz Shipyard, Russia
Alstom Leroux Naval, France
Kawasaki Zosen, Japan
NQEA, Australia
Rodriquez Messina, Italy
NQEA. Australia
Aker Finnyards, Finland
Almaz Shipyard, Russia
Rodriquez, Messina. Italy
Kawasaki Zosen, Japan
Austal, Australia
Incat, Australia
Almaz Shipyard, Russia
Rodriquez Messina, Italy
Austal Ships, Australia
Local yard, Malaysia
Incat, Australia
Almaz Shipyard, Russia
Incat, Australia
Halter Marine, USA
Richardson Devine Marine.Au
Austal, Australia
Unknown yard
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Appendix F
Digital files available upon request

319

Appendix G
International Maritime Organization Manila Statement on Enhancement of the
Safety of Ships Carrying Passengers on Non-International Voyages (April
2015)
Available to download from
(http://www.imo.org/en/About/Events/Documents/manila%20statement%20un
edited%20advance%20copy%202770415.pdf)

320

Appendix H

List of known fatal conventional monohull Ro-Pax Ferry Accidents 1966-2015 compiled from Appendix A, BMPVA database.
Year Country
1966
1970
1971
1976
1980
1981
1981
1982
1983
1986
1987
1988
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1992
1992
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1997
1997
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

Greece
St Kitts
Italy
USA
Cyprus
Indonesia
Israel
UK
Greece
Philippines
Belgium
Philippines
Denmark
UK
UK
Italy
Italy
Egypt
UK
France
Kenya
Egypt
Denmark
Estonia
Philippines
Philippines
Indonesia
Greece
Greece
China
Philippines
Sweden
Philippines
China
China
Greece
China
Philippines
Italy
Philippines
Kenya
Indonesia
UK
Spain
Turkey
Spain

Deaths
15048
231
233
41
78
1
580
1
6
28
194
193
5
159
1
2
14
143
470
1
1
272
21
1
912
122
54
338
1
1
1
150
1
4
8
3
14
292
237
13
52
1
550
1
6
1
1

Vessel name
Heraklion
Christena
Heleanna
George Prince
Zenobia
Tamponas II
Arion
European Gateway
Chryssi Avgi
Doña Josefina
Herald of Free Enterprise
Doña Conchita
Scandinavian Star
Norrona
Reine Mathilde
Espresso Trapani
Moby Prince
Salem Express
Norsea
Quiberon
Mtongwe One
Al Salam El Saudi El Misr
Falster Link
Estonia
Viva Antipolo VII
Kimelody Cristy
Gurita
Pegasus
Ionian Bridge
Guoron
Princess of the Orient
Prinsesse Ragnhild
Rosalia II
Sea Star 4

Sheng Lu

Superfast 3
Dashun
Asia South Korea
Espresso Catania
Our Lady of Mediatrix
Nyayo
Cahaya Bahari
Fivla
Ciudad de Ceuta
Gurgen 2
Ciudad de Palma

Tonnage Length (m) Year built Builder
8,922

150
48
169
37
178
129
137
133
61
72
132
96
142
132
120
113
131
110
179
129

1949
1968
1954
1937
1979
1971
1965
1975

7,697
5,493
21,794
108
492
196
12,576
12,000

125

1970

157
33
63

1980
1985
1972

151
142

1975
1976

13,614
35,855
2,452
1,026
8,264
28,800
9,843
2,840
14,398
202
568

196
170

1974
1981

11,674
259
10,000
6,139
7,851
4,263
736
991
7,951
1,442
10,513
12,519
5,464
2,719
6,187
4,771
31,785
11,813

230
5,460
4,178
11,513

194
126
150
27
30
101
138

1968
1980
1969
1971
1973
1970
1983
1968
1966
1987
1975

1978
1998
1983
1972
1993
1990
1985
1975
1966
1976

Fairfields (Glasgow), UK
Unknown
A/B Goterverken,Sweden
Unknown yard, USA
Kockums Varv, Sweden
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Jap
Fairfield Govan, UK
Schichau Unterweser,Germ
Unknown
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Jap
Schichau Unterweser,Germ
Ishikawajima Ship, Japan
Dubigeon- Normandie. Fr
Nobiskrug, Germany
Schiffbau Gesellschaft, Ger
Hijos de J Barreras,Spain
Cammell Laird, UK
Const. Nav.et Industr.deMed
Govan Shipbuiders, UK
Werft Nobiskrug, Germany
Unknown yard, Kenya
Ca Na del Terrino e Reuniti
Unknown
Jos L Meyer, Papenburg.Ge
Local yard, Philippines
Kaanawa Dockyard, Japan
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Dubigeon- Normandie SA, F
State Dockyard, Australia
Unknown yard, China
Kurushima Dock, Onishi,Jp
Howaldtswerke Deusche We
Unknown yard, Philippines
Unknown
Unknown yard, China
Kvaerner Masa Yards, Finla
Naikai Shipbuilding, Japan
Unknown yard, Japan
Fincantieri Palermo, Italy
Unknown yard, Japan.
Unknown yard, Germany
Unknown yard, Japan
Ferguson Ailsa, UK
Astilleros Armon Gijon, Spain
Nuovi Cantieri Apuania, Italy
Union Naval de Levante, Esp

Owner

Claimed cause

Author assessed cause

Aegean Steam Navig Typaldos
St Kitts and Nevis Government
Const.S. Efthymiadis
Local government
Rederi AB Nordo
Pelayaran Nasional Indon
Maritime Co of Lesvos
Townsend Thoreson (Monarch SS)
Minoan Flying Dolphins
Carlos A Gothong Lines
Townsend Thoresen
Carlos A Gothong Lines
Scandinavian World Cruises
Smyril Lines Faraeo Islands
Brittany Ferries
CONATIR
NavigazioneArcipeligo Madd
Samatour Shipping Co
P&O European Ferries
B.A.I. S.A.Brittany Ferries
Kenya Ferry Services
Khalid Ali Fouda
F-L Shipping
Estline Marine Co
Viva Antipolo Shipping
Moreta Shipping Lines
Government of Indonesia
Epirotiki Lines
Strinzis Lines
Dalian Marine Corp
Sulpicio Lines
Color Line
Lapu-Lapu Shipping Lines
Unknown
Yantai Ferry Co
Attica Lines
Yanda Ferry Co
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines
Adriatica di Navigazione
Daima Shipping Lines
Kenya Government
Unknown
Shetland Islands Council
Transmediterranea
Unknown
Transmediterranea

Enormous waves
Leaked/Capsizes/sank
Galley fire spread
Collided with cargo ship
Capsized, sank during salvage
Fuel ignited by cigarette butts
Terrorist bomb
Collision with Ro-Pax
Explosion, fire,panic,chaos
Capsized and sank
Bow doors not closed
Firecrackers started fire
Sabotage
Fire in accomodation
Engine room fire
Capsize in calm sea
Too fast, collision with tanker
Hit reef in storm
Lifeboat capsize in drill
Engine room fire
Capsized in sharp turn
Boiler explosion/Fire/Sink
Unknown
Too fast for conditions
Engine room fire
Galley fire/Overloaded
Repairs incomplete
Grounded at speed
Propane gas leak explosio
Hit anchored cargo ship
"Fortuitous event"
Engine room fire
Fire/panic
Sunk in bad weather
Ship caught fire and sank
Fire on vehicle deck
Vehicle cargo unlashed
Ran on rocks in storm
Collision sank cargo ship
Bombs in luggage exploded
Collision dislodged anchor
Stormy weather
Bow visor fell on engineer
Collision in "misty" weather
Electrical short circuit
Smoke inhalation

Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Panic
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Panic
Terrorism
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Sabotage
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Unseaworthy
Unknown
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Terrorism
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
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2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008

Canada
Russia
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Greece
China
Indonesia
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Russia
Philippines
Turkey
Senegal
Azerbaijan
Philippines
China
Greece
Philippines
France
Indonesia
Zambia
Indonesia
Philippines
China
New Zealand
Egypt
Egypt
Bangladesh
Canada
Philippines
France
UK
Vietnam
Japan
Indonesia
Indonesia
Canada
Indonesia
Philippines
Philippines
Ireland
Turkey
Israel
Thailand
Tanzania
Philippines
Turkey
Philippines

2
13
82
1
1
1
36
3
45
2
6
2
11
1,863
58
1
4
1
13
1
50
18
3
180
10
1
4
1,026
10
2
29
1
3
4
1
39
560
1
52
3
100
1
1
2
3
37
862
21
1

Spirit of Vancouver Island
Unknown
Express Samina
Koningen Beatrix
Knossos Palace
Express Aphrodite
Tonghui
Duta Banten
Maria Carmela
Al Salam 90
Sedelnikov
Tacloban Princess
Unknown
Le Joola
Mercury II
Filipina Princess
Liaoludu 7
Blue Star Paros
Superferry 12
Danielle Casanova
Wimala Dharma
Unknown
Mandiri Nusantara
Superferry 14
Unknown
Santa Regina
Pride of Al Salam 95
Al Salam Boccaccio 98
Unknown
Queen of the North
Filipina Princess
Paglia Orba
Pride of Bilbao
An Binh 100
Unknown
Tristra 1
Senopati Nusantara
Quinsam
Levina 1
Butuan Bay
Blue Water Princess
Dublin Viking
Ankara
Salamis Glory
Jern Jern
Unknown
Princess of the Stars
Hayat-N
Filipina Princess

18,747

1994

4,555
31,910
37,000
11,690

115
162
129

1966
1986
2001
1977

680
6,909

55
131

1971

3,079
2,087
3,950
13,700
1,324
10,438
11,914
41,447

1970
80

1990

170

1973

124
173
176

2002
1984
2002

8,257
10,181

156

1981

14,588
15,503
11,779

137
139
131

1985
1972
1970

8,889
13,705
29,718
37,500

125
170
166
177

1969
1973
1994
1986

2,718
1,459
1,800
3,864
492

95
87

1969
1982
1981
1989
1969
1997
1983
1982

10,870
10,392

115
60
151
20

23,842

193

1984

13,700

170

1973

Allied Shipbuilders/Yarrows, C
Unknown yard, Russia
Ch. De l'Atlantique, France
Van der Giessen de Noord, N
Fincantieri, Italy
Aalborg Vaerft,Denmark
Unknown yard, China
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Unknown yard, Japan?
Cant. Nav.del Tirreno, Italy
Unknown yard, Russia
Fukuoka Shipbuiding, Japan
Unknown yard, Turkey
Germersheim Schiffswerft
Unknown yard, USSR
Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan
Unknown
Daewoo Shipbuilding, S.Korea
Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan
Fincantieri, Italy
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Unknown yard, Zambia
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Hayashikane,Shimonoseki
Unknown yard, China
Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre
IHC 'Gusto' Schiedam,Neth
Italcantieri Monfalcone, Italy
Unknown yard, Bangladesh
Weser Seebeck,Bremerhav
Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan
ACH Construction Navale, Fr
Wartsila Perno, Finland
Vinashin, Vietnam
Unknown yard, Japan
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Taguma Shipbuilding,Japan
Vancouver Shipyards, Canada
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Iwagi Zosen, Japan
Unknown yard, Philippines
Unknown
Unknown yard, Turkey
Uljanik Shipyard, Croatia
Unknown yard, Thailand
Unknown yard
Ishikawajima-Harima,Aioi,Jp
Unknown yard, Turkey
Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan

BC Ferries
Unknown
Minoan Flying Dolphins
Stena Line
Minoan Flying Dolphins
Minoan Flying Dolphins
Unknown
PT ASDP Govt Co
Montenegro Shipping Lines
Al Salam Maritime Transport
Unknown
Sulpicio Lines
Unknown
Senegal Government
Caspian Shipping Co
Sulpicio Lines
Unknown
Blue Star Lines
WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz
SNCM
Unknown
Unknown
Prima Vista
WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz
Unknown
Straits Shipping(Bluebridge)
Al Salam Maritime Transport
Al Salam Maritime Transport
Roads & Highways Department
BC Ferries
Sulpicio Lines
SNCM
Irish Continental Group
An Binh Ferry Co
Unknown
Unknown
Prima Vista
BC Ferries
Praga Jaya Sentosa
Carlos A Gothong Lines
Sulpicio Lines
Norfolk Line
Denizciler Turizm Denizcilik
Salamis Tours Holdings
Jern Jern Co
Unknown
Sulpicio Lines
Marmara N Denizcilik Ferry
Sulpicio Lines

Launch turned in front of ferry
Bus rolled off ferry
Officers not on bridge
Man overboard
Crewman overboard
Mooring line in propeller
LNG truck cargo exploded
Crew ignored car roll back
Fire on vehicle deck
Short circuit in baggage
Collision with barge
Air tank explosion/Fire
Sank
Gross overloading
Cargo shift/Badly loaded
Passenger murdered crew
Pax died of hypothermia
Man overboard in rough sea
Collision with San Nicolas
Berthing ship rammed
Sank rapidly in calm seas
Boarding truck capsized ferry
Collision with cargo ship
Terrorism/ Abu Sayeff
Sank soon after leaving berth
Collision with small boat
Rammed by cargo ship
Fire broke out below deck
Vehicular river ferry sank
Inadequate bridge management
Lost control in storm
Car bumped overboard
Collision with yacht ignored
Loading error
Towed ferry capsized in typhoon
"Slammed by giant wave"
Bad weather/Storm
Ferry departed/no warning
Truck fire below deck
Possible terrorism
Cargo shift in face of typhoon
Mooring line snapped
Mooring line snapped
Collided with anchored ship
Cargo shift/Overloaded
Overloaded barge sank
Went to sea in typhoon
Cargo shift
Ramp fell on welder

Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Suicide/Accident
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Negligence
Murder
Human error/Unseaworthy
Suicide/Accident
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
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2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2016
2016
2016
2017
2017
1966
1968
1991
1993
1999

Netherlands
Malaysia
Indonesia
Tonga
Philippines
Philippines
UK
Italy
Indonesia
Sweden
Philippines
Egypt
Tanzania
Norway
Indonesia
Albania
Jordan
Philippines
China
Indonesia
Canada
Philippines
Iran
Philippines
Indonesia
Gambia
South Korea
Philippines
Italy
Cape Verde
Myanmar
Greece
Japan
Indonesia
Indonesia
Italy
Philippines
Indonesia
Indonesia
Denmark
New Zealand
Denmark
Germany
New Zealand

1
20
5
78
72
53
1
2
33
1
1
22
2,976
2
8
8
1
1
12
16
1
9
12
241
3
5
304
8
32
22
263
1
1
20
35
3
19
33
4
1
51
1
55
1

Pride of Rotterdam
Ibn Battuta
Mandiri Nusantara
Princess Ashika
SuperFerry 9
Baleno 9
Scottish Viking
Moby Line
Laut Teduh 2
Silja Festival
Trisha Kerstin
Unknown
Spice Islander 1
Nordlys
Kirana IX
Ankara/Reina 1
Pella
Superferry 3
Unknown
Bahuga Jaya
Quinsam
Lady of Mount Carmel
Unknown
St Thomas of Aquinas
Munuwar
Banjul-Barra ferry
Sewol
Maharlika II
Norman Atlantic
Vicente
Aung Tagun 3
Highspeed 5
Sunflower Daisetsu
Wihan Sejahtera
Rafelia 2
Sansovino
Starlite Atlantic
Mutiara Sentosa I
Wiraglory
Skagerak
Wahine
Dronning Margrethe II
Jan Heweliusz
Arahura

59,925
8,257
690
7,269
199
26,904

215

2000

51
142

1972
1986
1984
2009

186

33,818
380

75
168
45

1985

836
11,204

60
122

1967
1994

10,870
10,675
9,857

127
148

1983
1983
1971

1,459
98

87
30

1982
1980

11,408

139

1973

6,825

105

1994

26,904
3,100

186
57
30
85
190
120
65
123
72
135
94
88
150
140
126
148

2009
1965

4,900
11,401
9,786
999
10,977
1,497
12,365
1658
2,726
8,948
10,850
3,015
13,621

2005
2001
1985
1994
1989
1975
1988
2013
1965
1966
1973
1977
1982

Fincantieri, Italy
Unknown
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Shikoku Dockyard, Japan
Usuki Tekkosho,Saiki, Japan
Unknown yard, Philippines
Visentini di Visentini, Italy
Fincantieri, Italy
Germany
Wartsila Helsinki, Finland
Unknown yard, Philippines
Unknown yard, Egypt
Unknown yard, Greece
Volkswerft, Germany
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Stocznia Szczecinska, Pol
Unknown yard, Europe
Hayashikane Dockyard,Japan
Unknown yard, China
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Vancouver Shipyards
Unknown yard, Japan
Unknown yard, Iran
Onomichi Dockyard,Japan
Unknown yard, Indonesia
Unknown yard, Europe
Hayashikane Dockyard,Japan
Unknown yard, Philippines
Cantiere Navale Visentini, It
Brodosplit, Croatia.
Unknown yard, Myanmar
Austal, Australia
Ishikawajima Harima Ind, Jap
Fukuoka Shipbuilding, Japan
Sanuki Shipbuilding, Japan
Fincantieri, Italy
Wakamatsu Shipbuilding,Jap
Mitsubishi Jukogoyo, Japan
Unknown yard.
Aalborg Vaerft,Denmark
Fairfields (Glasgow),UK
Nakskov Skibsvaerft, Denmark
Trosvik Versted, Brevik. No
Aalborg Vaerft, Denmark

P&O North Sea Ferries
Unknown
Prima Vista
Shipping Corp of Polynesia
WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz
Besta Shipping Lines
Scandlines
Moby Lines
ROS Indopratama
Tallink Group
Aeson Shipping Lines
Unknown
Makame Hasnuu
Troms Fylkes/Hurtgruten
Unknown
Denizciler Turizm Denizcilik
Arab Bridge Maritime Co
WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz
Unknown
Unknown
BC Ferries
Medallion Transport
Unknown
2GO, formerly Negros Navig
Unknown
Gambia Ports Authority
Chonghaejin Marine
Unknown
ANEK Visenti Group
Tuninha Maritimo
Unknown
Hellenic Seaways/MinoanFD
MOL Ferry Co
Trimitri Samudra, Surabaja
Darma Bahari Utawa
Siremar
Starlite Ferries
Unknown
Unknown
Kristiansands Dampskips
Union S.S.Co. NZ
DSB Rederi
Polish Ocean Lines
Tranz Rail

Suicide/Accident??
Unknown
Engine room fire
Capsized/Sank swiftly
Vehicle shift on car deck
Water through bow ramp
Collision with fishing boat
Ship lurched from ramp
Cigarette on car deck
Drunk/Suicide?
Person overboard
Bus rolled off deck
Engine failed/Overcrowded
Engine room fire
Truck fire/Panic
Ferry, cargo ship collided
Fire in luggage store
Ferry rammed trawler
Ferry sank
Collision with gas tanker
Car drove off ramp
Engine failure.Weather
Vehicle ferry capsized
Collision with cargo ship
Leaking,sank
Ship moved before loading
Capsized in sharp turn
Engine failed in storm
Car deck fire
Sank in heavy weather
Overloaded unstable boat sank
Electrical fire
Truck fire on cargo deck
Grounded, capsized, sank
Leaked, capsized in calm sea
Crew gassed while tank cleaning
Capsized and sank in typhoon
Fire broke out on car deck
Passenger went berserk
Capsized, sank in heavy sea
Navigation error in bad storm
Collision
Bad weather/Force 12
Premature release of pin

Suicide/Accident
Unknown
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Suicide/Accident
Suicide/Accident
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Panic
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Poor lookout
Suicide/Accident
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Overloaded
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Negligence
Accident/Suicide
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Poor seamanship
Human error/Poor lookout
Human error/Unseaworthy
Human error/Negligence
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Literature Review
Neil Baird, ANCORS – February 2018
All references cited are described in detail in the Bibliography.
Since the mid-nineteenth century numerous enquiries and studies have
looked into the reasons why maritime accidents continue to occur with such
frequency and deadliness. In Britain, Samuel Plimsoll was the most noted and
most successful of the early campaigners for improvements in maritime
safety.
Plimsoll‟s campaigns are well described in The Plimsoll Sensation, Jones, N.
2006. Plimsoll, a product of the Enlightenment, in an effort to improve safety
at sea, lobbied for controls on loading of ships. Thus the Load Line or Plimsoll
Line was compulsorily introduced in Britain. It soon became universal and is
still in use today.
Thirty years later, the „Titanic‟ disaster was quickly followed by what was, until
then, the most intensive legal inquiry into an accident, (Eaton, J. & Harris, C.
1987). That led, ultimately, to the international Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
convention that specified minimum standards for life saving equipment that
had to be carried by ships. SOLAS has been continually updated since and is
effectively the foundation of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
These, obviously, were British initiatives, which is unsurprising as Britain was
then the world‟s leading maritime nation. The British moves were soon
followed in other developed countries in Europe, North America and
Australasia.

Compiling the data – the problem of excessive North Atlantic
focus
This is undoubtedly why so much of the literature, until very recently, has
been British-centric or, at least, north Atlantic in focus. The result of that focus
is that very little useful material has been produced to record and describe the
many accidents and deaths that have occurred in the poor and hot tropical
regions that are the major focus of this thesis. Very notably, SOLAS barely, if
at all, applies in poorer countries. The excuse for this lack of application is that
SOLAS only applies to international voyages. It does not apply to domestic
voyages and IMO is loathe to: “interfere in the internal affairs of its sovereign
member states” and, indeed, is legally precluded from doing so.
Some useful directories of passenger vessel accidents have been compiled,
mainly in the United Kingdom. They have been very much focused on the
north Atlantic region although some of the major disasters in Asia are listed.
Books such as Sea Disasters – The Truth Behind the Tragedies, by Keith
Eastlake; A Dictionary of Passenger Ship Disasters, by David L Williams;
Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987; and Maritime Casualties 1963-1996,

324

both by Norman Hooke, have provided useful information about most of the
major disasters that have occurred until 1996. There have been no similar
compendia published since and the lists presented on the Web, such as by
Wikipedia, are far from comprehensive. However, Google has generally
proved to be by far the best source of information about maritime and other
transport disasters including road, rail and aviation. Google derived
information has very effectively supplemented the directories mentioned
above and the, often brief, news reports used by the author in compiling the
Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database (Appendix A).
The major commercial databases including the Lloyd‟s Casualty Reports,
IUMI, and IHS Fairplay proved to be useful but are also far from
comprehensive. They are restricted as to vessel size and, to a degree,
geographically. The International Maritime Organization‟s GISIS database
provided no information that was unattainable elsewhere. Indeed, it was
disappointingly deficient overall. Similarly, a thorough search of all the many
databases available through the University of Wollongong Library failed to
uncover any additional data. The two most comprehensive and useful
databases of passenger vessel accidents by far have proved to be the
BMPVA database and that of the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is very little general interest in developing
country transport accidents evinced by the media and academia in developed
countries.
Interestingly, and very significantly, the prestigious Oxford Encyclopedia of
Maritime History, (2007) comprising vignettes contributed by many of the
world‟s leading academic maritime historians, fails to mention any fatal
passenger vessel accidents beyond the Titanic and three Ro-Pax accidents
that occurred in the North and Baltic seas in the nineteen-eighties and
nineties. From reading it, you would think that the countries where 96 per cent
of ferry fatalities occur never experience such accidents. It is a very
disappointing publication in many respects.

Cruise sector over-represented in literature
Numerous „popular‟ books have been published that describe the dangers of
cruise ship travel, for example, Mark Gaouette‟s Cruising for Trouble, and
Brian Bruns‟ Cruise Confidential. However, as the author‟s BMPVA database
makes clear, the reality is that cruise lines are very safe. The author, after
completing and thoroughly analysing his database, significantly changed his
mind about the dangers of cruising. Ferries are, and always have been, where
the real dangers lie. At least 91% of passenger vessel accidents have
involved ferries as have 95% of the resulting fatalities. Domestic voyages
accounted for 93% of those ferry accidents.
The cruise sector has been the subject of incomparably more literary efforts
than has the ferry sector. Cruise ships tend to be larger and more glamorous
than ferries and their passengers generally much wealthier.

325

There are, considering the number of fatalities involved, very few books
available on the specific subject of fatal ferry accidents. The author has had to
rely much more on press reports, press releases, inquiry reports and
conference papers from which to compile both data and comment. They, too,
have been disappointingly scarce, particularly until use of the Internet became
widespread around the year 2000. Fortunately, the aviation, tanker and bulk
shipping, railway and road traffic sectors have compiled considerable amounts
of safety data and published widely on that basis. This has provided many
useful comparisons and ideas that are applicable to the passenger vessel
safety problem. The aviation industry and its IMO counterpart, ICAO have
proved to be particularly useful sources of ideas and comparable data.
It has become obvious, too, that some Marine Boards of Inquiry and similar
tribunals are structured to search more for a scapegoat than for a cure that
might prevent future similar accidents. As Joseph Conrad stated in his novel
Lord Jim (1902), MBOIs are far more interested in “the how than the why” of
accidents. In poorer countries they are unlikely to report at all and, when they
do, rarely have an objective of prevention of future occurrences. In a rather
„half-hearted‟ way, IMO claims to encourage member nations to enquire into
and report on serious maritime accidents but most continue to fail to do so as
a search of IMO‟s GISIS database reveals.

Scarce and scapegoat seeking MBOI reports
Even in developed countries evidence and “expert” witnesses seem to be
more focused on technical than behavioural analysis. A blatant example of
that was the inquiry into the Estonia sinking in 1994, Bjorkman (1998) and
Eastlake (1998). Interestingly, Bjorkman‟s analytical abilities and objectivity
have been found wanting following the capsize and sinking of the Al Salam
Boccaccio 98 with which he was involved professionally.
Transnational inquiries are inevitably subject to conflicts of interest in that it is
easier to lay blame on foreigners than locals. Despite their many and obvious
inadequacies, it is probably still preferable to have some form of inquiry
whereby evidence is recorded and publicised than to not have them at all.
Unfortunately, in the poorer, hotter regions where most of accidents described
in this thesis occur, few inquiries are actually made. When they are, they tend
to be perfunctory and rarely publicised or even adequately documented.
There have, however, been examples of truly thorough inquiries that have
been recorded in developed countries where all factors in an accident have
been purely local. The outstanding example of that is the United Kingdom
inquiry Marchioness/Bowbelle: Formal Investigation under the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995, Clarke (2001). It provides an excellent model for Marine
Boards of Inquiry everywhere but, unfortunately, would be far too expensive to
be feasible except in the richest countries.
An exception to that general experience was the exceptionally thorough and
very revealing Commission of Inquiry into the sinking of the Rabaul Queen.
The report of that inquiry, which was commissioned by the Government of
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Papua New Guinea, was concise, simply and clearly put and devastating to
the culprits. At the time of writing, they were being tried for various crimes
including manslaughter, corruption and negligence.
The British inquiry into the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize and the South
Korean inquiry into that of the Sewol were also impressively thorough,
comprehensive, fair, informative and educational.
Until the use of the Internet became widespread during the first decade of the
twenty-first century, very few fatal marine accidents that occurred in less
developed regions were even recorded in the outside world. Despite this, the
Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database (Appendix A) shows that
80% of the fatalities arising from those accidents occurred in just 10 countries
and 90% in twenty countries. Sixty per cent of them occurred in just five
countries! However, Marine Boards of Inquiry and their transcripts or reports
describing such accidents have been extremely scarce.
Hence, the BMPVA database (Appendix A) that provides the data and
statistics upon which this thesis is based, contains details of far fewer
accidents and their resulting fatalities (179) in the 35 years prior to 2000 than
in the 15 years since (573). Indeed, by searching all the known databases
available in books such as Great Ship Disasters, Bonner, C & K. 2003 and
Maritime Casualties 1963 – 1996, Hooke, N. 1997; the Lloyd‟s List Casualty
Reports; and on the Internet such as www.maritimedata.com ,
www.ferrysafety.org , and www.eurotestmobility.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Chronology-FINAL.pdf, there still is a paucity of
information about accidents in the less-developed regions of the world. The
author estimates that ferry accidents and fatalities are under-reported by at
least 33 per cent.
This scarcity of accident data was remarked upon by Ralph Nader in his
important and influential book Unsafe At Any Speed in the context of road
accidents. That book was first published in 1965. As a result, in developed
countries at least, there is now, if anything, a surfeit of road accident data.
Boisson (1999) made similar comments about maritime accidents but they
have, so far, failed to lead to the same improvements experienced with
developed country road accident data.
Disappointingly, the International Maritime Organisation‟s GISIS database of
shipping accidents is compiled by the individual sovereign state members of
IMO. Most of those, particularly those with the worst maritime safety records,
have been particularly dilatory in their approach to that task. Indeed, for the
purposes of this thesis, the GISIS database is practically useless.
Careful statistical analysis of the data that does exist, however, has been very
revealing. For example the disproportionate 32% of fatalities that have arisen
from accidents involving Ro-Pax ferries revealed in the BMPVA data. That is a
devastating reality that needs to be immediately addressed by IMO.
Encouragingly and importantly, that same data highlights the significantly
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better safety record of modern catamaran and trimaran ferries, except for
bancas.

Scarce pre-2000 data
This, obviously, makes the compilation and analysis of statistics covering the
period prior to 31 December 1999 comparatively difficult. International news
agencies such as Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Reuters, the
BBC, CNN, Bloomberg and similar possess good archives but often fail to
record accidents in out-of-the-way places. They, too, presumably thanks to
the Internet, have widened and improved their coverage more recently. Also,
the fact that 90 per cent of fatalities have occurred in twenty countries enables
the attempts at a cure to be more economically and practically confined to just
those countries. For the purpose of effective reform, the more comprehensive
and accurate data that has been compiled since 2000 is quite sufficient.
As can be seen from Appendix A, the author‟s BMPVA database, many of the
reports have been gleaned from many local newspapers in the places where
accidents occurred as well as from the home-town media of tourist victims and
a variety of web news sites. Something of a “jig-saw” process then ensues in
an endeavour to verify the content of those reports.
It is difficult to believe, therefore, that the frequency and deadliness of
passenger vessel accidents has increased so dramatically since the year
2000. It can only be concluded that their approximate seven-fold increase is
due to better reporting facilitated by the widespread use of the Internet. This
has also been enhanced by the development of “open access” databases
although those, of course, need to be separately verified where possible. They
are, in any case, far from comprehensive. This phenomenon has been
commented on by Girija Shetter in an article in IHS-Fairplay on 1 December
2015 under the heading “EU maritime casualty rise „due to improved
reporting‟.
Newspaper and magazine reports are equally in need of independent
verification but that is often impossible. A reasonable judgement of the
veracity of such reports can usually be made based on the reputation of the
publication concerned and by comparing them with reports in competing
outlets. Sometimes, though, there are no other options. The BMPVA database
has been made available in its entirety to many people in the ferry industry
who have expressed an interest in its content. None have suggested any
corrections.
The case studies presented in Chapter 3 have required in-depth research
through reference to existing files of newspaper and Internet clippings; a
number of printed databases; MBOI reports, where available; and, extensive
Google searching. It was a most interesting and illuminating process that
revealed some impressive surprises such as the report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the sinking of the Rabaul Queen, mentioned above.
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Given recent improvements in safety consciousness, enforcement, search
and rescue services and survivability, it seems probable that rather than the
frequency and deadliness of accidents increasing over the last 15 years, that
they may have declined slightly. On the data available, that is probably so but
it appears that because of inadequate reporting the frequency of fatal
accidents prior to 31 December 1999 may have been considerably worse.
Numerous pamphlets, monographs, essays and journal and magazine articles
have been published on all aspects of the subject. Some, such as
Hetherington (2006), Weng (2015) and Low (2006) are cited in the thesis.
Those on behavioural and cultural causes have been constructive and,
generally, more relevant than those on structural or mechanical causes. Some
very constructive recent books by Boisson (1999), Grech (2015), Trafford
(2009), Talley (2008), Chauvel (1997), Kletz (2007) and Whittingham (2004)
have been very helpful on human factors in accidents.
One of the most comprehensive, positive and useful government reports on
the subject of human element factors in shipping accidents was published by
the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency in 2010. It is The Human Element –
A Guide to Human Behaviour in the Shipping Industry.
The scarcity of doctoral and masters theses on the general subject was both
notable and disappointing. A wide search of databases such as Google,
SCOPUS, Research Gate, Science Direct, World Maritime University, Royal
Institution of Naval Architects, Society of Naval Architects and Marine
Engineers, Elsevier and the University of Wollongong Library generally failed
to find anything of consequence under the various .key words. applicable to
this thesis that has not been cited in it.
Those works that were uncovered are appropriately cited. An exception was a
series of papers produced by students and academics associated with the
School of Naval Architecture at the University of Strathclyde in the early to
mid-1990s. They mostly seemed prejudiced towards maintaining the status
quo with respect to North European Ro-Pax ferries following the Estonia and
similar preceding disasters. In this writer‟s opinion, many of those took an
unprofessional approach that verged on the unethical. There was little to be
found concerning accidents in developing countries.
What has been discovered from this work, though, is that this project is very
multidisciplinary. It incorporates aspects of psychology, sociology, economics,
ergonomics, education, political science, law, naval architecture, meteorology,
demographics, geography, and history.

Badly behaved ship owners
The behaviour of shipowners, some of whom have been responsible for
numerous fatal accidents, has come under close scrutiny in newspaper
articles such as Ferry disaster is 5th tragedy for Philippine firm
www.inquirer.net, (2013). Indeed, the Go family, the subject of that article, has
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seen more than 6,000 of its customers die in accidents that befell its ships
over a twenty year period.
Other owners such as the Carnival Corporation and Royal Caribbean Cruise
Lines which, between them, control more than 60% of the world‟s cruise ship
tonnage, have been the subject of numerous books that describe their many
failings. Bruns (2008) and Butcher (2006) are typical examples of the genre.
However, to be fair, those companies carry hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of passengers annually and, while some may be inconvenienced by
accidents, very few have died. Of those, most deaths could be construed as
self-inflicted due to drunkenness or suicide. More deaths have occurred
among their crews than their passengers. Again, the main cause appears to
be suicide. That is a separate subject.

Useful literature on human factors
Some very useful texts have been published recently on human factors in
maritime accidents. Grech et al (2008) is a fine example as is Talley (2008).
Reference to the aviation industry as a good model for improvement and
benchmarking is made extensively in The Nautical Institute‟s Human
Performance and Limitation for Mariners (2015).
More recently, the Nautical Institute published Navigation Accidents and Their
Causes which strongly supports the thesis that most maritime accidents are
caused by human error. With its brief case studies or vignettes, it illustrates
clearly how such accidents occur. More positively, the book makes numerous
suggestions as to how such human errors might be avoided.
While little has been published on fatal ferry accidents in developing countries
generally, even less has been published on their human error causes. IMO
has published some brief, un-researched statements of concern, or even
alarm, and researchers such as Bhattacharya, Y. (2015) have looked at the
difficulty in trying to instil a safety culture in Indian ships officers. Two studies
of similar problems in Taiwan by Lu, C. S. et al are interesting but Taiwan
could now hardly be described as „developing‟.
Anne Ala-Pollanen, in 2014 in Helsinki, studied Cultural factors in maritime
accidents, but her findings were more to do with gender acculturation than
culture in the sense discussed here. Norwegian researchers Rumawax, V.
and Ashjornslett, B. E., did refer to the specific problems of human error in
ferry accidents in developing countries in their paper on Survivability of ships
at sea. Their paper is, unfortunately, too dependent on mathematical
modelling to be related to reality. Spouge, J. R. in his 1991 paper Passenger
ferry safety in the Philippines came closest to the author‟s thesis. His
comment: “However, the most important underlying cause of the (Philippine
ferry) accident record is poverty and therefore the most effective solution is
not naval architectural but lies in economic and political development”, was
prescient, particularly almost thirty years ago. The problems of poverty
induced malnutrition and its resulting fatalism and carelessness are,
regrettably, still with us. So too are the fundamentally unsafe bancas and
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elderly monohull Ro-Pax ferries that are still widely used in the Philippines,
Indonesia and parts of Africa.
The problems of poverty and the “failed state” have been widely canvassed.
One positive report and commentary was written by Pryke (2017). It described
the remarkable success of the Regional assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands.
Apart from a handful of conference papers and monographs such as those by
Golden (2014) and Ballantyne (2013), and various editorials and articles
published by the author and Michael Grey MBE over the years, little has been
presented describing the extent of the problem in developing countries. This
deficiency will, hopefully, be corrected, at least partially, with this thesis.

Government failure
The related problem of lack of local, national and international government
action in poorer countries has been confirmed and well described by Boisson
in his important and very useful Safety at Sea; Policies, Regulations &
International Law which explains well the inadequacies of the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO). He even makes some worthwhile suggestions
as to how those inadequacies might be remedied .
Poorer country governments generally have “bigger fish to fry” than to be able
to worry about ferry safety. Without widespread pressure from outside, they
are unlikely to respond to the problem unless their tourism industry is
threatened.

The excellent aviation model
Comparisons with other passenger carrying sectors, particularly aviation and
road transport (as described in Chapter 4) have made very interesting
reading. The lack of positive action on the part of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) contrasts strikingly with the very effective and ongoing
industry reform efforts of its United Nations sister body, the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and its European counterpart, the European
Maritime Safety Authority (EMSA). While IMO states that it, “Cannot interfere
in the internal affairs of sovereign member states”, ICAO does so actively and
positively on the basis that “no country is left behind” in the matter of air
safety. So too does EMSA. The web sites of the three bodies, www.imo.org,
www.emsa.europa.eu and www.icao.int, make for fascinating and very
revealing reading. ICAO provides an excellent model as to how IMO could be
reformed and so made significantly more effective. The IMO‟s GISIS accident
database is disgracefully deficient. The reasons for that deficiency are even
more disgraceful as the author‟s correspondence with IMO makes clear.
The ICAO website offers a very extensive and comprehensive overview of
how that organisation implements and encourages the adoption of
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developments aimed at improving aviation safety. It also „names and shames‟,
in a positive way, the countries where aviation safety is inadequate.

Successful behavioural improvement campaign models
Most developed countries have made very strenuous efforts to reduce the
number of road accidents and the resulting fatalities that occur in their
jurisdictions. Lengthy and costly public awareness campaigns have been
combined with rigorous enforcement and stiff penalties in an endeavour to
improve driver behaviour. These very successful campaigns are well
described on most countries‟ road safety authority websites. Most contain
numerous examples of activities that could well be adapted to passenger
vessels. For example, the Australian state of Victoria has met with
considerable success, see www.vicroads.vic.gov.au and
www.towardszero.vic.gov.au.
There have been similarly effective campaigns directed towards improving
occupational health and safety in most developed countries. The literature
generally disseminated as part of such campaigns is an excellent source of
ideas. Some of the anti-smoking campaigns, too, have ideas that could well
be transferred to passenger vessel safety campaigns. So also could the
various „Learn to Swim‟ campaigns that have been conducted in Australia and
elsewhere. Even IMO contributed very effectively to a global campaign to
improve oil tanker safety. That, however, had environmental rather than
human safety origins.
The psychology profession has done extensive work on this aspect of public
safety. It is very well described in Vera, E. M. et al. The Oxford Handbook of
Prevention in Counseling Psychology.

Starting with the ten worst performing countries
Chapter five examines the ten worst performing countries in terms of ferry
fatalities. While there are some signs of hope, little improvement has yet been
achieved. Research into other causes of premature death in those countries
offers some cause for optimism.
A public health improvement campaign that was very effective in Bangladesh
is well described in The Lancet and in an Irin News report. It described the
forty per cent improvement in Bagladeshi life expectancy that was achieved in
the thirty years from 1980. It offers some hope in the form of techniques that
could be adopted in the quest for improvements in ferry safety. Similarly, the
success of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands,
described by Pryke (2017), offers hope for reform of so-called „failed states‟.
Much the same applies to suggestions for reducing the frequency and
deadliness of accidents in poorer countries. Other than the quite rational
suggestion of „teach „em to swim‟ very few practical and affordable
suggestions have been noticed. Perhaps the now widespread use of the
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Internet will better highlight the deficiencies of some owners and operators
and their national governments and, so, encourage better behaviour.
Travel guides are media where more could be done to warn tourists of the
dangers of ferry travel in certain countries. It has been interesting to compare
and contrast the 2015 Lonely Planet Guide to the Philippines with the website
www.tripadvisor.com and its advice to travellers in Tanzania. The Lonely
Planet guide includes two warnings about the dangers of Philippine ferry
travel while Trip Advisor totally ignores the very real dangers of Tanzanian
ferries. It prefers to discuss the schedule reliability of various ferry services in
that country.
However, most developed country governments maintain websites offering
travel warnings to those of their citizens who may be travelling overseas.
Those of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the United States have
been reviewed. The information proffered is all fairly similar and the warnings
starker than those contained in most commercial travel guides. They uniformly
contain warnings about marine travel in the countries where the majority of the
passenger vessel fatalities have occurred.
Similarly, local media could be persuaded to expose the dangers of ferry
travel to their readers. Such public education could, if maintained
permanently, have a significant effect in warning domestic travellers of the
dangers of ferry travel. Media pressure has been effective in achieving
reforms in developed countries.
In Chapter 5, statistics drawn from the World Bank, OECD, UNODP,
Transparency International, Infoplease, and other sources have been widely
drawn on to provide the economic, geographic, cultural and behavioural
backgrounds to the study of the five worst nations for passenger vessel
fatalities. Maps provided by the University of Texas proved to be very useful in
that regard. A number of papers published in academic journals have been
useful in compiling Chapter 5. They cover ferry accidents in Bangladesh,
Indonesia and Tanzania. They offer some locally compiled statistics as well as
some well thought out ideas for improvements in marine safety.

The all-important human factors
Chapters 5, 7 and 8 inspired the perusal of the LinkedIn website to determine
the availability of human factors or human error consultants or managers. It
seems there are thousands of them. Every known airline and most railways,
major mining and oil and gas companies as well as manufacturers and
governments employ or, at least, consult them. As do the largest developed
country cruise and ferry owning companies.
The author has contacted many of them and has made contact with the
Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors (www.ergonomics.org.uk)
, the CEO of which has been particularly helpful. Indeed, the author has
produced a paper that was published in the Institute‟s monthly magazine. It
has become obvious that much more extensive use of such experts should be
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made by ferry operators and regulators. They have undeniably contributed
much to improvements in aviation, road, rail and industrial safety.
There are, of course, many books on human factors or human error of which
some are mentioned above or listed in the bibliography and cited through the
thesis. However, the existence of so many experts who are focused on the
subject in their daily work proves that such expertise has been very beneficial
to travel safety. Increasingly, there are manufacturers and suppliers of marine
safety equipment who distribute brochures and press releases that offer ideas
and solutions. The same applies to „Human Factors‟ consultants. Many
government bodies also distribute press releases, brochures and pamphlets
to encourage various aspects of safety consciousness.
IMO, too, publishes considerably in an effort to encourage maritime safety but,
alas, it rarely seems to be read or noticed by those who could most benefit
from it. Its database of passenger vessel accidents (GISIS) is wholly
inadequate, particularly with respect to those accidents occurring in
developing countries. It also fails to take any obviously serious interest in the
problem of domestic ferry safety in poorer countries. It falls back on the
excuse that it is “unable to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign member
nations”. Strictly legally, that claim is correct but given its published mandate,
it is exceedingly disappointing that IMO has been unable to imagine ways in
which it could work with its poorer member nations to assist them to improve
the safety of their domestic ferries.
No doubt more information will be uncovered as a result of further and more
intensive reading but this is a broad overview of the literature examined over
the three years of this project.
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